本文研析2011年至2016年期間，中國在人道干預立場上對利比亞和敘利亞的差異比較，試圖分析中國在「國家保護責任」（Responsibility to Protect）上的態度轉變。中國於安理會1970號和1973號針對利比亞內戰所涉及的人道干預決議案，不但同意將利比亞情勢送交國際刑事法院，更間接默許西方軍事干預利比亞，此與一向不干預他國內政、尊重他國主權為外交原則的中國相違背。然而，發生於同時期、同受到阿拉伯之春影響、同為推翻獨裁政權的敘利亞內戰，中國卻多次否決對其進一步軍事干預，形成人道干預立場上的矛盾。 而本文試圖利用「國家利益」和「形象建構」兩大分析途徑，探究中國隨著負責任大國的形象建立，和在國際事務上話語權漸增的情況下，於人道干預立場的考量是否有所改變或偏向。本文認為中國在利比亞案例上突破以往不干預他國內政的立場，並不代表中國對「國家保護責任」態度的轉變。其次，中國當前在人道干預立場上，仍以國家利益為主，形象建構為輔，特別是中共政權維穩、國家安全為首要。此外，中國也正試圖擺脫俄羅斯和西方國家的單方影響，建立一套獨立自主的人道干預外交原則。

The aim of this work is to analyze the relationship between R2P and violent regime change. The work gives an overview of the establishment of R2P on the international scene, and then deals with its problem of selectivity in its application in practice. Despite the formal adoption of R2P in 2005 by all UN member states, R2P has been since then applied to similar cases of humanitarian crises in different ways. The problem of selectivity of R2P is fuelling the criticism of its legitimacy, because it is according to many a mean for achieving regime change. The most important reason for R2P's criticism is the connection between R2P and violent regime change, and that is the central theme of this work. Based on an analysis of the documents which form R2P, the work concludes that military intervention under R2P must not be deliberately used for regime change. However, there may be situations, when regime change is necessary for the protection of civilians; which means that regime change can be regarded as legitimate only if it is as an indirect result of the intervention. Therefore regime change is an integral part of R2P. The work aims to explore this ambivalent relationship and find out, where lies the boundary between legitimate overthrowing of a régime for the protection of civilians, and regime...

[pt] Esta dissertação oferece uma análise crítica do discurso da Responsabilidade de Proteger (R2P). Para isso, eu sigo o entendimento pós-estruturalista da língua como performatividade, isto é, eu entendo que língua em uso (discurso) tem um papel no processo de construção de subjetividades. Eu adoto a estrutura de análise de dupla leitura de Richard Ashley para problematizar o discurso da R2P. Na primeira leitura, eu leio o discurso tradicional da R2P, começando por algumas de suas fundações no direito internacional e em debates sobre intervenção, soberania e segurança humana, seguindo para as discussões que ajudaram a constituir e delinear o escopo desse conceito. Esse discurso, como podemos ver, foi proposto como se fosse para a proteção de um universal (a humanidade). Dessa forma, na segunda leitura eu proponho uma reversão nas estruturas hierárquicas sobre as quais esse discurso foi erguido. Começando com uma crítica à estrutura da modernidade, eu argumento que o discurso da R2P, como parte dessa estrutura, reproduz suas lógicas de diferenciação e práticas de exclusão. Ao trazer o corpo daqueles que sofrem com a violência humanitária, eu questiono o que aconteceria se a R2P fosse de fato universal. Meu argumento é que, ao reivindicar um universal enquanto diferencia entre aqueles que promovem a proteção, aqueles que são protegidos, aqueles que poderiam ser protegidos mas sofreram os danos colaterais da violência humanitária, e aqueles que não podem ser protegidos, o discurso da R2P performa na constituição dessas distintas subjetividades. / [en] This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the discourse of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). For this, I follow the poststructuralist understanding of language as performativity, i.e., I understand that language in use (discourse) has a role in the process of construction of subjectivities. I adopt Richard Ashley s structure of analysis of double reading to problematize the discourse of R2P. In the first reading, I read the traditional discourse of R2P, starting from some of its foundations in international law and in debates about intervention, sovereignty, and human security, following to the discussions that helped to constitute and delineate the scope of this concept. This discourse, we see, was proposed as if it were for the protection of a universal (the humanity). Accordingly, in the second reading I propose a reversal in the hierarchical structures upon which this discourse has been erected. Starting with a critique of the structure of modernity, I argue that the R2P discourse, as part of this structure, reproduces its logic of differentiations and exclusionist practices. By bringing the body of those who suffer from the humanitarian violence, I question what would happen if R2P were in fact for a universal. My argument is that, by claiming for a universal while it differentiates between those that provide protection, those that are protected, those that could be protected but suffered the collateral damages of the humanitarian violence, and those that cannot be protected, the discourse of R2P performs in the constitution of these distinct subjectivities.

Dans ce travail, nous lèverons le voile sur la notion d’État souverain en droit international ainsi que son principe directeur, le principe de l’égalité souveraine des États et son corollaire, la non-ingérence dans les affaires internes d’un État. Dans une première analyse, nous établirons un rapport entre la souveraineté des États en droit international et l’ingérence humanitaire. Cette analyse se fera sur la base de plusieurs questions : l’ingérence dans les affaires internes d’un État pour des motifs humanitaires constitue-t-elle une atteinte au principe de la souveraineté des États ? Mieux, l’affliction des populations légitime-t-elle l’ingérence humanitaire dans un État ? Nous remettrons ainsi en cause le concept de souveraineté des États en faisant la lumière sur la complexité du principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires internes d’un État ; de même que les limites ou atténuations à la souveraineté des États. Ces atténuations nous aideront d’une part, à prouver le caractère licite de l’intervention humanitaire et d’autre part, à déterminer le champ d’application de cette dernière. Nous aboutirons à la licéité de l’ingérence humanitaire sous certaines conditions. Dans une seconde analyse, nous mettrons l’accent sur l’instrumentalisation ou les dérives de l’aide humanitaire ayant pour but la protection des droits humains. Nous nous sommes posé certaines questions : quelle est la légitimité de la croissance des opérations militaires en Afrique par les États dits puissants pour des motifs humanitaires ? Pourrait-on, à la lumière de l’instrumentalisation de l’ingérence humanitaire, parler d’une possible nouvelle forme de colonisation? Notre réflexion sera principalement axée sur les relations nord-sud. Dans une analyse basée sur les instruments juridiques en droit international humanitaire (DIH) et en droit international des droits de l’homme (DIDH) accompagnés d’exemples précis, nous montrerons comment les grandes puissances utilisent l’aide humanitaire pour assouvir leurs propres besoins (généralement d’ordre économique) dans les pays en voie de développement. Nous prouverons au cours de ce travail, à quel point l’action humanitaire est devenue un objet de politique voire un instrument de politique étrangère. En effet, bon nombre d’actions militaires, revêtues de motifs humanitaires, orchestrées dans certains pays du sud par certaines grandes puissances n’ont d’autres buts que la recherche du profit. La pratique humanitaire est trop souvent manipulée et cache des intérêts purement égoïstes des États. Nous conclurons finalement à la nécessité de la neutralité et de l’objectivité de l’action humanitaire. / In this work, we will lift the veil on the notion of sovereign state in international law and its guiding principle, the principle of the sovereign equality of States and its corollary, non-interference in the internal affairs of a state. In a first analysis, we will establish a relationship between state sovereignty in international law and humanitarian interference. This analysis will be made on the basis of several questions: does interference in the internal affairs of a state on humanitarian grounds constitute an infringement of the principle of state sovereignty? Does the affliction of populations legitimize humanitarian interference in a state? Thus, we will challenge the concept of state sovereignty by shedding light on the complexity of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, as well as the limits or attenuation to state sovereignty. These attenuations will help us, on the one hand, to determine its cope. We will surely end up with the legality of humanitarian interference under certain conditions. In a second analysis, we will focus on the instrumentalization, or abuses of humanitarian aid aimed at protecting human rights. We asked ourselves certain questions: What is the legitimacy of the growth of military operations in Africa by rich countries on humanitarian grounds? In the light of the instrumentalization of humanitarian interference, could we talk about a possible new form of colonization? Our reflection will focus mainly on North-south relations. In an analysis based on legal instruments in international humanitarian law (IHL) and International Human Rights (IHRL) with specific examples, we will show how the major powers use humanitarian aid to meet their own needs (generally economic) in developing countries. In the course of this work, we will demonstrate the extent to which humanitarian action has become an instrument of foreign policy. Indeed, many military actions, with humanitarians’ motives, orchestrated in Black and Arab Africa by certain major powers have no other goal than the pursuit of profit. We argue that humanitarian practice is too often manipulated and hides purely selfish interests of states. In the end, we will conclude that there is a need for neutrality and objectivity in humanitarian action.

