Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T12:54:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO_JURACI GUIMARAES JUNIOR.pdf: 1228773 bytes, checksum: b734e287f93009610a0ea40190ad0ee2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30 / The possibility and intensity of judicial review of participatory democracy in the popular initiative bill from the judgment by the Supreme Court of the Brasil of LC 135-2010, Law of Clean Record. After dealing the concept and evolution of direct and representative democracy to participatory democracy. Analyze the contours of democracy in the Brasil Federal Constitution of 1988 and the tension between democracy and the rule of law. Discuss to the various theoretical approaches to democratic deliberative aspects proceduralists and substantialists. The second step is to describe the political rights as fundamental rights, its concept, features and restrictions procedure. In a third step we discuss the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy, addressing the various existing currents and contextualizing the legal reality and brazilian politics. Finally, it explains on the LC 135-2010, its participatory democratic formation and critically analyzes the reasons for the decision of the Brasil Supreme Court which ruled their (in) constitutionality. / A possibilidade e intensidade do controle judicial da democracia participativa no projeto de lei de iniciativa popular, a partir do julgamento pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal da Lei da Ficha Limpa. Inicialmente, aborda-se o conceito e evolução da democracia direta e representativa até a democracia participativa. Analisa-se os contornos da democracia na Constituição Federal de 1988 e a tensão entre a democracia e o Estado de Direito. Debata-se as diversas correntes teóricas democráticas até as vertentes deliberativas procedimentalistas e substancialistas. O segundo momento consiste em descrever os direitos políticos como direitos fundamentais, seu conceito, características e procedimento de restrição. Em um terceiro momento discute-se a legitimidade do controle judicial de constitucionalidade numa democracia, abordando as diversas correntes existentes e as contextualizando na realidade jurídica e política brasileira. Por fim, explana-se sobre a Lei da Ficha Limpa, sua formação democrática participativa e se analisa criticamente os fundamentos da decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal que julgou a sua (in)constitucionalidade.

This research examined the legal nature of the presumption of guilt created by section 235(2) of the South African Tax Admiration Act and considered whether or not its practical application violates the taxpayer’s fundamental right contained in section 35(3) of the Constitution, which gives every accused taxpayer the right to a fair trial, including the right to be presumed innocent. The research also provided clarity on the constitutionality of this presumption because it has been widely criticised for unjustifiably violating the taxpayer's constitutional right to a fair trial. The conclusion reached is that the presumption created by section 235(2) of the Tax Administration Act constitutes an evidentiary burden rather than a reverse onus. It does not create the possibility of conviction, unlike a reverse onus where conviction is possible, despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not violate the accused taxpayer’s the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent and hence it is constitutional. Accordingly, the chances that the accused taxpayer will succeed in challenging the constitutionality of section 235(2) of the Act are slim.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-03-27T14:46:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Duarte de Oliveira Junior.pdf: 957011 bytes, checksum: 3a2470b245c01a0d0f208a3a6b53011e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-27T14:46:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Duarte de Oliveira Junior.pdf: 957011 bytes, checksum: 3a2470b245c01a0d0f208a3a6b53011e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-01-31 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar a relação existente entre mídia, processo penal e controle social. Isso para saber a razão que fundamenta a exploração da notícia sobre o crime e sobre o investigado, pelos meios de comunicação de massa, bem como os reflexos deste trabalho da imprensa no resultado do processo, na sociedade, na pessoa do investigado e na política criminal. O método escolhido para o desenvolvimento do estudo foi o fenomenológico-hermenêutico e o seu resultado foi verificação de que a mídia explora a notícia sobre o crime com o único objetivo de atrair consumidores para os produtos de seus anunciantes. Contudo, desta conduta resulta a violação de muitos direitos de quem faz parte do processo penal, uma vez que a mídia mitiga a presunção de inocência e os direitos e garantias individuais do acusado. Isso porque promove julgamentos antecipados, que resultam na estigmatização de determinados cidadãos e na seletividade operada pelo próprio Estado, através de uma legislação simbólica, desenvolvendo o que se denomina de processo penal do inimigo. Por fim, a única saída para minimizar os reflexos da atuação midiática no processo é a veiculação da notícia sempre com esteio na presunção de inocência, ampla divulgação das sentenças absolutórias e condenações para as hipóteses de ilícitos causados pelo abuso do direito de informar. / The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between media, criminal and social control. That to know the reason underlying the exploitation of the crime and the investigation by means of mass communication as well as the reflections of this work of the press in the process output, in society, in the person of the investigation and criminal policy. The method chosen for the development of the study was the phenomenological-hermeneutic. And the result was the finding that the media operates on news of the crime with the sole purpose of attracting consumers to the products of their advertisers. However, this behavior results in the violation of many rights who is part of the criminal proceedings, since the media mitigates the presumption of innocence and the rights and individual guarantees of the accused. This is because it promotes early trials, which result in the stigmatization of certain citizens and selectivity operated by the state itself, through a symbolic legislation, developing what is called the prosecution of the enemy. Finally, the only way to minimize reflections of the media work in process is the placement of news always stay with the presumption of innocence, full disclosure of convictions and acquittals sentences for cases of illicit caused by abuse of the right to inform.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

