本研究的主要目的是在於了解台灣企業母公司內與大陸子公司的內部網路 關係，在結合代理理論之下，期望能提出一個適合的海外單位管理模式。 經過對相關文獻的歸納之後，本研究認為多國籍企業母子公司的網路關係 會影響代理型態，由於必須管理不同的代理型態，企業會有較適的內部控 制機制。經過歸納整理後，本研究以「網路間母子公司互動程度」及「子 公司相對重要程度」來區分母子以司網路關係，而「互動程度」與「資訊 不對稱」呈反向關聯；「相對重要程度」與「任務風險性」呈正向關聯， 而在其交互影響下區分代理型態。本研究係屬於探索性之研究，採取個案 研究法進行資料的收集與分析。試圖結合網路理論與代理理論而能對多國 籍企業之內部控制機制有更進一步了解。主要的研究對象是在大陸投資經 營的本國企業。研究結果發現，在由資訊不對稱與任務風險性所構成的四 種代理型態中，其所著重的問題都不太相同，在資訊不對稱高且任務風險 性高的代理型態型Ⅰ中面臨的是雙重的壓力，母公司會傾向採用「掌控代 理」型管理方式。此時公司會有較多的正式化機制；適度中等的授權；採 用社會化機制維持員工的忠誠度；選擇行為統治的績效制度，使員工的作 為能符合公司的目標。在資訊不對稱高但任務風險性低的代理型態型Ⅱ中 ，公司對子公司的控制是設法突破分離可能帶來的問題，母公司會傾向採 用「監控代理」型管理方式。因此公司會有較多的正式化機制；對於子公 司給予相當的授權；透過社會化機制的採行與產出的績效制度，以維持員 工的向心力與激勵員工。在資訊不對稱低但任務風險性高的代理型態型Ⅲ 中公司對子公司的控制應是使子公司能夠正確有效的運作以配合公司的策 略，母公司會傾向採用「主理掌控」型管理方式。因此公司會有較多的正 式化機制；較高的集權掌握子公司的運作；並有社會化機制維持子公司幹 部的向心力，能按步就班完成任務；選擇行為的績效制度來評定員工的貢 獻。在資訊不對稱低且任務風險性低的代理型態型Ⅳ中對子公司的控制應 是如何激勵小兵，使其充分發揮效能，母公司會傾向採用「代理自主」型 管理方式。因此公司並不需投入太多的正式機制；並會給予較高的授權； 主要是透過產出統治的績效制度來加以管理。

財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正 式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。 實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司 確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognized employee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in paying less employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff). The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance and tend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directly proportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.

都市更新權利變換運作過程中的土地權利人與實施者的關係，是現代經濟活動典型的專業分工委託代理關係。土地權利人與實施者基於都市更新法制下相關的權利義務契約，執行都市更新事業，由於訊息不對稱、目標不一致與風險偏好之差異，實施者基於機會主義的決策或行動，經常不利於土地權利人的利益，於是產生代理問題、增加代理成本，雙方無法產生高度互信的基礎，而成為都市更新延宕與成效不彰的主因。本論文從土地權利人與實施者之間，於都市更新條例機制下的互動契約中，探討分析雙方之委託代理關係，並從土地權利人的角度設計監督方式，以維護土地權利人的權益，促進都市更新事業之實施。 當土地權利人與實施者，共同於一都市更新單元，組成生產團隊時，土地權利人初期擁有較強的提議與同意之控制權，隨著實施者握有超過都市更新法定之同意書門檻後，實施者掌握較強的執行控制權，土地權利人擁有較弱的監督控制權。又現行都市更新權利變換的價值分配，是實施者投入共同負擔費用，並以更新完成後之土地與建築物部分折價抵付，其餘土地及建築物則分配與原土地所有權人，因此土地權利人得到大部分的剩餘索取權。這樣的控制權與剩餘索取權分離狀態下，其權利變換價值分配模式，是否為適當的產權安排？對於都市更新參與人能否有所激勵？能否促進都市更新之推動效率？是本論文主要的探討分析重點。 此外，同一更新單元之土地權利人與實施者，具有短期且為一次性合作的特性，依現行都市更新法律規範，交易雙方以簽訂同意書做為實施都市更新事業的關鍵契約，由於契約簽定後，交易雙方所投入的特殊投資比例不相同，因而普遍引起期初契約簽署的遲疑，甚而契約簽定後，仍有權利義務不明確之爭議。本論文透過不完全契約理論的思維，探討分析土地權利人與實施者的契約關係與特殊投資關係，並建議一個新的交易契約模式，以降低雙方之機會主義行為，進而希能促進都市更新事業之推動。 / In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a「Production Team」on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.

