Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / 'n Kort elementologiese uiteensetting vir strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid word gevolg deur bewysregtelike begrippe wat van toepassing is op vermoedens by toerekeningsvatbaarheid. Die historiese regsposisie asook die ontwikkeling in die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse reg met betrekking tot geestesongesteldes, kinders en persone wat 'n verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid insluit, word bespreek. Daar word gekonsentreer op ·die ontwikkeling van 'n algemene verweer van niepatologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid. Die konstitusionele reg, vennoedens en ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid word aan die hand van Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak en die Interim Grondwet bespreek. Daar word na buitelandse reg gekyk ten einde 'n aanbeveling te kan maak wat grondwetlik nie sal indruis op die reg van die individu tot onskuld nie. 'n Algemene verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningvatbaarheid word onderstellll mits dit met omsigtigheid deur die howe benader word. Die arbitrere ouderdomsgrens vir vasstelling van toerekeningsvatbaarheid by kinders word gekritiseer en 'n verhoorbaarheidvasstellingseenheid word aanbeveel. / A short elementological discussion of criminal responsibility is followed by concepts of law of evidence that is applicable to presumptions of accountability. The historical legal position as well as the development in the current South African law and the present legal position with reference to the mentally disturbed children and persons with a defence of non-pathological unaccountability are included and discussed. The constitutional law, presumptions and unaccountablility are discussed with reference to the South African case law and the Interim Constitution. Foreign law is perused so that a recommendation could be made that would not interfere with the rights of the individual to be deemed innocent. A general defence of non-pathological unaccountability is supported if it is treated with the necessary circumspection by the courts. The arbitrary age boundaries for the determination of accountability in children is critized and a unit to determine trialability for pathological and non-pathological accountability is recommended. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-11-21T09:00:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonard Ziesemer Schmitz.pdf: 2040475 bytes, checksum: 4703c1d0434a03117e5c00bb5132f267 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-21T09:00:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonard Ziesemer Schmitz.pdf: 2040475 bytes, checksum: 4703c1d0434a03117e5c00bb5132f267 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present doctoral thesis seeks to deal with judicial presumptions, thus understood inferential reasoning about unknown facts, from facts known and proven in a concrete case. First, we want to identify if there are the spaces of discretion that are shielded by insufficient presumptive arguments. The work is divided into two parts, with three chapters each. The first part serves to establish theoretical premises, and the second part to approach more closely the topic of presumptions in court. The first chapter discusses the conditions of possibility for the interpreter of a particular case to become aware of the facts narrated by other Interpreter-Subjects. Further notes are given on how the ransom of the past occurs when the judge analyzes the evidence and the probative narratives of the parties. The second chapter deals with science and rationality as grounds for the relation between two facts – one known, one unknown. Considerations are made about generalizations from experience, which allow for deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning. Also questioned is the sufficiency of the use of the argument of "rationality", often insufficient to infer. The third chapter discusses the relationship between evidence and truth, especially when a judicial presumption is often made in the name of the "pursuit of truth" in the judicial process. Moving on to the second part, the fourth chapter addresses the division of labor between parties and judge in the correctness of the facts, establishing limits of action of each Subject of the process. There is also talk of judicial evidentiary activism. The fifth chapter deals specifically with the presumptions and rules of experience (Article 375 of the CPC), which serve as argumentative basis for inferences. The sixth and final chapter captures presumptions in their practical use and speaks, in detail, of the decision to reorganize and organize the process (article 357 of the CPC), which may be an opportune moment for the correct treatment of the subject. Finally, conclusions are drawn about a possible criteriology for the legitimate and discursive use of inferential reasoning / A presente tese de doutoramento busca tratar das presunções simples ou presunções judiciais, assim entendidos os raciocínios inferenciais sobre fatos não conhecidos, a partir de fatos conhecidos e provados em um caso concreto. Quer-se, antes de tudo, identificar quais são os espaços de discricionariedade que se blindam por trás de fundamentos presuntivos insuficientes. O trabalho está dividido em duas partes, com três capítulos cada. A primeira parte serve para estabelecer premissas teóricas, e a segunda para abordar mais de perto o tema das presunções em