[pt] Esta dissertação é fruto de um estudo sobre o surgimento de conflitos intraestatais após o fim da Guerra Fria e como estes conflitos, muitas vezes imprevisíveis e difíceis, tornaram-se fonte de preocupação internacional na década de 1990. Violações de direitos humanos em outros estados passaram a ser cada vez mais retratadas como ameaças à ordem internacional, levando a um aumento na mobilização de defensores de direitos humanos e atores políticos que pedem um maior envolvimento de potências estrangeiras, e a um aumento do otimismo relativo à capacidade dos Estados em agir dentro da esfera internacional. Em particular, identifica-se uma maior esperança de que as Nações Unidas iriam assumir mais responsabilidades como aplicadora de normas internacionais. Neste contexto, a presente pesquisa procura entender como reivindicações humanitárias na década de 1990 desafiaram a compreensão de soberania e não-intervenção como princípios fundamentais das relações internacionais, e a própria base de um sistema internacional estatista. Também, questiona se a lacuna entre os compromissos normativos dos Estados para com os direitos humanos, e seu respeito na prática, foi abordado, e se os estados são capazes de agir como agentes morais. Foi conduzida uma pesquisa composta de dois estudos de caso de intervenções humanitárias pós-Guerra Fria que trouxeram respostas muito diferentes da comunidade internacional: o caso do Kosovo, em 1999, e o de Darfur, desde 2004. Esse trabalho sugere que dois fatores principais ajudam a explicar a vontade ou relutância dos Estados de intervir em cada caso: a percepção do conflito como uma ameaça ou não para a ordem internacional e a existência de interesses estratégicos que ditam diferentes respostas. O principal argumento desenvolvido aqui é que, enquanto a moral desempenha um papel importante na motivação de Estados para intervir, estes são atores predominantemente racionais e o altruísmo não consegue compensar quando interesses ditam uma resposta diferente. Conclui-se que, a menos que uma crise determinada seja interpretada como grave ameaça para os interesses de segurança dos estados, provavelmente não ocorrerá intervenção. Consequentemente, os defensores de direitos humanos não conseguiram deslocar a primazia da ordem sobre a justiça. / [en] This thesis studies the rise of intra-state conflicts following the end of the Cold War and how these often unpredictable and intractable conflicts became the source of international concern in the 1990s. Human rights violations in other states were increasingly portrayed as a threat to international order, leading to an increase in calls from human rights advocates and political actors for greater involvement from foreign powers and increased optimism concerning states capacity to act within the international realm. In particular, there were hopes that the United Nations would take on more responsibility as a norm enforcer. Against this background, the present study explores how humanitarian claims in the 1990s challenged the understanding of sovereignty and non-intervention as the foundational principles of international relations, and the very basis of a statist international system. It questions whether the gap between states normative commitments towards human rights, and their respect in practice, has been addressed, and whether states are capable of acting as moral agents. This research has carried out two case studies of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, which generate very different responses from international community: Kosovo in 1999, and Darfur from 2004 to the present. The present thesis suggests that two principal factors help explain states willingness or reluctance to intervene in each case: the perception of the conflict as (or not) a threat to international order and the existence of strategic interests that dictated different responses. The main argument developed here is that while morality plays an important role in motivating states to intervene, they are predominantly rational actors and humanitarian concerns are not sufficient when interests dictate a different response. It concludes that unless a determinate crisis is interpreted as a serious threat to states security interests, probably no intervention will occur. Consequently, human rights advocates did not succeed in dislocating the primacy of order over justice.