本研究以Ha & McCann(2008)從資訊環境、廣告操縱和思考出發點等差異所提出的整合性分析架構，以及Dentsu(2006)提出媒體企畫從AIDMA模式轉化為AISAS的論點，探討新科技環境帶來媒體企畫思維和架構改變的同時，國內媒體代理商如何為廣告主擬定媒體企畫？策略為何？影響因素為何？又如何在資源有限又須更有效地觸達日趨複雜的消費者前提下，認知行銷環境上的變化？本文研究對象為台灣地區綜合媒體代理商之資深媒體企畫、購買及研究人員，主要採取量化的問卷調查，並以質性研究之深度訪談做為輔助。問卷調查採分層方式進行樣本配置，共發出102份問卷，回收101份，回收率為99%。統計分析方式包括描述性次數分配、T檢定、因素分析、相關分析和迴歸分析。 研究發現主要包括以下四個部分： 1.媒體企畫思維將轉向為以「電視」為主的傳統媒體，和以「網路」為主的新媒體之「雙核心」式的跨媒體企畫思維。 2.數位時代的廣告媒體企畫不以單一媒體為企畫重心。傳播媒體必須能與其他媒體有效整合，或擁有獨特傳播功能，才能保有優勢。 3.關於媒體企畫所需求的測量指標，仍以與廣告曝光相關的量化指標需求度較高，但需加上消費者對廣告活動的回饋情形，才能完整瞭解廣告效果。 4.媒體代理商仍傾向以透過媒體虛擬形塑出的集體社群進行傳播，並引導社群間的互動、分享，以及消費者對廣告活動的涉入。媒體代理商所需求的消費者資訊仍以集體社群為主，而非個人化的資訊尋求行為。 / The media scenario has become so complex that the information for media selection and planning is specific to the target, for a sophisticated segmentation of the media in relation to a segmented target, a specific combination, distribution and designing of advertisements in the media. This study explores how media agencies frame media planning packages for advertisers in the new era, changing media planning and implementation due to the new technology environment. It examines what are the influencing factors for media planning and buying agencies’ strategy. How do they cognize the change of marketing environment with the premise of limited resources and the necessity of effectively reaching increasingly complex consumers? The study is based on two theoretical contentions. One is an integrated model that Ha & McCann (2008) raised from the divergence of information processing, consumer or advertiser control, and media or consumer-centered strategies. The other that Dentsu (2006) raised is media planning has changed from AIDMA model to AISAS model. Subjects of the thesis consisted of senior media planners, buyers, and researchers of media agencies. The study adopts mainly quantifiable investigation and qualitative in-depth interviews as an auxiliary source. The sampling for quantifiable investigation adopts stratified sampling. The study was sent out to 102 respondents in total and received 101 returns; the response rate is 99%. The main findings are as follows: 1.Media buyers will change their planning and designing due to various reasons when making media mix decision. Television remains a significant medium for integrated communication, while the internet can be a first communication strategy to reach alternative audiences. 2.While emphasis on different audiences in the digital era, media planners tend to focus on multimedia strategies. For traditional media, it can remain advantageous position if the planners integrated effectively with new media with different effects. 3.Media planners tend to use quantifiable advertisement criteria as measurement before they make decisions. They also use various consumer service feedback to create advertisement campaigns for help understand whole advertising effect. The quantitative and iterative nature of media planning makes it an attractive tool for media planning. 4.Media agencies still tend to conduct interviews and collect information from wide variety of community groups. The growing trend of interactive media needs to engage with community groups for further information for interactive marketing strategies.

