Submitted by Marlene Santos (marlene.bc.ufg@gmail.com) on 2016-12-19T18:02:16Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Francisco Arantes Aranha - 2016.pdf: 1858675 bytes, checksum: 9ca4676e8e798ca2d28434651b6aa234 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2016-12-26T13:09:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Francisco Arantes Aranha - 2016.pdf: 1858675 bytes, checksum: 9ca4676e8e798ca2d28434651b6aa234 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-26T13:09:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Francisco Arantes Aranha - 2016.pdf: 1858675 bytes, checksum: 9ca4676e8e798ca2d28434651b6aa234 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-23 / On June 9th, 1964, it was created in São Paulo the National Association for Economic and Social Development (ANPES). ANPES was a think tank which main aim was to conduct surveys and technical studies that permanently assess the economic politics of the government, but also aimed to suggest measures and guidelines through a better understanding of the reality investigated, bearing in mind, primarily, to accelerate the capitalist development in Brazil. In front of this process, there was the career diplomat Roberto de Oliveira Campos, a member of the Brazilian technocracy that intended to combine business activities with academic tasks and planning. In terms of execution, many capitalists - especially people from São Paulo - dissatisfied with the direction and paths that Brazil followed with Goulart government, decided to support the initiative. Therefore, took part in this endeavor: civil engineer Ary Frederico Torres, the military engineer Edmundo Macedo Soares and Silva, industrial and banker John Adhemar de Almeida Prado, the lawyer Lelio Toledo Piza and Almeida Filho, economist and civil engineer Lucas Lopes, agronomist Luiz Simoes Lopes and the entrepreneur (and president of the Commercial Association of São Paulo - ACSP) Paulo de Almeida Barbosa; these technocrats would then assume the vice- presidency of ANPES. Still in this proposal: the banker, industrial and agricultural engineer Theodoro Quartim Barbosa hold the technical board of this association; while the bankers Sérgio Pinho Mellão and Gaston Eduardo Bueno Vidigal, respectively, exerted positions of financial vice president and president of the institution. Meanwhile, the 1964 coup occurred. Campos, who served as first general secretary of this institution, becomes Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination of Castelo Branco’s government. Soon, other technocrats of ANPES are recruited to the military governments. In this dissertation we inquire the relationship of this institution with the establishment of the military dictatorship in Brazil, presenting and justifying, therefore, the need for this historiographical study about the existence of ANPES. / Em 09 de junho de 1964, foi criado em São Paulo a Associação Nacional de Programação Econômica e Social (ANPES). A ANPES foi um think tank cujo intuito era realizar levantamentos e estudos técnicos que avaliassem permanentemente as políticas econômicas de governo, mas que também sugerissem medidas e diretrizes através de um melhor entendimento da realidade investigada, tendo em vista, principalmente, acelerar o desenvolvimento capitalista do Brasil. Na dianteira desse processo, encontrava-se o diplomata de carreira Roberto de Oliveira Campos, um integrante da tecnocracia brasileira que tencionava conjugar atividades empresariais com tarefas acadêmicas e de planejamento. Nos termos em que estava sendo executada, vários capitalistas – sobretudo paulistas –, insatisfeitos com os rumos e caminhos que o Brasil seguia com o governo de João Goulart, decidiram apoiar a iniciativa. Assim, participaram dessa empreitada: o engenheiro civil Ary Frederico Torres, o engenheiro militar Edmundo Macedo Soares e Silva, o industrial e banqueiro João Adhemar de Almeida Prado, o advogado Lélio Toledo Piza e Almeida Filho, o economista e engenheiro civil Lucas Lopes, o engenheiro agrônomo Luiz Simões Lopes e o empresário (e então presidente da Associação Comercial de São Paulo - ACSP) Paulo de Almeida Barbosa; tecnocratas esses que assumiriam os postos de vice-presidentes da ANPES. Ainda nesta proposta: presidiu o conselho técnico-administrativo desta Associação o banqueiro, industrial e engenheiro agrônomo Theodoro Quartim Barbosa; enquanto os banqueiros Sérgio Pinho Mellão e Gastão Eduardo de Bueno Vidigal, respectivamente, exerceram os cargos de vice-presidente financeiro e presidente da instituição. Nesse ínterim, dá-se o golpe de 1964. Campos, que exerceu a função de primeiro secretário geral dessa instituição, se torna ministro do Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica do governo Castelo Branco. Em pouco tempo, outros tecnocratas da ANPES são recrutados para os governos militares. Nesta dissertação indagamos a relação dessa instituição com a instauração da Ditadura Militar no Brasil, apresentando e justificando, portanto, a necessidade deste estudo historiográfico sobre a existência da ANPES.

