The sub judice rule is a media law practice that is currently often in the spotlight. Editors and journalists are constantly furiously speaking out against this rule that limits their freedom of expression in an attempt to assure the accused's fair and proper trial. Practitioners of the law, on the other side, say the sub judice rule is indispensable to the proper administration of justice. The rule, which much prevents the media from interfering with a pending case, causes confusion under journalists, as it is not consistently applied. Judges often warn the media against the violation of the rule during a high profile case, but those who do break the rule are not charged with contempt of the court. The aim of this study is to determine how Beeld, the Afrikaans daily newspaper, applies the sub judice rule in his reporting. The way in which this leading paper handles the rule is of importance to other journalists as well as the readers. The origin, development and function of the rule are also examined. It was established that Beeld did not contravene the sub judice rule as unceremoniously as a few other newspapers. Beelds violations of the rule were different experts' nuanced interpretations thereof. These violations is more based on the perception that the court's independence and worthiness must be upheld in the public eye than on the rule's actual function to guard against the interfering in the due course of a case. / Thesis (M.A. (Communication Studies))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007

A pornogra a foi apresentada como problema político por uma ramificação anti-porn do feminismo no final dos anos 1970 nos EUA. Esse grupo rompeu com o feminismo liberal e com perspectivas liberais de igualdade sexual ao tratar radicalmente a excitação sexual masculina como uma forma de subordinação da mulher e discriminação sexual, dadas condições específicas sob as quais a excitação era concebida como danosa. Mas essas condições, do modo como foram definidas por esse grupo, eram muito amplas. Quando interpretadas, poderiam ir de situações de tortura e estupro reais até a leitura da Ilíada. Essa definição foi codificada em lei por Catherine MacKinnon nos anos 1980, mas rejeitada pela Suprema Corte como tentativa de censura de conteúdo, uma violação da liberdade de expressão. Da perspectiva anti-porn, a Suprema Corte decidiu que a liberdade de expressão era superior a igualdade sexual, e que a pornogra a poderia continuar a subordinar as mulheres aos homens. O problema político que encontramos aqui e o problema de como equilibrar liberdade e igualdade, de modo que as pessoas sejam tratadas com igualdade sem ter sua liberdade violada. Apresentamos uma crítica liberal, de Ronald Dworkin, a posição anti-porn. Ela é uma defesa singular da pornografia, pois não apela a liberdade de expressão, mas sim ao próprio direito a igualdade A pornografia é defendida como um importante modo de vida para muitas pessoas que têm diferentes perspectivas sobre o valor e o significado da prática pornográfica. Elas têm um direito a independência moral, que a definição anti-porn de pornografia viola, pois tenta atribuir tanto o valor como o sentido da prática sem consideração pelos valores e sentidos que pessoas de fato envolvidas na pornografia dão a ela. A liberdade de expressãoé concebida como necessária a esse processo de dar valor e sentido a uma atividade. Segundo essa concepção, liberdade não conflita com igualdade, porque, para que sejam tratadas com igualdade, as pessoas devem ser livres para expressar, atrav es de suas vidas, diferentes valores e sentidos, que por sua vez devem ser respeitados em decisões políticas que as afetam. A posição liberal deixa aberta a possibilidade de reformar a pornografia, de as pessoas reinventarem a pornografia do modo como for adequado as suas vidas em sua presente situação, enquanto a anti-porn não deixa, pois concebe a pornografia de um modo unico e fixo. A principal critica liberal da posição anti-porn, portanto, nãoé sobre seu conteúdo, sobre o que feministas anti-porn dizem que a pornografia seja ou faça, mas ao modo como elas tratam as pessoas, que é sem respeito pelo sentido de suas atividades e pelo valor que estão tentando dar as suas vidas através da pornografia. / Pornography was introduced as a political problem by the anti-porn branch of feminism in the late 1970's in the USA. This group broke with liberal feminism and liberal perspectives on sexual equality when they radically treated male sexual excitement as a form of women subordination and sex discrimination, given speci c conditions under which the excitement was conceived as harmful. But those conditions, the way they were de ned by this group, were very broad. When interpreted, they could go from actual situations of torture and rape to the reading of the Iliad. This de nition was codi ed into law by Catherine MacKinnon in the 1980's but rejected by the Supreme Court as an attempt of content censorship, a violation of freedom of expression. From the anti-porn perspective, the Supreme Court decided that freedom of speech was superior to sex equality, and that pornography could continue to subordinate women to men. The political problem that we nd here is the problem of how to balance liberty and equality, so that people can be treated with equality while not having their freedom violated. We present a liberal critique, by Ronald Dworkin, of the anti-porn position. It's a singular defense of pornography, as it does not call for freedom of expression but for the right to equality itself. Pornography is defended as an important way of life for many people that have di erent perspectives on the value and meaning of the pornographic practice They have a right to moral independence, which the anti-porn de nition of pornography violates as it tries to give both the value and the meaning of the practice without concern for the value and meaning people actually involved in pornography give to it. Freedom of expression is conceived as necessary for this process of giving value and meaning to an activity. In that sense, liberty does not con ict with equality, because for people to be treated with equality they should be free to express, through their lives, di erent values and meanings, which in turn should be respected in political decisions a ecting them. The liberal position leaves open the possibility to reform pornography, for people to reinvent pornography as they see t for their lives in their present situation, which the anti-porn does not, since it conceives pornography in a single and xed way. The main liberal critique of the anti-porn position, thus, is not about it's content, about what anti-porn feminists say pornography is or what pornography does, but the way they treat people, which is without respect for the meaning of their actvity and the value they are trying to give to their lives through pornography.

