This thesis is an investigation into the phenomenon which Shozo Ohmori (1921-1997) considered “a peculiar manner of awareness”, and to which he attributed the term ‘fancy’. The objective is to achieve an approximate understanding of Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’, as it relates to awareness of entities in three-dimensional space, and the extensions mentioned in his only publication in English: “Beyond Hume’s Fancy” (1974). This objective will be realized by asking three questions. The first question is how we are to understand the demarcation of the different phenomena of awareness which Ohmori identifies. The second question that this thesis asks is what applications that the phenomenon ‘fancy’ mentioned in Ohmori’s account have, as Ohmori saw it. Having answered these questions, I will then make an assessment of another salient consideration: how does Ohmori’s employment of the term ‘fancy’ relate to Hume’s employment of the same term (seeing as the name of Ohmori’s article makes such a reference). As we shall see, Ohmori is attempting to identify a more specific phenomenon than the widely discussed issue of thinking about something that is not currently perceivable in our perceptual field. The third and final question that this thesis asks is whether there are any salient issues with Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’ and, if so, whether those issues can be resolved. When we are aware of entities in three-dimensional space, we are subject to various mental processes. Our awareness, seemingly, uses different modes of interpretation and orientation. In other words, our ‘point of view’ (which is something that not only pertains to the use of our visual sensory organs) determines both our place and relation towards other entities. One salient issue when considering the notion of awareness is how and by which order awareness emerges. Impressions, as David Hume would call them, seemingly precede our ideas. Sense-data, as Shozo Ohmori phrased it, is unquestionably inseparable from conceptions. Our conceptions, in turn, seem to inform our perceptions with expectations and predictions of how things are. When we perceive an entity, we are ready to make judgements about its being at this moment. When we see the front of a desk, we are ready to claim awareness of said desk-front as part of a desk (which entails the ontology of a desk, namely, being a three-dimensional construction of a particular variety). In everyday situations we simply speak of such an awareness as ‘perception’ when in actuality, all we see (which constitutes the sense-data or content of a perception) is the front of a desk. It seems we cannot regard our awareness of a desk (a three-dimensional entity) as a perception simpliciter. Of course, by having a notion of what a desk is, our awareness is pregnant with a ‘conception’ in the form of an idea that is informing our awareness of said desk. But our conceptual understanding of the notion of something being a desk is not enough to explain what our awareness of a desk-at-this-moment is. At least, that is what Ohmori thought.

