Russian application of deception in warfare has an extensive history. A lot of previous research has explored both its application and development through different historical conflicts. However, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea has raised a debate that challenges the classic application of Russian deception methods. Nevertheless, many researchers claim that Russia continues to use traditional methods of warfare and deception, albeit adapted to a modern context.   This thesis explores these claims by a concrete comparison of the application of Russian deception methods during the annexation of Crimea with a successful historical Russian deception operation, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is done by a comparative case study, which breaks down both cases with theoretical support from Barton Whaley's theory of deception. The study validates claims that traditional Russian deception methods are being applied in a contemporary context. What has changed, however, is how the different types of deception mutually support one another and are utilized to achieve synergy effects.

An annexation of landmasses or parts of another country is nowadays a rare case. However, Russia managed to annex parts of Ukraine after a violent and complicated conflict in 2014. There are several different theories and methods of describing Russian warfare and some of them even originate from Russia itself.   This paper aims to apply the Reflexive Control theory, which originated in Russia, and see how well it accounts Russian actions in Ukraine. The analyzation of this theory is necessary because after the annexation of Crimea there has been an increasing interest to describe Russian actions in the science of war discussions.   This is done by first describing different theorists’ approaches and views on the theory and then constructing a template from which this thesis’ analysis is concluded. There are four major contributors to the theory, all of which differ slightly in their description of the theory.   This paper concludes that patterns of Reflexive Control may have been implemented during the conflict in Ukraine. These patterns may also have been present before the conflict, after the annexation and up to present day. / -

Denna studie undersöker hur applicerbara traditionella krigföringsprinciper är på moderna okon-ventionella krig av hybrid karaktär. Krigföringsprinciperna härstammar från konventionella krig, men gör anspråk på att vara allmängiltiga i alla krig. Är de då applicerbara på moderna okonventionella krig av hybrid karaktär? Studien applicerar traditionella krigföringsprinciper på krig av hybrid karaktär i syfte att utforska principernas applicerbarhet i denna tillsynes ”nya” form av krigföring. Studien förhåller sig till Brett A. Friedmans On Tactics: A theory of victory in battle som teoretiskt analysverktyg, detta då hans teori är baserad på traditionella krigföringsprinciper. De två fallstudiernas resultat tyder på att krigföringsprinciperna genom Friedmans teori är applicerbara på okonventionella krig av hybrid karaktär men inte fullt ut. De innehar därmed ett värde som analysverktyg och pedagogiskt verktyg av genomförda eller pågående krig. Teorin skulle kunna utvecklas gällande kategoriseringen av fysiska och mentala principer, där vilseledning borde kategoriseras som en fysisk princip. Eventuellt har teorin större applicerbarhet på den mer offensiva parten i krig på grund av principernas ursprung ur en offensiv tradition.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda vilka förutsättningar som krävs för att ett krigsbrott ska föreligga enligt folkrätten, och illustrera detta genom Rysslands angrepp på Ukraina perioden 2014 fram till idag. Den kvalitativa metoden ligger till grund för arbetet, där information hämtats från folkrättsliga källor, såsom internationell sedvanerätt, konventioner och deklarationer, litteratur, pressmeddelanden och artiklar. Ett krigsbrott är en överträdelse av de seder och lagar som finns i krig. Exempel är attacker mot civila och dess egendom, tagande av gisslan, samt användning av viss typ av stridsmedel. Resultatet av analysen visar att Ryssland har gjort sig skyldiga till en rad folkrättsbrott i Ukraina. Ryssland har inte respekterat suveränitetsprincipen, och de har gjort sig skyldiga till brott mot FN-stadgans våldsförbud. De har attackerat civilbefolkningen vilket strider mot Internationell humanitär rätt. Rysk militär har brutit mot Genèvekonventionen om behandlingen av civila, militära och krigsfångar, och de har utsatt Ukraina för cyberattacker. Omvärlden tog tidigt ställning i konflikten genom att sanktionera bland annat ryska medborgare och företag. Internationella brottmålsdomstolen agerade genom att utfärda en arresteringsorder mot president Vladimir Putin och ryska barnrättskommissionären Maria Lvova-Belova, för deportering av ukrainska barn.