Em um Estado Democrático de Direito, o direito fundamental à liberdade de expressão deve ser tratado de forma heterogênea, sendo capaz de gozar de um status de direito fundamental preferencial prima facie nas hipóteses em que estiver relacionado a um tema de interesse público, tendo em vista a ocorrência de duas premisssas existentes nesses casos: a do direito que a sociedade tem de saber a respeito dos assuntos de interesse público e a do dever que a imprensa tem de informar a respeito desses assuntos. Firmada a tese da preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão em temas que envolvem assuntos de interesse público, torna-se necessário dar mais um passo e analisar como essa preferencialidade se consubstanciará no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. A respeito, pode se afirmar que a materialização dessa preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão ocorrerá com a importação, para o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, das teorias da actual malice e reportagem neutra (teorias provindas dos Estados Unidos) e privilégios de defesa Reynolds (Inglaterra) e Lange (Austrália). Com a aplicação dessas teorias no Brasil, alguns bons standards poderão ser traçados para orientar o intérprete no momento de solucionar eventuais conflitos entre os direitos fundamentais à liberdade de expressão e de personalidade, garantindo-se, assim, uma aplicação efetiva dos direitos em confilto e uma estrita observância do ideal democrático traçado pelo Constituinte originário. Aplicar a tese da preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão em sentido amplo significa apenas autorizar que a balança da ponderação, ao iniciar o procedimento ponderativo, confira maior peso inicial à liberdade de expressão, sendo perfeitamente admissível a inversão dos pesos inicialmente atribuídos aos direitos fundamentais em conflito a partir das circunstâncias do caso concreto. / In a Democratic State of Law, the fundamental right to freedom of speech should be treated unequally, being capable of sharing a status of a prima facie preferential fundamental right in cases in which it is related to a subject of public interest, considering the occurrence of two premises on such cases: the right that society has to know about matters of public interest and the duty of the press to inform about these matters. Once established the theory of prima facie preferentiality for freedom of speech on issues involving matters of public interest, it is necessary to go one step further and examine how this preference will be manifested in the Brazilian legal system. Concerning this matter, it can be stated that the embodiment of this prima facie preferentiality of freedom of speech will occur with the importation, into the Brazilian legal system, of the current theories of actual malice and neutral reportage (theories stemmed from the United States) and Reynolds (England ) and Lange (Australia) privileges of defense. By applying these theories in Brazil, some good standards can be traced to guide the interpreter when solving possible conflicts between the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and personality, ensuring, thus, an effective application of these conflicting rights and a strict observance of the democratic ideal outlined by the originating Constituent. Applying the theory of prima facie preferentiality of freedom of speech in a broad sense only means allowing that the balancing scale, when initiating its balancing procedure, provides a greater initial weight to freedom of speech, the reversion of the weights initially assigned to the conflicting fundamental rights from the circumstances of the concrete case being perfectly acceptable.

