La thèse examine ce que signifie être intellectuel et communiste à travers le cas du critique littéraire. Dans ce but elle reconstitue « l’ordre des livres » communiste lors de la première Guerre froide (milieu des années 1940-milieu des années 1950). Après une présentation liminaire du contexte d’exercice et d’écriture de la critique littéraire d’« expression communiste » en Guerre froide, une première partie dresse un panorama de cette critique et de ses caractéristiques dans l’avant-Guerre froide et un contexte encore de basses eaux idéologiques. Puis la thèse étudie son durcissement et sa « pamphlétarisation », son anti-américanisation : son entrée en Guerre froide. Une troisième partie restitue le déploiement bibliographique, la « petite bibliothèque rouge » communiste de Guerre froide qui en découle, tandis que la dernière partie brosse les variantes, la crise larvée et l’ébauche d’inflexion du milieu des années 1950 de cette critique littéraire. Il résulte de ce parcours un portrait du critique littéraire communiste en « penseur d’orthodoxie » des livres et des auteurs, aux tendances « publicistes » fortes et un aperçu de la « culture littéraire » communiste : réaliste social(ist)e, soucieuse de thématiques issues du quotidien, des luttes politiques et sociales en France et dans le monde, dix-neuviémiste dans ses références esthétiques et littéraires, soucieuse d’efficience politique et sociale, anti-formaliste sur les plans esthétique et thématique… / This Master's thesis tackle what it means to be a Communist and an intellectual through the example of literary appreciation. In order to do so, it will reconstruct the Communist “order of books” during the first Cold War (mid 1940s-mid 1950s). After a presentation of how this literary criticism came to be and its writing process, a first part will give a comprehensive overview of the criticism and its caracteristics, before the Cold War, when ideologies were still fledgling. Then the thesis will focus on how the literary criticism became more radical, sounding more like pamphlets and being more anti-American; in other words, how it took part in the Cold War. The next part will analyze the development of a bibliography, which would later evolve into the "little red library" of Communism during the Cold War. Finally, the last part will show how the literary criticism started to morph in the mid 1950s, it will explain its variations and the dormant crisis that it experienced. As a result of this work, we will be able to draw a portrait of the Communist literary critic as a thinker who would envision his readings and its authors through the prism of Marxist orthodoxy, someone who would strongly feel about expressing his political views. We will see a glimpse of the Communist literary culture, with its both social and socialist realism, which was concerned with everyday issues or political and social struggles, both in France and abroad. In this culture, the influence of the 19th century could be seen in its esthetic and literary references alike, as it strove to achieve something socially and politically, in an uncluttered fashion, as far as topics and style were concerned.

No description available.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

滿清末年以來，中國文官節制武官的傳統受到嚴重破壞，地方團練取代政府軍，地方軍隊演變成軍閥主義，國家領導人都是由戰場上勝利的軍人擔任。江澤民時期開始，中共實施世代交替，黨、政、軍高層領導人，轉移給一批技術官僚與軍事專業人員手上，此期間中共黨、政、軍互動關係為本文研究之目的。透過歷史比較，江澤民，是一個幾乎與解放軍毫無淵源的文官，沒有任何服役與作戰的經驗，卻能順利掌握軍隊與國家，本研究證明在中國中斷數百年來「文官統制武官」的歷史傳統，已經恢復。此外，近二十年來，中共軍事現代化成就確實令人刮目相看，與江澤民的外語專長及電機專長有密切關係，這些人格特質也是他令軍隊信服的重要工具。軍政軍民關係上，江澤民堅持民主集中制，排除多黨制，造成軍隊遠離政治紛擾，並與黨充分合作，以獲致預算並做好軍民與軍政關係。在解放軍內部，推動軍事教育的改革，也造就解放軍戰略思維的重大轉變，形成解放軍現代化的動力之ㄧ。然而，敏感性的軍文關係議題，例如一黨領軍，中共有禁忌而且沒有試驗場，台灣的寶貴經驗，很值得大陸參考。 關鍵字：中國共產黨、軍隊現代化、解放軍、文人統制、軍事專業主義 / During the decline of Chin Dynasty, as an unintended result to rely upon localized National Guard defeating upraise event, the Chinese traditional Civilian Control system was replaced by warlord system. Since then, the war hero was the one who advanced to political leadership. Until Jiang Zemin, a civilian with civil college certificate took leadership over the PLA, CCP, and PRC. The purpose of this paper is to exam the civil-military interaction during Jiang Zemin’s journey. Through historical comparison, this paper confirmed that the Chinese traditional Civil-Control system has been revived. Also, Jiang Zemin was the military leadership over PLA modernization. With personal attributes of profound languages and electronic profession, he shaped his position successfully in PLA community. This paper also recognized significant relationship between one-party theory and PLA, and the relationship between PLA　NDU and strategic thinking. Key Words: Chinese Communist Party, Military Modernization, People Liberation Army, Civil-Control and Military Professionalism.