Under det senaste decenniet har Ryssland nyttjat det militära maktmedlet mot forna sovjetstater i syfte att uppnå politiska målsättningar. Skälen till detta är troligtvis flera, där Natos och EUs expandering till Rysslands närmaste intressesfär antas utgöra en väsentlig drivkraft. Den ryska interveneringen i Georgien år 2008 och annekteringen av Krim i Ukraina år 2014, var ur ett svenskt strategiperspektiv oväntade samt överraskande händelser som bidrog till djupgående förändringar av den svenska säkerhetsstrategin. Denna undersökning syftar till att analysera om och i så fall hur, dessa två ryska strategiska chocker har påverkat svensk säkerhetsstrategi under de senaste tio åren. Undersökningen ämnar även ge en ökad förståelse för utformningen av svenska säkerhetsstrategier, dess bakgrund, påverkansfaktorer och förhållande till ryskt geopolitiskt agerande. Denna kunskap skapar även förutsättningar att bättre förstå den aktuella strategin, generella säkerhetspolitiska ageranden likväl som den utgör ett bidrag till analys av framtida strategier. Denna fallstudie nyttjar en referensram som utgår ifrån Jacob Westbergs modell av strategins komponenter, miljö, mål, medel och metod. Genom textanalys studeras fyra analysenheter bestående av officiella säkerhetsstrategier och försvarspropositioner. Undersökningens första analysenhet utgörs av En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet från år 2006 och den sista analysenheten är Nationell säkerhetsstrategi från år 2017 med dess delrapport från år 2018. För att ytterligare berika empirin har även tidigare forskning inom ämnesområdet använts, likväl som rapporter från Försvarsberedningen och Försvarsmakten. Undersökningens slutsatser visar att de två strategiska chockerna har haft en betydande påverkan på svensk säkerhetsstrategi under det senaste decenniet. Chockerna har bidragit till ett skifte från internationella operationer, en solidaritetsdoktrin och ett frivilligt anställt försvar, till ett ökat fokus på närområdet, en form av Östersjöallians samt upprättandet av ett totalförsvar med värnplikt. Rysslands intervenering i Georgien hade dock inledningsvis en blygsam påverkan i jämförelse med annekteringen av Krim, som orsakade ett paradigmskifte inom svensk säkerhetsstrategi. Det framstår som att den första chocken delvis absorberades av en övertro till europeisk säkerhet i kombination med Sveriges 200-åriga tradition av fred samt den rotade synen på neutralitet och alliansfrihet. Den initialt absorberade chocken visar sig dock senare utgöra en förstärkare till den andra chocken, vilket leder till en helomvändning i säkerhetsstrategin. Följderna kan ses i återupprättandet av totalförsvaret, nya militära förmågor, ökad nationell försvarsförmåga och etableringen av en ökad permanent militär närvaro på Gotland. Det innebär även fördjupade bilaterala samarbeten med Finland, USA, NATO samt de nordiska och baltiska länderna. Svenskt fokus kanaliserades nu främst till två metoder, att kunna möta ett militärt väpnat angrepp mot Sverige, samt en form av alliansstrategi med främst Finland och USA i östersjöområdet. / Over the course of the past ten years, Russia has used its military means against former Soviet states in an effort to achieve its political objectives. The explanations behind this behavior are probably several, but NATO’s and EU’s expansion to Russia’s proximity and area of interest could very well have played a significant role. The Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were from a Swedish strategy perspective, both unexpected, surprising and led to severe changes in Swedish security strategy, thus by definition being strategic shocks. This study aims to analyze if and, in that case how two Russian strategic shocks have affected Sweden’s national security strategy over the course of the past decade. Thus, in doing so it contributes to an increase in understanding the development of Swedish security strategy, its underlying causes, background and relation to Russian geopolitical behavior. This knowledge will also help to better understand the current strategy, political security actions in general as well as a contribution to future analysis of strategies. This case study utilizes a frame of reference based on Jacob Westberg’s model of a strategies components, environment, ends, means andways, to define, analyze and evaluate the security strategy in its right context. Through qualitative text analysis, this case study analyzes four analysis units consisting of official security strategy and Defense bills by the Swedish government. Spanning from 2006 to the last unit, the National security strategy from 2017. To enrich the empirical analysis, earlier research on the subject at hand, as well as, reports from the Swedish Defense Commission and the Swedish armed forces have been added to the study.   The study concludes that the two strategic shocks have in fact had a major impact on Swedish security strategies over the past decade. Causing a shift from focusing on international operations, a solidarity doctrine and a strictly professional armed force mainly used abroad, to focusing on Sweden’s immediate vicinity, with a Baltic Sea alliance and a re-establishment of a total defense concept. Russia’s intervention in Georgia had a modest impact compared to the annexation of Crimea which created a paradigm in Swedish security strategy. It seems like the first shock was partly absorbed due to a misbelief of European safety as well as Sweden’s two-hundred-year long history of peace, mainly due to a neutral- and alliance free policy. As a result, the first shock functioned as a catalyst, amplifying the impact of the second strategic shock, causing a total turnaround of the Swedish security strategy. Its effects initiated the re-establishment of a total defense concept, new military means, strengthening of the national defense and establishing an increased permanent military presence on Gotland. It also included deepening the bi-lateral co-operation with Finland, USA, the other Nordic-Baltic countries as well as with NATO. The Swedish security strategy is now being focused to two main courses of action. The first, being able to handle a military attack on Swedish soil, the other an alliance strategy with mainly Finland and the USA in the Baltic area.

