自八O年代以後，台灣半導體通路產業即邁入了激烈的競爭時代。眾多高同質性的業者，相互競奪上游產品線的代理權，以及下游買者市場的交易權；業者的生存契機，主要來自於提供上、下游業者間進行商業交換的平台。因此，此一平台所能提昇的交換效率，及其處理跨組織間交換成本的能力，乃成為不容忽視的課題。半導體通路業為台灣資訊工業中，歷史悠久且具重要地位的產業；研究瞭解半導體通路產業之價值鏈活動，將有助於台灣半導體通路產業之促進升級。 半導體通路商所從事之價值鏈活動功能，予以分類概有商流、物流、金流、資訊流及技術流等五大項；其中，諸多研究證實——技術支援能力，乃屬半導體通路商之核心競爭力之一。過去有關半導體通路商的研究，大多是由競爭策略、企業資源規劃及整體通路之價值鏈活動等觀點著手，但專注於技術流部分，予以進行4C交換成本態勢分析之探討者，則尚未得見；因此，本研究乃有其創始性。 本研究以台灣地區的半導體通路商為研究對象，期望所做研究結果可供台灣半導體通路業者，做為規劃技術行銷策略之實務參考。本研究屬於質性之探索性研究，經由個案訪談及問卷之初級資料與次級資料的蒐集彙整，並以4C交換成本理論的四個主要變數：外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本、專屬陷入成本，進行個案企業之比較分析，並歸納出下列之研究發現與結論： 1. 上游供應商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序為：道德危機成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本、外顯單位效益成本。 2. 技術性協力廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序：道德危機成本、外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本。 3. 下游系統製造廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求為：外顯單位效益成本之功效，高於內隱交換成本之效能。 4. 規模經濟型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 5. 利基型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，內隱交換成本優勢，高於外顯單位效益成本。 6. 經營低技術層次產品之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 / After the eighth decade, the channel industry of Taiwan semiconductor moved toward serious competition. Many of high similarity company compete with each other in the agency of product line source and the buyer market of OEM customer; the survival opportunity of company is to provide the platform for the exchange between the supplier and customer. Hence, the most critical point is to increase the efficiency and to reduce the exchange cost between the cross-organization in the platform. Semiconductor channel industry is long historical with important position in Taiwan information industry; to investigate and study the semiconductor channel industry will contribute to the research for the upgrade of semiconductor channel industry in Taiwan. The value chain activity of semiconductor channel can be break through into business flow, logistics, financial flow, information flow and technology flow; Among them, technical support ability has been approved to be one of the key competitiveness of the semiconductor channel by many researches. Most of the past researches stood on the views, such as competitive strategy, Enterprise Resource Planning and whole value chain activity, etc., but the point on the 4C exchanges cost co-opetition analysis in the technology flow has not been seen yet. Hence, it’s important for this research. This research is expected to provide the result for the practice reference of the technical marketing strategy to the Taiwan semiconductor channel by focusing on them. This research is belong to the qualitative exploratory research from the data collection of the primary and the secondary information in the interview cases and questionnaires, then to analyze the cases comparatively by the four primary parameters of the 4C exchange cost the cost: the external cost on utility, information searches, morals hazard and hold up asset specificity. Finally, the following important results have been pointed out: 1. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the supplier to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: morals hazard, information searches, asset specificity and the external cost on utility. 2. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the independent design house (IDH) to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: moral hazard, the external cost on utility, information searches and asset specificity. 3. The technical cooperation between the channel and the system manufacture customer to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: the effectiveness of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 4. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel of the scale economic type is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 5. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the niche type semiconductor channel is: the advantage of the inner exchange cost is higher than that of the external cost on utility. 6. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel with operating in the low technical level product is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost.

由中央與地方之間財政關係中權力不對等與對利益要求的目標不一致以及委託代理結構中委託人與代理人同樣存在著資訊不對稱與目標不一致的特性。是以中國大陸中央與地方之間必然存在著委託代理問題，代理人常常只會追求著自己的目標，甚至會損害整體利益，中國大陸中央與地方之間的一切矛盾與問題起源自中央權力大過地方，因此中央動輒使用「決定」與通知這類的行政性指令，取代應該經由制度或是法制的模式來調整諸如財政管理體制等政策，造成地方擁有較多的資訊，但在權力上卻無法脫離中央而獨立。換言之，地方在某些程度上仍受中央所控制，在分稅制實施之後，中央與地方雖然各自有其所屬的稅種，但中央與地方共享稅的分成比例以及何種稅種屬中央抑或地方，這些事項縱然不致於全盤由中央決定，但未來中央與地方定會共同協議與決定財政資源的分配比例。 是以由委託代理理論來驗證中國大陸中央與地方之間的財政關係，本論文發現中央與地方之間所產生種種問題，乃是因為缺乏制度化以及法制化所致，中共中央以行政性指令來達到其分權、集權的目的，這些措施卻不能真正解決問題。制度變遷與經濟發展係為促進中國大陸經濟成長及中央、地方之間財政資源配置產生變動的重要誘因。在此前提下，制度變遷促成市場機能逐漸恢復，以及經濟發展使得生產、就業結構改變。是以由中國大陸的財政收入結構產生根本的改變、中央與地方對於財政資源的配置仍未訂定合理的比例，以及中央政府仍然能夠主導資源配置這三方面觀之，未來只有在中央主導下與地方協調共同決定財政資源的分配比例，這是本論文研究的發現。

