Este trabalho tem como objetivo traçar um perfil da evolução das pesquisas sobre decisão judicial. Foi dada certa ênfase àquelas teorias e modelos influenciados pela teoria da decisão proposta pelo Realismo Jurídico Americano, ou seja, teorias e modelos que consideram fatores extrajurídicos que influenciam a decisão judicial e/ou que consideram que juízes decidem os casos primeiro com sua intuição, para somente depois racionalizar e fundamentar a decisão com argumentos jurídicos. O trabalho, em primeiro lugar, busca detalhar o pensamento realista, em seus aspectos históricos - como reação a formalismos existentes até então - e em seus aspectos teóricos - propondo (i.) uma teoria do direito; (ii.) instrumentalismo jurídico; e, especialmente (iii.) uma teoria da decisão judicial. Após a retomada do pensamento realista, o trabalho debate três modelos (ou teorias) modernos da decisão judicial: o modelo atitudinal, o modelo estratégico e o modelo psicológico. Posteriormente, e como último capítulo teórico, o trabalho aborda as novas possibilidades de estudo do comportamento judicial, especialmente trabalhos e experiências que utilizam a tecnologia e modelos computadorizados e algoritmos para a previsão de decisões. Alguns modelos computacionais serão examinados bem como alguns aspectos sobre base de dados e dados estruturados e não estruturados no direito, além de experiências com Mercados de Previsão e com a \"Sabedoria das Multidões\". Após toda as abordagens teóricas, o trabalho adentra em um capítulo prático e empírico, sobre o estudo da decisão judicial no Brasil. Foram analisados alguns elementos de todas as dissertações e teses de mestrado e doutorado em direito defendidas nos anos de 2011 a 2014, para que se pudesse entender como a matéria do comportamento judicial é abordada na academia jurídica brasileira. Conclui-se, com os dados, que a pesquisa sobre decisão judicial no Brasil ainda é incipiente, predominantemente normativa e quase nada se debate a respeito de teorias ou modelos descritivos ou preditivos, tais quais as que foram examinadas nos capítulos anteriores. / This dissertation aims to study the evolution of research on judicial decision. Special emphasis was placed on those theories and models influenced by the decision theory proposed by the American Legal Realism, which means those theories and models that consider extralegal factors that influence the judicial decision and/or theories and models that believe that judges decide cases first with their intuition, to only then rationalize and justify the decision using legal arguments. The dissertation first aims to break down the legal realist thought into two aspects: into its historical aspects, as being a reaction to existing formalisms, and into its theoretical aspects - as proposing (i.) a theory of law; (ii.) legal instrumentalism; and, finally (iii.) a theory of adjudication. After the analysis of the legal realism, the dissertation studies three modern models of judicial decision: the attitudinal model, the strategic model and the psychological model. Later, in the last theoretical chapter, this dissertation discusses new possibilities in the study of judicial decision, especially addressing works and experiences that uses technology, computer models and algorithms for predicting decisions. Some models will be examined in addition to some aspects of structured and unstructured data and databases in law, as well as experiences with Prediction Markets and with the \"Wisdom of the Crowds\". After this theoretical approach, this dissertation enters into a practical and empirical chapter on the research of judicial decision in Brazil. All masters and doctoral thesis and dissertations in Law defended in the years 2011-2014 were analyzed, so that one could understand how the matter of judicial behavior is addressed in the Brazilian legal academy. The empirical research concludes that the research on judicial decision in Brazil is still incipient, predominantly normative and there is almost nothing regarding descriptive or forecasting theories or models such as those examined in the previous chapters.

L’« intérêt de l’enfant » est un concept fondamental en droit de la famille puisqu’il constitue le critère déterminant dans toute décision qui concerne l’enfant. Le Code civil du Québec énonce, au second alinéa de l’article 33, les facteurs qui doivent servir à le déterminer, soit « les besoins moraux, intellectuels, affectifs et physiques de l’enfant, son âge, sa santé, son caractère, son milieu familial et les autres aspects de sa situation ». Les auteurs qui s’y sont intéressés l’ont abordé sous différents angles. Certains se sont intéressés à ses origines et à son évolution. D’autres en ont proposé leur propre définition. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avons choisi d’explorer ledit concept en nous intéressant aux diverses interprétations qu’il reçoit de la part des tribunaux dans les décisions relatives à la garde des enfants dans un contexte post-rupture, et ce, à la lumière du genre et de l’âge du décideur. Le concept d’intérêt de l’enfant étant hautement indéterminé, son interprétation est laissée à l’appréciation du juge qui en précisera le contenu en référence à la loi et aux faits particuliers de chaque cas d’espèce. Or, dans les situations où, une fois considéré le contexte factuel et normatif, le juge se retrouve face à une situation « neutre », c’est-à-dire où la garde exclusive et la garde partagée sont tout aussi envisageables, peut-on prétendre que son l’inclinaison vers l’une ou l’autre de ces modalités de garde est influencée par des facteurs autres que le droit et les faits mis en preuve ? Telle est la question au cœur de notre étude. Reposant sur des théories reconnues et bien établies affirmant l’importance de tenir compte du contexte social et de l’expérience individuelle du décideur dans la démarche interprétative que le droit sous-tend, l’hypothèse que nous soumettons est qu’au-delà des faits mis en preuve et du droit, des éléments indissociables au processus d’interprétation, à savoir les valeurs, les idéologies et les traits caractéristiques dominants que sous-tendent le genre et la génération du décideur, influent sur la teneur des jugements qu’il prononce. Sans admettre que ces éléments suffisent, à eux seuls, pour expliquer le produit judiciaire, nous sommes d’avis qu’on ne peut qualifier d’improbable l’incidence qu’ils exercent sur celui-ci. Nous intéressant au processus cognitif qui préside à la réflexion des décideurs, notre thèse vise à cerner, à travers une analyse interdisciplinaire, les facteurs humains et les forces sociales qui structurent les expériences et qui sont susceptibles d’avoir un impact sur les décisions judiciaires. L’objectif de notre étude n’est pas d’établir un lien de causalité entre le genre et l’âge du juge et les décisions qu’il rend, mais plutôt de vérifier si des corrélations peuvent être établies entre ces paramètres. Désirant aller au-delà des perceptions traditionnelles véhiculées par la doctrine classique, nos travaux se veulent davantage une contribution au développement d’une conception non formaliste du droit plutôt qu’une démonstration que le profil identitaire des décideurs conditionne systématiquement et invariablement leurs décisions. Une étude de ce genre comporte certes des difficultés en ce qu’elle confronte le juriste à des concepts et des théories qui appartiennent à d’autres champs disciplinaires et qui, partant, ne lui sont pas familiers. La compréhension plus fine du processus interprétatif et des décisions qui en résultent en justifie cependant le bien-fondé. / The “best interest of the child” is a fundamental concept of family law as it is the decisive criterion in each decision concerning a child. The Civil Code of Québec enumerates, in art. 33 para. 2, the criteria that must be taken into consideration, which are “the moral, intellectual, emotional and physical needs of the child, [his] age, health, personality and family environment, and [the] other aspects of his situation”. Scholars have approached this concept from different angles. While some of them have expressed interest in its origin and evolution, others have articulated their own definition. In this thesis, I chose to explore the concept of the “best interest of the child” by examining the manner in which courts have interpreted this principle in cases related to child custody, and to what extent it is affected by the gender and the age of the decision-maker. Indeed, whenever a child is part of a conflict, regardless of whether it concerns custody or any other matter, his best interest constitutes the central element. Yet the concept of the child's best interest is highly indeterminate: its interpretation is left to the discretion of the judge, who will specify its content according to the law and facts of each