Bates et al.(2009)之實證發現，美國公司自1980年至2006年之間，平均現金比率有大幅上升的現象，但由於全球資本市場逐漸走向自由化與國際化，因此任一國家的資本市場若受到了某些衝擊，將會迅速地影響、擴散到其他國家，因此本研究認為，現金持有量的改變可能並非單一存在於某幾個國家，而是更廣泛地存在於世界各國；另外，就公司企業的融資決策而言，由於公司本身所持有之現金可能與企業融資決策的改變有較為直接的關係，因此當融資方式有所改變的時候，將較容易於現金比率上反映出來，據此，研究資本市場的變化對企業現金比率的影響，將對瞭解企業融資方式的改變有所助益。因此，本研究以世界35國國內之上市公司為樣本，分析使企業現金比率產生變化的可能原因。 本研究所選用之財務指標以及非財務指標之參數估計值為顯著者，均符合預防性動機(The Precautionary Motive)、代理問題(The Agency Motive)，或是Bates et al.(2009)所提出的「交易成本的考量」等論點；另外，研究結果亦顯示，不論是依循Fama and French (1998)之計量方法，或是使用時間序列截面迴歸(TSCSREG: Time Series Cross Section Regression)之分析方式，在1996年之後，一直到2008年為止，公司的現金比率均會因為股票市場的相對發展程度較高而較高，本研究認為上述現象可能與公司於股票市場上取得資金所需承擔的發行成本之高低有關，此結論亦與前述預防性動機之推論相符合(The Precautionary Motive)。

已開發國家中，無論個人或是法人所擁有之財富大多透過金融中介機構管理，因此，財富委由他人管理衍生出現代資本市場中重要的委託關係。委託人與基金管理人產生委任契約時，也必然產生代理問題，即雙方利益不一致所額外增加的成本。為降低代理成本，於委任合約加入對管理人下檔投資風險的要求成為降低代理成本的重要機制。本研究因此探討當基金管理人面對契約存在最低報酬要求時，如何進行最適資產配置決策，並同時分析下檔風險限制改變時對管理人投資行為的影響。研究結果顯示，委任合約增加經理人最低保證收益時，基金管理人傾向增加持股，而經理人風險趨避程度增加時，將減少風險性股票資產，進而持有債券；如果投資目標收益於受委託期間皆不改變，將造成經理人持有債券組合以規避下檔風險，同時卻喪失追求資本利得。 / In most developed countries, financial wealth is not managed directly by the investors, but through a financial intermediary. Hence, the delegated portfolio management is one of the most important principal-agency relationships in the current economy. In addition to that, the principal-agency relationships between the investor and portfolio manager must produce agency cost. In order to reduce these costs, the mandates in the contract become an important factor in reducing the principal-agent problem in a delegated portfolio management framework. In this research, we study how fund managers do asset allocation when they face some guaranteed returns and the relationships between the choices of mandates and the behavior of fund managers. We suppose that the objective of the delegated fund managers is to maximize the expected utility of wealth of the long-term fund at the end of each period and fund managers also have to fulfill some constrains given at the beginning. Finally, we explain how fund managers do optimal asset allocation by our model and some numerical analysis.

高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： １、董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 ２、公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 ３、機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 ４、總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 ５、公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms'' top executive with firms''stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years'' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive''s cash compensation.

為了探討與分析長期以來存在，關於行政院高階政務官、事務官員調動的「普遍說」與「特殊說」爭議，並且探究哪些制度性、組織性因素，對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響。本研究嘗試在制度的代理人理論架構，以及相關理論預設之下，以一九八八年第一季到兩千零一十年第四季，時序橫跨李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統主政期間，包括行政院本部暨所屬三十二個部會的高階政務、事務官員，作為研究對象，進行實證的分析。 在本文的第一到第四章，我們分別說明了研究動機與背景、進行相關文獻回顧、探討研究理論，以及說明研究問題與模型。而在第五章則是分析、探討，台灣於一九九零年代初期，到一九九零年代中期，因為持續進行憲法增修條文的制訂，進而使得總統在憲法本文，以及憲法增修條文，所構成的憲政制度上，獲得了行政院高階行政官員的人事任免權。而且總統在取得了這個制度上的重要權力之後，行政院高階行政官員的任命、調動，就成為總統掌控行政體系的重要制度性工具，同時更是高階行政官員控制的重要手段。 此外，我們更進一步在第六章，分析了台灣從一九八零年代晚期，到兩千零一十年間，分別在不同階段，先後掌權的李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統，對行政院高階行政官員，所採取以高階行政官員任命、調動，作為手段的控制模式，並且探討於第四章所提出的假設一、假設二、假設三，分別獲得實證資料支持的情況。至於第七章則是先透過總體資料的分析，探究假設四到假設十一，能否獲得實證資料的支持，同時更以部會為單位的季度別資料，建構縱橫資料的多元迴歸模型，用以分析哪些因素，對於行政院高階行政官員的更替，是有所影響的。 然而，在相關的實證分析之後，我們可以確切的認為，以往關於行政院高階行政官員控制上，所存在的「普遍說」與「特殊說」的爭論，是以普遍說可以獲得理論上，以及實證資料的支持。而就各種可能對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響的制度性、組織性因素而言，總統處在什麼樣的政治時機、面對哪些性質的部會，將會是關鍵。當總統必須更為重視行政體系的穩定，以及施政品質時，必然會選擇壓抑行政官員控制的強度。反之，當總統所面對的是，委託代理人難題疑慮的攀升，且有較大的空間容忍行政體系的不穩定時，那麼可以預期的是，大範圍、數量龐大的高階行政官員清洗，將會接踵而至。 最後，透過相關資料的分析，我們也發現了，在一次、二次政黨輪替，於西元兩千年到兩千零八年，相繼的發生，以及相應出現範圍廣泛、人數繁多，全面性高階行政官員清洗，也使台灣社會，在短期間之內，必須付出可觀的政治交易成本。這樣的情況，也使得台灣民眾的民主信念，是有所動搖，同時這也對於台灣的民主政治發展，是一個不容被忽視的隱憂。 / This reasearch offers an analysis of the long-standing discourse on transferal patterns of government officials in Taiwan, with the focus on the much-debated “general theory” vs. “special theory” approach. We will look at the systemic and organizational factors that influence the appointment, replacement, and transferal of both administrative and executive officers in the higher echelons of government. Specifically, this paper examines the time period from 1988 to 2010, employing a systematic agent framework in combination with related theoretical parameters to explore the concrete situation in the Executive Yuan and its 32 ministries, commissions, and other agencies under three consecutive administrations (i.e. presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou). In the first four chapters, we will outline background and motive of this paper, give an overview of past research on this topic, scrutinize relevant theoretical approaches, and illustrate research problems and models. In the fifth chapter, we explore and analyze the period from the early to the mid-1990s, a time that saw repeated amendments and additions to the constitution that gave the president increasingly greater powers of appointment and removal of cabinet members. These powers have become one of the most important political tools the president wields, allowing the nation’s leader to exert highly effective and immediate control over the Executive Yuan, in particular over its highest-ranking officials. In the sixth chapter, we will cover the entire period from the late 1980s to the 2010. During this time, three presidents were successively at the helm (Lee from 1988-2000, Chen from 2000-2008, Ma since 2008), and we will scrutinize the different appointment and transferal modes applied during their terms, in particular as regards their use as a tool of political control. In addition, we will further discuss the first three hypotheses initially proposed in chapter four, and show if and how they are borne out by the data and facts assembled in this research. Chapter seven contains a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data to facilitate our discussion of hypotheses four to eleven as first proposed in chapter four, and to determine whether or not these are supported by the empirical data. At the same time, we look at the quarterly figures from Executive Yuan ministries and commissions to create a multiple regression model of the cross-section data, which will help us to analyze which specific factors influence the substitution and transferal of high-ranking officials. After a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we will find that of the two theories usually applied to the problem of systemic and political control over the higher echelons of the executive, i.e. the general and the special theory mentioned above, the general theory is in fact better supported by the relevant set of data. As for which particular systemic and organizational factors may influence the replacement or