Murdoch&rsquo / s fiction has been influenced by dramatic elements, particularly comic elements. This influence has been revealed as parody. Murdoch parodies the comic character types of the eiron, alazon, buffoon and agroikos by exaggerating and mixing their functions and themes of love, separated lovers and metamorphosis in her novels, The Nice and the Good, The Black Prince, and The Sea, The Sea. In addition, she makes parodic uses of Shakespearean plays, As You Like It and Love&#039 / s Labour&#039 / s Lost, Hamlet, and The Tempest, in her novels in question. Her use of parody as a weapon against the genre of romantic comedy, its character types and main themes is the result of her philosophical view of drama and the dramatic. She argues that comedy and tragedy deal with appearance whereas drama and the dramatic ought to involve reality. In her novels in question, she shows that the dramatic is the conflict of selfish self with itself to reach self-knowledge. Murdochian self- knowledge is the knowledge of what lies beyond self. This kind of knowledge is achieved by unselfing, a process through which a solipsistic self recognizes its solipsism and challenges it by means of love and art.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work aims to elaborate on solipsism how philosophical problem and attempt to overcome as from the Husserlian phenomenology. We leave the analysis of the concept of solipsism and then describe the place that it occupies in the philosophies of Augustine, Descartes and Husserl. Then will deal about intersubjectivity in Husserl as an attempt to overcome. We stress the importance of the discussion that Husserl gives the question the other and, therefore, to examine thinkers Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Waldenfels overcoming ethical solipsism. In order to achieve such objective, we will make a reconstructive and immanent analysis, divided into three parts, of the aspects relevant to this issue, as well as some of the critical readings available. First we show the Husserl s philosophical trajectory, the basic aspects of its phenomenology regarding the question of solipsism and is carried out as an attempt to overcome through intersubjectivity. Thus, at first we will try to thematize the concept of solipsism in general, passing by the subjectivist philosophies of nature as Augustine and Descartes. Following the central concepts of phenomenology will be analyzed, as well as the distance a head of the philosophical tradition and its possible response to solipsism. Finally, we analyze how proposal from the Husserlian intersubjectivity, is forwarded to the question of intersubjectivity in the philosophies of Merleau-ponty, Levinas and Bernhard Waldenfels to overcome charges of solipsistic and put the ethical treatment required with respect to others. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo dissertar sobre o solipsismo como problema filosófico e a tentativa de superação a partir da fenomenologia husserliana. Partiremos da análise do conceito de solipsismo e em seguida descrevemos o lugar que o mesmo ocupa nas filosofias de Agostinho, Descartes e Husserl. A seguir trataremos acerca da intersubjetividade em Husserl como tentativa de superação. Destacamos a importância da discussão que Husserl dá a questão do outro e, com isso, analisar com os pensadores Merleau-Ponty, Levinas e Waldenfels e a superação ética do solipsismo. Com vistas a atingir tal objetivo, faremos uma análise reconstrutiva e imanente, dividida em três partes, dos aspectos pertinentes para esta temática, bem como na literatura crítica disponível. Descreveremos a trajetória filosófica de Husserl, os aspectos básicos de sua fenomenologia no que concerne a questão do solipsismo e como é realizada a tentativa de superação por meio da intersubjetividade. Dessa forma, em um primeiro momento trataremos de tematizar o conceito de solipsismo em geral, perpassando pelas filosofias de cunho subjetivistas como Agostinho e Descartes. A seguir os conceitos centrais da fenomenologia serão analisados, assim como o distanciamento destes frente à tradição filosófica e sua possível resposta ao solipsismo. Ao final, analisaremos o modo como, a partir da proposta husserliana da intersubjetividade, é encaminhada a questão da intersubjetividade nas filosofias de Merleau-Ponty, Levinas e Bernhard Waldenfels a fim de superar a acusação de solipsista e colocar o tratamento ético necessário com relação a outrem.

Esta dissertação procura destacar e compreender a função da noção de corpo na filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, especialmente em suas reflexões consagradas à metafísica e à teoria do conhecimento. O corpo é melhor compreendido e ao mesmo tempo destacado, no interior do sistema schopenhaueriano, quando se percebe que sua função está vinculada ao posicionamento do filósofo em relação à chamada polêmica da coisa em si do período pós-kantiano. A introdução da noção de corpo permite a Schopenhauer combater os dois desafios legados por essa polêmica: por um lado, o corpo ajuda a erigir uma teoria do conhecimento que não pretende recair num dogmatismo consistente na afetação da sensibilidade pela coisa em si; por outro lado, o corpo aparece ao mesmo tempo como via de acesso ao em si e como operador central de um argumento de analogia que, ao possibilitar o reconhecimento da coisa em si em todos os fenômenos, combate diretamente o solipsismo. / The present thesis propounds the spotting and comprehension of the function of the notion of body in Arthur Schopenhauers philosophy, particularly in regard to his reflections upon metaphysics and epistemology. The body is better understood through the awareness of the fact that in Schopenhauers set of ideas the function of the body is entwined with the philosophers view on the so-called controversy about things in themselves from the post-kantian period. The introduction of the concept of body provides Schopenhauer with authority to negate two obstacles thrived on that controversy. On the one hand, the body fosters a knowledge which does not intend to be led to a dogmatism of the affection of sensibility by things in themselves, but on the other, the body is here reckoned as a means to access the thing in itself and as the core of an analogy argument which nullifies solipsism whilst favours the recognition of things in themselves in every phenomenon.