The theoretical conflict between democracy and technocracy (rule by those with knowledge or skill) is an issue of ever-present interest in political science and democratic theory. In recent decades, much scholarship has shown that the influence of science and scientists over politics has grown more and more significant, in different ways. However, what seems to be an overlooked and understudied aspect of this relationship is how the scientific community, theoretically integral to technocratic forms of power due to their role as producers and first-hand disseminators of knowledge, themselves think and feel about their role in society and in relation to politics. This thesis seeks to remedy this perceived gap in the literature using a qualitative interview study with a number of professors from different fields at one Swedish university. It finds that the respondents are clearly sceptical about the feasibility of advancing scientists to positions of authority (i.e., technocracy), while at the same time emphasising scientific knowledge as an important or the pre-eminent basis for policy-making. In an attempt to remedy a priori theoretical insufficiencies and capture respondents’ expressed attitudes, the analysis culminated in two propositional theoretic models of decision making.

Les thèses de l'autonomie de la technique et l'identification du progrès au progrès technique ont exclu la notion de démocratie du champ de la réflexion de la philosophie politique sur les sciences et les techniques, au profit de conceptions technocratiques. Ce sont alors l'histoire et la sociologie des techniques qui ont essentiellement abordé les relations entre technique et démocratie. En examinant leurs travaux, nous montrons à la fois l'importance des facteurs socio-culturels pour expliquer le développement technique d'une société et l'existence d'une forme faible de déterminisme par lequel les techniques structurent les relations sociales. La possibilité et la pertinence qu'il y a à faire de la technique un objet du débat démocratique apparaît alors à double titre : d'une part, elle engage chaque société sur le chemin d'un mode de développement que les citoyens doivent pouvoir discuter et, d'autre part, elle est déjà un objet de politique puisqu'elle est concernée par des législations et constitue, sous la forme de l'innovation, un élément majeur des projets politiques nationaux et internationaux. Nous montrons que, confrontée à différentes critiques, la démocratie technique doit être complexifiée afin de ne pas s'en tenir à une réflexion sur l'expertise et la compétence et de pouvoir répondre aux enjeux des conditions juridiques, économiques et épistémiques de la production des savoirs et des innovations comme aux enjeux classiques de la démocratie en général dont elle constitue un approfondissement vers un nouveau champ, celui de la définition du progrès. / The topic of democracy has been excluded from thinking about sciences and technologies in political philosophy by the idea of an autonomous technology and the identification of technical progress to progress itself. Instead, technocratic conceptions of power have been examined. Consequently, it is in history and sociology of technology that we can find considerations on relationship beteween technology and democracy. By analysing how they conceive this relation, we show both the importance of socio-cultural factors to explain technical development of society and existence of a weak version of determinism which implies that technologies shape social relationships. Then, we can understand that there is two reasons which explain why making technology an object of democratic debate is possible and relevant: first, technology commit society on a development path that citizens should be entitled to discuss; second, it is already a political object for it is adressed by legislations and, as innovation, is a key element of national and international political objectives. We point out technical democracy, given the critics it receveid, has to become more complex in order no to be limited to thinking about expertise and skill and to be able to adress what is at stake in the economic, juridic and epistemic conditions of knowledge and innovation production as well as what is at stake in the classic thinking about democracy. For technical democracy is a way to enlarge democracy to new topics, particularly to the question of how to define progress.