juízo. O primeiro capítulo fala a respeito das condições de possibilidade para que o intérprete de um caso concreto tome conhecimento dos fatos narrados por outros Sujeitos-intérpretes. São feitas ainda anotações sobre a maneira como o resgate do passado ocorre quando o juiz analisa as provas e as narrativas probatórias das partes. O segundo capítulo trata da ciência e da racionalidade como fundamentos para a relação entre dois fatos – um sabido, outro não sabido. Fazem-se considerações sobre as generalizações a partir da experiência, que permitem raciocínios dedutivos, indutivos e analógicos. É também questionada a suficiência do uso do argumento “racionalidade”, muitas vezes insuficiente para presumir. O terceiro capítulo fala sobre a relação entre provas e verdade, especialmente quando uma presunção judicial frequentemente é feita em nome da “busca da verdade” no processo judicial. Dando início à segunda parte, o quarto capítulo discute a divisão de trabalho entre partes e juiz no acertamento dos fatos, estabelecendo limites de atuação de cada Sujeito do processo. Fala-se também do ativismo judicial em matéria de provas e da possibilidade de produção oficiosa de provas. O quinto capítulo trata especificamente das presunções e das regras da experiência (art. 375, do CPC), que lhes servem de base. O sexto e último capítulo capta as presunções em seu uso prático e fala, com detalhe, da decisão de saneamento e organização do processo (art. 357, do CPC), que pode ser um momento oportuno para o trato correto do tema. Por fim, são traçadas conclusões a respeito de uma possível criteriologia para o uso legítimo e discursivo do raciocínio inferencial probatório

A noção de livre convencimento estipula ao julgamento de processos judiciais uma investigação sobre fatos amparada em avaliação epistemológica. Essa estratégia, entretanto, apresenta dificuldades insuperáveis nas diversas formulações desse tipo de raciocínio por não oferecer respostas definitivas para solucionar problemas práticos, como aqueles envolvidos na concretização do direito, levando a graus diferentes de dúvida. Diante desse quadro surge a pergunta sobre qual nível de confirmação será aceito para respaldar uma decisão. Esse trabalho propõe como solução a tal aporia uma aproximação dos argumentos utilizados para a decisão em matéria de fato à estrutura dos argumentos práticos. Assim, além das reflexões epistemológicas, incorporam-se elementos morais e políticos em seu esquema central. Por meio dessa conclusão são introduzidos obrigatoriamente ao raciocínio judicial o que se denomina critérios de suficiência, orientações sobre o grau de comprovação das versões levantadas num caso concreto. Esse instituto, além de imprescindível para viabilizar a racionalidade dos juízos de fato, assume ainda a função de distribuir o risco de decisões equivocadas entre os litigantes. Trata-se de elemento de legitimação das decisões em matéria de fato, mediante a argumentação dos riscos que o processo envolve. Esse raciocínio não é de forma alguma ignorado pela dogmática jurídica brasileira, embora não seja adequadamente sistematizado. Daí a importância de sua abordagem teórica, a demonstrar que é requisito imprescindível de legitimação das decisões sobre fatos tomadas nos processos judiciais, e verificação prática de diversos institutos, integralmente compatíveis com essa proposição. A partir de experiências jurídicas que tratam do assunto de modo sistematizado a mais tempo, propõe-se uma discussão sobre os termos que devem ser observados no ordenamento brasileiro em acordo com suas características. / The idea of free proof stipulates to judicial process decision an investigation over facts supported only by epistemological evaluation. This strategy, however, presents unbearable difficulties in the various manifestations of this kind of reasoning, as it does not offers definitive answers to solve practical problems, like those involved in applying the law, which leads to different degrees of doubt. Considering this picture, emerges the question about what level of confirmation will be accepted to sustain a decision. This dissertation proposes as a solution to the presented aporia an approximation of the arguments utilized to decide about facts to the structure of practical argumentation. Thus, beyond epistemological reasons, moral and political elements are incorporate to its central sketch. Through this conclusion are necessarily introduced to judicial reasoning what is called standards of proof, guidance about the degree of confirmation which versions must sustained to be successful on specific situations. This institute, additionally to its importance to validate the rationality of factual decisions, it assumes the purpose of distributing the risk of wrong perceptions among litigants. Its an element of legitimating decisions about facts, by reasoning the risks that the process handles. This reasoning is not at all ignored by Brazilian law, in despite of its lack of systematization. Hence the importance of its theoretical approach, which demonstrates that is an indispensible requirement of legitimacy to the decisions about facts taken in judicial processes, and of its practical approach, verifying the compatibility of several law mechanisms to this proposition. Build on juridical experiences that study the subject in an systematized fashion and longer than our occupation of the subject, it is proposed a discussion about the terms in which these should be observed in Brazilian law, in accordance to its characteristics.

