Thin amorphous films of binary aluminum-chromium alloys have been produced by flash evaporation and characterized by means of electron diffraction and measurements of transport properties. Beside the known effect of hybridization on the phase stability an additional structure forming mechanism could be identified in the aluminum-chromium alloys and other amorphous binary aluminum-transition-metal alloys as well. A systematical influence of the transition-metal-d-electrons on the plasma resonance energies was found. / Es wurden amorphe Schichten von binären Aluminium-Chrom-Legierungen mit Hilfe abschreckender Kondensation aus der Gasphase hergestellt und einer elektronischen und strukturellen Charakterisierung unterzogen. Neben dem bereits bekannten Einfluss von Hybridisierungsmechanismen auf die Strukturbildung und Stabilität der amorphen Aluminium-Übergangsmetall-Legierungen, konnte ein weiterer Ordnungsmechanismus bei hohen Chrom-Anteilen gefunden werden. Im Vergleich mit anderen, bereits früher untersuchten, binären amorphen Aluminium-Übergangsmetall-Lergierungen, konnte gezeigt werden, dass dieses Verhalten auch dort auftritt. Desweiteren konnte eine Systematik im Einfluss der Übergangsmetall-d-Elektronen auf die Plasmaresonanz der Aluminium-Übergangsmetall-Legierungen gefunden werden.