Le thème de la protection pénale de l'accusé, connu des pénalistes, mérite aujourd'hui d'être renouvelé sous un angle essentiellement probatoire, au regard de l'évolution actuelle du procès pénal. Situés au confluent de l'innocence et de la culpabilité, les droits et garanties accordés à l'accusé, entendu dans son acception conventionnelle, doivent être analysés en considération des principes fondateurs que sont la présomption d'innocence et les droits de la défense. L'évolution continue de ces deux principes, dans un sens diamétralement opposé, rejaillit inévitablement sur l'intensité et les modalités de la protection dont bénéficie toute personne suspectée ou poursuivie dans le cadre d'une procédure pénale.La présente étude, volontairement limitée à la phase préparatoire du procès pénal, se propose d'appréhender, dans un souci pratique et technique, les différentes évolutions jurisprudentielles et législatives opérées en la matière. Y seront ainsi abordées les principales problématiques actuellement rencontrées en procédure pénale telles que la question du statut juridique du suspect ou encore l'effectivité du principe du contradictoire dans l'avant-procès pénal. S'il peut être tentant, au premier abord, de conclure à un renforcement indiscutable de la protection pénale accordée à l'accusé, il conviendra alors de reconsidérer cette question à l'aune de l'étude des limites procédurales attachées au procès pénal. Loin d'aborder ce thème dans une optique partisane, il sera question de modération dans les propos tenus. En effet, peut-être plus que sur toute autre question de procédure pénale, il est impératif de savoir raison garder. / The theme of the criminal protection of the accused, well-known to criminal specialists, today deserves to be renewed under a probationary essentially angle, in the light of current developments in the criminal trial. Located at the confluence of innocence and guilt, the rights and guarantees granted to the accused understood in its conventional sense, must be analyzed in consideration of the founding principles of presumption of innocence and the rights of the defense. The continuing evolution of these two principles, in a sense diametrically opposite, inevitably reflects the intensity and the terms of the protection afforded any person suspected or prosecuted under criminal proceedings.This study deliberately limited to the pre-trial phase, proposes to understand, in a practical and technical problems, the various case law and legislative developments carried out in the field. Will thus addressed the key issues currently faced in criminal proceedings such as the question of the legal status of the suspect or the effectiveness of the adversarial principle in the preliminary criminal trial. While it may be tempting, at first, to conclude an indisputable strengthening the criminal protection afforded to the accused, then it will be necessary to reconsider this issue in terms of the study of procedural limitations attached to the criminal trial. Far from addressing this issue in a partisan way, it will be about moderation in the remarks. Indeed, perhaps more than any other issue of criminal procedure, it is imperative to keep a sense of proportion.