Pour lutter efficacement contre les phénomènes de fraude et d'évasion fiscales internationales favorisés par l'opacité des juridictions offshores et l'attractivité des paradis fiscaux, Je législateur a eu recours aux présomptions. Cette technique juridique a pour caractéristique de modifier la dialectique de la preuve en faveur de l'administration, qui n'est plus tenue de faire la démonstration de la fraude ou de l'évasion, mais seulement d'un ou de plusieurs faits connexes à l'infraction frauduleuse ou au fait d'optimisation fiscale abusive. En pratique, le législateur a souvent eu recours à des présomptions à la force renforcée, renversant directement le fardeau de la preuve sur le contribuable qui est d'emblée tenu d'établir la preuve d'un fait connexe exonératoire à l'infraction ou au fait abusif. Pour muscler leur efficacité, le législateur a également introduit des présomptions irréfragables, au couperet définitif. Les présomptions simples caractérisées par une clause anti-abus centrée sur l'objet ont pour particularité de faire peser sur le contribuable la charge d'une preuve qualitativement supérieure. Ces présomptions, dont l'actionnement est conditionné à la preuve d'un fait connexe par l'administration, représentent une catégorie hétérodoxe de dispositifs présomptif renforcés, obligeant le contribuable à faire un effort d'analyse sur les finalités des opérations, ce qui revient à lui faire supporter la charge de la preuve de l'absence d'abus de droit. L'emploi des présomptions se heurte essentiellement aux droits et liberté économiques communautaire et conventionnels, obligeant Je législateur à adapter les dispositifs présomptifs à ces contraintes. / In order to struggle efficiently against tax avoidance and tax evasion tendencies, enhanced by offshore jurisdictions, often lacking transparency, and tax havens with their attractive conditions, the lawmaker has enabled rebuttable and conclusive presumptions to be used in suing cases. These legal tricks favour Tax administrations in winning the argument, since those are no longer required to bring compelling evidence of tax avoidance or tax evasion. It is enough to prove a fraud, an offence or an aggressive tax optimisation process with one or several connected facts. In practice, the lawmaker is often using strengthened standards on presumption to reverse the burden of proof onto the taxpayer, who therefore must provide evidence for any exemptions from responsibility regarding the alleged offence or abuse. To improve these tools efficiency, the lawmaker has also designed conclusive ( or irrebuttable) presumptions. Usual presumptions are characterised by their emphasis on anti-abuse clauses, which oblige taxpayers to bring stronger evidences in lawsuit. For Tax authorities, these are part of a legal arsenal using connected facts against the defensor who carries the burden of proof related to tax monitoring operations in the absence of abuse of rights.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:18:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 doris_souza_castelo_branco.pdf: 1899991 bytes, checksum: 95de4f04b2803c1b6161902f55cbdea4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-21 / The proof is undoubtedly the most important tool put to the knowledge of the judge to determine the conviction and, from there, set within the normative criteria, who must be ensured clamada justice. This thesis proposes a dogmatic and empirical investigation of the applicability of the evidence in the tax process, whether administrative, or judicial, demonstrating its power as a means rhetorical for through the defense of the legal truth and the use of language as training of the instrument knowl edge, convince the state judge the validity of propositions brought in the process. It also aims to demonstrate the limits of application of the presumptions in tax matters, with an emphasis on tax planning and the position adopted by the administration and the judiciary on issues involving the tax liability of companies perceived as economic group. / A prova é, sem dúvida, o instrumento mais importante posto ao conhecimento do julgador para determinar o seu convencimento e, a partir daí, definir, dentro dos critérios normativos, a quem deve ser assegurada a clamada justiça. Essa dissertação se propõe a uma investigação dogmática e empírica da aplicabilidade das provas no processo tributário, seja administrativo, seja judicial, demonstrando o seu poder como meio retórico para, por meio da defesa da verdade jurídica e do uso da linguagem como instrumento da formação do conhecimento, convencer o Estado-juiz da validade das proposições trazidas no processo. Também pretende-se demonstrar os limites de aplicação das presunções em matéria tributária, com ênfase no planejamento tributário e no posicionamento adotado pela Administração e pelo Judiciário nas questões envolvendo a responsabilidade tributária de empresas tidas como integrantes de grupo econômico de fato.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Determination of Parenthood (Abstract) The determination of parenthood is undoubtedly a very topical issue. There are significant changes which are consequences of modern society approach to the family life as well as of massive progress in the field of medical science and genetics. The development in these areas has brought new concepts such as baby-boxes, assisted reproduction and surrogacy. Now it is up to the legislation to provide rules within the legal framework for these new institutions to steady parental relationships and to secure their protection as well. The aim of this thesis is to familiarize the reader with Czech legal regulation of determination of parenthood by means of its description and analysis. Another aim of the work is to compare this legal regulation with regulation in other countries, in particular in Germany and to find similarities and differences between them. Finally the thesis highlights new institutions within determination of parenthood. This thesis consists of nine chapters which deal with particular parts of its subject-matter. The opening chapter discusses the relationship between a parent and a child both theoretically and historically. Apart from that it also describes legal regulations applicable in the Czech Republic and Germany in the course of time. The second...