Esta dissertação procura destacar e compreender a função da noção de corpo na filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, especialmente em suas reflexões consagradas à metafísica e à teoria do conhecimento. O corpo é melhor compreendido e ao mesmo tempo destacado, no interior do sistema schopenhaueriano, quando se percebe que sua função está vinculada ao posicionamento do filósofo em relação à chamada polêmica da coisa em si do período pós-kantiano. A introdução da noção de corpo permite a Schopenhauer combater os dois desafios legados por essa polêmica: por um lado, o corpo ajuda a erigir uma teoria do conhecimento que não pretende recair num dogmatismo consistente na afetação da sensibilidade pela coisa em si; por outro lado, o corpo aparece ao mesmo tempo como via de acesso ao em si e como operador central de um argumento de analogia que, ao possibilitar o reconhecimento da coisa em si em todos os fenômenos, combate diretamente o solipsismo. / The present thesis propounds the spotting and comprehension of the function of the notion of body in Arthur Schopenhauers philosophy, particularly in regard to his reflections upon metaphysics and epistemology. The body is better understood through the awareness of the fact that in Schopenhauers set of ideas the function of the body is entwined with the philosophers view on the so-called controversy about things in themselves from the post-kantian period. The introduction of the concept of body provides Schopenhauer with authority to negate two obstacles thrived on that controversy. On the one hand, the body fosters a knowledge which does not intend to be led to a dogmatism of the affection of sensibility by things in themselves, but on the other, the body is here reckoned as a means to access the thing in itself and as the core of an analogy argument which nullifies solipsism whilst favours the recognition of things in themselves in every phenomenon.

In my diploma thesis I deal with the topic of experience of another person from the phenomenological philosophical point of view. The two major motives of my diploma thesis are: the revelation of the shift in thinking of Edmund Husserl in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and showing that Merleau-Ponty went way beyond Husserls thinking. In the first chapter I clarify what Husserls term 'empathy' meant in his Cartesian Meditations and how this conception follows the theory of Theodor Lipps. Then I explaine Husserls thinking of intersubjectivity from the book Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Second Book. In the third chapter I describe the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the work of Merleau-Ponty. The fourth chapter is an interpretation and subsequent comparison of both authors. My main aim is to show that Merleau-Pontys comprehension of 'intercorporeity' surpasses Husserls conception of intersubjectivity. The final chapter displays the critical thinking of my opinion according to Zahavis interpretation of Merleau-Pontys philosophy, from Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. In this diploma thesis I bring the analysis of one source of thinking about the experience of another person to an end. I have accomplished the imaginary circle...

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The aim of this sociological study is to understand whiteness in relation to available selections of makeup products. The research was made in a small town in Sweden. Data has been gathered from local stores and their selection of makeup with availability of makeup that resembles and matches ones own skin color. The theory includes earlier studies that are considered relevant for the study and also historical background. This is used to explain how whiteness is produced and reproduced and the notion of Swedes as white and discoures therein. The result show that 99 percent of makeup available is for white skin not for dark skin. The reproduction of whiteness directly dictates the available selection of makeup. This confirms the aim of the study that dark skin is excluded and that whiteness in relation to available makeup. / Uppsatsen undersöker hur utbud av foundation i en svensk småstad kan förstås i relation till normer om vithet. Utbudet hos samtliga butiker i staden har räknats. För att förtydliga vilka hudfärger som analyseras i uppsatsen används som analysverktyg en ”karta” över hudfärger, avsedd för konsumenter att finna sin rätta foundation utifrån vilken hudfärg som mest liknar sin egen. Teoridelen innehåller tidigare studier som anses vara relevanta analysverktyg för att kunna besvara syftet. Inläsning av studier om vithetsnorm samt inläsning av historia har ansetts relevant för att förstå de strukturer och relationer som har inverkan på normer om vithet. Teoridelen sammanfattar och presenterar därför relevant historia, om hur föreställningen om svensken som vit skapats och presenterar olika diskurser som skapar och reproducerar vithet. Resultatet visar att en procent av utbudet riktas till mörkhyade medan 99 procent är för ljus hy. Cirkeldiagram och tabeller över utbudet av foundation skapades för att tydliggöra redovisning av resultatet. Socialt skapade strukturer om svensken som vit syns tydligt i resultatet. Resultatet förstås i relation till de strukturer som skapas socialt för att producera och reproducera vithetsnormen. Genom ett nästan uteslutande av mörkhyade tolkas resultatet som en föreställning om svensken som vit och att det är en rådande vithetsnorm som påverkar utbudet. Den historiska kontexten påverkar därmed parallellt med de rådande diskurser som avgör vad vitheten gör. Studien anser därmed ha besvarat sina frågeställningar om hur utbudet av foundation kan förstås i relation till vithetsnorm.