case. But once the judge has considered the factual and normative contexts, he can sometimes face a « neutral » situation, for which he could consider sole and shared custody as options. Would it therefore be accurate to assume that the judge’s inclination toward one or the other option of custody is governed by elements other than the law and facts of the case? This is the main question of this study. Based on recognized and well established theories asserting the importance of considering the social context and individual experience of the decision maker in the interpretative process, the proposed hypothesis is that beyond the facts and the law, there are other elements that have a crucial influence on the process of interpretation (and on the content of the decision that a judge renders), most notably the identity profile of the judge (i.e., gender and age, including their underlying values and ideologies). Indeed, and although the values, ideologies, and dominant social characteristics are not sufficient in themselves to explain the judicial outcomes, I nevertheless consider that the impact that the former has on the latter cannot be denied. By examining the cognitive process that governs the reasoning of the decision maker, this thesis aims to identify, through interdisciplinary analysis, human factors and social forces that shape individual experiences and are likely to have an impact on judicial decisions. The objective of this research is not to establish a causal link between the profile of the judge and his/her decisions, but rather to determine whether a correlation can be established between these parameters. Wishing to go beyond traditional perceptions conveyed by the traditional doctrine, this thesis is a contribution to the development of a non-formalist conception of law, as a way of demonstrating the idea that the profile of the judge systematically and consistently frames his decisions. A study of this kind certainly faces difficulties, in that it confronts the lawyer with concepts and theories that belong to other disciplines, and which therefore may not be familiar. However, the deep understanding of the interpretive process and resulting decisions justify the importance of this kind of research.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

Esta tese busca analisar a viabilidade do projeto de naturalização da teoria do direito defendido por Brian Leiter. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se o esforço da filosofia desde o fundacionismo de Descartes até Carnap para a solução da dúvida cética sobre o que é conhecimento e que conduziram ao que foi denominado fisicalismo, evidenciado nas obras de Kelsen e dos Realistas Escandinavos e Norte-Americanos. A virada linguística foi determinante para a reconstrução dos parâmetros cartesianos, sendo notável a influência de Wittgenstein e Quine. Com Quine, a proposta de naturalização da epistemologia ganhou corpo, tendo conduzido, entretanto, ao abandono do desafio cético e ao cientismo. O behaviorismo já apresentava sinais no Realismo Jurídico Norte-Americano e foi criticado por H.L.A. Hart. Hart se apropriou de elementos do naturalismo quineano e de Wittgenstein, estabelecendo uma nova objetividade para o direito. O projeto de Leiter, apresentado no segundo capítulo, nasce da discordância dessa crítica hartiana. Dois são seus objetivos: (i) resgatar o Realismo Norte-Americano, reconstruindo-o à luz do pragmatismo e do naturalismo quineano, ancorado no antifundacionismo e na substituição das teorias normativas por descrições causais-nomológicas das decisões judiciais para fins de previsibilidade do direito. Cabe ao dogma do positivismo estabelecer o critério de legalidade, excluindo a moral como parte do que é juridicamente objetivo; (ii) adotar uma postura cética externa, numa tentativa de minar o interpretativismo de Ronald Dworkin. É no terceiro capítulo discute a viabilidade do projeto de Leiter propriamente. É possível verificar que Leiter não consegue mostrar o naturalismo na teoria do direito sob sua melhor luz, uma vez que é incapaz de lidar com as questões normativas inerentes ao direito e, por conseguinte, de justificar as decisões judiciais sem recorrer a uma teoria substantiva, algo que Dworkin consegue realizar com maior proveito, especialmente no que tange ao tema da objetividade. Leiter aponta para um futuro em que a investigação empírica pode aumentar a confiança no direito, mas seu projeto teórico limitado à descrição causal-nomológica das decisões é inviável para os fins propostos por uma teoria do direito de sucesso. / This thesis aims to analyze the viability of the project of naturalization of jurisprudence championed by Brian Leiter. The first chapter presents the effort