The main frame of this research is ¡§Economic Modernization¡¨ categorized modernization theory, and the objective of this research is TVEs to analyze the characteristics of Mainland China¡¦s economic modernization. TVEs is a kind of special enterprise style of China. TVEs integrate rural resources, collective ownership, and modern business management into the main power of the development of rural economy. Moreover, also the particularities of TVEs¡¦ system are the emphasis of this research. The members of TVEs which are villagers, local government officers, managers, and party cadres form a kind of special mutual-dependence relationship between rural communities, CPC (Communist Party of China), and governments. Finally, the extending question is economic modernization transiting to political modernization, also China with the different development from western nations.

Based on the theory of local state corporatism, the state-centered approach, which emphasizes the importance of state autonomy, was applied to explore the evolvement of rural industry. From the viewpoint of the relationship between state and society, the author explained why the local government and farmers were able to promote the development of Township Village Enterprises (TVEs) and rural economy in 1970s¡¦. Basically, the evolvement of rural industry in China was derived from the thinking of state industrialization and modernization. It has changed three times since the establishment of People¡¦s Republic of China. During the periods of Mao and Deng, though each change was due to the different situations or strategies, the fundamental philosophy were the same. The central government ¡¦s policy, the reform of rural economy, and the effective decision and control of local government were the major factors for the development of TVEs and the change of property system in 1980s¡¦. In short, local state corporatism was a makeshift device for the local government to control and divide resources with administrative powers to pursue desired political, economic and societal goals. It formed a system in which the cadres of the Communist Party, the officials of government, businessmen and farmers were united to achieve these goals. Under the autarchy of Chinese Communist Party, this kind of political-oriented economy reform in rural areas changed dramatically the interrelationship between state agents and social organizations and rebuilt a new model for such interactions. These experiences would have a great deal of implications for the underdevelopment countries of the third world.

The study compares the use of authoritarian corporatism in Taiwan and Indonesia. The comparison is made for the purpose of obtaining a more balanced relation between the state and the society in these two countries. The adopted definitions of corporatism in the study are by Wiarda and Stepan. Wiarda defined corporatism as a system of social and political organization in which the major social and interest groups are all integrated into the government system. The integration is on a monopoly base so that the state can reach a balanced development by means of directions, protections, and control over these groups. Stepan divided corporatism into two kinds: exclusionary and inclusionary corporatism. Specifically, the study adopts the theory of exclusionary and focuses the comparison on the establishment and operation of trade union system. The research results of the study are as follows. First, both in Taiwan and Indonesia, the use of authoritarian corporatism has social and political backgrounds. The social background refers to the prevailing traditional values of Confucialism in Taiwan and Pancasila Industrial Relation in Indonesia. Both values systems place a premium on a harmonious and cooperative interaction between the employers and the labors. Therefore, the idea is denied that labors have the right to fight for their own benefits against the employers. Second, both Taiwan and Indonesia governments choose authoritarian corporatism as the tool to control the society. The choice is made not out of the need to moderate benefits of various social classes or to cope with economic crisis. Instead, it is for setting up functional, not competitive social organization systems. These organizations are the paths connecting different interest groups. At the same time, some organizations which are not favored by the state are kept from being formed. The participation in politics is limited to a certain scale. Such measure is considered preventive authoritarian corporatism. The application of the authoritarian corporatism makes the trade union systems both in Taiwan and Indonesia become the marginal parts of the political framework. It¡¦s hard then to have the labors own more rights. So the corporarism is also exclusionary authoritarian corporatism. The labor organization is naturally an expansion of the political control of the state over the labors. Third, it is found that under the framework of authoritarian corporatism, the operation of labor organizations varies according to the changing goals of state¡¦s development. However, there is a difference in the manner and extent of Taiwan¡¦s control over the operation from that of the Indonesia government. Taiwan government controls the operation in an active manner while the Indonesia government controls the operation in a passive manner. Fourth, at the end of authoritarian politics in Taiwan and in Indonesia, the demands for changes are appearing in both countries. It¡¦s inferred that there may appear inclusionary corporatism which will lead to a more balanced relation among the labors, the employers and the states both in Taiwan and Indonesia.

