This thesis purpose is to analyze specific content in Sweden’s doctrine to illustrate a trend in doctrine development in small states. Small states doctrine tends to promote political messages rather than messages about operational efficiency. Due to this trend, it is important to study how small states implement and accept these types of developments. Kjell Bjerga and Torunn Haaland describes this phenomenon through an analysis of the Norwegian doctrine. The arguments they point out creates a tool, which explain concepts in Sweden’s military strategic doctrine. This thesis then takes a discursive form to identify the doctrines hidden roots and underlying narratives. It is then possible to structure concepts such as operational efficiency or operational inefficiency. The result of this analysis is that Sweden follow the development in small states strategic doctrine, decreasing the amount of concepts promoting operational efficiency. The result comply with Bjerga and Haalands theory and confirm the question at issue. This may lead to a dilemma where Sweden cannot achieve military operational efficiency because their doctrine promoting messages hard to translate to distinct military action.

The research debate concerning small states and military doctrine development delivers two main arguments for and against the ability of these states to formulate doctrines specifically adapted to their strategic contexts. One argument supports the view that a small state has limited ability to develop properly adapted doctrines because they are influenced by larger states. The opposing argument claims that small states’ ability should be better than those of their larger counterparts due to the fact that small state organizations are smaller and are therefore likely to be more adaptable. These two arguments lay the foundation for this essay. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Swedish military doctrines from 2012 and 2016 to determine the extent to which they are specifically adapted to Sweden’s conditions. Specific Swedish conditions have been identified in order to enable an analysis of the Swedish military doctrines and how they are attuned to these conditions. Findings of the analysis show that one of the military doctrines exhibits a low level of adaptation to Swedish conditions, while the later military doctrine is found to be partially adapted to Swedish conditions. These findings are vital to the debate on the relationship between small states and military doctrine development and expose the need for further research.

According to Sweden’s military strategic doctrine, Swedish defense capabilities should be deterrent based upon deterrence. The ambition to deter potential aggressors is also expressed in guiding and executive political documents. There are a few defining expressions within the theories of deterrence of which credibility is considered as vital. However, over the recent years the credibility of the Swedish defense forces has been exposed to criticism. Among the critics is the supreme commander who has publicly stated that Swedish defense doesn´t reach the decided capability. Since credibility is considered a corner stone in deterrence, is it possible for Sweden to apply a deterrent strategy despite its credibility issues? The purpose of this single case study is to examine Swedish efforts to act deterrent when applying the theoretical definitions of deterrence. Current political documents and the Swedish military strategic doctrine constitutes the material that has been reviewed through qualitative text analysis. As an instrument for analyzing the material, three fundamental criteria within deterrence theories has been used as indicators. These criteria are credibility, ability and communication. The result shows that both political and military documents share a common direction. Swedish defense capability is currently undergoing a change towards a national defense built on a credible security strategy. This strategy contains both active and passive measures grounded in the theories of deterrence.

Under kalla kriget fanns stora skillnader mellan den deklarerade svenska säkerhetspolitiken och det faktiska handlandet. Problemformuleringen lyfter frågan om även nutida svensk säkerhetspolitik innehåller betydande diskrepanser. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka korrelationen mellan proposition 2008/09:140 – ett användbart försvar och proposition 2010/11:111 - Svenskt deltagande i den internationella militärainsatsen i Libyen. Med utgångspunkt i ett antal empiriskt bevisade småstatsbeteenden som syftar till ökat inflytande och därmed, för en liten stat i Europa som Sverige, ökad makt analyseras propositionerna. Beteendena tolkas även genom två perspektiv; neutralitetspolitiken samt strategisk kultur och identitet. Slutsatserna som dras av undersökningen är att det inte föreligger några nämnvärda diskrepanser mellan deklarerad och agerad säkerhetspolitik så som de manifesteras i propositionerna. Kopplingen mellan nutida svensk säkerhetspolitik och perspektiven är tydlig om än med vissa motsättningar. / During the cold war, there were significant differences between the declared Swedish security policy and the way it was actually carried out. Sweden was not quite as neutral as it purported to be and maintained covert collaborations with the west throughout the cold war. This history of contradicting policies raises the question if contemporary Swedish security policy contains significant discrepancies. The purpose of this paper is to explore the correlation between the bill 2008/09:140 – a useable defence and bill 2010/11:111 – Swedish participation in international military action in Libya. The bills are analysed from a number of empirically proven small state foreign policy behaviours aimed at increasing influence and thus, for a small state in Europe like Sweden, increasing power. These behaviours are also interpreted through two perspectives: the Swedish policy of neutrality and Swedish strategic culture and identity. The conclusion drawn from the study is that there are no significant discrepancies between declared and acted security policy as manifested in the propositions. The connection between contemporary Swedish security policy and the perspectives are clear, albeit with some differences.

This study aims to test the strength of Shaun Clarkes air theory SPOT-bombing for small nations, to see if the theory could be of good use for all the small states around the world which are not able to master the capacity needed for large nation air theories. The British use of airpower during the Falkland war serves as case which is compared to the SPOT-bombing theory. The British task force, although much smaller than the Argentine military force, succeeded to win the war through extensive use of airpower. The studies analytic results reveal that the indicators taken from the air theory are not found to any greater extent in the British use of airpower during the war. Therefore this study is not able to strengthen or falsify Clarkes air theory as a whole, but reaches the conclusion that using unconventional methods are useful for a smaller state to get effect on strategic level against a larger opponent. Still, after this study there is more work to be done to test the relevance of the SPOT-bombing for small nations air theory, to be able to state if it is worth for small states to base their airpower doctrines upon it.

Denna teoriprövande fallstudie försöker svara på frågan om små staters ökande militära internationella ambitioner, och villighet att ta militära risker är ett förväntat beteende utifrån ett brett realistisk perspektiv. I centrum för undersökningen går den svenska säkerhets- och försvarspolitiska utveckling under luppen. Uppsatsen har en hög abstraktionsnivå och under undersökningens gång görs tre nedslag som alla försöker belysa realismen aktualitet. Inledningsvis undersöks dagens oklara hotbild, för att därefter ta en närmare titt på de motåtgärder som EU- länderna gemensamt har bestämt sig för, varvid begreppet Peace support operations belyses ur ett realistiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuteras hur realismen kan förklara små staters agerande varvid olika möjligheter diskuteras. Detta leder fram till en slutsats som konstaterar att små staters militära aktivitet mycket väl kan öka hotet mot den egna staten snarare än att eliminera det, vilket inte är ett förväntat realistiskt beteende av små stater. Dock finns indikationer på att små stater, möjligen använder sig av militära medel för att indirekt maximera sin makt i andra samanhang. ( 26818 ord) / In this case study the pattern of small states increasing willingness to use military force on the international arena, is being used in order to test the realist theory. Are the actions taken by small states expected behavior according to a broad understanding of the realist theory? To find out, the Swedish military development is put in the center of this study. The study proceeds in three steps; first out is a closer look at the new security threat, next the counter measures is examined, in particular the Peace Support Operations. Finally the realist theory tries to explain the behavior of small states. The conclusion of this study indicates that the increasing willingness to take military risk actually can increase the level of threat against the small state. This is not an expected behavior of a small state. Although the study also indicate that small states use its military operation, to indirectly gain power in other fields of interest. (26818 words)