substitution of high-ranking administrative and executive cabinet members, the crucial parameters affecting this question are the larger political climate that the president faces, as well as the type and political weight of the concerned ministries and commissions. At times when administrative stability and quality are the paramount considerations, the president will necessarily deemphasize his control over the executive and refrain from making too many personnel changes, while in times of political crisis, or when there is growing concern over the competence and suitability of his entrusted agents (i.e. leading members of the Executive Yuan’s subdivisions) and thus more tolerance for change, one will almost always see large-scale cabinet reshuffles as the president attempts to flush out unfit or unwanted elements. Finally, an analysis of the overall data also shows that the two transitions of power Taiwan has seen in 2000 and 2008 respectively were—as a matter of course—accompanied by extensive personnel changes as numerous high-ranking government officials were removed from office to make place for new faces. These far-reaching waves of “political purging” and complete reorganization of the cabinet within short periods of time have come at a considerable political cost for Taiwan’s society as a whole. This has somewhat shaken the population’s faith in democracy as a political system, and here lies a significant potential concern for the future development of Taiwan’s democracy.

近年來，國際間政府推動資訊公開蔚為風潮，伴隨著資訊通信科技的發展，電子化政府和政府網站更普遍被各界視為一個低成本且高效率的透明化途徑。台灣的政府網站長期受到國際間高度評價，在發展中國家更是名列前茅。然而，既有的研究與調查大多數僅片面側重於政府供給面的探究，通常以化約且可標準化的指標來評鑑特定政府網站的介面資訊功能。相形之下，鮮少有關注民眾的需求認知、機關政策執行以及網站內容評估等較全面的研究成果供參。因而無法更深入地釐清政府網站、法制和政策執行績效不彰等困境與透明化治理之間的關聯。 在委託代理理論的運用之下，本研究兼顧政府治理中委託方民眾的認知以及代理方政府機關的經驗與成效。目的在於釐清網站資訊公開供給和需求的現況與問題，並更具體地檢證政府網站資訊公開對機關施政資訊揭露、績效衡量和政府課責的影響。爰此，研究者參與多項網站資訊公開相關研究，以蒐集多元化次級資料，包括：量化的網路民眾問卷調查，各級機關的跨年度問卷調查，機關網站內容評估比較，以及質性的個別訪談、焦點團體座談。藉由理論聚焦與多重研究方法的交叉檢證分析，以達研究綜效。 研究結果分為網站資訊公開對政府施政資訊揭露，施政績效衡量，以及政府課責的影響三個部分來討論。首先，相較於法制，網站資訊公開更有助於揭露政府施政資訊，特別是網站資訊公開實施過程可呈現出政府治理內、外部的多重代理關係及代理問題，甚至可緩和部分的代理問題。其次，網站資訊公開可具體地呈現並衡量施政績效，以因應傳統官僚體系內各層代理績效難以衡量的困境。但囿於目前整體制度缺乏績效誘因設計，而限制了此效益。最後，因整體資訊公開績效制度的匱乏，也使得網站資訊公開對政府課責的效益備受限制。 整體而言，本研究揭示了代理理論應用於政府治理的價值，並檢證政府資訊公開、績效和課責等三項治理要件的關聯。研究成果可彌補實務與研究的落差，並對相關文獻做出貢獻。 / In recent years, governments from around the world have adopted Freedom of Information Act to increase transparency in their governance. With advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs), e-Government has been seen as a cost-effective and possible mean to promote openness and transparency. Taiwan’s efforts to develop e-Government services have been well-recognized; especially, have made remarkable advantages among developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches in evaluating e-Government service are based on supply-side indicators and often assess websites alone; as yet, little information is available on the demand aspect of e-Government. The paper aims to explore the potential and practice of government website information disclosure in terms of the perspective of end user and government agencies. The results show the significance of three aspects in information disclosure of Taiwanese government websites through the application of quantitative and qualitative methodology, including self-administered questionnaire, website evaluation, individual interview, and focus group interview. First, government website information disclosure benefits the revelation of government information, manifestation of multi-agent relationships in internal and external governance of government, and alleviation of partial ageny problems. Second, government website information disclosure enhances revealing and measuring the performance of government agencies; nevertheless, in which the effectiveness is limited due to the absence of institutional incentives. Third, under the circumstances of unsound institution, the effectiveness of accountability has difficulties to be thoroughly realized through government website information disclosure. In sum, the finding contributes to a valuable reference for other countries in implementing information transparency of e-Government, and has significant implications for policy makers, government agencies, and system designers.