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vitor Martins Flores.pdf: 1799128 bytes, checksum: 693a95ff3a84a83754c0575e6c22d846 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-06 / The purpose of this study is to investigate and demonstrate scientific a method for assessing the legitimacy of the modification of the legal concept of profits , as defined by corporate law, for corporate income tax purposes. By proposing objective parameters for assessing the limits which the tax legislation may modify the concept of profits, we construct a useful tool for endorse or refuse such modifications. For achieving this goal, the study investigates how the interpretation of tax law interacts with the legal presumptions and legal fictions / O objetivo deste trabalho é o de investigar e demonstrar cientificamente um método para avaliar a legitimidade jurídica da atribuição de efeitos quantitativos ao lucro contábil-societário pela legislação do Imposto sobre a Renda, para fins de apuração do novo lucro para efeitos tributários, o lucro real . Com a definição de parâmetros objetivos para avaliar os limites em que a legislação fiscal pode partir de um conceito ou um instituto de direito privado para atribuir-lhe efeitos que lhes altere a substância, espera-se criar um instrumento de justificação dessas modificações quando legítimas ou para a sua oposição quando contrárias à Constituição e a outros princípios legais positivados. Para atingir esse objetivo, o estudo adota como método a investigação sobre como se relacionam a interpretação do direito tributário com as presunções e ficções jurídicas, de modo a verificar os limites desses efeitos. Ao final, como resultado, propõe-se um método para avaliar a justificação ou refutação dessas tais modificações

Ce travail d'investigation est fondé sur une analyse discursive des notions de race et de classe sociale dans la production narrative de l'écrivaine Marvel Moreno, née à Barranquilla. Dans un premier temps, il a été nécessaire de déterminer les antécédents du sujet pour pouvoir, ensuite, élaborer un corpus de récits qui rendent compte de ces deux notions. Nous avons finalement reconstruit le code raciste et le code social de l'œuvre à travers l'étude de termes comme racisme, noir, métis, mulâtre, blanc, noir, aristocratie, décadent, bourgeois, parvenu ou nouveau riche et classe moyenne. La pertinence de cette étude est validée par l'absence, jusqu'à aujourd'hui, d'un travail qui explique, à partir de l'œuvre, de la théorie littéraire et de l'histoire colombienne, les préjugés et stéréotypes au sein de la société décrite par l'écrivaine. D'un point de vue méthodologique, nous avons analysé les opinions exprimées par les voix narratives lorsqu'elles décrivent et qualifient les personnages et les situations. Par conséquent, nous avons démontré que dans l'univers fictif de l'auteure, les idées reçues depuis la Colonie façonnent les modes de pensée et les relations de la haute société de Barranquilla, société raciste et discriminante. / The present research establishes an analysis of the discourse and narrative of the Barranquillan author Marvel Moreno. First, it was necessary to determine the background investigation on the same topic to be able to later elaborate a corpus which took into account the maximum of value judgments about the two notions, consequently. Finally, the reconstruction of the terms racist-code and social-code of the author’s literature, was reconstructed in accordance with the theoretical definitions as well as with the literature itself, analyzing terms such as racism, race, black person or negro, half blood, mulatto, white person, “down at heel person”, an upstart person or parvenu and middle class, aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The pertinent of this study is therefore justified by the absence so far of another study that treats the same chosen narratives and discourses used by the author to explain the social conflict in the fictional Barranquilla. From a methodological point of view, the goal was to see how narrators and characters judge and were judged. Consequently, it was demonstrated that the narrative voices focus on describe the social and racial codes belonging to the upper class, which at the same time and through their prejudices construct the rest