No description available.

La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

Le devoir de coopération s'affirme comme un nouveau concept destiné à faciliter le bon usage des accords contractuels. En élargissant les principes de bonne foi ou d'intérêt commun, il jouxte la notion d'affectio societatis du droit des sociétés. Ce concept s'est particulièrement développé pour appuyer la mondialisation des échanges économiques aussi bien comme guide des parties contractantes dans la bonne administration de leurs relations que comme mode d'interprétation ou de règlement des différends. Le devoir de coopération est un souffle nouveau destiné à rendre implicite une attitude coopérative et non plus antagoniste des parties. Le domaine de.la franchise internationale est une , bonne illustration de ce nouveau concept: les parties au contrat de franchise internationale doivent s'adapter au marché local par exemple, ce qui nécessite à l'évidence une attitude entrepreneuriale coopérative. Le devoir de coopération peut être conçu comme une notion clef de la bonne exécution contractuelle. Il est en tout cas déjà consacré comme tel en droit contractuel international où il agit comme source de droit supplétive lorsque la lettre du contrat s'avère insuffisante. / The duty to cooperate is emerging as a new legal concept intended to facilitate the performance of contractual agreements. By broadening the principles of good faith or common interest, the notion of cooperation could be seen as analogical to the notion of affectio societatis in the right of societies? This notion has developed in particular to support the globalization of economic exchanges, not only as a guide for contracting parties in the proper administration of their relationship, but also as a mode of interpretation or for dispute resolution. The duty to cooperate is an innovative notion designed to create an implicit cooperative, no longer antagonistic , attitude among the parties. This is could be best demonstrated by examining its development in the field of international franchising : for example, the parties to an international franchising agreement must adjust their business plan to the local market and culture, which obviously necessitates a cooperative entrepreneurial attitude. The dut y to cooperate should be understood as a key element in the proper performance of contractual agreements. It has already been acknowledged as such normative compone nt in international contractual law where it serves as a suppletive law in those cases where the letter of the contract is insufficient. / Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

In this study author examines the regulation of obligation, arising from damages caused by misleading advertising. He also tries to reveal the content of liability for damages caused by misleading advertising and to clear out the possible problems of application and interpretation of the legal standards.This study deals with the backgrounds and development of advertising regulation and advertising regulation in the European Union. The present study also takes up with the constitutional grounding of restriction of advertising as a form of information, it analyses the Lithuanian legal acts, regulating advertising activity, compares administrative and civil liability for violation of prohibition to use misleading advertising.

The aim of the present study was to investigate how the impermanence of contract work affects working lives, self-perceptions and the career strategies of Swedish screenwriters of finding and keeping work. Furthermore, it also explored how screenwriters experience their abilities to exercise authorial leverage over media content. Introducing the concept of “career authoring” to cover different aspects of the professional lives of screenwriters such as managing a career, establishing authorship and contractual negotiations, the study was able to embrace various mind-sets and strategies for career success. Combining ethnographical studies and textual analyses the study was able to ascertain that the contingency of the Swedish film and television industries necessitates strategies to cultivate reputations, industrial visibility, consciously receive writing credits and conform to a traditional division of labour. Moreover, the study illuminated the importance of contractual negotiations for career success in terms of both retaining and wavering rights to their work. Strategies for exercise increased authorial leverage were not only confined to the script, but extended beyond the page, where the latter  accentuated processes of reconfiguring traditional conceptions of screenwriters’ abilities to influence media content.