This paper focuses on ministers as government executives, paying special attention tothe case of Peru after the fall of Alberto Fujimori’s rule. This exploratory perspective seeks to provide a look over the political and technical characteristics of these executive corps in recent governments as well as the variation in their stability. In that sense, the purpose of this paper is (1) to describe their demographic and professional characteristics; and (2) analyze some indicators of ministerial stability and cabinet configuration. For this purpose a database of ministers (1990- 2014) is used, focusing the analysis in democratically elected governments after Fujimori (2001-2014). / Este artículo se centra en los ministros de Estado como ejecutivos del gobierno, prestando especial atención al caso peruano luego de la caída del régimen de Alberto Fujimori. Desde esta perspectiva exploratoria se busca proporcionar una mirada sobre las características políticas y técnicas de estos cuerpos ejecutivos en los últimos gobiernos, así como sobre la variación en la estabilidad de estos cargos en los tres últimos períodos. En ese sentido, el propósito de esta investigación es (1) presentar de manera descriptiva las características demográficas, políticas y profesionales del cuerpo ministerial peruano; así como (2) analizar indicadores sobre la estabilidad ministerial y la configuración de los gabinetes. Para ello se utiliza una base de datos sobre ministros de Estado (1990-2014) y se observan principalmente los gobiernos democráticamente electos luego de la caída de Fujimori (2001-2014).

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:14:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Arissane Damaso Fernandes.pdf: 1420009 bytes, checksum: 44799ec735e444621601af89ffb41ed7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-06 / Ignácio Rangel played an important role in the consolidation of so-called conditions of capitalist production in Brazil, mainly in the years 1950-1970. As economic adviser of President Getúlio Vargas (between 1952 and 1954), he participated in the elaboration of projects of Petrobras and Eletrobras, he also headed the Economics Department of the BNDES (which at the time, played the role that years later would be of the Ministry of Planning) and participated in the drafting of the Plan of Goals in government of Juscelino Kubitschek. However, he remains unknown by most historians (and academics in general). The intent of this study is precisely to rescue the historical aspect of the theory rangeliana, which, while presenting an interpretation of Brazilian reality had a specific goal: to intervene in reality through analysis that sought effective proposal of action. The central objective of this study is, thus, understand political-institutional performance and the significance of the trajectory of Ignacio Rangel to the history of Brazil. / Ignácio Rangel desempenhou um papel fundamental na consolidação das chamadas condições de produção capitalistas no Brasil, essencialmente nos anos 1950-1970. Como assessor econômico do presidente Getúlio Vargas (entre 1952 e 1954), ele participou da elaboração dos projetos da Petrobrás e da Eletrobrás, ele também chefiou o Departamento de Economia do BNDES (que, na época, desempenhava o papel que, anos depois, caberia ao Ministério do Planejamento ) e participou da elaboração do Plano de Metas, no governo de Juscelino Kubitschek. Entretanto, ele permanece desconhecido por grande parte dos historiadores (e dos acadêmicos de maneira geral). A intenção deste estudo é a de justamente resgatar o aspecto histórico da teoria rangeliana, a qual, ao apresentar uma interpretação da realidade brasileira tinha um objetivo concreto: intervir nessa realidade através de uma análise que buscava proposta efetiva de ação. O objetivo central deste estudo é, portanto, compreender a atuação político-institucional e o significado da trajetória de Ignácio Rangel para a história do Brasil.