Thin films of a ternary alloys between aluminum, manganese and copper (AlMnCu), prepared at low temperature, are reported in the present work. It is a study along two binary edges (Al100−xMnx and Al100−xCux (from literature)), the first almost along the entire range of concentrations, and two different cuts through the ternary system. The first cut begins at amorphous Al50Mn50 and adds Cu step by step (from literature). The second cut begins at amorphous Al60Cu40 and varies Al and Mn such that the Cu-content stays constant. There is a wide amorphous range, purely amorphous or with additional quasi-crystalline local features, and there are ranges where mixtures between amorphous and nano- or partially crystalline phases with a high content of lattice defects exist. The work exclusively deals with the development of the static structure and its thermal stability, as well as the development of its electronic transport properties. The ternary AlMnCu is a model for a deeper understanding of different scenarios of structure stabilization and their interaction, with consequences on the emergence of physical properties. The analysis focuses on self-organizing spherical-periodic, global resonance effects between two global subsystems of the alloy under consideration, the Fermi gas as one and the forming static structure of ions as the other. The global resonances are self organizing by i.e. an exchange of characteristic momenta and energy between the subsystems and trigger, besides a particular structure, particle-density anomalies and/or hybridization effects. The work shows strong evidence of a combined action of the particle-density anomalies with the effective valence of the atoms involved, in order to maintain the resonance condition under all circumstances. Whereas at high Al-content, additionally, local features of quasi-crystallinity arise, closer to pure Mn phase separations arise, causing mixtures of amorphous with nano-crystalline phases or crystals with a high content of lattice distortions. Reports on density anomalies, hybridization effects, and angular correlations, have been published quite often. In the present work, besides similar effects in a ternary system, first indications for phase separations and lattice defects as additional scenarios of stabilizing condensed matter are reported. The resonance, seen as spherical-periodic-order at short- and medium-range distances in real space, causes in reciprocal space a resonance maximum (analogous to a Bragg peak in crystals). Its location on the axis of the scattering vector is defined by the electron system and a pseudo-gap in the electronic density of states arise at the Fermi energy. The origin of the structural order and its thermal stability, the pseudo-gap at the Fermi energy, as well as the transport properties with its anomalies, all are attributed to the resonance. The spherically-periodic atomic order in an amorphous phase is analogous to the planar order in a crystal. The interatomic distances between the nearest neighboring shells at short- and medium range distances coincide with half the Fermi wavelength, also called Friedel-wavelength. / In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird über bei niedriger Temperatur hergestellte dünne Schichten aus einem ternären Legierungssystem zwischen Aluminium, Mangan und Kupfer (AlMnCu) berichtet, über zwei binäre Randlegierungen (Al100−xMnx und Al100−xCux (aus der Literatur)) und über zwei verschiedene Schnitte durch den ternären Bereich. Ein Schnitt durch den ternären Bereich beginnt bei amorphem Al50Mn50 und fügt schrittweise Cu zur Legierung (aus der Literatur). Der zweite Schnitt beginnt bei amorphem Al60Cu40 und fügt schrittweise Al und Mn so zu, dass der Cu-Gehalt konstant bleibt. Es gibt amorphe Bereiche, teilweise mit weiteren lokal quasi-kristallinen zusätzlichen Merkmalen, sowie Bereiche, in denen Mischungen aus amorphen mit nano oder teilkristallinen Phasen auftreten. Die Arbeit behandelt die Entwicklung der statischen Struktur und deren thermische Stabilität, sowie die Entwicklung elektronischer Transporteigenschaften. Das ternäre AlMnCu ist ein Modellsystem für ein tieferes Verständnis der verschiedenen Szenarien struktureller Stabilisierung und deren Interaktion, mit Auswirkungen auf ein tieferes Verständnis der mit der Struktur sich entwicklenden physikalischen Eigenschaften. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf sich selbstorganisierende sphärisch-periodische, globale Resonanzeffekte zwischen zwei globalen Untersystemen des gewählten Materialsystems, der Fermi-Kugel als einem und der sich bildenden statischen Struktur der Ionen als dem anderen. Die globalen Resonanzen bilden sich u.a. durch einen Austausch von charakteristischen Impulsen und Energie zwischen den Untersystemen, die neben einer bestimmten Struktur zunächst auch Teilchendichteanomalien und/oder Hybridisierungseffekte erzeugen. Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt dabei starke Anzeichen für eine kombinierte Wirkung dieser Effekte um die Resonanzbedingung unter allen Umständen beizubehalten. Bei hohen Al-Anteilen treten zusätzlich lokale Merkmale von quasi-Kristallinität, mit 5-facher Winkelkorrelation auf, um auch diesen Bereich strukturell zu stabilisieren. Bei hohen Mn-Anteilen sind es lokale Phasentrennung in amorphe und nano-kristalline Phasen oder hohe Anteile von Gitterdeffekten, die zusätzlich auftreten. Über Dichteanomalien, Hybridisierungseffekte und Winkelkorrelationen wurde in der Vergangenheit bereits mehrfach berichtet. In der vorliegenden Arbeit sind es, neben der modellhaften Behandlung dieser im ternären System, die Hinweise zu Phasentrennung und Gitterdeffekten als zusätzliche Szenarien zur Stabilisierung kondensierter Materie, über die erstmalig berichtet wird. Die auf dem Austausch von Impuls beruhende Resonanz, als sphärisch-periodische-Ordnung im nahen und mittleren Abstandsbereich des Ortsraumes zu sehen, verursacht im reziproken Raum ein Resonanzmaximum (analog zu einem Bragg-peak in kristallinen Systemen), dessen Lage auf der Achse der Streuvektoren vom Elektronensystem definiert wird, und eine Pseudolücke in der elektronischen Zustandsdichte der Elektronen an der Fermi-Energie. Letztendlich werden die Entstehung der strukturellen Ordnung selbst, ihre thermische Stabilität, als auch die Transporteigenschaften mit ihren Anomalien auf diese Pseudolücke und demzufolge auf die Resonanz zurückgeführt. Die sphärisch-periodische Ordnung der Atome in einer amorphen Phase ist analog zur planaren Ordnung in einem Kristall. Die Atomabstände zwischen den Nächstnachbarschalen im mittleren, aber auch nahen Abstandsbereich, stimmen über große Distanzen mit der halben Fermi-Wellenlänge überein, die man auch als Friedel-Wellenlänge bezeichnet.

This study explores the rediscovery and development of a tradition of Ciceronian academic scepticism in British philosophy between c.1660-c.1760. It considers this tradition alongside two others, recently recovered by scholars, which were recognised by contemporaries to offer opposing visions of man, God and the origins of society: the Augustinian-Epicurean, and the neo-Stoic. It presents John Locke, Conyers Middleton and David Hume as the leading figures in the revival of the tradition of academic scepticism. It considers their works in relation to those of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, and Bernard Mandeville, whose writings refashioned respectively the neo-Stoic and Augustinian-Epicurean traditions in influential ways. These five individuals explicitly identified themselves with these late Hellenistic philosophical traditions, and sought to contest and redefine conventional estimations of their meaning and significance. This thesis recovers this debate, which illuminates our understanding of the development of the ‘science of man’ in Britain. Cicero was a central figure in Locke’s attempt to explain, against Hobbes, the origins of society and moral consensus independent of political authority. Locke was a theorist of societies, religious and civil. He provided a naturalistic explanation of moral motivation and sociability which, drawing heavily from Cicero, emphasised the importance of men’s concern for the opinions of others. Locke set this within a Christian divine teleology. It was Locke’s theologically-grounded treatment of moral obligation, and his attack on Stoic moral philosophy, that led to Shaftesbury’s attempt to vindicate Stoicism. This was met by Mandeville’s profoundly Epicurean response. The consequences of the neo-Epicurean and neo-Stoic traditions for Christianity were explored by Middleton, who argued that only academic scepticism was consistent with Christian belief. Hume explored the relationship between morality and religion with continual reference to Cicero. He did so, in contrast to Locke or Middleton, to banish entirely moral theology from philosophy.

