The purpose of this essay is to discuss relationality in G.W Leibnizs Monadologie (1714). In general terms this essay analyzes the notion of individuation in relation to the concept of monads. The analysis proposes a question regarding the body in this individuation, and what consequences follows for the understanding of the relation between the single individual and other individuals. It will be shown that the irreducibility of having a body transcendens something like ownness, subjectivity, personality and individuation, and this is explained through the pre-established harmony between the monads – where the plurality of monads is detected before the monads singularity. To widen this investigation of relationality between the monads, I will turn to Edmund Husserls phenomenological operation for solving the egological problem of solipsism in Cartesian Meditations (1929). In his meditations, Husserl uses the monad as a self-conscious ego with peculiar ownness. After having outlined the relevant characteristics of Husserl phenomenological methodical operation, I turn to Deleuzes non-phenomenological reading of Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988). In Deleuzes reading Leibniz is ascribed a transcendental philosophy which bears on the event rather than the phenomenon. The purpose is to develop a discussion between Leibniz, Husserl and Deleuze about relationality in relation to the concept of monads, and about the different ways in which we can approach this subject.

The main thesis of this dissertation is that final causes are beings of reason (‘entia rationis’) in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez (1547-1617). The rejection of final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern philosophy, marking the transition from an earlier Aristotelian tradition. However, in this dissertation it is shown that final causes had a problematic position already within the Aristotelian tradition. Although other examples of this can be found, this dissertation centers around the thinking of the philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez and his treatment of final causes in his Disputationes Metaphysicae from 1597. Suárez counts final causes as one of the four kinds of causes, in line with the Aristotelian tradition. However, what these are and how they cause is, at closer inspection, not at all clear, as Suárez shapes his notion of final causation against the background of a definition of causation where efficient causation is the principal kind of causation. Due to this basic view on causes, he is faced with a host of problems when it comes to “salvaging” final causes. Though at first sight seemingly real, in a final analysis final causes are shown to belong to the class of “beings of reason,” ‘entia rationis,’ which are not real beings at all. However, it is also argued that this does not in itself preclude counting final causes as causes; something can really be a cause without being real. Chapter one presents Suárez’ general view on causes and causation. Chapter two presents his view on final causation. Chapter three examines the close link between final causation and moral psychology. Chapter four relates the question of final causation to God’s concurrence with the world. Finally, chapter five argues for the thesis that final causes are beings of reason.

Uppsatsens syfte är att jämföra olika gudsbilder, den monarkiska bilden, gud sett ur ett ekologiskt perspektiv och gud utifrån en vetenskaplig hypotes, hur skiljer sig dessa åt och vad förenar dem. Ur boken The Omniverse beskrivs gud ur ett metafysiskt perspektiv där transdimensionella dimensioner är en del samt de andliga dimensionerna, vilket inkluderar intelligenta civilisationer av själar, andliga varelser och skapelsen gud. Studien bygger på en jämförande litteraturstudie av böckerna The Omniverse av Alfred Lambremont Webre, och Imaging a Theology of Nature: The World as God’s bodyav Sallie McFague. Den mest framträdande skillnaden i jämförandet av författarnas gudsbilder är de olika förklaringsmodeller de båda ger Webre utifrån en vetenskaplig hypotes och McFague utifrån ett teologiskt perspektiv. Det som förenar dem är en holistisk gud sett utifrån en naturlig teologi detta relaterar till en skapelsebaserad gud sett utifrån ett kosmiskt perspektiv, en gud som står i direkt relation till människan.

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.

This thesis aims at formulating a human rights justification based on the assumption that disbelief in human rights is found in communicative grounds, rather than some sort of unreasonable evil. I first identify what I believe to be a flaw in the communicative strength of existing human rights justifications in explaining why rights should be. I suggest that there is a gap between the justifications of human rights that contain metaphysical narrative, and the justifications that rely on subjective experience of rights as good. I further explain how this is a gap that political consensus and the idea of Kantian moral reason cannot seem to fill. I subsequently boil this gap down to the concept of value, since the foundation for each justification is based on a type of value. These are categorized as either given value – which applies to all attributes of value that is “given” to us independently of our actions or opinions, or created value – which applies to all attributes of value that stem from social interaction (thus action) and experience. As justifications are funneled into either of these two categories of value, it begins to look like no other type of value exist, and as a result no one looks for it. To respond to this problem, I formulate a philosophical explanation, in Robert Nozicks terms. This explanation shows that there may be other routes to apply to value than sticking to simply given or created value. My explanation utilizes the three theories of philosophical anthropology, internal metaphysical realism and Wittgensteins philosophy of language, and it is based on the result of an analysis of material consisting of human rights justification arguments by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdaire MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. The actual philosophical explanation I formulate utilizes the metaphysics of Helen Steward to provide a given-value foundation for the primitive reactions of Stefan Eriksson, which creates value through social organization. Overall, I find that there are untried possibilities which may allow for a different type of value to act as the foundation for a human rights justification. My contribution to the field rests in the novelty of the theories used in my explanation, and the angle of the problem formulation.