Em um Estado Democrático de Direito, o direito fundamental à liberdade de expressão deve ser tratado de forma heterogênea, sendo capaz de gozar de um status de direito fundamental preferencial prima facie nas hipóteses em que estiver relacionado a um tema de interesse público, tendo em vista a ocorrência de duas premisssas existentes nesses casos: a do direito que a sociedade tem de saber a respeito dos assuntos de interesse público e a do dever que a imprensa tem de informar a respeito desses assuntos. Firmada a tese da preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão em temas que envolvem assuntos de interesse público, torna-se necessário dar mais um passo e analisar como essa preferencialidade se consubstanciará no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. A respeito, pode se afirmar que a materialização dessa preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão ocorrerá com a importação, para o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, das teorias da actual malice e reportagem neutra (teorias provindas dos Estados Unidos) e privilégios de defesa Reynolds (Inglaterra) e Lange (Austrália). Com a aplicação dessas teorias no Brasil, alguns bons standards poderão ser traçados para orientar o intérprete no momento de solucionar eventuais conflitos entre os direitos fundamentais à liberdade de expressão e de personalidade, garantindo-se, assim, uma aplicação efetiva dos direitos em confilto e uma estrita observância do ideal democrático traçado pelo Constituinte originário. Aplicar a tese da preferencialidade prima facie da liberdade de expressão em sentido amplo significa apenas autorizar que a balança da ponderação, ao iniciar o procedimento ponderativo, confira maior peso inicial à liberdade de expressão, sendo perfeitamente admissível a inversão dos pesos inicialmente atribuídos aos direitos fundamentais em conflito a partir das circunstâncias do caso concreto. / In a Democratic State of Law, the fundamental right to freedom of speech should be treated unequally, being capable of sharing a status of a prima facie preferential fundamental right in cases in which it is related to a subject of public interest, considering the occurrence of two premises on such cases: the right that society has to know about matters of public interest and the duty of the press to inform about these matters. Once established the theory of prima facie preferentiality for freedom of speech on issues involving matters of public interest, it is necessary to go one step further and examine how this preference will be manifested in the Brazilian legal system. Concerning this matter, it can be stated that the embodiment of this prima facie preferentiality of freedom of speech will occur with the importation, into the Brazilian legal system, of the current theories of actual malice and neutral reportage (theories stemmed from the United States) and Reynolds (England ) and Lange (Australia) privileges of defense. By applying these theories in Brazil, some good standards can be traced to guide the interpreter when solving possible conflicts between the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and personality, ensuring, thus, an effective application of these conflicting rights and a strict observance of the democratic ideal outlined by the originating Constituent. Applying the theory of prima facie preferentiality of freedom of speech in a broad sense only means allowing that the balancing scale, when initiating its balancing procedure, provides a greater initial weight to freedom of speech, the reversion of the weights initially assigned to the conflicting fundamental rights from the circumstances of the concrete case being perfectly acceptable.

A pornogra a foi apresentada como problema político por uma ramificação anti-porn do feminismo no final dos anos 1970 nos EUA. Esse grupo rompeu com o feminismo liberal e com perspectivas liberais de igualdade sexual ao tratar radicalmente a excitação sexual masculina como uma forma de subordinação da mulher e discriminação sexual, dadas condições específicas sob as quais a excitação era concebida como danosa. Mas essas condições, do modo como foram definidas por esse grupo, eram muito amplas. Quando interpretadas, poderiam ir de situações de tortura e estupro reais até a leitura da Ilíada. Essa definição foi codificada em lei por Catherine MacKinnon nos anos 1980, mas rejeitada pela Suprema Corte como tentativa de censura de conteúdo, uma violação da liberdade de expressão. Da perspectiva anti-porn, a Suprema Corte decidiu que a liberdade de expressão era superior a igualdade sexual, e que a pornogra a poderia continuar a subordinar as mulheres aos homens. O problema político que encontramos aqui e o problema de como equilibrar liberdade e igualdade, de modo que as pessoas sejam tratadas com igualdade sem ter sua liberdade violada. Apresentamos uma crítica liberal, de Ronald Dworkin, a posição anti-porn. Ela é uma defesa singular da pornografia, pois não apela a liberdade de expressão, mas sim ao próprio direito a igualdade A pornografia é defendida como um importante modo de vida para muitas pessoas que têm diferentes perspectivas sobre o valor e o significado da prática pornográfica. Elas têm um direito a independência moral, que a definição anti-porn de pornografia viola, pois tenta atribuir tanto o valor como o sentido da prática sem consideração pelos valores e sentidos que pessoas de fato envolvidas na pornografia dão a ela. A liberdade de expressãoé concebida como necessária a esse processo de dar valor e sentido a uma atividade. Segundo essa concepção, liberdade não conflita com igualdade, porque, para que sejam tratadas com igualdade, as pessoas devem ser livres para expressar, atrav es de suas vidas, diferentes valores e sentidos, que por sua vez devem ser respeitados em decisões políticas que as afetam. A posição liberal deixa aberta a possibilidade de reformar a pornografia, de as pessoas reinventarem a pornografia do modo como for adequado as suas vidas em sua presente situação, enquanto a anti-porn não deixa, pois concebe a pornografia de um modo unico e fixo. A principal critica liberal da posição anti-porn, portanto, nãoé sobre seu conteúdo, sobre o que feministas anti-porn dizem que a pornografia seja ou faça, mas ao modo como elas