Ce mémoire vise à comprendre les motivations des États à intervenir militairement dans un autre État pour mettre fin aux violations graves des droits de l’homme tel que le nettoyage ethnique et le génocide. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre pourquoi il y a eu une variation dans la position américaine face aux cas de génocide au Rwanda en 1994, au Kosovo en 1999 et au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. À partir d’une approche réaliste en Relations Internationales qui met l’accent sur l’intérêt national égoïste comme facteur principal explicatif du comportement des États, nous procédons à l’étude des cas de la position américaine lors de trois crises humanitaires. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre la non intervention des États-Unis lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, l’intervention américaine au Kosovo en 1999, et enfin la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. En somme, nos études de cas démontrent que c’est l’intérêt national qui motive les États d’intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir lors des cas de nettoyage ethnique ou de génocide. D’une part, lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, les États-Unis ne sont pas intervenus car l’intérêt national interprété comme le repli sur les affaires internes américaines ne serait pas maximisé par l’intervention militaire. Ensuite, l’intervention des États-Unis et de l’OTAN au Kosovo en 1999 est expliquée par l’intérêt national américain dans un contexte de l’après guerre froide d’approfondir son engagement sécuritaire en Europe et de préserver sa position hégémonique et son prestige sur la scène internationale, d’assurer la stabilité régionale et de préserver la crédibilité de l’OTAN. Finalement, l’intérêt national défini en termes de sécurité dans un contexte de la guerre au terrorisme explique la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. / This master’s thesis seeks to analyze what motivates a state’s military intervention in another state in order to stop mass human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Particularly, it tries to explain the United States inconsistent behavior towards genocide and ethnic cleansing during the Rwanda 1994, the Kosovo 1999, and the Darfur 2003 to 2008 humanitarian crisis. Using arguments of the realist approach in International Relations, whose main explanatory factor for state behavior is egoistic national self- interest, this paper examines the United States position during these three human rights crisis. Specifically, we seek to understand the United States non intervention during the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the United States intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and finally the United States non intervention during the mass killings in Darfur in 2003 to 2008. These case studies demonstrate that shifting definitions of the national self-interest motivate states to intervene or not intervene in ethnic cleansing and genocide crisis. First, during the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, the United States chose to not intervene because the national interest, defined as the concentration on domestic affairs, would not be maximized by a military intervention. Secondly, the United States and NATO military intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 can be explained by the pursuit of national self-interest maximization: in the post cold war context, the United States seek to strengthen their security engagements in Europe, to preserve their position and prestige in the international arena, to ensure regional stability as well as the NATO credibility. Finally, it will be argued that the national security self-interests motivated the United States non intervention in Darfur 2003 to 2008.

This thesis examines the policies, positions, and perspectives of developing countries on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, focusing on the period between 1991 and 2001. In doing so, it questions the role of opposition that conventional wisdom has allotted to them as parochial defenders of sovereignty. Instead, the thesis reveals variation and complexity, which militates against defining the South, or the issues that humanitarian intervention raises, in simplistic either-or terms. Part I draws on insights about ‘sovereignty as what states make of it’ to break the classic pluralism-solidarism impasse that has otherwise stymied the conversation on humanitarian intervention and confined the South as a whole to a ‘black box’ labelled rejectionism. It reconstructs the empirical record of developing countries at large on six cases of military intervention (northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor), revealing variation that defies easy categorization. It also charts a cumulative and dynamic trend within the South towards a grey area between pluralism and solidarism that shows how these were not diametrically opposed positions. Following from that, Part II looks in-depth at India and Argentina. Whereas Argentina accepted the idea of humanitarian intervention, India remained reluctant to countenance it and persistently objected to the development of a new rule in its favour. Part II argues that the level of congruence between the emerging norm and the two countries’ prevailing values, aspirations, and historically constructed ways of thinking played a key role in determining the different levels of acceptance that the idea found with them. Part III delves deeper into the substance of their views. It shows how neither country constructed mutually exclusive choices between pluralism and solidarism, sovereignty and human rights, and intervention and non-intervention. Rather, both exhibited an acute awareness of the dilemmas of protecting human rights in a society of states, and a wariness of yes-no answers. Cumulatively, this thesis thus points away from thinking about the South itself as a given category with clear, shared or pre-determined ideas, and towards a more nuanced and inclusive conversation on humanitarian intervention.

Réalisé en cotutelle avec le Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, pour un doctorat en études politiques. / L’intervention militaire justifiée par des raisons humanitaires est une constante de l’ordre international, désignée par différentes appellations : intervention d’humanité au XIXe siècle, intervention humanitaire (humanitarian intervention) dans la tradition anglophone, droit ou devoir d’ingérence en France, responsabilité de protéger depuis quelques années. L’objectif de cette thèse interdisciplinaire est de comprendre ce phénomène complexe dans toutes ses dimensions – historique, juridique, éthique et politique – et d’élaborer une théorie réaliste de l’intervention par l’analyse de cinq critères : cause juste, autorité légitime, bonne intention, dernier recours et proportionnalité. Nous montrons que le réalisme n’est pas une conception amorale de la politique étrangère mais une exigence épistémologique d’analyser les relations internationales comme elles sont plutôt que comme l’on voudrait qu’elles soient. Que l’intervention dite humanitaire n’est pas, contrairement à un préjugé répandu, un phénomène récent, ni même hérité du XIXe siècle, mais qu’on peut en retracer la généalogie sur plusieurs millénaires dans plusieurs civilisations. Qu’aucune des terminologies employées n’est satisfaisante. Qu’il faut abandonner le critère de bonne intention car l’Etat intervenant n’est pas, ne peut pas et ne doit pas être désintéressé. Qu’il est possible de défendre un interventionnisme minimal, dans certains cas et à certaines conditions, tout en assumant cette absence de désintéressement, la sélectivité des interventions, le risque d’abus et l’incertitude du résultat. / Military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds is a constant of the international order, designated by different names: “intervention d’humanité” in the nineteenth century, humanitarian intervention in the English-speaking tradition, “droit” or “devoir d’ingérence” in France, responsibility to protect the last few years. The aim of this interdisciplinary dissertation is to understand this complex phenomenon in all its dimensions - historical, legal, ethical and political - and develop a realistic theory of intervention by the analysis of five criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort and proportionality. We show that realism is not an amoral conception of foreign policy but an epistemological commitment to analyze international relations as they are rather than as we would like them to be. That so-called humanitarian intervention is not, contrary to a widespread prejudice, a recent phenomenon, or even inherited from the nineteenth century. We can trace its genealogy in several millennia in many cultures. That none of the terminology used is satisfactory. That one must abandon the criterion of good intention because the intervening state is not, cannot and should not be disinterested. That it is possible to defend a minimal interventionism, in some cases and under certain conditions, while assuming the lack of disinterestedness, the selectivity of interventions, the risk of abuse and the uncertainty of the result.

La recrudescence des conflits internes dans le contexte post-guerre froide a permis de propulser à l’avant-plan la préoccupation pour les individus. Alors que la paix et la sécurité internationales ont historiquement constitué les piliers du système institutionnel international, une porte s’ouvrait pour rendre effectif un régime de protection des droits de l’homme par-delà les frontières. Pour les humanistes, l’intervention humanitaire représentait un mal nécessaire pour pallier aux souffrances humaines souvent causées par des divergences ethniques et religieuses. Pourtant, cette pratique est encore souvent perçue comme une forme de néo-colonialisme et entre en contradiction avec les plus hautes normes régissant les relations internationales, soit les principes de souveraineté des États et de non-intervention. La problématique du présent mémoire s’inscrit précisément dans cette polémique entre la préséance des droits de l’État et la prédilection pour les droits humains universels, deux fins antinomiques que la Commission internationales pour l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) a tenté de concilier en élaborant son concept de responsabilité de protéger. Notre mémoire s’inscrit dans le champ de la science politique en études internationales mais s’articule surtout autour des notions et enjeux propres à la philosophie politique, plus précisément à l’éthique des relations internationales. Le travail se veut une réflexion critique et théorique des conclusions du rapport La responsabilité de protéger, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le critère de la juste cause et, dans une moindre mesure, celui d’autorité appropriée. Notre lecture des conditions de la CIISE à la justification morale du déclenchement d’une intervention humanitaire – critères issues de la doctrine de la guerre juste relativement au jus ad bellum – révèle une position