abstract: This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions. First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people. Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible. Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE. Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Philosophy 2016

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Este trabalho apresenta uma análise crítica à forma de se abordar casos jurídicos e proferir decisões judiciais denominada abordagem judicial pragmática, disseminada pelo magistrado e professor norte-americano Richard A. Posner. O objetivo é explicitar suas principais características e contornos, bem como sua repulsa pela teorização abstrata e pelos debates e argumentos morais na decisão judicial. A partir disso, pretende-se refutar parte dessa abordagem pragmática, por meio de argumentos levantados por filósofos morais e profissionais do direito a saber: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan Jr e Martha C. Nussbaum - em defesa de uma abordagem que prega a inevitável utilização do raciocínio teórico, assim como a argumentação e reflexão moral na resolução de casos difíceis relacionados ao direito. Também será destacado como a repulsa pragmática pela teoria moral e abstrata é incompatível com a conjuntura justeórica contemporânea e como a análise de alguns casos difíceis expõe a falibilidade, ainda que parcial, desse estilo de abordagem pregado por Posner. / This paper presents a critical analysis of the way of approaching legal cases and rendering judicial decisions called Pragmatic Adjudication, disseminated by the magistrate and American professor Richard A. Posner. The aim is to explain its main features and contours, as well as his repulsion for abstract theorizing and moral debates and arguments in judicial decision. Based on that, it is intended to refute part of this pragmatic approach using arguments raised by moral philosophers and legal professionals - namely: Ronald Dworkin, Charles Fried, Anthony Kronman, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Martha C. Nussbaum - in defense of an approach that preaches the inevitable use of theoretical reasoning, as well as moral argumentation and reflection to solve hard cases. It will also be highlighted how the pragmatic rejection by moral and abstract theory is incompatible with the contemporary legal theory situation and how the analysis of some hard cases partly exposes the fallibility of this style of approach preached by Posner

abstract: The landscape of science education is changing. Scientific research and the academy are both becoming increasingly complex, competitive, interdisciplinary, and international. Many federal research agencies, scientific professional societies, and science educators seem to agree on the importance of strong ethics education to help young scientists navigate this increasingly craggy terrain. But, what actually should be done? When it comes to teaching ethics to future scientists, is the apparent current emphasis on basic responsible conduct of research (RCR) sufficient, or should moral theory also be taught in science ethics education? In this thesis I try engage this question by focusing on an existing, related debate on whether moral theory should be part of teaching professional ethics more generally. After delving into the respective approaches promoted by the three primary participants in this debate (C. E. Harris, Bernard Gert, and Michael Davis) I unpack their views in order to ascertain their practical application potential and relative benefits. I then take these findings and apply them to ethics education in science, paying particular attention to its purported learning objectives. In the end I conclude that the presentation of these objectives suggests that moral theory may well be required in order for these objectives of ethics education in science to be fully achieved. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Biology 2014

Whistleblowing är någonting som i dagsläget blir allt mer känt. Edward Snowden och Wikileaks är det första som kommer till tanken när whistleblowing nämns. I den ekonomiska världen förekommer även Enron som en whistleblowing skandal, som många känner till då det är den största företagsskandal som inträffat under modern tid. Whistleblowing definieras som ett verktyg som ska motverka oegentligheter och börjar införskaffas av fler företag. Medan föregående studier undersöker vad som rapporteras, men också vilka individer som blåser i pipan, förekommer det inte någon studie om hur arbetet med whistleblowing faktiskt ser ut i företagen. Därför finns ett intresse att undersöka hur de anställda, de som faktiskt blåser i pipan, uppfattar arbetet med whistleblowing samt vad det leder till. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur arbetet med whistleblowing uppfattas ur en anställds perspektiv, jämföra detta med andra anställda men även chefers uppfattning. Med denna kunskap syftar vi sedan till att fastställa vad det leder till och utifrån teoretiska begrepp kunna ge en insikt i hur arbetet med whistleblowing faktiskt ser ut i ett företag. Undersökningen sker via en abduktiv ansats där teorier om moral, institutionell samt förväntanskap används som hjälp vid tolkning av empirin. En hermeneutisk forskningsfilosofi används och en kvalitativ metod där intervjuer utförts på ett företag. Fem intervjuer som omfattar anställda på olika avdelningar i företaget, vilket ska ge olika perspektiv och uppfattningar så att bästa möjliga svar på forskningsfrågan kan ges samt att syftet kan fastställas. Uppsatsen fastställer att samtliga respondenter uppfattar arbetet med whistleblowing ur ett moraliskt perspektiv. Genom expectancy theory förekommer det dock brister i kunskap om hur whistleblowing faktiskt går till bland de anställda och denna brist bidrar till att många inte vill, eller kommer att använda sig av systemet. Detta gör att whistleblowing blir väldigt institutionellt i organisationen. Det betyder att det endast finns där för att det måste, utan att egentligen användas. Slutligen visar det sig att det finns effekter i form av fördelar och nackdelar, men att det i slutändan lönar sig att arbeta med whistleblowing inom organisationen. / Whistleblowing is currently becoming a more known subject. Edward Snowden and Wikileaks are famous in whistleblowing situations. In the economical world, another famous scandal concerning whistleblowing is Enron. It is the biggest corporate scandal in modern time. The definition of whistleblowing is to prevent misconduct/illegal activities and more companies are starting to implement whistleblowing-systems. While previous studies have investigated matters of whistleblowing and actual whistleblowers, there is no research about how whistleblowing actually exists and is perceived within organizations. Therefore we find an interest in investigating how employees perceive the work of whistleblowing, and what it could lead to. The purpose of this study is to examine how employees perceive the work of whistleblowing and then compare it to other employees and also managers. With help from different theories, a clearer insight can be provided in how the work with whistleblowing actually is perceived within an organization. The research approach is of abductive form, where theories about moral, institutional and expectancy are used as help to interpret the empirical data. A hermeneutic research philosophy is used and a qualitative method with interviews. Five different individuals are interviewed and everyone works in different departments of the company, which should give a wider span of perspectives and perceptions, thus a richer data. From this, a more accurate answer can be provided for the research question and also fulfill the purpose of this study. The conclusions are that the respondents perceive the work with whistleblowing from a moral standpoint. However, flaws are found through expectancy theory in the absence of knowledge about how whistleblowing actually works within the organization. This contributes to the fact that employees does not want and will not use the whistleblowing-system. From these factors whistleblowing becomes more of an institutional tool and is rarely used, however it exists because it has to. Lastly there are effects such as advantages and disadvantages. In the end it proves to be useful to work with whistleblowing within an organization.