This thesis investigates the compatibility of a crucial aspect of Sudanese criminal justice, namely, the compatibility of the right to a fair trial with two main sources of this right: international human rights law and Shari’a law. The right to a fair trial is a cornerstone for any society and serves to observe the rule of law and other rights of citizens. The study illustrates that the right to a fair trial could play a significant role in the protection of human rights in Sudan. The main aim of this study is to establish ways in which the right to a fair trial can be strengthened in Sudan. The thesis has examined the work emanating from the international level by reviewing decisions, providing general comments and analysing other jurisprudence emanating from bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Human Rights Committee. The decisions, general comments and other jurisprudence from these bodies are juxtaposed against Sudan’s laws to establish the extent to which the right to a fair trial is upheld at the domestic level in Sudan. The study critically examines the sources of the right to a fair trial in Sudan. The main sources of right to a fair trial in Sudan are the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act, the Penal Code, Shari’a law and international human rights law. It seeks to answer the question whether Sudanese fair trial rights are compatible with international standards. The study establishes that one of the sources of law that govern the right to a fair trial in Sudan is Shari’a law. The main principle in Islam is that nothing is unlawful, unless it is expressly forbidden by law. However, the Shari’a law in Sudan has not been properly implemented as is illustrated through the rigid and traditional implementation of some of its provisions. The selective and rigid implementation of provisions of Shari’a law has resulted in a conflict with the accepted international standards of fair trial rights. What the study establishes is that a more progressive interpretation of Shari’a law can potentially solve the contradictions with international human rights law that currently exist. The study identifies a number of factors that have affected the development of the right to a fair trial in Sudan. Among these factors are the lack of political will, poverty, the lack of awareness about rights, laws that are contrary to the right to a fair trial, laws that inadequately protect victims and witnesses, impunity, corruption, the lack of resources both human and financial, abuse of power, existence of military and special courts, institutional constraints, discrimination against women, and the refusal or resistance of the executive branch of government to implement decisions of the courts. This study concludes that some pre-trial, trial and post-trial rights and standards in Sudan are not in conformity with international and regional standards. The study concludes by making a number of recommendations aimed at institutional and legal reform. / Dissertation (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Unrestricted

Malgré le peu de fondements écrits consacrés à la justice dans le texte de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, le Conseil constitutionnel, en réalisant un travail d’actualisation à partir de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, a permis l’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel processuel, construit autour de principes directeurs. Ceux-ci peuvent être répartis dans trois catégories : deux principales, selon que l’acteur du procès prioritairement concerné soit le juge ou les parties et une troisième, complémentaire, celle des garanties procédurales, permettant de favoriser les qualités essentielles du juge et de contrôler le respect des droits des parties. Une gradation des exigences du Conseil constitutionnel est discrètement perceptible entre les deux premières catégories de principes, plus facilement identifiable entre celles-ci et la dernière famille. Cette échelle décroissante de « densité » des principes directeurs du procès témoigne d’une véritable politique jurisprudentielle en matière de droit constitutionnel processuel, qui met l’accent sur l’accès au juge, doté des qualités indispensables à l’accomplissement de sa mission juridictionnelle. Toutefois, aussi satisfaisante que soit l’action du juge constitutionnel français à l’égard du droit du procès, celle-ci nécessiterait aujourd’hui le relais du constituant, afin de moderniser le statut constitutionnel de la justice. / In spite of a relatively low number of written dispositions dedicated to justice inside of the body of the Constitution of October 1958 4th, the constitutional Council, while updating this text through the Declaration of Human Rights, contributed to the development of a procedural constitutional law, which is structured around guiding principles. Those principles can be classified within three different categories : two major categories depend on the trial actor that is primarily concerned, either the judge or the parties; a third and additional category pertaining to procedural protections, fosters the essential qualities of the judge and secure the protection of the parties’ rights. A gradation of the requirements of the constitutional Council is discreetly perceptible between the first two categories of principles, and more easily identifiable between those first two categories and the last one. This decreasing scale of “density” yoked to the trial guiding principles highlights a genuine judicial policy when it comes to procedural constitutional law, emphasizing access to the judge, whom is given essential qualities in order to achieve its judicial duty. However, the action of the French constitutional judge, as satisfactory as it is towards the rights of the trial, would easily support the intervention of the constituent power in order to update Justice’s constitutional status.

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage. / The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights.