<p>På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat.</p><p>Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.</p>

På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat. Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.

We live in a society where preconceived notions about religious schools and indoctrination are many but the rules regarding a non-denominational education are strict. It is of great importance to get a better understanding of religious schools and their effect on the pupils that attend them. The aim of this study is to analyze whether or not the compulsory religious education on a private religious school in the south of Sweden is non-denominational. In order to get a greater understanding of the impact on the pupils’ religious identity, Henri Tajfel’s theory of social identity is used. A total of eight observations, three interviews and collected materials such as previous tests regarding Islam, Christianity and Judaism have been gathered and discussed with the help of Tajfel’s theory and other previous research. The results show that some denominational elements could be found in the compulsory education and that the school at hand had an impact on their pupils’ Muslim identities. With these results, my ambition is that teachers that read this study will be more reflective and critical of their own teaching. It is possible that some teachers do not notice that their own religion or beliefs are shining through their teaching and could potentially effect the pupils. However, if teachers start to reflect upon their teaching and the impacts it could have on a pupil these denominational elements could be prevented.

The purpose with this paper is to study anti-muslim content within Swedish parliament proposals between the years 2019 and 2022. The constitutional comittee response is highlighted so it could be compared to EU:s attempts to create a unified European identity. The questions for this paper are: what ideological content is uttered in anti-muslim Swedish parliament proposals during 2019 and 2022, what ideological content is shown in parliament debate and the following parliament decisions in relation to anti-muslim proposals and how does the Swedish parliament debate relate to both binding and nonbinding international guidelines and documents? Document- and content analysis has been used for this paper. The chosen theory for this paper is the multilateral model for understanding islamophobia as well as the conclusions made by Olivier Roy. The conclusions for this paper are that Swedish parliament proposals are in accordance with what is warned by international documents where islamophobias presence is increased in Sweden. The constitutional committe is seen as in accordance with international documents for the promotion of a united European identity and European values.

<p>Denna fenomenografiska uppsats' syfte är att visa på olika synsätt på muslimsk jämlikhet. Den presenterar olika muslimers och två ickemuslimers synpunkter på förhållandet mellan islam och jämlikhet. Gemensam utgångspunkt för muslimerna är att islam är jämlikt.</p><p>Frågeställningarna avhandlar hur författarna argumenterar för sin syn på förhållandet mellan islam och jämlikhet, vad jämlikhet är, vad de anser om slöjpåbud och västerländsk feminism. Uppsatsen visar på hur stor spännvidden är hos dem som menar att islam är en jämlik religion, samt några av de argument de använder för att hävda sin ståndpunkt.</p><p>Min slutsats är att många använder korancitat, hadither och det tidiga islam som argument för sin syn på islam och jämlikhet, men att dessa lika gärna kan vändas emot dem då de är tvetydiga.</p>

Denna fenomenografiska uppsats' syfte är att visa på olika synsätt på muslimsk jämlikhet. Den presenterar olika muslimers och två ickemuslimers synpunkter på förhållandet mellan islam och jämlikhet. Gemensam utgångspunkt för muslimerna är att islam är jämlikt. Frågeställningarna avhandlar hur författarna argumenterar för sin syn på förhållandet mellan islam och jämlikhet, vad jämlikhet är, vad de anser om slöjpåbud och västerländsk feminism. Uppsatsen visar på hur stor spännvidden är hos dem som menar att islam är en jämlik religion, samt några av de argument de använder för att hävda sin ståndpunkt. Min slutsats är att många använder korancitat, hadither och det tidiga islam som argument för sin syn på islam och jämlikhet, men att dessa lika gärna kan vändas emot dem då de är tvetydiga.

Muslims and islam are unquestionably a part of European social life. In recent times, however, different events, such as the enlargement of the EU and the fact that muslims to a higher extent demand their rights, have brought a number of questions to the fore concerning muslims and islam in Europe. Moreover, we can see an increasing level of islamophobia in contemporary Europe, but also that the EU has launched several programs to increase both the diversity and the unity throughout the Union and to combat islamophobia. However, most of these programs focus on islam as religion and muslims in general, and such a narrow viewpoint runs the risk of missing important issues. In this new context it would be interesting to widen the scope and ask what place not only the muslim community and islam, but also sharia (an important element in islam), may have in future Europe – especially when it comes to muslim identity? My main objects are to see how the concept of sharia is constructed in the debates in the European Parliament, how that discourse relates to a social practice – the increasing islamophobic ideas in Europe – and what effect this may have on muslim identity in a European context. The results shows that the Parliament constructs sharia as, for example, something archaic, threatening, inhuman and misogynistic. In that sense, the discourse fits in with the predominant order of discourse regarding islam and muslims (in Europe) – and strengthen it. Though my results are neither absolute nor uniform, they show, persuasively enough, that sharia (as it is seen by the Parliament) is not consistent with and can not be included in or accepted by “European norms and values”. However, this must be said with one reservation: sharia is not always excluded as a whole. Still, it is not difficult to maintain that it is sharia as such that activates the (negative and) excluding connotations. Thus, an “approved” European muslim identity, as it seems, can not have too close connections with sharia, if (any) at all. Moreover, there is a risk that muslims themselves take on a restricting practice concerning their identity. In all, this will to a large extent circumscribe the possible muslim identities in Europe. To form a substantial and really pluralistic diversity in Europe, the EU, and others, must liberate itself from the logic of these discourses. But this is not an easy thing to do. One way that might be profitable, is to challenge the prevailing discourse with new narratives – narratives and voices that for the most part must come from the muslims themselves. Despite the fact that these voices do exist, as has been shown, the question is how and under what circumstances they can be seen – or rather heard. Unfortunately the answer is not to be found in this thesis; the need of further research is obvious.