The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand’s COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand’s current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok’s most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.

“The Proletarian Prometheus: Socialism, Ethnicity, and Revolution at the Lakehead, 1900-1935” is an analysis of the various socialist organizations operating at the Canadian Lakehead (comprised of the twin cities of Port Arthur and Fort William, Ontario, now the present-day City of Thunder Bay, and their vicinity) during the first 35 years of the twentieth century. It contends that the circumstances and actions of Lakehead labour, especially those related to ideology, ethnicity, and personality, worked simultaneously to empower and to fetter workers in their struggles against the shackles of capitalism. The twentieth-century Lakehead never lacked for a population of enthusiastic, energetic and talented left-wingers. Yet, throughout this period the movement never truly solidified and took hold. Socialist organizations, organizers and organs came and went, leaving behind them an enduring legacy, yet paradoxically the sum of their efforts was cumulatively less than the immense sacrifices and energies they had poured into them. Between 1900 and 1935, the region's working-class politics was shaped by the interaction of ideas drawn from the much larger North Atlantic socialist world with the particularities of Lakehead society and culture. International frameworks of analysis and activism were of necessity reshaped and revised in a local context in which ethnic divisions complicated and even undermined the class identities upon which so many radical dreams and ambitions rested. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2007-12-14 20:26:40.652

本論文研究的主題是泰國為維護其邊界安全作出的國家安全政策。泰國位在印度支那半島的中心點，當周邊國家發生動亂時，泰國就成為政治難民逃難的目的地，而且入侵的人數非常多。先後進入泰國的政治難民有泰北孤軍、馬來亞共產黨及柬埔寨難民。本文探討他們進入泰國的原因、在泰國的行為、及泰國政府處置政治難民的政策及最後的歸屬。當時泰國國內也深受共產主義的迫害，使得泰國政府除了要消除來自國外的威脅，還要利用這些難民來協助阻止泰共的活動，或者利用這些難民團體構建其邊疆的防衛圈，成為防衛泰國邊界的前沿軍隊。最後泰國政府以其維護邊境安全有功的理由給予泰北孤軍和馬來亞共產黨人泰國籍，對柬埔寨難民則採取遣返回國或送至第三國安置的辦法。總之，泰國政府以包容性的政策，容納週鄰政治難民，藉以防衛其邊境並開發其邊疆荒蕪之地，是乃泰國邊境安全政策成功之道。 / This paper focuses on Thailand’s national security policy for its boundary issue. Due to the central position in Indo-Chinese Peninsular, when there happened the political turmoil of the surrounding countries, territory of Thailand has been used as a shelter for a large number of political refugees. Those political refugee groups include the Chinese Nationalist troops (KMT), Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), and Cambodian refugees. The reasons of political refugees entering into Thailand, activities and Thai government policy towards them, would be discussed in this paper. Since the 1950s, Thailand suffered from rebel activities of the Communist Party of Thailand, so Thai government took advantage of combating experience of political refugees to fight against those Thai Communists in bordering area. Thai government even gave them the land and agricultural instruments to cultivate in bordering area and encouraged them stay by giving Thailand nationality to KMT troops and members of CPM, but repatriated those Cambodia refugees to back to Cambodia or to resettle in the third country. Thai government adopted an accommodate policy towards those political refugee groups, by using them to defence its border area and develop the economy, successfully to maitain its border security.