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

科学研究費補助金 研究種目:基盤研究(C) 課題番号:07801002 研究代表者:田村 均 研究期間:1995-1997年度

L'espérance se présente comme l'expérience d'un avenir qui n'a pas été encore vécu et qui se donne comme inobjectivable. Cette intuition a commandé la problématique de cette recherche, qui met au jour les conditions de possibilité d'une espérance véritable dans un monde – le nôtre – où elle ne trouve pas immédiatement sa place. Ce monde ''cassé'', comme l'appelle Gabriel Marcel, est sous l'emprise de la technique. C'est un monde où prime l'exigence du faire et où les questions existentielles sont réduites elles-mêmes à des ''problèmes'' qui doivent trouver leur ''solution'' comme n'importe quel problème relevant de l'ordre de l'avoir. Il y a, en ce sens, un ''problème de l'espérance ». Il se développe dans une philosophie qui s'émancipe de la foi et dont on trouve des illustrations notamment dans le probabilisme de Hume et dans le matérialisme de Bloch. Or Gabriel Marcel fait le pari, par la méthode dite de la ''réflexion seconde'', de placer l'espérance sous le sceau du ''mystère''. Il s'agit alors de comprendre que l'espérance, pensée sur le plan de l'être et non plus de l'avoir, relève d'une expérience qui est toujours en cours de formation, et qui ouvre le chemin que suit une personne que définissent sa capacité d'agir, ses relations avec les autres personnes et son aptitude à la responsabilité. Nous soutenons dans ce sens, avec l'appui de Ricœur, que l'identité du sujet de l'espérance est essentiellement intersubjective et ouverte, selon une exigence de fidélité créatrice.  Nous trouvons plus précisément dans le nous familial, comme l'appelle Marcel, la condition de possibilité d'une expérience concrète de l'espérance, comprise alors comme patience d'un présent éprouvant et confiance en un avenir incertain. Renvoyant dos à dos, pour ce faire, les conceptions essentialiste et constructiviste de la famille, nous appelons vœu créateur ce qui, au sein même de la famille, dont nous proposons une conception élargie, est jaillissement du nouveau et promesse de vie. Ainsi nous affirmons que l'espérance, pour invérifiable qu'elle soit, est, mais selon des formes authentiques ou inauthentiques. L'enjeu de ce travail, en reconnaissant cette différence au cœur même de l'espérance, est de comprendre comment celle-ci, plus que comme un ensemble de moyens, se présente fondamentalement comme une mise en route qui se reçoit d'un appel de ou à l'autre, et qui est constitutive de toute action vouée au temps. La présence de cet autre déborde toute tentative d'objectivation. Elle est le lieu intérieur où se vit in fine l'attente active qu'est l'espérance comme expérience ontologique. / Hope appears as the experience of a future which was not still lived yet and which is given as inobjectivable. This intuition has commanded the problematic of this research, which brings to light the conditions of possibility of a true hope in a world – ours – where it does not immediately find its place. This « broken » world, as Gabriel Marcel calls it, is under the influence of technic. It's a world in which prevail the need to do things, and also where existential questions are reduced to ''problems'' which must find their ''solution'' as any other problem come under the order of the possession. In this way, there is a ''problem of hope''. A philosophy is growing which emancipate itself from faith and which illustrations are found in particular in Hume's probabilism and Bloch's materialism. But Gabriel Marcel, by the method said about ''second reflection », bet to place hope under the seal of ''mystery''. It's all about understanding that hope, thought on the plan of ''the being'' and no more of ''the having'' is an experience still on training and which opens the way that follows a person defined by its ability to act, its relations to others and its aptitude to responsibility. In this sense, we support, with Ricoeur's support, that the subject identity of hope is essentially intersubjective and opened, according to a requirement of creative fidelity. We find more exactly in the « I and you familial» as Marcel calls it, the condition of possibility of a concrete experience of hope, understood as patience of a trying present and trust in an uncertain future. Referring back to back, the essentialist and constructivist conceptions of the family, we call creative vow, what within the family, of which we propose an enlarged conception is springing forth for the new and promise of life. So we assert that hope, however unverifiable as it may be, is, but according to authentic and inauthentic forms. The challenge of this work, recognizing this difference at the very heart of hope, is to understand how it, more than as a set of means, is fundamentally a start-up that is received from a call. From one to other, and which is constitutive of all action devoted to time. The presence of this other overflows any attempt at objectification. It is the inner place where the active expectation of hope as an ontological experience is lived.

More than two hundred years ago David Hume together with his fellow philosopher Adam Smith posited, that ethical behaviour arises from so called: "moral sense". In the other words, they share the same idea, that passions are principle evoking and guiding human behaviour. Hume claim: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (…). It is possible that this statement - among others - woke up from the 'dogmatic dream' one of the greatest philosophers of all time - Immanuel Kant, who propose, - contrary to Hume - that reason but not necessary passions can determinate human actions. In the question of what rule the passions in ethics have, it seems to be helpful to use the knowledge which follows from recent science. During this thesis we will use methods such as: comparison, analysis and synthesis. Main aim of this thesis will be to deal with the following question: what relationship can be observed between empathy, "moral sense" and ethical behaviour in perspective of recent science. This enquiry will therefore try to deal with the old question: what the the relationship between reason, passions and ethical behaviour is.

Bibliographical references at end of each chapter / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated. The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law.

本論の目的は、「知覚」的世界の実相の解明を通じて、『人間本性論』におけるヒュームの哲学の基本的枠組みを闡明するところにある。本論文は、印象と観念の差異としての「生気」を因果的力能と捉える解釈を軸とし、次のように展開する。最初に、関係的知覚の構造と、因果の観念の知覚的起源を究明する。それに基づいて、「生気」にかんする因果的解釈を明確化する。最後に、この解釈に依拠して、観念の表象性および真理についての自然主義的な説明を試みる。 / The purpose of this dissertation is to make explicit the basic framework of Hume's philosophy, by clarifying the nature of Humean 'perceptions' upon which his arguments in Treatise are founded. I begin with the hypothesis that the liveliness of perceptions, to which Hume refers to differentiate impressions and beliefs from ideas, is a kind of causal power to produce certain effects. I firstly investigate Hume's view on the perceptions of relations and on the perceptual origin of causal ideas. I then articulate the causal interpretation of liveliness. Finally I pursue its consequences, reconstructing Hume's conception of ideas as representations from a naturalistic point of view about truth and inquiry. / 博士(哲学) / Doctor of Philosophy / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University