This thesis is an investigation into the phenomenon which Shozo Ohmori (1921-1997) considered “a peculiar manner of awareness”, and to which he attributed the term ‘fancy’. The objective is to achieve an approximate understanding of Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’, as it relates to awareness of entities in three-dimensional space, and the extensions mentioned in his only publication in English: “Beyond Hume’s Fancy” (1974). This objective will be realized by asking three questions. The first question is how we are to understand the demarcation of the different phenomena of awareness which Ohmori identifies. The second question that this thesis asks is what applications that the phenomenon ‘fancy’ mentioned in Ohmori’s account have, as Ohmori saw it. Having answered these questions, I will then make an assessment of another salient consideration: how does Ohmori’s employment of the term ‘fancy’ relate to Hume’s employment of the same term (seeing as the name of Ohmori’s article makes such a reference). As we shall see, Ohmori is attempting to identify a more specific phenomenon than the widely discussed issue of thinking about something that is not currently perceivable in our perceptual field. The third and final question that this thesis asks is whether there are any salient issues with Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’ and, if so, whether those issues can be resolved. When we are aware of entities in three-dimensional space, we are subject to various mental processes. Our awareness, seemingly, uses different modes of interpretation and orientation. In other words, our ‘point of view’ (which is something that not only pertains to the use of our visual sensory organs) determines both our place and relation towards other entities. One salient issue when considering the notion of awareness is how and by which order awareness emerges. Impressions, as David Hume would call them, seemingly precede our ideas. Sense-data, as Shozo Ohmori phrased it, is unquestionably inseparable from conceptions. Our conceptions, in turn, seem to inform our perceptions with expectations and predictions of how things are. When we perceive an entity, we are ready to make judgements about its being at this moment. When we see the front of a desk, we are ready to claim awareness of said desk-front as part of a desk (which entails the ontology of a desk, namely, being a three-dimensional construction of a particular variety). In everyday situations we simply speak of such an awareness as ‘perception’ when in actuality, all we see (which constitutes the sense-data or content of a perception) is the front of a desk. It seems we cannot regard our awareness of a desk (a three-dimensional entity) as a perception simpliciter. Of course, by having a notion of what a desk is, our awareness is pregnant with a ‘conception’ in the form of an idea that is informing our awareness of said desk. But our conceptual understanding of the notion of something being a desk is not enough to explain what our awareness of a desk-at-this-moment is. At least, that is what Ohmori thought.