mitoyenne entre une conception progressiste cosmopolitique et une vision conservatrice d’un ordre international composé d’États souverains. D’une part, la commission se dissocie du droit international en faisant valoir un devoir éthique d’outrepasser les frontières dans le but de mettre un terme aux violations massives des droits de l’homme et, d’autre part, elle craint les ingérences à outrance, comme en font foi l’établissement d’un seuil de la juste cause relativement élevé et la désignation d’une autorité multilatérale à titre de légitimateur de l’intervention. Ce travail dialectique vise premièrement à présenter et situer les recommandations de la CIISE dans la tradition de la guerre juste. Ensuite, il s’agit de relever les prémisses philosophiques tacites dans le rapport de la CIISE qui sous-tendent le choix de préserver une règle de non-intervention ferme de laquelle la dérogation n’est exigée qu’en des circonstances exceptionnelles. Nous identifions trois arguments allant en ce sens : la reconnaissance du relativisme moral et culturel; la nécessité de respecter l’autonomie et l’indépendance des communautés politiques en raison d’une conception communautarienne de la légitimité de l’État, des réquisits de la tolérance et des avantages d’une responsabilité assignée; enfin, l’appréhension d’un bouleversement de l’ordre international sur la base de postulats du réalisme classique. Pour finir, nous nuançons chacune de ces thèses en souscrivant à un mode de raisonnement cosmopolitique et conséquentialiste. Notre adhésion au discours individualiste normatif nous amène à inclure dans la juste cause de la CIISE les violations systématiques des droits individuels fondamentaux et à cautionner l’intervention conduite par une coalition ou un État individuel, pourvu qu’elle produise les effets bénéfiques désirés en termes humanitaires. / The increasing number of internal conflicts in the Post-Cold War era propelled to the foreground the concern for individuals. Though international peace and security historically constituted the pillars of the world institutional system, the opportunity arose to establish an effective and cross-boundary human rights protection regime. According to humanists, humanitarian intervention was the necessary evil to bring an end to the human sufferings caused by ethnic and religious differences. Nevertheless, this kind of interference is still nowadays perceived as a neo-colonialist action and goes against the highest international relations norms, namely the state sovereignty and the non-intervention principles. This thesis’ issue lies within the controversy between states’ rights and universal human rights, which are two conflicting ends the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) tried to reconcile along with elaborating its responsibility to protect concept. The field of this paper is political science in international studies, but the focus is above all on political philosophy notions and stakes, particularly on ethics of international relations. The goal is to build a critical and theoretical thinking about the Responsibility to Protect conclusions, particularly regarding the just cause and appropriate authority criteria. In accordance with our interpretation of the ICISS moral justification conditions for humanitarian intervention – criteria derived from the just war theory’s concern for jus ad bellum – the commission’s stance is split into a progressive cosmopolitan view and a more conservative one that promotes a world order constituted by sovereign states. On one hand the commission separates itself from international law, putting forward an ethical duty to stop the massive human rights violations beyond borders. At the same time it is afraid of excessive interferences, as shown by the establishment of a relatively high just cause threshold and the appointment of a multilateral body in charge of legitimizing the intervention. This dialectical paper’s first objective is to describe and place the ICISS recommendations into the just war tradition. Then, the purpose is to sum up the tacit philosophical premises of the ICISS report in relation to its choice to preserve a firm non-intervention norm from which no derogation is permitted, except in case of exceptional circumstances. From that we identify three arguments: the acceptance of moral and cultural relativism; the requirement of respecting political communities’ autonomy and independence on account of a communitarian conception of state sovereignty, the prerequisites for tolerance and the assigned responsibility advantages; finally, the fear of an international order disruption on the basis of classical realism postulates. Ultimately, we challenge each one of these ideas adopting a cosmopolitan and consequentialist reasoning. Adhering to the normative individualist discourse, we propose to broaden the ICISS just cause so that it includes systematic fundamental human rights violations and to support coalition or individual state intervention, insofar as it produces the desired humanitarian benefits.