Seit Beginn der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen in der Ukraine und der anschließenden russischen Annexion der Krim ist das öffentliche Interesse an der neusten Geschichte Russlands und an Putins System international stark gestiegen. Auch im deutschsprachigen Raum sind in den letzten zwei Jahren auffällig viele Publikationen erschienen, die der aktuellen Situation in Russland und speziell dem russischen Machthaber gewidmet sind. Die Mehrheit dieser Veröffentlichungen stammt aus dem Gebiet der Journalistik oder Populärwissenschaft (Ewers, Philipp. 2015. Putin verstehen? : russische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Ära Wladimir Putin; Reitschuster, Boris. 2016. Putins verdeckter Krieg; Bidder, Benjamin. 2016. Generation Putin: Das neue Russland verstehen, u. a.), aber auch einige Fachwissenschaftler wagen sich an die hochaktuelle Thematik, die weit über den wissenschaftlichen Bereich hinausführen kann.

Following the 2008 Georgian war, Russia identified major deficiencies in its warfare capability, which lead to an extensive reformation and modernization of Russian forces. The reformation was accompanied by a Russian theoretical discussion concerning the wars of tomorrow. Several eminent Russian theorists emphasized the growing importance of non-kinetic means and methods, of which psychological warfare was considered as one of the most primary. Western scholars also emphasized an increased Russian focus on psychological warfare. Despite the identified increased significance on the subject, there is a palpable lack of research on contemporary Russian psychological warfare. This study aims to decrease this lack of research on the subject. Using a theory consuming approach, Russian psychological warfare is analyzed from two cases, Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of open sources. By combining two theories on psychological warfare, an analytical tool is developed which is then used in the analysis of the two cases. The theories that form the study´s theoretical base derives from Martin Libicki and Ron Schleifer. The two cases are analyzed and then followed by a comparative analysis of the cases. The study’s result shows that psychological warfare is an important component in Russian warfare, especially in the case of Crimea. Furthermore the study indicates that psychological warfare was a main component in the Crimea case, whereas it was a mere supportive component in the Georgian case.   The results show that Russian psychological warfare is used above all to create a favorable strategic context, where the Russian society and neutrals appears to be the most important target audiences to influence. The results also indicates that psychological warfare contributes in misleading the opponent and could thereby also contribute with obvious operational and tactical advantages for Russian warfare.

The characteristics of the Russian military operations during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and again in the Crimean Crisis 2014, were “rude awakenings” to a shift in the strategic behaviour of Russia, not refraining from military aggression as means to political aims. In the aftermath of these “strategic shocks”, the scholarly debate on how to interpret and understand these limited wars, has several ongoing discussions, among which is whether this modern Russian style of warfare, as demonstrated in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, really is a novel concept or plainly “old wine in a new bottle”. This thesis is part taking in that debate through the theoretical framework of three Soviet era warfare methods from the psychological dimension: Deception – Maskirovka, Information Warfare – Reflexive Control, and Subversion – Active Measures. Within the framework, an analytical tool for qualitative text analysis is designed and then applied for the case studies of the Russo-Georgian War, as it compares to the Crimean Crisis, collecting indicators for the apparent presence of traditional methods in these cases. The study concludes that the Soviet era warfare concepts of Maskirovka, Reflexive Control and Active Measures, are relevant as explanators for a facet of the modern day Russian warfare style, in alignment with the general argument on the Russian warfare doctrine as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, vis-a-vis the strategic practices of the Soviet era.

After a period of political unrest in Ukraine in late 2013 and the beginning of 2014, the so called Euromaidan movement, Russia decided to invade and late annex the Crimea. The act changed the conception of both European and world security and has opened up for scholarly debate on why Russia chose to make this move. The purpose of this study is to bring a new perspective on the underlying reasons behind the invasion with the help of Van Evera’s window theory. The theory’s hypothesis states that war is more likely if and when the relative power between states fluctuates sharply and the theory aims to examine if and how windows caused by this fluctuation are the causes of war. The result shows that a shift in power has taken place between Russia and the west and that different types of windows has forced Russia into a state where they saw preventive war as the only choice if they wanted to keep their control over the Crimea. The window theory has given a new perspective on the underlying reasons for Russia’s invasion and the purpose of this study is therefor considered to be fulfilled.

Studies have shown that the Russian operations in Georgia and Crimea have been described as both examples of failed and successful operations. Both conflicts had hybrid elements to them, especially the Russian annexation of Crimea which jumpstarted the western debate into the subject.  This study aims to analyse the difference in Russian methodology and differences between the two conflicts, this is done based on a theoretical framework of ‘effective hybrid warfare’. The goal of this study is to discern to what extent these two cases can be described as effective hybrid warfare operations. This is done thru the method of comparative studies.  The results showed that the operation on Crimea to a greater extent could be considered effective hybrid warfare, more specifically, the weaker aspects of the Russian operation in Georgia seemed to have been corrected and were less present in the Crimean operation. This indicates that the Russian staff learned from its mistakes and the weak points of the Crimean operation is not likely to be present in their next campaign.