of the society validating in this way the elite’s racist and excluding identity. / La presente indagine consiste in un’analisi discorsiva delle nozioni di razza e di classe sociale nella narrativa di Marvel Moreno, scrittrice di Barranquilla. In un primo momento è stato necessario determinare gli antecedenti dei due temi, per poi stabilire un corpus di racconti che ne trattano. Infine, si sono ricostruiti il codice razzista e il codice sociale dell’opera attraverso lo studio di termini come razzismo, razza, meticcio, mulatto, bianco, negro, aristocrazia, borghesia, fallito, arricchito, nuovo ricco e classe media. L’importanza di questa ricerca è avvalorata dall’assenza, fino ad oggi, di un lavoro che chiarisca i pregiudizi e gli stereotipi della società rappresentata dall’autrice a partire dall’opera stessa, dalla teoria letteraria e dalla storia colombiana. Da un punto di vista metodologico si sono analizzate le opinioni delle voci narranti per descrivere e qualificare personaggi e situazioni. Di conseguenza, si è dimostrato che, all’interno dell’universo fittizio dell’autrice, le ideologie ereditate dal periodo coloniale configurano modalità di pensiero e relazioni di potere nella società.

« [L]e commandement appartiendra, […] l'obéissance sera due, à un ordre qui n'a point de visage, dont on peut attendre, puisqu'il est impersonnel, qu'il interpellera sans passion et sera écouté sans colère »1219. C’est à ces fins que la procédure pénale et la pratique tentent d’évincer du jugement les émotions « passives » paralysant le raisonnement autonome du juge, ou certaines émotions « actives » non fondées sur un raisonnement logique. Mais parmi les émotions pourchassées, seules celles qui peuvent être effectivement contrôlées par leur matérialisation sont susceptibles d’être évitées et d’engager la responsabilité du juge. Au-surplus, il faut compter sur l’autodiscipline du juge en le sensibilisant au moyen de règles déontologiques. Toutefois, malgré la crainte de l’arbitraire que pourraient susciter les émotions, la bonne administration de la justice ne peut se faire nonobstant toute considération émotionnelle : le juge perçoit des émotions telles que les doutes méthodiques nécessaires au jugement et doit composer avec celles des tiers. Ainsi, au sein de l’espace laissé aux émotions, le magistrat tente de réguler celles qui survivent légitimement. Finalement renvoyé à sa condition d’être social, le juge ne peut échapper aux émotions qu’il a intégrées par sa sociabilisation. Il est le représentant des émotions sociales, restant ainsi en phase avec les valeurs qu’elles révèlent. La contribution de ces émotions à la décision est légitimée par leur représentativité. La légitimité se propage enfin aux décisions et à l’action du juge. / «Commandment shall belong […] and one shall obey to a faceless order, which may be expected, given its impersonality, to rule without passion and to be listened to without anger»1220. To reach such an aim, practice and criminal procedure try to erase from judgment «passive» emotions as well as some «active» ones that are not based on any logical thinking, since they paralyse the judge's autonomous reasoning. However, among such hounded emotions, only those which can be genuinely controlled by their materialisation are likely to be avoided and to involve the judge's responsibility. Furthermore, one has to take into account the judge's self-discipline by making him aware of these issues thanks to deontological rules. Nevertheless, and despite the fear of arbitrariness that emotions might trigger, the right administration of justice cannot cast aside every emotional consideration: a judge perceives emotions such as the methodological doubts that are necessary to his judgment; he must also take into account the ones felt by others. As a result, within the space left for emotions, a magistrate tries to regulate those which legitimately survive. A judge is ultimately brought back to his status of social being, he cannot escape the emotions which he has integrated through his socialization. He represents social emotions and stays in tune with the values they reveal. The contribution of these emotions to the final decision is legitimised by their representativeness. This legitimacy finally spreads out to the judge's decisions and actions.