of philosophy from Descartes foundationalism to Carnap for the solution of skeptical doubt about what is knowledge and that led to what was called physicalism, evidenced in the works of Kelsen and Scandinavian and Americans Legal Realists. The linguistic turn was decisive for the reconstruction of Cartesian parameters, being remarkable the influence of Wittgenstein and Quine. With Quine, the naturalization of epistemology proposal gained momentum and led, however, to abandon the skeptical challenge and scientism. Behaviorism already showed signs in american legal realism and was criticized by H.L.A. Hart. Hart appropriated elements of Quinean naturalism and Wittgenstein, establishing a new objectivity to law. Leiters project, presented in the second chapter, was born of the disagreement with hartian criticism. Two are his goals: (i) redeem American Legal Realism, reconstructing it in the light of pragmatism and Quinean naturalism, supported by antifoundationalism and replacement of normative theories by causal-nomological descriptions of judicial decisions for predictability purposes. The dogma of positivism will establish the criteria of legality, excluding the moral as part of what is legally objective; (ii) adopt an external skeptical position in an attempt to undermine the interpretativismo of Ronald Dworkin. The third chapter discusses the feasibility of Leiters project properly. Leiter cannot show the naturalism in theory of law in its best light, since it is incapable of dealing with normative questions related to law and, therefore, to justify judicial decisions without resorting to a substantive theory, something that Dworkin can make more profit, especially with regard to the issue of objectivity. Leiters project points to a future in which empirical research can increase laws confidence, but its limitation to a theoretical project of causal-nomological description of decisions is not feasible for the purposes proposed by a successful theory of law.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline. / El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.

[pt] A Escola de Gênova sobre a Interpretação Jurídica, para alguns, ou o Realismo Jurídico Genovês, para outros, é corrente teórica italiana que lança luz sobre uma série de problemas que envolvem a interpretação jurídica; especialmente, aqueles vinculados ao caráter discricionário do intérprete ao interpretar um documento normativo. Este trabalho faz uma reconstrução dos problemas jurídicos interpretativos mais consistentes que geraram as preocupações da Escola, e apresenta as principais reflexões dos autores a ela vinculados. Seus principais fundamentos são: a postura ceticista frente à interpretação jurídica e as decorrências analíticas: separação entre texto e norma e necessidade de despolitização dos juízes. Apresenta-se, neste trabalho, os argumentos principais que marcam um bloco de posições dos autores da Escola, que subsistem às críticas e que marcam o pensamento genovês. São estes: a criação de um modelo meta-teórico e metajusrisprudencial de análise do direito; o clareamento das discussões entre o formalismo jurídico e o ceticismo interpretativo; as críticas ao objetivismo moral; a separação analítica entre texto e norma; a reflexão crítica sobre o modelo tradicional de separação dos poderes e as noções e os conceitos de sistema, decisão, ponderação e discricionariedade como limitações da politização do judiciário. / [en] The Genoa School on Legal Interpretation, for some, or Genoese Legal Realism, for others, is an Italian theoretical current that sheds light on a series of problems involving legal interpretation; especially those linked to the interpreter s discretion when interpreting a normative document. This work reconstructs the most consistent interpretive legal problems that generated the School s concerns, and presents the main reflections of the authors linked to it. Its main foundations are: the skeptical attitude towards legal interpretation and the analytical consequences: separation between text and norm and the need for depoliticization of the judges. In this work, the main arguments that mark a block of positions of the authors of the School, that remain with criticisms and that mark the Genoese thought are presented. These are: the creation of a meta-theoretical and meta-jurisprudential model of law analysis; the clarification of the discussions between legal formalism and interpretive skepticism; criticisms of moral objectivism; the analytical separation between text and standard; critical reflection on the traditional model of separation of powers and the notions and concepts of system, decision, weighting and discretion as limitations of the politicization of the judiciary.