觀察台灣近代的發展過程，學者主要將焦點放在國家（State） 對經濟場 域的干預或控制，尤其多著重國家在經濟發展過程的策略操導，至於維繫 生產活動的兩大族群：資本家和勞工，則明顯地沒有在「經濟發展」議題 上被同時納入來進行討論；換言之，在發展過程中‘國家與資本家’及‘ 國家與勞工’的關係為何？國家透過何種方式來掌握資本家和勞工？國家 對‘個別資本家’和‘資本家聯盟’的態度是否一致？這些問題當在解讀 台灣的經濟發展經驗時，顯然地並沒有被同時放在分析網絡中進行思考， 因此本文在解釋台灣的經濟發展經驗時，除了探討國家的角色扮演外，還 嘗試分析國家與資本家、國家與勞工的關係，期能週延地解讀台灣經濟的 「發展經驗」。本論文以國家統合主義檢視台灣的經濟發展，藉由‘攏絡 性統合主義’和‘排斥性統合主義’兩組概念可發現，國家在追求經濟成 長的前提下，和資本家維持著‘利益的合夥關係’：此不僅體現在生產過 程中國家以財政和金融政策來施惠於資本家，國家更配合資本家來提供生 產要素（土地、資本）以利生產活動的持續進行，而在特定時空下國家亦 扮演生產者（如委託商、上游獨占廠商）的角色，和資本家構築彼此合作 的生產型態。對國家而言，施惠於資本家的目的在求國內的經濟成長。另 一方面，國家對勞工階級的排斥則體現在其長期未調整勞工的基本工資基 數，藉以避免因工資上揚而抵消了資本家的投資意願，影響經濟成長；而 工資基數的長期凍結，除了使資本家能盡量壓低勞動所得外，亦使勞工所 得遠落後物價波動，導致勞工消費能力薄弱和偏低的生活水準；此外，國 家還透過法令編織強力禁制罷工活動，在此情況下造成勞工無法藉集體行 動來改善勞動條件。 儘管如此，國家與資本家的合作關係，似乎僅止 於在生產活動的個別授受，本文從「意識型態」、「組織設計」、及「組 織控制」等三個面向可發現，國家不管是對資本家聯盟抑或勞工聯盟，事 實上都有著強烈的干預現象－－即國家企圖將二者‘轉化’為整合及動員 機制。由於聯盟本質上蘊含龐大的動員力量，基於對聯盟的疑懼和防堵， 國家並不允許有組織的聯盟擁有真正的實力，進而藉此實力來挑戰或分享 國家在政╱經資源的分配權。於是種種干預措施使得聯盟力量被真正地化 整為零，無法壯大來抗衡國家。此不僅反應在資本家聯盟身上，在勞工聯 盟方面，亦同樣可見；在國家的強控制下，資本家聯盟和勞工聯盟僅具有 象徵意義而已。

國民黨執政期間國家社會關係為上對下威權統治關係，而後威權時期台灣國家社會關係最突出的現象為社會自主性的提昇，國家社會關係轉變為平行合作伙伴關係，經濟自由化促進政治民主化，表面上「民意」成為台灣政經發展的主要推動力量，但支持台灣後威權時期民主政治發展之多元制度卻仍付之闕如，促使台灣發生類似民主民粹化現象。高漲的民意反噬民主政治賴以建立的根基—多元化民主，政治一元化論述撕裂了民主社會應有的基本共識與互信，並造成國家認同問題，筆者認為，民主民粹化現象使後威權時期台灣國家社會關係反而回到國家社會衝突對抗關係，多元與互補性認同是撫癒此種社會裂痕的主要關鍵。而缺乏制度性安排是造成此種緊張關係的主要原因，國家社會鑲嵌性不足，聯帶影響台灣整體國家能力。 後威權時期台灣所臨的困境主要在於如何以制度性安排重建國家社會鑲嵌性，社會需求、想法能循正常制度管道完全供輸至公部門，而公部門在制定重大政策時能同時整合私部門的需求與想法，但切忌以國家基礎建設能力為祭品，讓行政官僚體系無法發揮應有的效能，不僅社會鑲嵌性出現問題，也使貧富差距加大，造成社會不穩定。 台灣正處於政經轉型階段，如何以正面適切的回應解決來自全球化的挑戰，是政府和民間社會必需共同面對的問題，制度若無法成為民主政治的主要屏障，則民主化不必然保證多元社會的出現。