This essay consists of a comparative study of the ontological argument for the existence of God asformulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury and René Descartes. The comparative analysis itselfconsists of two parts. Firstly, a comparative study of the argument itself, and an examination of theunderlying metaontological commitments that form the basis of the respective arguments, whichare then likewise contrasted. The stated purpose is to examine whether two versions of theontological argument that appear to be similar may have an underlying framework that makes themfundamentally fundamentally distinct in a way that is not immediately apparent. The analysis foundthat this was the case, and that there are significant differences in how the argument is formulated.This is of interest especially as these two thinkers wrote in and were influenced by widely differingcultural, intellectual and academic contexts, which may be reflected in their work. Ontologicalarguments for the existence of God as a phenomenon is a metaphysical argument that seeks toprove that God exists without relying on empirical and observational evidence. Rather, one seeksthrough these ontological arguments to show that the existence of God is self-evident.With Anselm and Descartes this happens in a seemingly very similar yet fundamentally differentway. The results of this study demonstrate differences that appear primarily in the starting point forthe respective discourses, as well as in the methodology that is applied. Anselm bases his discourseon a distinctly neoplatonic foundation regarding the highest good, which he later extrapolates to amore comprehensive reasoning regarding the distinction between different natures according togreatness, of which goodness is one such greatness. Descartes, on the other hand, anchors hisdiscourse in scholastic philosophy and especially the idea of the causal principle of transference,especially in relation to human consciousness and the idea or the concept of God which manifeststherein. These results have been achieved primarily by examining Anselm's arguments based onsecondary sources that relate both directly and indirectly to his ontological argument, which in itssimplicity otherwise consists almost in its entirely of a self-evident descriptive definition of whatGod is. However, the differences that emerge are not of such a degree that a division of these twoargument into different categories can be made with a high degree of confidence. On the otherhand, it is of interest to analyze these underlying frameworks for ontological arguments in order toalso be able to analyze the potential influence or impact of various contextual aspects such as place,time and prevailing academic culture as this essay attempts to do.

This thesis intends to explore whether endurantism is compatible with realism. This is done by presenting an alternative approach, where instead of starting with Quine’s postulate, that being and existence are the same thing, those are treated as different things. By using minimal realism, where you only say that something exists independently of a creature, and an ontological theory based on affordances, a thesis that endurantism is compatible with realism is presented. Affordance ontology means that what something is depends on what actions it can offer a certain human. Objections that this might lead to relativism are answered, as actions are independent of a specific creature. Objections that minimal realism isn’t realism are answered on the grounds of it being independent of a human, and thus is realism. Finally, the thesis is concluded to be true, but more work is needed to explain temporal facts. / Uppsatsen syftar till att utforska om endurantism är förenlig med realism. Detta görs genom att presentera en alternativ ansats, där man istället för att utgå från Quines postulat att vara och att existera är samma sak, särskiljer dessa. Med hjälp av minimal realism, där man bara konstaterar att något existerar oberoende av en varelse, och en ontologisk teori byggd på affordanser, så presenteras tesen att endurantism är förenlig med realism. Affordansontologi innebär att vad något är är beroende av vilka handlingar det kan erbjuda en viss människa. Invändningar som att det skulle leda till relativism bemöts, då handlingar är oberoende av en specifik människa, och att minimal realism är så intetsägande att det inte rör sig om realism, bemöts med argumentet att det är oberoende av en människa, och därmed är det faktiskt realism. Slutligen konstateras att tesen är sann, men att mer arbete behövs gällande tid och affordansontologi, för att förklara tidsatta fakta.