[pt] O presente trabalho almeja problematizar os déficits democráticos existentes na jurisdição constitucional, partindo da premissa de que o direito decidido pelas Cortes, sob certas condições, pode ter o mesmo efeito desmobilizador sobre o mundo da vida que os sistemas clássicos de ação estratégica (dinheiro e poder), caso utilize o saber jurídico especializado como meio difusor de ideologias disfarçadas pela técnica. Chamaremos a atenção para os riscos envolvendo uma atuação tecnocrática dos tribunais para as relações sociais, no sentido de juridificá-las, e, por conseqüência, subtrair dos atores a deliberação acerca dos rumos de sua comunidade, se valendo, para tanto, de uma suposta neutralidade da norma, capaz de ocultar o exercício elitista de poder político. Para fundamentar a nossa hipótese, será feita a reconstrução dos processos de modernização das sociedades tradicionais, passando pelo Estado liberal até chegar na variante intervencionista. O objetivo é identificar como dois processos distintos de acúmulo de razão – comunicativa e instrumental - se tornaram concorrentes e contraditórios na seletividade específica que marcou o capitalismo ocidental, a culminar com a colonização sistêmica do mundo da vida pela burocracia e economia. Feito o diagnóstico das distorções modernas, e para reforçar a crítica inicial à tecnocracia, será descrito um modelo de Estado constitucional que refuta veementemente o uso sistêmico do direito, e o coloca como principal instituição de defesa do mundo da vida contra os assédios funcionais. Um sistema jurídico comunicativamente engajado não comprometeria a resolução dos problemas de reprodução material da sociedade, mas submeteria o uso do poder político ao poder comunicativo, conferindo-lhe legitimidade em virtude da gênese democrática. / [en] The present work aims to problematize the democratic deficits that possibly exits in the abstract judicial review, starting from the premise that the law which is decided by Courts could have the same demobilizing effect over the lifeworld as the classic systems of strategic actions (power and money) if it uses the specific juridical knowledge as a medium to difuse ideologies disguised as technique. We’ll call attention for the risks to social relations involving a technocratic ruling, which could lead to juridification, and thus taking away from the society the task of deliberating their own social goals, and neutralizes a elitist political power using as resource the presumed technical impartiality. To ground our hypothesis, we are going reconstruct the modernization processes of the tradicional societies, through the liberal state up to the welfare state variant, having as purpose the explanation of how two different processes of rational acumulation – communicative and instrumental – became contradictory and concurrent according to the specific capitalism selection, culminating on lifeword’s systemic colonization by bureaucracy and economy. From this diagnose of the modern distorcion, and to reinforce our inicial criticism of technocracy, we are going to describe a constitutional state model which strongly refuses the sistemic use of law, and places it as the main lifeworld’s institution defense against functional steering. A juridic system communicatively engaged would not compromise the problems of material reproduction of society, but at the same time would submit the political and economic power to communicative power, atributing both legitimacy because law’s democratic genesis.

在眾多新聞報導或是學術論文中，描述到改革開放之後中共政治領導精英的資歷特徵時，皆認可現今中共領導人具有技術官僚出身的背景，但到底技術官僚定義為何？又現今中共領導階層果真多為技術官僚？技術官僚治國實能展現與職業官僚(career bureaucrats)迥異的執政風格？針對這些命題，卻是很少學者能夠提出一個完整而清晰的解釋。 針對以上所提出的疑問，形成了本論文的問題意識與架構，除了第一章導論與最後一章結論外，依序可以分成定義、起源、過程、影響四個部分，進一步說明： 一、從定義方面，何謂技術官僚？在第二章「技術官僚理論」中，提出本文對於技術官僚的定義：技術官僚是一個受過科學、技術等相關學科大學以上高等教育者，擁有專業的知識經驗，掌握政治上權力並傾向推動理性化決策機制，致力發展社會經濟。進而觀察技術官僚理論的歷史脈絡，主要分成兩大主軸發展，包括著重於社會專業技術發展背景的「後工業社會理論」以及著重於國家體制轉變的「漸常化理論」。最後，針對技術官僚理論中的兩大爭議，提出本文的看法：在技術官僚與政治技術官僚爭議方面，技術官僚將超越普通官僚佔據政治上的主導地位，因此採取技術官僚的說法是比較適合的；在有關民主化爭議方面，「政治最小化改革論」正說明技術官僚對於民主化的心態。 二、從起源方面，技術官僚在中共領導階層中興起原因為何？在第三章「中共技術官僚興起的背景」中，著眼於中國大陸的獨特性，從宏觀與微觀兩個方面，進行對於中共技術官僚興起原因的闡釋。在宏觀方面，由於技術官僚具備靈活政策執行能力的特性與經濟發展的觀點，讓中共得以應付極權主義衰退、威權主義興起所帶來的衝擊，創造新的合法性以維持統治地位。在微觀方面，鄧小平理論當中紅專論、科教興國論成為指導思想，新型態的幹部遞補制度則淘汰了年老、不具競爭力的革命幹部，建立年輕、具有執行力的幹部隊伍，這些措施皆幫助技術官僚在中共政治舞台上的興起。 三、從過程方面，中共政治領導精英是否為技術官僚？在第四章「中共技術官僚的發展—政治局案例分析」中，以十二大到十六大政治局作為樣本，從汰換率、教育、職業三個指標驗證中共技術官僚的形成，技術官僚在中共政治領導精英當中的發展，主要可分為三個時期：1982-1987年的「醞釀期」、1987-1997年的「成長期」，1997年之後的「成熟期」。時至今日，技術官僚不但佔了政治局委員一半以上，甚至每位政治局常委皆有技術官僚的背景，由此推論技術官僚已佔據中共政治體制當中的主導地位。 四、從影響方面，技術官僚制是否對於中國大陸政治具有影響力？是否真如理論中所言展現出有別於革命幹部新型態的統治方式？在第五章「中共技術官僚制的影響—三峽大壩決策分析」當中，對照改革開放前後三峽大壩決策方式的差異，革命幹部時期領導人是以防洪、國家安全，以及動員式思考的觀點出發，一元化、非專業化地推動三峽大壩的決策過程，專家能夠論證的空間狹小；技術官僚時期則著重三峽大壩對於經濟發展的帶動效應，決策方式較為多元化、專業化，不同領域的專家能夠針對三峽大壩能有較開放的意見討論空間。由此證明技術官僚理論對於解釋中國大陸政治確有其有效性，也解決了長久以來技術官僚制僅限於理論說明而不能提出實證依據的困境。 本文在結論部分回歸理論層次，反思後社會主義時期精英轉型，學界曾提出兩種對立的觀點：精英再生產理論與精英循環理論，若就中共政治領導精英的更替而言，本文支持精英循環理論的觀點，認為舊的革命幹部已被新型態的技術官僚所取代，老幹部們不再繼續掌握政治甚至社會上的權力。