tratam as pessoas, que é sem respeito pelo sentido de suas atividades e pelo valor que estão tentando dar as suas vidas através da pornografia. / Pornography was introduced as a political problem by the anti-porn branch of feminism in the late 1970's in the USA. This group broke with liberal feminism and liberal perspectives on sexual equality when they radically treated male sexual excitement as a form of women subordination and sex discrimination, given speci c conditions under which the excitement was conceived as harmful. But those conditions, the way they were de ned by this group, were very broad. When interpreted, they could go from actual situations of torture and rape to the reading of the Iliad. This de nition was codi ed into law by Catherine MacKinnon in the 1980's but rejected by the Supreme Court as an attempt of content censorship, a violation of freedom of expression. From the anti-porn perspective, the Supreme Court decided that freedom of speech was superior to sex equality, and that pornography could continue to subordinate women to men. The political problem that we nd here is the problem of how to balance liberty and equality, so that people can be treated with equality while not having their freedom violated. We present a liberal critique, by Ronald Dworkin, of the anti-porn position. It's a singular defense of pornography, as it does not call for freedom of expression but for the right to equality itself. Pornography is defended as an important way of life for many people that have di erent perspectives on the value and meaning of the pornographic practice They have a right to moral independence, which the anti-porn de nition of pornography violates as it tries to give both the value and the meaning of the practice without concern for the value and meaning people actually involved in pornography give to it. Freedom of expression is conceived as necessary for this process of giving value and meaning to an activity. In that sense, liberty does not con ict with equality, because for people to be treated with equality they should be free to express, through their lives, di erent values and meanings, which in turn should be respected in political decisions a ecting them. The liberal position leaves open the possibility to reform pornography, for people to reinvent pornography as they see t for their lives in their present situation, which the anti-porn does not, since it conceives pornography in a single and xed way. The main liberal critique of the anti-porn position, thus, is not about it's content, about what anti-porn feminists say pornography is or what pornography does, but the way they treat people, which is without respect for the meaning of their actvity and the value they are trying to give to their lives through pornography.

Esta dissertação é dedicada à interpretação do direito à liberdade de expressão disponível na obra do filósofo Ronald Dworkin. No primeiro capítulo, abordo o sentido em que o autor fala de direitos, o significado das liberdades no seu pensamento, e o esforço por ele feito de integrá-las à sua concepção de justiça distributiva, a saber, a igualdade de recursos. O capítulo segundo é dedicado a aspecto importante da teoria do autor: a continuidade entre ética e moral, em especial à sua teoria da dignidade, seja na forma do que chama de modelo do desafio, seja na forma de dois princípios (do respeito-próprio e da autenticidade). Ele também explora consequências da teoria ética de Dworkin às liberdades e a integração entre ela e o valor da igualdade. O terceiro capítulo, então, é dedicado mais diretamente ao direito à liberdade de expressão como Dworkin o concebe: integrado à justiça distributiva e fundamentado no que chama de independência ética e na autenticidade que marca a igualdade de recursos, bem como a uma concepção de democracia, de que fazem parte, a depender da terminologia que adota em diferentes trabalhos, agência, e os princípios ou dimensões da sua concepção de democracia como parceria. Também faz parte do terceiro capítulo discussão de casos concretos, em que a generosidade de Dworkin em relação ao direito objeto da dissertação se evidencia. Discuto por que Dworkin inclui na liberdade de expressão o discurso de ódios e pornografia mas também por que, justamente pelo seu fundamento na dignidade do emissor, não inclui a liberdade de imprensa, a liberdade acadêmica, e os atos de expressão por empresas. A conclusão da dissertação é dedicada às suas ideias de cultura de liberdade e de cultura de independência. / This dissertation is dedicated to the interpretation of the right to free speech available in the work of philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the first chapter, I dwell with the sense in which the author speaks of rights, with the meaning of liberties in his thought, and his effort to integrate them to his conception of distributive justice, namely, equality of resources. The second chapter is dedicated to an important aspect of the authors theory: the continuity between ethics and morals, especially his theory of dignity, either in the form o what he calls the model of challenge or in the form of two principles (of self-respect and authenticity). It also explores the consequences of Dworkins ethical theory to the liberties and integration between it and the value of equality. Then, the third chapter is dedicated more directly to the right of free speech as Dworkin conceives it: integrated to distributive justice and founded in what he calls ethical independence and in the authenticity that marks equality of resources, as well as in a conception of democracy, formed, depending on the terminology he adopts at different works, agency and the principles or dimensions of his partnership conception of democracy. It is also part of the third chapter discussion of concrete cases, where Dworkins generosity towards the right which is the object of the dissertation makes itself evident. I discuss why Dworkin includes in free speech hate speech and pornography but also why, precisely because of its foundation in the dignity of the speaker, does not include freedom of the press, academic freedom and expressive acts by companies. The conclusion of the dissertation is dedicated to his ideas of culture of liberty and culture of independence.