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中國共產黨建政8年後，就宣布完成全行業社會主義改造（1949-1956），實現了公有制與計畫經濟體制，取消了中國既有的混合經濟體制與私有財產制度。然而，自70年代末期開始，一連串試圖搞活經濟的措施開啟了中國經濟制度變化的序幕，30年來，中國已經由公有制計畫經濟體制，轉變到今日混合所有制市場經濟形態。 那些力量驅動了這場變化？那些變數與其交互作用影響，變化了經濟改革的方向？通過經濟制度變化的過程，那些成果帶來經濟制度走上不歸路的效用呢？這是筆者試圖解釋的課題。 事實上，中國經濟制度的變化，是一連串政權行動者「始料未及」的變化的結果，這場制度變遷─中國由公有制計畫經濟體制重新回到混合所有制市場經濟體制，一開始並未有指引變革行動的藍圖，變革的方向亦是在變化的過程上才漸次浮現的，它受到制度的限制，也受到偶發事件的影響，當然也就不意味是整體領導層的共識結果，它是在特定歷史結構與制度交錯相互影響下的產物。換句話說，是歷史（時間序列上的事件與變化）、制度與行動者組構了這場變遷。同時，這也是一場動態的變遷過程，變遷的路徑有來自制度遺產的影響，它也存在著路徑依賴的現象。 不過，路徑因行動者與制度安排的激勵而強化，從而實現變遷，但也在行動者基於觀念（意識形態）或利益下予以限制，從而轉折到不同的方向上。筆者認為，在中國獨特的政經體制下，路徑自我強化的現象不是內部自我激勵造成的結果，而是來自外部的因素；在路徑依賴的背後，制度結構與行動者的作用具有不容忽視的影響。 筆者認為，改變中國經濟制度最重要的取徑，就是「雙軌制」。「雙軌制」是一項行動者非意圖的創造，它始自陳雲倡議「摸著石頭過河」，獲得鄧小平的贊同，從而形成「試點」模式，並作為該模式的指導原則。 此外，觀念的引進與衝突是這場變化過程的重要部份，像是在推動「經濟特區試點政策過程中尤為明顯；當政權領導人受外部引入的觀念的影響，產生經濟特區政策，而領導人內部也因觀念的分歧，形成足以阻滯特區試點政策的衝突；他們之間的衝突（正統派vs改革派）貫穿整個變遷過程，這也正好說明了觀念因素在中國改變經濟制度過程上的重要影響。 / 8 years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party claimed that socialist reform has been successfully conducted. Public ownership and planned economy replaced mixed economy as well as private ownership. In the end of 1970s, however, a series of economic reform challenged public ownership with planned economy, which leads China enter into a mixed ownership economy. This thesis attempts to sort out the forces and consequences that drive economic reform. Through the transition of economic system, which leads China’s economy into a no return road. In fact, economic reform in China is an unexpected result by political regulators. Originally, it did not have a blueprint to lead the way. The direction from public ownership to mixed economy emerged throughout the reform, which is not a common consensus from the political leaders. Instead, it is dominated by history, political system as well as regulator in a dynamic way. This path dependency with institutional heritage character is the spot light of economic reform. The author claims the importance and direction of this reform is dominated by external factor. The most importance factor that change China’s economic is the launch of dual system. This system, with the slogan of “crossing the river by groping the stones along the way,” is proposed by CHEN Yun and approved by Deng Xiao-Ping. The introduction of concept is an important factor through the reform, which can be seemed from the process during the promotion of Special Economic Zones SEZs. When political regulators received outer concept and launched SEZs, internal diversity emerged that blocking the reform. Conflicts between orthodoxy and reformist can be seemed throughout reform period, influencing the forces and consequences of China’s economic system.