Muslims and islam are unquestionably a part of European social life. In recent times, however, different events, such as the enlargement of the EU and the fact that muslims to a higher extent demand their rights, have brought a number of questions to the fore concerning muslims and islam in Europe. Moreover, we can see an increasing level of islamophobia in contemporary Europe, but also that the EU has launched several programs to increase both the diversity and the unity throughout the Union and to combat islamophobia. However, most of these programs focus on islam as religion and muslims in general, and such a narrow viewpoint runs the risk of missing important issues. In this new context it would be interesting to widen the scope and ask what place not only the muslim community and islam, but also sharia (an important element in islam), may have in future Europe – especially when it comes to muslim identity? My main objects are to see how the concept of sharia is constructed in the debates in the European Parliament, how that discourse relates to a social practice – the increasing islamophobic ideas in Europe – and what effect this may have on muslim identity in a European context. The results shows that the Parliament constructs sharia as, for example, something archaic, threatening, inhuman and misogynistic. In that sense, the discourse fits in with the predominant order of discourse regarding islam and muslims (in Europe) – and strengthen it. Though my results are neither absolute nor uniform, they show, persuasively enough, that sharia (as it is seen by the Parliament) is not consistent with and can not be included in or accepted by “European norms and values”. However, this must be said with one reservation: sharia is not always excluded as a whole. Still, it is not difficult to maintain that it is sharia as such that activates the (negative and) excluding connotations. Thus, an “approved” European muslim identity, as it seems, can not have too close connections with sharia, if (any) at all. Moreover, there is a risk that muslims themselves take on a restricting practice concerning their identity. In all, this will to a large extent circumscribe the possible muslim identities in Europe. To form a substantial and really pluralistic diversity in Europe, the EU, and others, must liberate itself from the logic of these discourses. But this is not an easy thing to do. One way that might be profitable, is to challenge the prevailing discourse with new narratives – narratives and voices that for the most part must come from the muslims themselves. Despite the fact that these voices do exist, as has been shown, the question is how and under what circumstances they can be seen – or rather heard. Unfortunately the answer is not to be found in this thesis; the need of further research is obvious.

The aim of the study is to analyse the stories of four homosexual women with Muslim backgrounds about coming out as homosexuals, from an intersectional perspective. The experience of coming out as lesbian and the intersectionality are related to different social contexts. The homosexuality becomes a problem in connection to family and countrymen while the Muslim background becomes more of a problem in relationships. Heteronormativity and gender system appear to be cooperating systems of oppression. These women don’t describe themselves as oppressed, but potential oppression is still something that influences their lives. They strive for freedom to be themselves in all everyday situations. The quest for freedom to be able to express their sexuality risks relationships with families and girlfriends. But freedom and symbiosis don’t have to be in opposition. These women have found contexts, for example among friends, where none of the social categories are problematic and where they can experience symbiosis. They can choose certain contexts where they are allowed to express their sexuality. The experiences of coming out is analysed as linked to development in late modernity.

Spiritual care in hospitals is a well-established practice in Sweden that is justified by religious freedom. Contemporary Sweden is a multicultural society with a culturally and religiously diverse population. Since 2006, a Muslim spiritual care organization has been established in co-operation with the Swedish state. This interview study with Muslim spiritual caregivers examines how Islam is being interpreted and how Muslim spiritual care in Swedish hospitals is apprehended by the informants. By approaching Islam as a discursive tradition and combining historical and ethnological methods, this study sheds light on what aspects of Islam are considered relevant in the hospital context and it examines why that is the case. The study shows that Muslim spiritual care is regarded to be a complement to other healthcare practices. To a large extent, the care is provided by supportive conversations, Islamic counseling, as well as help with religious practices and rituals. To manage a patient’s various wants and the denominational diversity, the Muslim representatives hold that they put the patient’s and the relatives’ needs and interpretations of Islam first. The study concludes that the representatives are spiritual care professionals that are loyal to the state and the secular institutions they serve. This involves staying true to ideals of cultural and religious pluralism and equality but also knowing that these principles are subordinated to the hospital’s rules. This constructs boundaries regarding how Islam is interpreted and has to be negotiated in the efforts of making Islam a natural part of the institution.