This essay has examined the current debate between freedom of speech and personal integrity in the in Swedish news media. Freedom of speech and personal integrity is a controversial debate and they are two values that creates opinions and conflicts between different instances in the society. The essay´s methodology is a critical discourse analysis and the study has gained ground in both theory and methodology in Norman Faircloughs critical discourse analysis with its three dimensions; text, discourse practice and the sociocultural practice. The study is based on 17 reviewed articles, the articles are all published in the Swedish press and includes the current debate between freedom of speech and personal integrity. The two sides have strong arguments and what is clarified is that the democracy will be threatened if laws concerning freedom of expression are taken, and especially journalists are not happy about the proposal. What also emerges in the study was that the technology development is seen as the reason for why regulations are needed in the society. The internet has created a new arena to find and retrieve information about other citizens but also made it possible to disseminate information without any ethical approaches.

The purpose of this bachelor thesis was to examine how traditional news media vis-à- vis alternative news media in Sweden portrayed the Quran burnings and the riots which followed during august in the summer of 2020. With the basis in framing theory and intermedia agenda setting we examined these research questions: How do the news papers frame the Quran burnings? What discourses are reproduced? How do the traditional news papers and the alternative news papers framing of the Quran burnings differ from each other?  The qualitative methods used in this bachelor thesis were Robert Entmans framing theory combined with Rens Vliegenthart &amp; Stefaan Walgraves intermedia agenda setting theory. Also, we used different theories regarding populism, clash of civilizations and freedom of speech in order to find various themes in the reporting. For instance, the study applies Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque to examine how the alternative news paper Samnytt framed the Quran burnings.  Through examining news articles, we discovered several preexisting frames and some additional ones. The results showed that the traditional news papers framed the Quran burnings in a laconic way as an intolerant act against Muslims, while the alternative news papers framed the Quran burnings as a clash of civilizations and simultaneously as an act of freedom of speech. In relation to the alternative news papers overly dramatic and sensationalistic discourse, the traditional news papers discourse was more moderate. In this way the populist discourse in the alternative news media and their focus on the “man on the street” is an example of how the alternative news media defines itself as an opposition to the hegemonic “elite” news media institutions. In the alternative news papers, we also found one specific frame concerning anti-Semitism in Malmö, which was not given the same amount of attention by the traditional news papers.  The result of this study shows differences in framing, in line with previous research regarding alternative news media and populism, that could be an example of how the alternative news media is born and defines itself as an alternative to a narrative they deem wrong or lacking in traditional news media. This is primarily an effect of the fact that the traditional news papers lacked diversity in their interviewees since they mostly relied on authority sources, or in one case their own opinion piece writer, to tell the story. The results of this study highlights processes and effects that lies at the core of several phenomenon in this sphere, therefore it should be used to further the research on framing, alternative news media and populism. / <p>En kvalitativ analys av traditionella kontra alternativa nyhetsmediers gestaltning av koranbränningarna i Malmö 2020. </p>

Social media are often referred to as democracy drivers in autocratic states, whereas in some countries, they appear as tools of the regimes that employ a wide range of mechanisms to restrict freedom of expression online. In authoritarian countries, political bloggers stand out as new political leaders or anti-regime actors, serve as alternative information sources, advocate for political action, or mobilize financial support for different initiatives. Political conditions in countries with established governments’ control practices complicate publishing routines for political bloggers and may increase incentives to self-censor. Employing the theory of the spiral of silence, this study analyzes self-censorship in social media among political bloggers in two neighboring post-Soviet autocratic