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Allt fler privata och institutionella investerare väljer att placera pengar i etiska fonder. Fondbolag världen över erbjuder sina kunder att investera i fonder som går i enighet med sina egna moraliska värderingar. Redan under 1700-talet kom idén om att investera etiskt. Syftet med denna typ av ekonomisk förvaltning har dock förändrats något de senaste decennierna. Idag råder det inget tvivel om att åsikter går isär om vilka bolag som bör få ingå i en etisk fond.Den tidigare forskningen visar att fondförvaltarna främst använder sig av två metoder när de avgör vilka bolag som skall ingå i de etiska fonderna. Dessa två metoder kallas för negativ och positiv screening. Även fondbolagen som ingick i denna uppsats använde sig av positiv respektive-negativ-screening.I den här uppsatsen undersöks de moraliska aspekter som finns kring etiskt fondsparande. Det sker även en gransking av hur fondförvaltarna väljer ut de bolag som skall ingå en etisk fond, samt vilka konsekvenser detta får för fonden ur ett moralfilosofiskt perspektiv. Denna uppsats beskriver dessa två principiellt olika tillvägagångssätt, där båda dessa påvisas vara problematiska. Detta gör att det går att det starkt går att ifrågasätta deras legitimitet.Uppsatsen har bidragit till att undersöka och beskriva huruvida dessa screeningsmetoder är etiskt hållbara genom att använda två olika moralfilosofiska infallsvinklar.Positiv screening är en allt för godtycklig metod som ger upphov till allt för många subjektiva bedömningar för fondförvaltarna. Dessutom bortser positiv screening från om företag har dåliga sidor, utan den fokuserar endast på styrkorna hos ett bolag. Detta gör att icke ansvarstagande bolag kan följa med.Negativ screening är en allt för motsägelsefull metod eftersom att den inte helt tar avstånd från de branscher som den försöker att stänga ute. Bland annat så stänger den inte ute underleverantörer till företag som exkluderas med denna metod. Fondbolagen tillåter också att vissa procent av omsättningen får komma från de branscher man försöker att stänga ute vilket gör att negativ screening förlorar sitt syfte. Dessutom är det tveksamt om fondbolagen överhuvudtaget bör utesluta spelbranschen, alkoholbranschen, eller pornografibranschen på enbart moralfilosofiska grunder.Vidare har även uppsatsen kommit fram till att det är de institutionella kunderna som driver utvecklingen framåt och att de har en stark påverkan på vilka branscher som väljs bort genom negativ screening.

For the last thirty years or so, there has been a search underway for a theory that canaccommodate our intuitions in regard to moral duties to future generations. The object ofthis search has proved surprisingly elusive. The classical moral theories in the literature allhave perplexing implications in this area. Classical Utilitarianism, for instance, implies thatit could be better to expand a population even if everyone in the resulting populationwould be much worse off than in the original. The main problem has been to find an adequate population theory, that is, a theoryabout the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of theirlives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has totake these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normativestatus of actions, the study of population theory is of general import for moral theory. A number of theories have been proposed in the literature that purport to avoidcounter-intuitive implications such as the one mentioned above. The suggestions arediverse: introducing novel ways of aggregating welfare into a measure of value, revising thenotion of a, life worth living, questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare,counting people's welfare differently depending on the temporal location or the modalfeatures of their lives, and challenging the logic of axiological and normative concepts. Weinvestigate the concepts and assumptions involved in these theories as well as theirimplications for population theory. In our discussion, we propose a number of intuitively appealing and logically weakadequacy conditions for an acceptable population theory. Finally, we consider whether it ispossible to find a theory that satisfies all of these conditions. We prove that no such theory exists.

In diesem Buch schlage ich eine radikal neuartige Sicht auf den Utilitarismus vor. Meine Hauptthese ist, dass der Utilitarismus selbst keine vollständige normative Theorie ist, aus der sich per se Handlungsbewertungen ableiten ließen, sondern normativ untersättigt und neutral ist. Sein normativer Gehalt ist vollständig abhängig von angenommenen Nutzenfunktionen. Jede konsistente Menge von moralischen Regeln (Moralsystem) kann, wie ich im Anhang beweise, als ein Spezialfall des Utilitarismus interpretiert werden. Um dies zu explizieren, stelle ich utilitaristische Interpretationen verschiedener Moralpositionen vor: Zwei alltagsmoralische Regeln (das Gebot, Versprechen zu halten und das Tötungsverbot), egalitäre Positionen zu Verteilungsfragen sowie die Rawls’sche Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hierbei gebe ich stets korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen an, deren Vorliegen Utilitaristen auf die interpretierten moralischen Positionen verpflichtet. Die Frage nach dem normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus schlechthin ist somit falsch gestellt. Ein Großteil der Kritik des Utilitarismus als moralische Theorie läuft ins Leere, denn sie kritisiert einen solchen nur scheinbar eigenständigen normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus, den sie selbst durch unterstellte Nutzenfunktionen erst erzeugt. Die Verteidigung des Utilitarismus verfehlt ebenso oft das Ziel, wenn sie zur Rettung des Utilitarismus an sich konkurrierende Nutzenfunktionen ins Feld führt, ohne die normative Neutralität des Utilitarismus generell zu thematisieren. Diese normative Neutralität macht den Utilitarismus gleichsam zur Normalform der Ethik, denn jeder moralische Disput lässt sich in einen Disput über korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen überführen. Der Utilitarismus ist also nicht moralische Theorie, sondern vielmehr die Methode der Ethik. / In this book I suggest to look at utilitarianism in a radical new way. My key starting point is that utilitarianism in itself is not a complete normative theory from which judgements of actions could be drawn but instead that utilitarianism is normatively undersaturated and neutral. Its normative content is entirely dependent on assumed utility functions. Every consistent set of moral rules (moral system) can, as I prove in the appendix, be interpreted as a special case of utilitarianism. To explicate this, I give utilitarian interpretations of a number of different moral positions: two everyday moral rules (the rule to keep promises and the prohibition of killing), egalitarian positions on distribution, and the Rawlsian theory of justice. In each case I propose corresponding utility functions that commit utilitarians to the interpreted moral position. Thus, asking about the normative content of utilitarianism in itself is meaningless. Much of the critique of utilitarianism as a moral theory misses the point as it criticizes such an assumed normative content of utilitarianism in itself while imputing the existence of certain utility functions. Many defendants of utilitarianism fall for the same mistake, as they propose rival utility functions to rescue their assumed normative content of utilitarianism without addressing the general normative neutrality of utilitarianism. For this normative neutrality, utilitarianism can be viewed as the normal form of ethics, because every moral dispute can be translated into a dispute over corresponding utility functions. Therefore, Utilitarianism is not a moral theory, but rather the method of ethics.

The intent of this work is to explore how children, youth, and adults with disabilities are discriminated against in cultural systems, specifically the education system, and how the beliefs and structures encompassed in these systems create and recreate the phenomena of ableism. This study will explore the hegemony of ableism within school cultures by exposing prevailing discourses and the systems that enforce these discriminatory discourses and educational practices. Additionally, it will illustrate significant human rights infractions and discriminatory processes that keep disabled peoples throughout the world in states of marginalization and oppression. The analysis of this study shows resistance to the oppression of people with disabilities through the use of critical disability theory, legal theory, and social justice philosophy. In addition, the advancement of inclusive education as a human right is offered as a solution to the collective oppression and states of disenfranchisement that many disabled peoples experience. The exploration of moral and legal theory, equality jurisprudence, and libratory pedagogy will advance a collective human rights framework as an educational model for school cultures globally. This analysis will utilize an equality premise known as the right to belong to defend inclusive education as a fundamental human right. In support of this fundamental right, a theoretical base for inclusive pedagogies reveals how the deconstruction of hegemonic practices and, simultaneously, the development of transformative educational models of learning are necessary best practices in the pursuit of equality for all disabled students. This work concludes with recommendations for changes in educational leadership, philosophy, and research of education for disabled students.