婦女的政治參與是促進性別平等的重要條件。中國的經濟改革帶來了在該國的社會和經濟部門大量的改進。然而，權力，政治文化和經濟的原因與其他社會文化因素相結合的政權的壟斷，導致婦女在中國的政治生活中連續的統治。本研究結合使用的輔助研究方法與合理的數據量涵蓋1977至2013年的婦女在選擇的最高政治機構的存在。該研究發現，女性在整個政治委員會代表性不足，但最糟糕的政府高層官員（精英）和黨的機構。這意味著，在國家層面，政治仍然是男性領域，有超過黨的機構也存在著一個嚴峻的陽剛壟斷。婦女被真正發現，如議會，他們的存在只是作為在中國共產黨的利益高於性別平等或行使平等權利的真正意義上滿足全球重要的還是國內需求的來源（男人之間和女性）在確定他們的社會事務。 / Women’s participation in politics is an important requirement for gender equality. China’s economic reform has brought massive improvements in the social and economic sectors of the country. However, the regime’s monopoly of power, political culture and economic reasons in combination with other socio-cultural factors has resulted to continuous domination of women in China’s political life. This study has employed a secondary research approach in combination with a reasonable data quantity covering 1977 to 2013 on the presence of women in selected top political institutions. The study finds out that women are under-represented across the political board but worst in top government (elite) and party institutions. This means that, at the state level, politics remains a domain for men and there exist a stern masculine monopoly over party institutions also. Where women are genuinely found, such as the parliament, their presence only serves as a source of meeting an important global or domestic requirement in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party than a true sense of gender equality or exercise of an equal right (between men and women) in determining the affairs of their society.

This thesis focuses on the developments in the Soviet top-elite dynamics from 1981 to 1991. It claims that a careful examination of particular characteristics of the Soviet nomenklatura as a form of top-elite can give us important hints on how the intra-nomenklatura tensions that had been accumulating since its inception aggravated in the last decade of the USSR and contributed substantially to the Union&rsquo / s drive to the end. Hence, the main argument of this thesis is that when the Soviet top-elite lost its confidence on the elite-preserving capacity of Gorbachev, it started searching for alternatives, one of the most notable of which was the market economy option advocated by Boris Yeltsin at that time. This shift in the preferences of the Soviet nomenklatura played a considerable role in the dissolution process.

1895年清廷把臺灣割讓給日本，臺人以民族大義，組「臺灣民主國」扺抗，事敗後，不願被日本統治的臺人，紛紛返回祖國大陸的中國，此後終日本領臺的五十年間，一批又一批的臺人陸續踏上中國，有獲得傳統科舉功名者，有參與中國革命運動者，有參加中國抗日戰爭者。回到中國後，他們所從事的活動是臺灣抗日運動的延伸，也是中國近現代民族運動及反帝國主義運動不可或缺的一部份，在相當程度內，他們的活動與兩岸關係的歷史進程進行了聯結。 本文共分為七章： 第一章 回返中國的科舉士群。論述回返中國的進士及其對乙未割臺的反應。他們乃是懷抱民族大義，以依依不捨的心情回到中國的，但回到所謂的祖國後，卻受到始料未及的遭遇，各界猜忌，甚至有以為抗日是「抗旨」者，種種情形，不一而足。他們始終忘不了臺灣，念念不忘臺灣。他們或者為官，或者致力於中國的新式教育工作，也有人從事政治活動。為了稍解思念臺灣之情，回到中國的科舉士群彼此之間相互酬酢來往。 第二章臺灣人與辛亥革命。在中國辛亥革命的過程中，臺灣人始終參與其間。丘逢甲是清末立憲運動的一份子，之後他從擁護立憲轉而贊助革命。革命運動之中除了直接的行動，經費一項尤不可缺，臺灣人無論是捐獻革命經費或是參與起義，均不落人後，可以說是出錢又出力，在辛亥年三二九之役尤為顯著。 第三章奔向北伐。中國的北伐，是為打倒軍閥及其背後的帝國主義，臺灣人林祖密早就支持孫中山的護法大業，而國民黨一全大會後創辦的黃埔軍校與中山大學，都有臺灣人就讀，臺灣青年就讀黃埔軍校與中山大學之餘，還組織「廣東臺灣學生聯合會」與「廣東臺灣革命青年團」，孫中山去世，臺灣人極力哀悼，北伐大軍出動後，臺灣人更是直接參加。 第四章參與反帝國主義運動。「五卅運動」是中國人大規模反帝國主義運動的序幕，發生在上海的這次運動，臺灣人也參加了，在波瀾壯闊的五卅運動狂潮下，臺灣人捲入中國的國民革命運動和共產主義運動之中。臺共在上海創立，參與建立臺共的臺灣人，部份也加入了中共，更有一些臺共黨人被安排到莫斯科東方大學受訓。 第五章夾縫中的臺灣人：國民黨或中共。在國共兩黨的鬥爭與分合過程中，不僅中國人，連臺灣人也被捲入這個旋渦。丘念台在國共二次合作期間，前往延安考察，回到廣東後，取中共民眾組訓工作之優點，組成東區服務隊，其下有自臺灣專程回到中國的臺灣青年加入。