另外，在中共技術官僚制發展成熟之後，經濟以及法律相關系統出身的官僚將會逐漸增加，成為未來注意中共精英政治發展新的焦點。 / Numerous news reports or academic papers with describing the political elites in CCP after the open and reform in 1980’s have mostly recognized that nowadays the leaders of CCP have the same background of technocrats. But who’s technocrat? Are most of CCP’s political leaders technocrats? Is technocracy different from bureaucracy? Few scholars have a complete and clear explanation for this. These questions lead to the main idea and structure of the dissertation, except the first and the last chapter, which is divided in four parts: definition, origin, process, and influence. These four parts are as follows: About the definition, what’s the kind of man so-called “technocrat”? In the second chapter “technocratic theory,” the definition of technocrat is: a technocrat is a highly educated person, who majors in science and technical fields in result of having professional knowledge and experiences. He (She) holds political power in hand, inclines to move decision-making machines into rationalization, and devotes himself (herself) faithfully to develop social economics. Following history step by step, the technocratic theory develops toward two main directions: one is the theory of post-industrial society that focuses on the development of professional technology in modern society; the other is the theory of devolution that focuses on the transformation of national system. Moreover, for two arguments in technocratic theory, our points are as follows: about the difference between technocracy and political technocracy, technocrats will be taking much advantage in politics over career bureaucrats so that the version of technocracy is appropriate; political minimalism describes the attitude of technocrat toward democracy. About the origin, why technocrats could rise in the leading class of CCP? The third chapter “the background of CCP’s technocrats,” focusing on the unique of Mainland China, explains the reason from macroscopic and microscopic vision why technocrats rise. From macroscopic vision, because of technocrats’ policy-enforcing capability and economic-developing ability, CCP could not only control the impact that totalitarianism declines while authoritarianism rises but also establish new legitimacy to maintain its governance. From microscopic vision, the theory of “expert is red” and the strategy of “rejuvenate the country through science and education” direct politics elite recruitment system that young and capable elites replace revolutionary cadres. These measures actually help technocracy built in politics of CCP. About the process, are CCP’s political leaders technocrats? In the fourth chapter “the development of technocrats in CCP: a case study of politburo committee,” it examines the formation of technocrats from 12th to 16th politburo members of CCP with three indexes: recruitment, education, and profession. The development of CCP’s technocrats can be divided in three phases: the recessive period from 1982 to 1987, the growing period from 1987 to 1997, the mature period after 1997.Nowadays, technocrats have been more than 50% in politburo members of CCP. What is more, every standing member of politburo is the technocrat and technocrats take great advantage of political system in Mainland China. About the influence, do technocrats have important influence over Chinese politics? Is technocracy different from bureaucracy as the theory describes? The fifth chapter “the influence of CCP’s technocracy: an analysis of the decision-making process of Three Gorges Dam” compares the difference between the decision-making processes of Three Gorges Dam before and after 1980’s: during the period of revolutionary cadres, political leaders focus on the point of view in preventing flood, national security, and mobilization that drive the decision into monopoly, un-profession, and little discussion of experts; during the period of technocracy, political leaders focus on the promotion of booming economy, meanwhile, drive the decision into pluralism, professionalism, and open discussion. From above, it confirms that technocratic theory has its validity for politics in Mainland China and solves the dilemma of only theory but no actual evidence in technocracy. After all, we turn into the level of theory about the elite transformation during post-Communist period that includes two points of view: theory of elite reproduction and theory of elite circulation. As the recruitment of political leading elite in CCP, theory of elite reproduction is a better explanation because old revolutionary cadres, no longer have political even social power, are replaced by the new type of technocrats. Eventually, after technocracy has been developed maturely, elites who are professional in economics and law will become important and attractive points in the research field of CCP’s elite politics in the near future.