Trata-se de dissertação elaborada com o escopo de identificar os efeitos da denúncia unilateral exercida no âmbito dos tipos contratuais instrumentalizados ao processo de distribuição de bens e serviços, a partir do exame das diferenças tipológicas entre cada um deles. Aludidos tipos contratuais correspondem ao de agência, de representação comercial autônoma, de concessão comercial e de franquia, cujos contornos ainda são frutos de intenso debate doutrinário. No ordenamento pátrio, enquanto alguns tipos contratuais não sofreram regulamentação legal, outros tais como o de agência, de representação comercial autônoma, de concessão comercial de veículos autores e de franquia são regulados legislativamente, em fenômeno a que não se assiste em nenhum outro ordenamento da família romano-germânica. A construção da disciplina de tais consequências jurídicas transpassa pela delimitação do âmbito de incidência de cada um desses regimes legais, os quais podem atribuir consequências jurídicas próprias. Os tipos de agência e de representação comercial são equivalentes, o que permite tratá-lo de maneira conjunta, enquanto aqueles de concessão comercial e de franquia, a despeito de apresentarem diferenças relevantes, também podem ser examinados em conjunto pela similar estruturação dos interesses, a despeito de apresentarem peculiares leis regulando-os. Após realizado o exame legislativo e tipológico, examinou-se o impacto do princípio da boa-fé objetiva na determinação dos efeitos desencadeados pela resilição unilateral exercida pelo produtor nos contratos por tempo indeterminado, assim como a influência da previsão do parágrafo único do art. 473 do Código Civil na delimitação desses corolários jurídicos no que tange aos tipos contratuais analisados. Realizado essa investigação, constatou-se que, conquanto existam inúmeros fatores que distanciem, de um lado, os tipos de agência e de representação comercial autônoma e, de outro, de concessão comercial e de franquia, os efeitos desencadeados pela denúncia unilateral são semelhantes, próximos àqueles das relações de duração e nas quais existe estreita confiança. / This dissertation aims to identify the effects of unilateral termination of contractual types exploited under the economic process of distribution of goods and services, from the examination of typological differences between each of these contracts. Alluded contractual types correspond to the agência, representação comercial autônoma, concessão comercial and franquia, which contours are still fruit of intense doctrinal debate. In the Brazilian legal system, while some contractual types suffered no legal regulation, others such as agência, representação comercial autônoma, concessão comercial de veículos automotores and franquia are regulated legislatively, in a phenomenon that it is not witnessed in any other roman-germanic legal system. The construction of the discipline of such legal consequences pierces the scoping incidence of each of these statutory schemes, which may assign legal consequences of their own. It was found that the types of agência and concessão comercial are equivalent, allowing to treat them jointly, while those of concessão comercial and franquia, despite presenting relevant differences, can also be examined jointly as they present a similar structure of interests, despite presenting peculiar laws regulating them. After the legislation and typological examination, it was examined the impact of the principle of good faith in determining the effects triggered by the notice to quit of the producer in contracts for an indefinite period, as well as the determining influence of the sole paragraph of article 473 of the Brazilian Civil Code in the legal definition of these corollaries with respect to the contractual types analyzed. It was found that while there are numerous factors that distance themselves the effects triggered by unilateral withdrawal are similar and close to those of the contracts relational contracts.

Définies comme des pratiques contractuelles abusives dans les rapports entre professionnels, les pratiques restrictives amoindrissent considérablement la capacité concurrentielle du partenaire commercial. Le droit de la concurrence et plus particulièrement, le droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles peut constituer une voie de droit permettant la répression de ces comportements. L’étude menée permet de s’interroger sur l’efficacité de l’entente et des abus de domination, entendus comme concepts d’accueil, afin de lutter contre les pratiques restrictives. Alors même que les abus de domination présentent des points de convergence importants avec la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension est profondément nuancée. Les exigences textuelles inhérentes à la démonstration de l’abus de position dominante (102 TFUE et art. L.420-2, al. 1er du Code de commerce) sont drastiques et l’appréciation de l’abus de dépendance économique en droit français (art. L.420-2, al. 2 du Code de commerce) est si étroite qu’elle ne permet pas de faciliter la captation positive des pratiques restrictives. En outre, la preuve de la restriction de concurrence est difficile à rapporter en présence de comportements qui atteignent, le plus souvent, le simple partenaire contractuel et non le marché entendu dans sa globalité. Paradoxalement, si l’entente apparaît comme un concept peu ressemblant dans ses composantes à la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension y est privilégiée. Afin de faciliter la mutation de la pratique en comportement concerté, les autorités de concurrence procèdent à une lecture généreuse du critère de la concertation. La restriction de concurrence fait également l’objet d’une appréciation compréhensive. Que l’appréhension soit opérée au titre de l’entente ou des abus de domination, des pistes de réflexion sont proposées afin de perfectionner le traitement concurrentiel des pratiques restrictives. / Defined as unfair contractual practices in relations between professionals, restrictive practices significantly undermine the competitiveness of the trading partner. Competition law and, more specifically, antitrust law can be a remedy to the suppression of these behaviours. The study raises questions about the effectiveness of the cartel and abuse of dominance in the fight against restrictive practices. The analysis tends to gauge their understanding through the prism of the two concepts that are cartels and abuse of dominance. Even as abuse of dominance have important points of convergence with the concept of “restrictive practice”, apprehension is deeply nuanced. Textual requirements inherent in the demonstration of the abuse of dominant position (102 TFUE andart. L.420-2, al. 1 of the Commercial Code) are drastic and appreciation of the abuse of economic dependence in French law (art. L.420-2, al. 2 of the Commercial Code) is so narrow that it does not facilitate the positive uptake of restrictive practices. In addition, evidence of the competition restriction is difficult to bring in conduct that reach, in most cases, the mere contractual partner and not the market heard in its entirety. Paradoxically, if the cartels appears to be a bit like concept in its components to the concept of “restrictive practice ", apprehension is preferred. To facilitate the transfer of practice concerted behaviour, competition authorities proceed to a generous reading of the meeting of minds. Competition restriction is also the subject of a comprehensive appreciation. That apprehension is made under the cartel or abuse of dominant position, actionable insights are proposed to improve the competitive treatment of restrictive practices.