Le droit international classique volontaire basé sur la notion absolue de la souveraineté étatique est remis en cause par l’émergence des règles impératives (jus cogens). A cet égard, la cristallisation des droits humains impératifs est le résultat du processus d’humanisation du droit international moderne où les règles impératives des droits humains de rangs supérieurs se situent au sommet. On peut estimer que l’acceptation des droits humains impératifs créée des obligations erga omnes de protection pour les États membres de la communauté internationale. Dans ce cadre, dans le cas de violations des droits humains impératifs, tous les États sont directement affectés, touchés et lésés par les violations en question et ont le droit d’agir. A cet effet, il nous semble que tous les États peuvent adopter des contre-mesures individuelles à l’encontre de l’État fautif, violateur des droits humains impératifs. Dans le cas de violations des droits humains impératifs, il nous paraît aussi que, sous certaines conditions, les États peuvent recourir à une intervention militaire à but humanitaire, même sans l’avis favorable du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Aussi, selon certaines conditions, les États peuvent fournir une aide humanitaire aux victimes des violations des droits humains impératifs survenues à l’extérieur de leur territoire, même sans le consentement de l’État territorial. Les États sont aussi tenus de réprimer les crimes de jus cogens commis à l’extérieur de leur territoire. Dans ce contexte, il nous semble que les États en appliquant la règle aut dedere aut judicare, peuvent poursuivre les étrangers suspectés d’avoir commis des crimes de jus cogens. Dans ce cadre, les États doivent appliquer la règle aut dedere aut judicare en respectant l’obligation de non refoulement afin de prévenir les violations des droits humains impératifs à l’étranger. Il nous paraît aussi que les États en appliquant la règle aut dedere aut judicare, doivent prévoir la compétence universelle des juridictions internes. A cet égard, les États peuvent exercer la compétence universelle à l’encontre des crimes de jus cogens commis à l’étranger par l’étranger et sur l’étranger. Dans ce cadre, il nous semble que les États peuvent exercer la compétence universelle absolue. A cet effet, un État peut déclencher une poursuite pénale à l’encontre de l’étranger suspecté d’avoir commis des crimes de jus cogens, même si ce dernier n’est pas présent et/ou en détention sur le territoire de l’État du for. Il nous semble aussi que, l’immunité des hauts représentants d’État, ainsi que les lois d’amnistie étrangères, ne peuvent pas empêcher l’État du for d’exercer la compétence universelle afin de protéger les intérêts généraux de la communauté internationale dans son ensemble. / Traditional international law based on absolute notion of state sovereignty, is challenged by theemergence of peremptory norms Çus cogens). In this respect, the crystallization of peremptory humanrights norms is the result of the process of humanization of modern international law where theperemptory human rights norms of superior ranks place at the summit. We could believe that theacceptance of peremptory human rights norms creates erga omnes obligations of protection for States,members of the international community. In this context, in the case of violations of peremptoryhuman rights norms, all States are directly affected and injured by the violations in question and have the right to react. To this end, we believe that all States can adopt individual countermeasures against the wrongdoer state, violator of peremptory human rights norms. In the case of violations ofperemptory human rights norms, under certain conditions, States may resort to military interventionfor humanitarian purposes, even without the autholization of the United Nations Security Council.Also, under certain conditions, States can provide humanitarian aid to victims of violations ofperemptory human rights norms occurred outside their territory, even without the consent of theterritorial state. States are also required to suppress jus cogens crimes committed outside their territory. In this context, we believe that States can apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare and prosecute aliens suspected of jus cogens crimes. In this context, States that apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, must respect the obligation of non-refoulement to prevent violations of peremptory human rights norms abroad. It seems to us that States that apply the principle of aut dedere aut judicare must also apply the principle of universal jurisdiction before their internal courts. In this regard, States can exercise universal jurisdiction againsl jus cogens crimes committed abroad, by foreigners and against foreigners. In this context, we believe that States may exercise the absolute universal jurisdiction. To this end, a State may initiate criminal proceedings against alien suspected of jus cogens crimes, even if helshe is not present and/or in custody in the territory ofthe forum State. It also seems to us that the immunity of senior state representatives and foreign amnesty laws, cannot prevent the forum State to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to protect the general interests of the international community as a whole.