Récemment, le Chili a vu la victoire des politiques publiques de prévention et de soins de l'infection à VIH promues par la vérité technique de l'OMS et de l'ONUSIDA (notre acception de la vérité technique a été définie dans les derniers travaux de Michel Foucault). Pourtant, l'histoire récente des politiques de santé du Chili dans notre domaine de recherche nous incite à la prudence. Des questions telles que la responsabilité sociale des dépenses de santé ont connu des va et vient répétés dus aux bouleversements politiques de ces dernières décennies. Certains sujets cruciaux pour la prévention de la transmission verticale du VIH / SIDA, liés à la morale privée et à son influence sur les politiques publiques, comme dans le cas de l'avortement thérapeutique, ont longtemps été influencés par la dose laïcité permise par l'église catholique aux partis politiques chiliens les plus conservateurs. La promotion du préservatif comme seul moyen de prévenir la transmission sexuelle du VIH, simple vérité technique «connue» par les politiques publiques du Nord depuis les années 80, a partagé les campagnes de prévention officielles chiliennes avec abstinence et fidélité jusqu'en 2015. Cependant, si une vérité mérite notre sympathie, elle mérite en même temps l'aversion des secteurs de la population tout aussi respectables que nous. Si nous considérons avec bienveillance une vérité technique qui émerge du débat pour s'imposer comme «la vérité», ignorant que ce qui a vraiment été imposé est le prestige de la technicité, nous ignorons probablement le sens du combat politique comme objet scientifique. / Recently, Chile lived the victory of public policies of prevention and care of the HIV infection as promoted by the WHO’s and UNAIDS technical truth (our meaning of the technical truth has been defined in the latest works by Michel Foucault). Yet the recent history of Chile's health policies in our research matters urges us to be cautious. Issues such as social responsibility of health spending have come and gone according to the political upheavals of the recent decades. Some crucial topics for the prevention of vertical transmission of HIV/AIDS, linked to private values and its influence on public policies, as in the case of therapeutic abortion, has long been under the influence of the dosage of secularity allowed by the catholic church to the most conservative political parties. The promotion of the condom as the only way to prevent the sexual transmission of the HIV, a simple technical truth “known” by the northern public policies since the 80’s, shared the official prevention campaigns with abstinence and fidelity till 2015. However, if a truth deserves our sympathy, it deserves at the same time the aversion of sectors of the population just as respectable as we are. If we consider with kindness a technical truth that emerges from the debate to impose itself as "the truth", ignoring that what has really been imposed is the prestige of technicality, we probably ignore the sense of political struggle as a scientific object.