Pendant longtemps, le non-professionnel a été considéré comme un professionnel dont la situation de faiblesse était comparable à celle du consommateur et il était protégé comme tel. Or, le juge européen a défini le consommateur comme « visant exclusivement la personne physique ». Cela a conduit le juge français à nuancer sa position ; le non-professionnel est défini comme la personne morale n’exerçant pas d’activité professionnelle. De son côté, la notion de petit professionnel a été consacrée par les textes relatifs au droit de la consommation et au droit de la concurrence. Si ces contractants faibles sont protégés c’est avant tout parce qu’ils peuvent être marqués par une situation de faible économique, technique ou juridique. En tout état de cause la protection n’est accordée que par détermination de la loi et elle doit rester circonstanciée. Dans tous les cas, la protection de ces contractants est spécifiée par l’absence de standardisation car elle ne peut être calquée sur le modèle de protection du consommateur. Partant, la protection de ces contractants faibles est nécessaire contre les abus contractuels. Ainsi, le non-professionnel est essentiellement protégé contre les clauses abusives par l’appréciation du déséquilibre significatif dans les contrats de consommation. Alors que le petit professionnel est protégé par le contrôle du contenu du contrat et surtout contre toutes sortes d’abus dans les pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Aussi, les mécanismes de l’information prévus par le droit de la consommation, le Code civil ou ceux prévus au profit de l’acquéreur non-professionnel ou des non-avertis peuvent être étendus au profit du non-professionnel et du petit professionnel. / For a long time , the non-professional was considered as a professional whose weakness was comparable to that of the consumer and was protect as such. However, the European judge has defined the consumer as « exclusively targeting the natural person ». This led the french judge to qualify his position ; the non-professional is defined as the legal person not exercising a professional activity. For his part, the notion of small business has been enshrined in the text relating to consumer and competition low. If this weak contractors are protected it is primarily because they can be marked by a weak economic, technical or legal situation. In any case, protection is granted only by the determination of the law and must remain detailed. In all cases, the protection of this contractors is specified by the lack of standardization because it can not be modeled on the model of consumer protection. Therefore, the protection of these weak contractors is necessary against contractual abuses. Thus, the non-professional is essentially protected against unfair terms by appreciating the significant imbalance in consumer contracts. While the small business is protected by the control of the content of the contract and especially against all kinds of abuses in anti-competitive practices. Also, the information mechanisms provided by consumer law, the civil Code or those provided for the benefit of the non-professional purchaser or uninformed can be extended to the benefit of the non professional and the small business.