This essay provides a thorough reading of Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–95) philosophy of nature and the way music relates to this philosophy. It does so with regards to changes in the view of nature in 20th century science, especially in the theories of self-organisation as developed by, among others, Ilya Prigogine. Deleuze’s metaphysics is viewed in relation to these theories, and is also compared to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which is related to classical science. The essay then investigates certain key issues in Deleuze’s philosophy concerning difference and univocity (or immanence), developed in his doctoral thesis Différence et répétition (1968). Also, certain aspects of the further evolution of this philosophy of immanence in Mille plateaux (1980), co-written with Félix Guattari, are examined. The essay then studies the role of aesthetics in Deleuze’s philosophy, and the way he transforms the aesthetics of Kant. The following chapter deals with Deleuze & Guattari’s primary text concerning music, ”De la ritournelle” in Mille plateaux. In this text, they develop a highly abstract concept of music, which, in their philosophy, is: 1) granted a cosmological reach regarding rhythms and motives; 2) made an essential aspect of the emergence of art, which they find in animals creating a territory (especially in the songbird); 3) used to discuss Baroque/Classicist, Romantic and 20th century musical styles. Apart from analysing these aspects, this chapter focuses on 20th century music, with a thorough examination of Gustav Mahler and of spectral music, demonstrating that Deleuze’s philosophy can deepen the understanding of this music. The chapter also discusses problematic tendencies in Deleuzian research on contemporary music, which does not take the entirety of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature into account. This essay argues that such knowledge is necessary to correctly examine the implications of Deleuze & Guattari’s philosophy of music. The lack of awareness of Deleuze’s philosophy of nature is also significant in the critique that Deleuze’s aesthetics has received by Jacques Rancière, which is analysed in the final chapter. This chapter also discusses Michael Gallope’s reading of Deleuze & Guattari, in which he makes a distinction between a metaphysical and an ethical-aesthetic philosophy of music. Although the relation between metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, is key to understanding their philosophy of music, this essay argues that Gallope’s idea of what sort of music they advocate is incorrect.

<p>Mirakelkursen är ett verk som definierar orsaken till projektion som skulden över tron att man har separerat sig från Gud eller Ettheten. Det ingår i Etthetens karaktär att detta är omöjligt att göra. Helandet av denna skuld tar bort orsaken till projektionerna och den verkliga världen uppenbarar sig. Projektionen är till sin karaktär en psykologisk lögn och är enligt Jung orsaken till emotionella affekter. Frågeställningarna är följande: Hur beskrivs psykets projektionsmekanism i Mirakelkursen? Är Mirakelkursens beskrivning av projektion förenlig med Jungs beskrivning av den? Är den en avvikelse från Jungs definition eller en naturlig följd av den? Vad är implikationerna av förståelsen av projektion, för vårt sätt att betrakta världen?</p>

The author has attempted a dubbleedged purpose, as indicated by the title. The author firstly deals with Pereboom; begining with his so-called ‘wild coincidence’-argument, by which Pereboom claims agent-causation to be unlikely. The author argues that this argument lacks both scope and strenght. The author then deals with the question of compatiblity between physics and agent-causation as related to Pereboom’s basic problematization; whether agent-causation would or would not diverge from what is expected (from any other event) given our best physical theories. This results in a strong criticism against Pereboom’s whole position, and a positive argument for agent-causation. After the first purpose is achieved, the author turns to the purpose indicated by the subtitle. The author presents a general criticism against the field of metaethics concerning the question of free will. The author also makes suggestions for a possible solution. / Författaren har, som titeln indikerar, tagit på sig ett tveeggat problem. Först hanterar författaren Pereboom; och börjar med hans så kallade ‘wild coincidence’-argument, med vilket Pereboom hävdar att agentkausalitet är osannlik. Författaren menar att detta argument saknar både omfång och styrka. Författaren hanterar sedan frågan om kompatibilitet mellan fysik och agentkausalitet, så som den är relaterad till Perebooms grundläggande problematisering; huruvida agentkausalitet skulle eller inte skulle avvika från vad som vi förväntar oss (givet någon annan händelse) från våra bästa fysiska teorier. Detta resulterar i en stark kritik mot Perebooms hela position, och ett positivt argument för agentkausalitet. Efter att det första syftet är avklarat, så vänder sig författaren till undertitelns syfte. Författaren presenterar en generell kritik mot fältet metaetik avseende frågan om fri vilja. Författaren föreslår även en möjlig lösning på problemet.