This thesis is an exploration of liberalism in Romania and in anthropology. Liberalism is frequently represented in contemporary anthropology as a hegemonic technocratic practice, rationalist ideology and hypocritically exclusionary politics. I challenge this representation through an ethnography of a British-Romanian rural revitalisation and conservation programme in the Saxon villages region of southern Transylvania, Romania, and the vernacular liberalism of the cosmopolitan youth who have taken this project up. Douglas Holmes has asserted that in the European Union (EU) in the twenty-first century, communities and people are experimenting with new identity projects that fuse the liberal and illiberal in innovative ways. I trace how the rural revitalisation programme brought together romantic, "integralist" visions of the Saxon villages with the EU's liberal technologies of governance to create a set of projects the value of which could be translated between diverse sets of actors, from British tourists through European bureaucrats and Transylvanian farmers. This provided local youth with the possibility of making a life in their home region in a context of significant economic decline and massive emigration. The seemingly disparate liberal and romantic elements, initially brought together in a transnational context, were "domesticated" by Transylvanian liberals as complementary resources that could be mobilised to combat entrenched problems of Romanian society and modernity, as liberals saw it, notably the failure of the state to provide key services and the stagnation of the public sphere. The state's failures had led liberals to abandon it is a source of hope, turning instead to voluntary action, which made the dilemmas of how to mobilise engaged publics all the more crucial. Village liberals' attempts to foster such publics frequently ended up reproducing their own marginality, however. Against conventional representations of liberalism, I argue that its technocratic pretensions can be an object of hope in a milieu where expertise is perceived to be absent as much as an institutional hegemony. I further conclude that the multiple ways in which the liberal and the romantic are combined challenges dominant images of liberal ideology and practice as purely abstract and formal.

Depuis les années 2000, l’équilibre mondial se trouve confronté à deux menaces majeures, le réchauffement climatique et la fin annoncée des ressources en hydrocarbures, préfigurant un changement de paradigme énergétique imminent. Face aux inquiétudes grandissantes concernant l’équilibre des systèmes énergétiques futurs, de nombreux pays ont récemment vu dans l’industrie nucléaire la solution permettant d’allier système de production stable et faible pollution. Depuis 2006, le Royaume-Uni s’est également engagé dans la voie de la renaissance nucléaire. Toutefois, cette transformation soulève de nombreux questionnements pour une industrie qui a, au cours de l’ère néo-libérale des années 1990, subi de nombreuses transformations provoquées par un désengagement progressif de l’Etat à travers des phases de privatisation, d’agencification et de déstructuration. Selon les théories de la gouvernance, ces processus sont les symptômes d’une érosion pérenne et profonde des pouvoirs de l’Etat centralisateur, dont les leviers d’action ont été émoussés et qui ont été vidés de leur substance (hollowed out). Dans la mesure où la renaissance nucléaire britannique est conditionnée par un soutien étatique fort, le cas britannique constitue un exemple de choix afin de tester cette théorie. À travers une mise en perspective historique et selon une approche systémique, cette recherche analyse l’évolution des politiques électronucléaires britanniques de 1979 à 2015. Son objectif sera de démontrer que, depuis la fin des années 2000, la relance du nucléaire a déclenché la réactivation des mécanismes de leadership étatique, malgré la permanence des principes de primauté des marchés et de concurrence vertueuse. Il s’agira alors d’identifier ce nouveau paradigme qui a émergé depuis le milieu des années 2000, au sein des relations entre l’État britannique, la société civile, l’industrie nucléaire nationale et les marchés. Cette nouvelle dynamique se caractérise par des pratiques dorénavant hybrides d’action politique, telles que des formes innovantes de gouvernance technocratique, de néo-corporatisme et de néo-keynésianisme. / Since the turn of the century, the threats of climate change and the future depletion of the world’s oil reserves have triggered mounting concerns over a looming energy crisis, foreshadowing a shift in energy paradigm. Many industrial nations have recently turned to nuclear power as a possible low-carbon and stable means of producing electricity. In 2006 the UK became a new player in this worldwide nuclear renaissance. However, the UK nuclear industry was greatly weakened during the neo-liberal era of the 1990s, when its previously monopolistic structure was dismantled and privatised. According to governance theories, such practices underscore how the State has essentially been hollowed out and has seen its capacity to interfere in policy-making greatly eroded throughout the 1990s. Since new nuclear energy projects rely on strong state support, the British situation offers a case in point to test this governance theory. This research explores how the British nuclear power policies evolved from 1979 to 2015 from a historical and systemic angle. It reveals that, since the end of the 2000s, the UK State has managed to revive some of its leadership instruments, despite its attachment to free market principles. A new paradigm is therefore emerging in the relationship between the State, the citizens, the industrial sector and the electricity markets that can be characterised by new innovative and hybrid decision-making practices, involving forms of technocratic governance, neo-corporatism and neo-Keynesianism.