countries - Belarus and Russia. The research is based on a comparison of media legislation in Belarus and Russia, textual analysis of political blogs, and survey among political bloggers in the two countries. The survey demonstrates that political bloggers face obstacles in forms of administrative or criminal sentences, forceful blocking of their pages, online threats, or experience pressure/ attention from secret services. Despite these challenges, political bloggers in Belarus and Russia demonstrate readiness to speak out and criticize political elites. According to the model suggested in this thesis, the majority of political bloggers practice self-censorship at the pre-publishing stages in forms of selecting topics and wording, avoiding particular names. The author argues that in autocratic countries, the spiral of silence, that engages more people to silence their opinion due to political obstacles, can be and is currently challenged by political bloggers, as decentralized political opinion leaders, who aim to break down the spiral of silence. The research contributes to media studies of social media and freedom of expression in autocratic countries. Political bloggers as neither ordinary social media users nor media in the non-democratic world require more attention among media and political scholars.

Dans la France du XVIe siècle, la justice traque l’hérésie chez les auteurs et les imprimeurs attirés par la Réforme : on connaît les poursuites à répétition contre Clément Marot et l’exécution d’Étienne Dolet sur le bûcher en 1546. Mais cette politique répressive ne se limite pas à ces condamnations tristement célèbres, ni aux seuls sujets touchant la foi. Plusieurs autres poètes, connus et méconnus, sont mis en cause pour leurs compositions religieuses, mais aussi satiriques, voire, dans quelques cas isolés, obscènes. Les contentieux portant sur la propriété littéraire mettent également aux prises les différents acteurs de la fabrication du livre. Il s’agit alors de comprendre comment de telles contraintes judiciaires ont pu déterminer l’écriture de la poésie à la Renaissance. Il faut d’abord reconstituer les opérations de censure des textes poétiques, depuis le repérage du texte suspect jusqu’à l’interrogatoire du poète, en passant par l’octroi de l’autorisation d’imprimer ou l’enquête sur les vers satiriques placardés aux carrefours de la ville. On prend ainsi la mesure du régime de contrôle auquel les poètes font face en tentant de défendre leur liberté d’écrire – droit à la satire, droit de chanter leur foi, liberté de jouer avec les codes de la poésie érotique. Aussi l’idée de liberté d’expression ne leur est-elle pas si étrangère qu’on pourrait le croire, car ils peuvent donner un sens politique à la notion de « licence », qui, d’ordinaire, justifie les excentricités du langage poétique. Grâce à l’écriture, les poètes essaient de faire avancer leurs procès et se réapproprient leur expérience de la justice : ces usages spécifiques font de la poésie judiciaire l’équivalent d’un genre à la fois en prise avec le réel et ouvert aux échappées irréelles de la réécriture des événements. / In XVIth century France the legal system hunts down heresy among the writers and printers attracted by the Reformation. Some well-known examples are the repetitive legal actions against Clément Marot and the execution of Étienne Dolet, burned at the stake in 1546. But this repressive policy was not limited to only these sadly famous cases, nor to matters of religious faith. Many other poets, famous and unknown, are put on trial because of their religious, satirical, and, in a pair of isolated cases, even obscene writings. Moreover the various actors implicated in the making of the book confront each other in some cases concerning literary ownership. This study aims to understand how such legal constraints influenced the writing of poetry in the Renaissance. The first steps are to reconstruct the process in which poetic texts were censored, from the identification of the suspicious text to the interrogation of the poet, including the licensing of the book and the investigation of satirical verses posted at town intersections. This is the system of control which poets stand up against, attempting to defend their freedom of speech, –the right to write satire and to sing their religious beliefs, the freedom to play with the codes of erotic poetry. In fact, the idea of freedom of speech is not so foreign to them as we could think, as they give political meaning to the notion of « license », which ordinarily justifies the excentricities of poetic language. Through their writing, poets try to advance their cause and to reappropriate their experience of the law : these specific goals make legal poetry a genre of its own, both in dealing with the reality and in recreating the events in an unrealistic manner.