生存、獲利以及成長是企業的目標。第二次世界大戰之後，國際性的商業活動快速的成長，隨著全球商業活動自由化、國際化，加上資訊科技的興起，市場全球化與生產全球化為企業創造了機會，也使得企業面臨的競爭環境日趨嚴峻，企業面臨來自全球的挑戰，威脅其生存與獲利。在競爭環境的迅速變動下，企業為了追求永續經營，不斷的成長成為企業生存之必要條件。購併是企業追求快速成長的捷徑之一。 雖然購併能夠幫助企業迅速取得所需要的關鍵資源，但是從所收集的資料顯示，失敗的購併案例還是佔了七成之多，可見成功的購併是一件相當不容易的事。 本研究所描述的個案企業是目前世界上歷史最悠久的化學與製藥公司，公司成立的日期可以回溯到西元1668年。以購併取得所需要的關鍵資源在該企業是常見的作法，所以該企業透過經驗的累積發展出購併相關活動的標準作業程序（SOP）。但是即使已經有豐富的購併經驗，並不是每一件購併案都能夠達成原先所設定的目標。 本研究希望透過研究實際購併案例的啟動購併動機與後續整合行動以印證相關購併理論，並且整理歸納出成功的購併案例中值得學習的作法以及失敗的購併案例中為何失敗的地方以供未來想要採取購併方式的企業作為參考。 歸納個案企業的購併案例得到以下結論。企業選擇購併作為成長方式的動機是為了達成綜效理論中所提及的啟動綜效、營運綜效和市場綜效。至於後續整合行動，在事前必須要有清楚的整合計畫、工作小組、組織架構與人事布局；然後透過即時且透明的溝通管道傳達給每一位員工；並且強化人力資源管理系統讓不管原本是屬於購併公司的員工還是被購併進來的員工都能夠清楚的瞭解自己在購併後的新組織中可能的職涯發展，協助所有員工穩定下來以渡過整合變動期。 / Survive, gain and grow are the targets for all companies. Business environment has been changed and globalization is the mainstream for all business activities after World War II. This change creates opportunities but also bring threats to companies. Companies now have to face challenges from all over the world. Keep growing is the means for companies to keep survival from these challenges. Merger and acquisition（M&A）is one of the shortcuts for companies to pursue fast growth. M&A can help companies to get key resources quickly. However, the chance to get fail is extremely high up to 70% from collected research data. Apparently it is not easy to have a success M&A case. This paper is describing a more than 300 years old pharmaceutical company whom accumulates a lot of experiences in M&A cases from company history. These M&A cases will be analyzed to prove related theories. Key successful factors will also be concluded for companies who will choose M&A as their growth alternative for reference. To sum up illustrated M&A cases, the motivation of a company to trigger M&A is aiming for starting synergy, operating synergy and market synergy. To ensure post-merger integration can proceed smoothly, it requires clear integration plan which contains dedicated task forces for execution, well-thought-out organization structure and important position appointment. Reinforce personnel system to ensure its function can provide necessary and sufficient assistance to all employees timely. Transparent and open communication channels shall be established in order to eliminate insecure atmosphere.