L’art. 62 del d.l. n. 1 del 2012, che riecheggia lo schema della Legge n. 192 del 1998, ma nello specifico settore agroalimentare, prevede non solo regole di forma, che hanno un obiettivo di protezione della parte debole del rapporto (neoformalismo contrattuale), ma anche regole di contenuto e di comportamento, che intendono prevenire la formazione di contratti iniqui. Lo scopo di questo studio non è soltanto quello di offrire un inquadramento sistematico ad una legislazione che, peraltro, si inserisce in un contesto sempre più frammentato, ma anche quello di analizzare i vari strumenti previsti e di valutare la loro capacità nel perseguimento dello scopo prefissato dalla legislazione, anche attraverso l'applicazione della disciplina generale prevista all'interno del codice civile, alla quale oggi, più che mai, si sente il bisogno di ridare spazio. Il lavoro si dipana lungo quattro capitoli, attraverso un percorso che inizia con l’analisi delle relazioni tra contratto e mercato, tramite un’indagine sistematica sulla nuova disciplina dei contratti, prosegue con l’approfondimento della disciplina dell’articolo 62, per poi analizzare gli strumenti introdotti in relazione all’impatto sull’efficienza del mercato, ed in particolare sul settore agroalimentare, in termini di food safety, food security e accesso al credito. / Article 62 of the d.l. n. 1 of 2012, which echoes the scheme of Law no. 192 of 1998, but in the agri-food sector, provides not only rules of form, which have the objective of protecting the weak part of the relationship (neoformalism), but also rules of content and behavior, which intend to prevent the formation of unfair contracts. The aim of this study is not only to offer a systematic framework for legislation that, moreover, is part of an increasingly fragmented context in italian legislation, but also to analyze the various instruments and to assess their ability to achieve the intended purpose, also through the application of the general principal of civil code which today, more than ever, feels the need to be applied. The work unfolds along four chapters, through a process that begins with the analysis of the relationship between contract and market, through a systematic survey on this new discipline of contracts, continues with the examination of the discipline of Article 62, and then analyze the tools introduced and their impact on the efficiency of the market, and in particular on the agri-food sector, in terms of food safety, food security and access to credit.

L’évolution contemporaine du droit privé des contrats est marquée par la multiplication des hypothèses dans lesquelles l’une ou l’autre des parties dispose de la possibilité d’agir seule sur le contenu ou le sort d’un contrat définitivement formé. Par exemple, depuis 1995, il est admis que l’une des parties à un contrat-cadre puisse seule fixer le prix. De même, en cas de manquement grave de l’une des parties, l’autre peut, à ses risques et périls, procéder à la résolution du contrat. Ces deux types de prérogatives contractuelles appartiennent à une catégorie plus large que la doctrine désigne couramment sous le nom de « pouvoirs contractuels ». Or, les pouvoirs contractuels viennent perturber les règles traditionnelles du droit privé des contrats à deux égards. D’une part, les pouvoirs contractuels introduisent une logique unilatéraliste, synonyme d’inégalité, dans le contrat qui répond traditionnellement à une logique consensualiste synonyme d’égalité. D’autre part, le mécanisme des pouvoirs contractuels implique une redéfinition de la place du juge dans le contentieux contractuel puisque ce dernier ne devra plus nécessairement être saisi pour trancher les litiges entre les parties relatifs à l’exécution du contrat. Celui-ci sera saisi postérieurement à la modification des effets du contrat décidée unilatéralement, et ce, par la partie qui entend en contester la régularité. Consacrer une étude aux pouvoirs contractuels suppose donc de chercher à identifier plus précisément ce mécanisme qui vient introduire dans le contrat une logique de pouvoir qui n’est pas la sienne, puis, de tenter de définir les contours de l’intervention du juge. / The contemporary evolution of the private law of contracts is marked by the multiplication of the hypotheses in which one or other of the parties has the possibility of acting alone on the content or fate of a definitively formed contract. For example, since 1995, it has been accepted that one of the parties to a framework contract can only fix the price. Similarly, in the event of a serious breach by one of the parties, the other party may, at his own risk, proceed to the termination of the contract. These two types of contractual prerogatives belong to a broader category that the doctrine commonly refers to as "contractual powers". However, contractual powers disrupt the traditional rules of private contract law in two respects. On one hand, contractual powers introduce a unilateralist logic, synonymous with inequality, in the contract that traditionally responds to a consensualist logic synonymous with equality. On the other hand, the mechanism of contractual powers implies a redefinition of the judge's place in contractual disputes since the latter will no longer necessarily be seized to settle disputes between the parties relating to the performance of the contract. It will be seized after the modification of the effects of the contract decided unilaterally, and this, by the party who intends to contest the regularity. To devote a study to the contractual powers therefore presupposes seeking to identify more precisely this mechanism that introduces into the contract a logic of power that is not its own, and then attempts to define the contours of the judge's intervention.