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

科学研究費補助金 研究種目:基盤研究(C) 課題番号:07801002 研究代表者:田村 均 研究期間:1995-1997年度

L'espérance se présente comme l'expérience d'un avenir qui n'a pas été encore vécu et qui se donne comme inobjectivable. Cette intuition a commandé la problématique de cette recherche, qui met au jour les conditions de possibilité d'une espérance véritable dans un monde – le nôtre – où elle ne trouve pas immédiatement sa place. Ce monde ''cassé'', comme l'appelle Gabriel Marcel, est sous l'emprise de la technique. C'est un monde où prime l'exigence du faire et où les questions existentielles sont réduites elles-mêmes à des ''problèmes'' qui doivent trouver leur ''solution'' comme n'importe quel problème relevant de l'ordre de l'avoir. Il y a, en ce sens, un ''problème de l'espérance ». Il se développe dans une philosophie qui s'émancipe de la foi et dont on trouve des illustrations notamment dans le probabilisme de Hume et dans le matérialisme de Bloch. Or Gabriel Marcel fait le pari, par la méthode dite de la ''réflexion seconde'', de placer l'espérance sous le sceau du ''mystère''. Il s'agit alors de comprendre que l'espérance, pensée sur le plan de l'être et non plus de l'avoir, relève d'une expérience qui est toujours en cours de formation, et qui ouvre le chemin que suit une personne que définissent sa capacité d'agir, ses relations avec les autres personnes et son aptitude à la responsabilité. Nous soutenons dans ce sens, avec l'appui de Ricœur, que l'identité du sujet de l'espérance est essentiellement intersubjective et ouverte, selon une exigence de fidélité créatrice.  Nous trouvons plus précisément dans le nous familial, comme l'appelle Marcel, la condition de possibilité d'une expérience concrète de l'espérance, comprise alors comme patience d'un présent éprouvant et confiance en un avenir incertain. Renvoyant dos à dos, pour ce faire, les conceptions essentialiste et constructiviste de la famille, nous appelons vœu créateur ce qui, au sein même de la famille, dont nous proposons une conception élargie, est jaillissement du nouveau et promesse de vie. Ainsi nous affirmons que l'espérance, pour invérifiable qu'elle soit, est, mais selon des formes authentiques ou inauthentiques. L'enjeu de ce travail, en reconnaissant cette différence au cœur même de l'espérance, est de comprendre comment celle-ci, plus que comme un ensemble de moyens, se présente fondamentalement comme une mise en route qui se reçoit d'un appel de ou à l'autre, et qui est constitutive de toute action vouée au temps. La présence de cet autre déborde toute tentative d'objectivation. Elle est le lieu intérieur où se vit in fine l'attente active qu'est l'espérance comme expérience ontologique. / Hope appears as the experience of a future which was not still lived yet and which is given as inobjectivable. This intuition has commanded the problematic of this research, which brings to light the conditions of possibility of a true hope in a world – ours – where it does not immediately find its place. This « broken » world, as Gabriel Marcel calls it, is under the influence of technic. It's a world in which prevail the need to do things, and also where existential questions are reduced to ''problems'' which must find their ''solution'' as any other problem come under the order of the possession. In this way, there is a ''problem of hope''. A philosophy is growing which emancipate itself from faith and which illustrations are found in particular in Hume's probabilism and Bloch's materialism. But Gabriel Marcel, by the method said about ''second reflection », bet to place hope under the seal of ''mystery''. It's all about understanding that hope, thought on the plan of ''the being'' and no more of ''the having'' is an experience still on training and which opens the way that follows a person defined by its ability to act, its relations to others and its aptitude to responsibility. In this sense, we support, with Ricoeur's support, that the subject identity of hope is essentially intersubjective and opened, according to a requirement of creative fidelity. We find more exactly in the « I and you familial» as Marcel calls it, the condition of possibility of a concrete experience of hope, understood as patience of a trying present and trust in an uncertain future. Referring back to back, the essentialist and constructivist conceptions of the family, we call creative vow, what within the family, of which we propose an enlarged conception is springing forth for the new and promise of life. So we assert that hope, however unverifiable as it may be, is, but according to authentic and inauthentic forms. The challenge of this work, recognizing this difference at the very heart of hope, is to understand how it, more than as a set of means, is fundamentally a start-up that is received from a call. From one to other, and which is constitutive of all action devoted to time. The presence of this other overflows any attempt at objectification. It is the inner place where the active expectation of hope as an ontological experience is lived.

More than two hundred years ago David Hume together with his fellow philosopher Adam Smith posited, that ethical behaviour arises from so called: "moral sense". In the other words, they share the same idea, that passions are principle evoking and guiding human behaviour. Hume claim: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (…). It is possible that this statement - among others - woke up from the 'dogmatic dream' one of the greatest philosophers of all time - Immanuel Kant, who propose, - contrary to Hume - that reason but not necessary passions can determinate human actions. In the question of what rule the passions in ethics have, it seems to be helpful to use the knowledge which follows from recent science. During this thesis we will use methods such as: comparison, analysis and synthesis. Main aim of this thesis will be to deal with the following question: what relationship can be observed between empathy, "moral sense" and ethical behaviour in perspective of recent science. This enquiry will therefore try to deal with the old question: what the the relationship between reason, passions and ethical behaviour is.

Bibliographical references at end of each chapter / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated. The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law.