This dissertation analyzes the solipsism subject in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein, exploring its possible interpretations and the result of each of them. While solipsism is held to be true and likely to match the realism, although it is not possible to be approached by the language with meaning, which is carried forward in the mystical and showed fields and where we encounter the metaphysical subject, the one that thinks, represents but does not exist as object alongside other objects. Since then, we will demonstrate that it is not possible for Wittgenstein to use the term solipsism in a usual manner, but in a different format, where it can be conceivable the me (solipsism) and the world (realism) simultaneously and in harmony, and the acceptance of other minds in the world. Thus being able to know the truth of solipsism through the mystical feeling. / A presente dissertação analisa o tema do solipsismo no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein, explorando algumas possíveis interpretações e suas decorrências. O solipsismo é tido como verdadeiro e passível de coincidir com o realismo, mesmo não sendo possível de ser abordado pela linguagem com sentido, o que o faz transitar pelos campos do místico e do mostrável, onde nos deparamos com o sujeito metafísico, aquele que pensa, representa mas não existe como um objeto ao lado dos demais. Tentaremos mostrar não ser possível para o Wittgenstein do Tractatus fazer uso do termo solipsismo de uma forma usual, mas sim de uma forma diferenciada, onde possa ser concebível o eu (solipsismo) e o mundo (realismo) ao mesmo tempo e em harmonia, bem como a aceitação de outras mentes no mundo, podendo-se, assim, conhecer a verdade do solipsismo através do sentimento místico.

La rencontre entre Wittgenstein et Schopenhauer était inéluctable dans la Vienne « fin-de- siècle », fascinée par le philosophe allemand et lasse des exigences d’une rationalité néo-kantienne non exempte de contradictions. Mais le héraut de la volonté aveugle et sans but laisse un héritage difficile à assumer, dans lequel la quête du sens de l’existence et les problèmes d’identité interfèrent avec les conditions très strictes imposées à l’exercice de la pensée et aux formes de la représentation, dominées dans la culture moderne par la recherche incessante des causes et l’idéal de la science. L’exigence éthique et esthétique de Wittgenstein l’incite en réponse à mettre à nu les origines et le développement de toute activité intellectuelle et philosophique. Il suit ainsi d’abord la piste proposée par Schopenhauer à l’intellect en quête d’objectivité et de repos, celui de l’artiste ou du génie osant s’avancer aux limites de la représentation, dans la pure contemplation des idées. Mais ce chemin passe aussi tout près des frontières de la maladie mentale, et l’apaisement de la contemplation intellectuelle passive et détachée de la volonté peut basculer à tout instant dans le chaos d’une forme morbide de désengagement du monde, d’un solipsisme non seulement théorique mais vécu. Wittgenstein peu à peu identifie le solipsisme comme l’archétype de la maladie philosophique, conduisant les jeux de langages à se détacher des formes de vies et des comportements instinctifs qui les ont engendrés. Sa propre vocation philosophique se manifeste au cours de ce processus thérapeutique, comme l’expression d’une lutte vigilante contre les tentations réflexives de l’entendement et un retour humble à l’action dans la vie ordinaire. / Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer’s meeting was inescapable in the ‘End-of-Century’ Vienna, fascinated by the German philosopher and tired by the demands of neo-kantian rationality, itself not immune to contradiction. But the herald of blind and pointless will left a burdening inheritance, in which the quest for the meaning of existence and the problems of identity interfered with the very strict conditions imposed upon the practice of thought and the forms of representation, which, in the modern culture, are dominated by the relentless search for causes and by the ideal of science. Wittgenstein’s ethical and esthetic demands lead him, in answer, to reveal the origins and the development of any intellectual and philosophical activity. At first, he follows Schopenhauer’s path for the intellect looking for objectivity and rest, that of the artist or the genius daring enough to tread at the limits of representation, in the pure contemplation of ideas. But this path comes very close to the frontiers of mental illness, and at any moment, the soothing of passive intellectual contemplation, detached from will, may fall in the chaos of a morbid form of worldly disengagement, that is, of a not merely theoretical solipsism, but also lived. Wittgenstein gradually identifies solipsism as the archetype of philosophical illness, leading his language games to come apart from the forms of life and instinctive behaviors which fostered them. His own philosophical calling is made manifest through this therapeutic process, which expresses a vigilant struggle against the reflexive temptations of intellect, and a humble return to language and action in ordinary life.

A transcript of the audio that constitutes the work by the same title, along with an introduction and relevant bibliography.