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21	Préservation de la nature, protection sociale et justice entre les générations : Privilégier le présent pour transmettre au futur un monde plus juste / Nature conservation, social welfare and justice between generations : Emphasizing the present to transmit to the future a fairer world Rio, Cédric 29 November 2013 (has links) Comment peut-on concilier le respect des droits à la liberté des membres des générations futures et présentes ? Agir en faveur des premiers ne doit pas se faire aux dépens des seconds. Selon nous, la garantie pour tous de pouvoir développer et concevoir une conception spécifique de la vie bonne suppose de privilégier l'objectif d'une justice sociale globale dans le temps présent pour ainsi transmettre à la postérité un monde plus juste. Nous indiquons en premier lieu en quoi les générations qui se succèdent sur Terre ont des devoirs envers celles qui les suivront dans le temps, mais également pourquoi nos actes ne reflètent pas la reconnaissance de tels devoirs. Nous nous interrogeons ensuite sur le contenu du monde à transmettre en conformité avec ces devoirs. Il incombe aux générations de préserver autant que possible l'environnement naturel et d'édifier un environnement politique et social suffisant. Cela requiert la constitution d'une épargne intergénérationnelle au cours d'une phase limitée, suivie d'une phase de croisière dans laquelle l'accumulation doit être stoppée. Mais les efforts pour cette épargne et les ressources générées par celle-ci sont à répartir équitablement au sein et entre les générations : ce point est l'objet de notre troisième partie. Nous montrons que les efforts demandés à chacun au sein de la phase d'accumulation devraient dépendre de l'environnement dont disposent les individus, tandis que les ressources produites sont à redistribuer en priorité aux contemporains les plus démunis. Une telle préférence sociale pour le présent ne va pas à l'encontre des droits des individus futurs : elle permet au contraire de limiter la perpétuation, de génération en génération, des inégalités intragénérationnelles et de favoriser le respect de leurs droits par les individus qui vivent dans le temps présent. / How can we reconcile the respect to liberty rights of members of future and current generations? Act in favour of the former should not be at the expense of the latter. According to us, the guaranty for all to be able to develop and conceive a specific conception of the good life involves favouring the objective of global social justice in the present time, and so transmitting to posterity a fairer world. We show first how the succeeding generations on Earth have duties to those who follow in time, but also why our acts do not reflect the recognition of such duties. Then we wonder about the content of the World to transmit in compliance with these duties. Generations bear the responsibility to preserve as much as possible the natural environment and to edify a sufficient political and social environment. This requires the constitution of an intergenerational savings during a limited phase, followed by a steady-state phase in which the accumulation must be stopped. But efforts to the savings and resources generated by it have to be distributed fairly within and between generations: this is the subject of our third part. We show that efforts required to everyone during the accumulation phase should depend on the environment available to individuals, while produced resources have to be redistributed primarily to the most disadvantaged contemporaries. Such a social time preference does not run counter the rights of future individuals: it allows instead to limit the perpetuation of intra-generational inequalities from generation to generation and to promote the respect of their rights by individuals living at the present time. Développement durable Éthique environnementale Justice entre les générations Justice sociale Préférences temporelles Régime d'historicité Axel Gosseries Martha Nussbaum Derek Parfit John Rawls Environmental ethics Intergenerational Justice Regime of Historicity Social Justice Sustainability Time Preference Axel Gosseries Martha Nussbaum Derek Parfit John Rawls Philosophie Psychologie
22	Personal Identity and the Extended Mind: A Critique of Parfitian Reductionism Miller, Jamie M. 27 August 2015 (has links) No description available. Philosophy Cognitive Psychology personal identity psychological criterion extended mind active externalism situated cognition distributed cognition derek parfit parfitian reductionism edwin hutchins andy clark social media peter unger replication teleportation
23	L'éthique et sa place dans la nature Dishaw, Samuel 09 1900 (has links) Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel. / One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains. Non-naturalisme moral Naturalisme moral Propriétés morales Métaphysique des raisons Argument de la question ouverte G.E. Moore David Enoch Just-too-different intuition Derek Parfit Intuition normative J.L. Mackie Motivation morale Thomas Scanlon Is-ought gap Moral naturalism Moral non-naturalism Moral properties Metaphysics of reasons Open question argument Normative intuition Moral motivation Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)
24	Charles Taylor y la identidad moderna Cincunegui, Juan Manuel 16 December 2010 (has links) El propòsit principal d'aquesta tesi és analitzar críticament l'antropologia filosòfica de Charles Taylor.A la primera part abordem qüestions preliminars: les fonts, els fonaments teòrics i els elements metodològics del seu pensament.A la segona part elaborem la seva teoria de la identitat. Això implica: (1) donar compte de la relació inextricable entre el jo de la persona i la seva orientació moral, i (2) per mitjà d'arguments transcendentals, articular una ontologia que determini els trets perennes de la naturalesa humana.Una ontologia de la identitat exigeix l'articulació de les continuïtats i discontinuïtats entre els animals humans i no humans. És a dir, una filosofia de la biologia que aporti les intuïcions de l'aristotelisme al post-darwinisme. En línia amb Adaslair MacIntyre, intentem completar les aportacions realitzades per Taylor en el context de la seva filosofia de l'acció.D'altra banda, identifiquem alguns dels trets distintius de l'agent humà (lingüisticitat, propòsit i dialogicitat), i abordem els desafiaments de (1) les versions que radicalitzen les conseqüències de la contingència del subjecte i (2) els reduccionisme que prosperen entre els filòsofs analítics. Per això hem confrontat a les interpretacions de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche i Freud, i a la posició quasi-budista de Parfit, l'hermenèutica forta de Charles Taylor i Paul Ricoeur.A la tercera part, estudiem la dimensió històrica de la identitat humana. Això implica assenyalar les peculiaritats del anthropos modern. Per això, a més de contraposar al jo modern la versió premoderna de la nostra comuna humanitat, hem hagut d'enfrontar a la interpretació de Taylor sobre el sentit de les mutacions cosmovisionales, antropològiques i ètiques de la modernitat, les interpretacions que a aquestes mutacions concedeixen autors com Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre i Jürgen Habermas. / El propósito principal de esta tesis es analizar críticamente la antropología filosófica de Charles Taylor. En la primera parte abordamos cuestiones preliminares: las fuentes, los fundamentos teóricos y los elementos metodológicos de su pensamiento. En la segunda parte elaboramos su teoría de la identidad. Eso implica: (1) dar cuenta de la relación inextricable entre el yo de la persona y su orientación moral; y (2) por medio de argumentos trascendentales, articular una ontología que determine los rasgos perennes de la naturaleza humana. Una ontología de la identidad exige la articulación de las continuidades y discontinuidades entre los animales humanos y no humanos. Es decir, una filosofía de la biología que aporte las intuiciones del aristotelismo al post-darwinismo. En línea con Adaslair MacIntyre, intentamos completar los aportes realizados por Taylor en el contexto de su filosofía de la acción. Por otro lado, identificamos algunos de los rasgos distintivos del agente humano (lingüisticidad, propósito y dialogicidad); y abordamos los desafíos de (1) las versiones que radicalizan las consecuencias de la contingencia del sujeto y (2) los reduccionismos que prosperan entre los filósofos analíticos. Para ello hemos confrontado a las interpretaciones de Richard Rorty sobre Nietzsche y Freud, y a la posición cuasi-budista de Parfit, con la hermenéutica fuerte de Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur.En la tercera parte, estudiamos la dimensión histórica de la identidad humana. Eso implica señalar las peculiaridades del anthropos moderno. Para ello, además de contraponer al yo moderno la versión premoderna de nuestra común humanidad, hemos tenido que enfrentar a la interpretación de Taylor sobre el sentido de las mutaciones cosmovisionales, antropológicas y éticas de la modernidad, las interpretaciones que a éstas mutaciones conceden autores como Michel Foucault, Alasdair MacIntyre y Jürgen Habermas. / The main purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze the philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor.The first part deals with preliminary issues: the sources, the theoretical and methodological elements of his thought.In the second part we elaborate his theory of identity. This implies: (1) to account for the inextricable relationship between the self of the person and his moral orientation, and (2) by means of transcendental arguments, to articulate an ontology that determines the perennial features of human nature.An ontology of identity requires the articulation of the continuities and discontinuities between human and nonhuman animals. That is, a philosophy of biology which provides insights from Aristotelianism to post-Darwinism. In line with Adaslair MacIntyre, we try to complete the contributions made by Taylor in the context of his philosophy of action.On the other hand, we identify some of the distinctive features of human agency (language, purpose and dialogue) and tackle the challenges of (1) versions that radicalized the consequences of the contingency of the subject and (2) the reductionism that thrive among the analytical philosophers. So we confront the interpretations of Richard Rorty about Nietzsche and Freud, and the quasi-Buddhism of Parfit, with the strong hermeneutics of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur.In the third part, we study the historical dimension of human identity. That means pointing out the peculiarities of the modern anthropos. Therefore, in addition to contrast the modern self with the premodern version of our common humanity, we confront Taylor's interpretation of the meaning of the cosmological, anthropological and ethical mutations of modernity, with the interpretations that authors as Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MaIntyre offer about these mutations. Orden moral moderno Modernidad Identidad personal Identidad narrativa Identidad Ontología Hermenéutica Fenomenología Buddhisme Cristianisme Transcendència Marc immanent Era secular Imaginaris socials moderns Ordre moral modern Modernitat Identitat narrativa Identitat personal Ontologia Identitat Hermenèutica Fenomenologia Ivan Illich Thubten Jinpa Steven Collins Paul Ricou Derek Parfit Michael Polanyi Richard Rorty Martin Heidegger Ludwig Wittgenstein Maurice Merleau Ponty W.F. Hegel Jürgen Habermas Michel Foucault Alasdair MacIntyre Charles Taylor Imaginarios sociales modernos Era secular Marco Inmanente Trascendencia Cristianismo Budismo Phenomenology Hermeneutics Ontology Identity Personal identity Narrative identity Modernity Modern moral Modern Social Imaginaries Secular age Immanent frame Transcendence Christianity Buddhism Filosofia i Estudis Humanístics 1
25	Embryo Adoption: Implications of Personhood, Marriage, and Parenthood McMillen, Brooke Marie 14 April 2008 (has links) Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / One’s personal claims regarding personhood will influence his moral belief regarding embryo adoption. In Chapter One, I consider the personhood of the human embryo. If the human embryo is a person, we are morally obligated to permit the practice of embryo adoption as an ethical means to save human persons. However, for those who do not claim that an embryo is a person at conception, embryo adoption is not a necessary practice because we have no moral obligation to protect them. There are still others who claim that personhood is gained at some point during gestation when certain mental capacities develop. I offer my own claim that consciousness and sentience as well as the potential to be self-conscious mark the beginning of personhood. Embryo adoption raises several questions surrounding the institution of marriage. Due to its untraditional method of procreation, embryo adoption calls into question the role of procreation within marriage. In Chapter Two, I explore the nature of the marriage relationship by offering Lisa Cahill’s definition of marriage which involves both a spiritual and physical dimension, and then I describe the concept of marriage from different perspectives including a social, religious, and a personal perspective. From a personal perspective, I explore the relationship between marriage and friendship. Finally, I describe how the concept of marriage is understood today and explore the advantages to being married as opposed to the advantages of being single. Embryo adoption changes the way we customarily think about procreation within a family because in embryo adoption, couples are seeking an embryo from another union to be implanted into the woman. This prompts some philosophers to argue that embryo adoption violates the marriage relationship. In Chapter Three, I further consider the impact of embryo adoption on the family as an extension of the marital relationship as well as the impact of embryo adoption on the traditional roles of motherhood and fatherhood. I examine motherhood by looking at how some philosophers define motherhood and when these philosophers claim a woman becomes a mother. After considering these issues regarding motherhood, I examine the same issues surrounding fatherhood. Peg Brand, PhD., Chair Embryo adoption Embryo rescue Embryo Adoption Rescue Motherhood Fatherhood Marriage Personhood Gestation Conception Reproductive technology Reproduction Surrogacy Conscious Consciousness Sentience Person Self-conscious Self-consciousness Procreation Conjugal union Marriage relationship Procreate Pregnancy Genetic motherhood Gestational motherhood Social motherhood Genetic father Social father Mother Motherhood Father Fatherhood IVF In vitro In vitro fertilization Pregnancy Postnatal adoption Althaus Aquinas Conee Crosby DeGrazia Finnis Ford Locke Lovering McMahan Parfit Quinn Singer Sumner Thomson Tooley Warren Cahill Moller Landau Mill Catholic Lutheran Calvinist Calvinism Aristotle Catholicism Kant Parsons Primoratz Feldman Firestone Tonti-Filippini Watt Geach Human embryo -- Transplantation Adoption -- Religious aspects Motherhood Fatherhood Marriage

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