李友邦組成臺灣義勇隊，其下更是集中了大批的臺灣菁英。專研日本政情的宋斐如創辦《戰時日本》，專門收集和分析日本情報，提供中國政府及各界參考。 第六章臺灣人的傾軋：臺灣革命同盟會與臺灣黨部的紛爭。在國民黨主導下成立的臺灣革命同盟會與國民黨臺灣黨部，對於團結臺灣人抗日有所貢獻，但兩者之間都有著人事上的紛爭，臺人互相攻擊和指控，首任臺灣黨部主任委員翁俊明最後也因為不明原因猝逝。 第七章在抗日烽火下。日本對中國的侵略戰爭給中國造成巨大的損失，其間，留在臺灣的臺灣人受日本的殖民統治，另一方面，回到中國大陸的臺灣人則是在在各個部門直接或間接參加了這次的戰爭。臺人有加入中共陣營的，有在國民黨領導下致力的，更有直接在戰場前線衝鋒陷陣的，國內戰場固不必論，連在國外的緬甸戰場上，也有臺灣人參加。 結論。由於中國大陸政局動蕩不安，五十年間內憂外患不斷，始終沒有積極的臺灣政策，臺灣人到中國大陸，都是自動前往，不是中國當局主動爭取，他們到了中國沒有保障，時有危險，卻又不能團結，彼此傾軋，其道路是充滿曲折的。 / In 1895, when the government of Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan, the Taiwanese, out of the righteousness of a people, organized the “Republic of Taiwan” to resist Japanese. After the resistance failed, those Taiwanese unwilling to be governed by Japan went to mainland China, their homeland then. Through out the 50-year governing by Japan, groups after groups of Taiwanese arrived in China continually. Some of them won scholarly honor or official ranks by taking imperial examinations, some joined Chinese revolutionary movements, and some participated in the war against Japan. For those who later returned to Taiwan, the activities they engaged in are an extension of Taiwan’s anti-Japan movements, also a part indispensible to China’s contemporary national movements and anti-imperialism movements. To a certain extent, their activities are closely connected to the historical progress of the relations across Taiwan Straits. This article is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 Intellectuals going to China for imperial examinations Those scholars going to China and their response to the cession of Taiwan in 1895 are discussed. Embracing a national righteousness, they returned to China quite grudgingly. Once arriving in so-called the fatherland, they unexpectedly encountered suspicion from all circles. Even their action against Japan was considered “disobedient” to the imperial government. In spite of various situation, however, they never forgot Taiwan. They became officials or devoted themselves to the modern education in China. Some went into politics. To relieve their missing of Taiwan, the intellectual Taiwanese in China had friendly interexchange among themselves. Chapter 2 Taiwanese and the Revolution in 1911 In the progress of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Taiwanese took part in it from beginning to end. Qiu Feng-jia was one of the constitutionalists at the end of Qing Dynasty. Later he altered to support the revolution. The revolutionary movements require direct actions, but funds are also indispensible. The Taiwanese never hesitated to contribute to fund raising or participate in uprisings. They made a great contribution to the Revolution in both funds and actions, significantly above all in the uprising on March 29, 1911. Chapter 3 Running for the Northern Punitive Expedition The Northern Punitive Expedition in China was to overthrow the warlords and the imperialism behind them. Quite early Lin Zu-mi, a Taiwanese, supported Sun Yat-sen’s great cause to protect the Provisional Constitution. Taiwanese students entered Huang-pu Military Academy and Zhong-shan University, both established after the First Plenary Assembly of Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). Taiwanese youth not only entered the Academy and the University established by Kuomintang, but also organized “Taiwan Student Union in Guangtong” and “Taiwan Revolutionary Youth Corps in Guangtong”. When Sun Yat-sen passed away, Taiwanese expressed great condolence over his death. After the Northern Punitive Expedition marched out, Taiwanese even participated in it directly. Chapter 4 Participating in anti-imperialism movements “May 30th Movement” is the overture for large-scale anti-imperialism movements by Chinese. In this Movement, which took place in Shanghai, Taiwanese also participated. Under the tidal waves of this grand Movement, Taiwanese were involved in national revolutionary movements and Communism movements in China. Communist Party of Taiwan was established in Shanghai. Some of the participants in establishing Communist Party of Taiwan also joined Communist Party of China, and some Taiwanese Communists were even sent to Moscow East University for training. Chapter 5 Taiwanese in a crack: Kuomintang or Chi-Comm? During the on-and-off process of clashes and collaborations between Kuomintang and Communist Party of China, not only Chinese but also Taiwanese were engulfed in the whirlpool. During the second collaboration period between Kuomintang and Chi-Comm, Qu Nian-tai went to Yan-an for a survey. After returning to Guangtong, by utilizing Chi-Comm’s merit in gathering and training people, he organized East Region Service Team, which was joined by some Taiwanese youth especially returning to China. Li You-bang organized Taiwan Volunteers, calling together lots of Taiwanese elites. Song Pei-ru, an expert on Japanese political situation, founded “War-time Japan”. He specialized in gathering and analyzing Japanese information to provide reference for Chinese government and others. Chapter 6 Internal strife among Taiwanese: The disputes between Taiwan Revolution Alliance and Kuomintang’s Taiwan Headquarters Taiwan Revolution Alliance and Kuomintang’s Taiwan Headquarters, both established under the guidance of Kuomintang, made a contribution to the unity of Taiwanese against Japanese. There existed, however, personnel disputes between them, with Taiwanese attacking and accusing one another. The first appointed commissioner of Taiwan Headquarters, Weng Jun-ming, died suddenly with the cause unaccounted for. Chapter 7 Waging warfare against Japanese The aggressive war by Japan caused tremendous damages to China. During the war, the Taiwanese remaining in Taiwan were ruled by the Japan’s colonial government. On the other hand, those returning to mainland China participated in the war directly or indirectly at various departments. Some of them joined the camp of Chi-Comm, while others endeavored under Kuomintang’s leadership. Even at the frontline of battlefields, brave Taiwanese fought vigorously. Needless to mention domestic battlefields, Taiwanese were found fighting even in remote Burmese jungles. Conclusion Due to the unstable political situation in mainland China, with internal revolts and foreign invasions unceasing for 50 years, there was no active Taiwan policy all along. Taiwanese went to China all voluntarily by themselves, not initiatively strived for by the Chinese authorities. There was neither guarantee nor safeguard when they arrived there. To the worse, they engaged in internal strive without unity. Their road was complicated with ups and downs.