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

創新一直是經濟學長久想要補捉的現象之一, 能夠成功地描述人類的創新, 就能解釋微觀的個體興衰以及巨觀的經濟成長。本研究嘗試建立一個以商品內涵為中心的經濟體系, 包裝在生產者和消費者所組成的商品市場。個體是以軟體代理人 (software agent) 來建模, 其被賦予獨立的學習機制。藉由個體的市場互動模擬, 我們可以更進一步的瞭解創新所帶來經濟成長背後的底層結構。有別於過去的研究對商品的描述。我們使用的方法可以同時兼具商品的質與量, 換言之, 商品的異質與同質大量生產目的是為了滿足各式各樣不同的消費族群。透過消費者對商品的篩選機制, 生產者的優勝劣敗於是產生。什麼樣的特徵具有較佳的存活機率, 什麼樣的組合結構會帶來較高的經濟成長 (即創新所帶來的福利效果), 便成為我們積極想要探索的問題。 / Innovation has always been viewed as one of the phenomena economists ardently attempt to explain. Once the process of innovation is successfully identified, it can be applied to describe not only individual progress but also the economic development as a whole. In this study, a commodity market with producers and consumers is conducted. Each producer has been modeled as a software agent who can independently perform learning functions. The simulation of the market activities may foster our understanding of the base structure of economic development brought by innovation. Unlike past research, our approach takes into account both the quality and quantity of a manufactured good. In other words, in respond to the need of diverse consumers, a producer may choose to adopt quantity-oriented or quality-oriented strategy. Success is defined in terms of the popularity of goods. This paper aims to discuss the characteristics and commodity combinations of successful producers. By doing this, the benefit of innovation can therefore be unveiled.

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.

本研究立於「法人實在理論」和現代公司之「經營與所有分離原則」上，大膽假設「公司經理人有別於民事的意定代理人、公司法經理人的規範結構應有別於民法經理人的規範結構」，因此本文必須檢討經理人法律地位各面向的法律問題，從解構經理人法制開始，最後根據探討後的發現，重新定位經理人的法律構造和法律地位。本研究的思考脈絡及論理體系反映在論文目錄，摘要如下： 第一章說明研究架構和研究方法。 第二章檢討經理人的法律概念。在法律規範中，「經理人」是享有管理事務和簽名權限、負擔特定法律義務和法律責任之自然人。本章比對後歸納現行經理人法制中認定經理人實有三種標準，展現出四種態樣以及現行法對於經理人資格的要求和欠缺積極或消極資格的六種法律效果。最後，檢討各種認定經理人標準的實益及影響，以本章探討為基礎，提出以經理人登記作為認定經理人的標準。 第三章檢討經理人的職權位階和法理構造。本章探討經理人在商業組織中的功能、位階和享有執行業務權限的正當性，所以必須清查現行法中其他具有執行業務權限的人員和法人機關，並且一一與經理人的職權做比較，以凸顯經理人在組織中的位階；其次，檢討經理人與其他有執行業務權限之人，其間發生權限衝突和權限競合的情形，以及合理的處理方法；以前述探討後的發現為基礎，再比較經理人與執行業務機關職權的法理構造，透視經理人與執行業務機關的內在結構。本章發現公司組織的經理人與公司執行業務機關皆立於營業輔助人的地位，其經理權與法人機關權限有別，屬於代理權限，為公司經理人找到初步的定位。 第四章從經理權特性檢討經理權的得喪變更。第三章對公司經理人之定位，是否能夠在法理上得到支持？本章首先要確立經理權的法律屬性，次分析經理權與民事意定代理權法律屬性的差異，以便進一步確認民事意定代理、民法經理權和公司法經理權法理構造的差異。其次，以第三章確認的經理人位階和經理權法理構造以及本章確認的經理權法律特性做為意識，以民法授與代理權的理論模型分別檢討公司法、民法和特別法經理權限的取得、喪失/變更和法律效力。分析後發現，公司法「選任經理人的決議」的性質是關鍵，其不僅賦予經理人身分，同是具有「授與經理權」的性質，但是不宜認定為「締結有償契約關係」的意思表示。 第五章檢討經理人與營業主體的基礎法律關係。本章首先探討該基礎契約關係的特徵，次與委任契約和雇傭契約比較後，以前幾章研究後累積的認知為基礎，檢討是否有必要將基礎法律關係定性為委任契約？有無必要與經理權的授與行為掛鉤？再以民法之代理權授與行為無因性理論為基礎，檢討基礎法律關係之變動對於經理權是否有影響？探討後導出基礎契約關係不必然是委任契約，基礎契約關係的得喪變更對於經理權的得喪沒有必然的影響，此一發現，可以呼應經理權授權行為不必採取契約說，間接地支持本文第三章採取的單獨行為說。此外，從信賴保護的原理檢討發生表見經理權的可能情況，而論及經理人登記制度在信賴保護原理下健全經理人制度的使命。 第六章探討經理人的義務與法律責任。本章檢討公司治理的對象是否及於經理人？在我國討論經理人對內、對公司負擔契約義務，乃基於其間的基礎法律關係，幾乎不曾討論基於代理理論，經理人對本人是否負擔義務？本章以美國為例，探討其現況。其次，整理和分析現行法中科以經理人賠償責任、刑罰和行政罰的法條，歸納出經理人對內、對外的民事賠償責任、刑事法律責任和行政法律責任；並再加以區分為個人身分、經理人身分、公司負責人身分和受雇人身分負責，以及區別是否與營業主體連帶賠償或者並罰等情形。以此為架構再探討適用經理人處罰規定時的法律問題。除了呼應第二章所提出的以經理人登記做為認定經理人的標準和第五章呼籲經理人登記制度的使命，經理人身分在現行法下沈重的法律責任，更凸顯以「登記行為做為取得經理人身分的生效要件」，慎重其事的正當性。 第七章檢討經理人法規範下的適用問題。本章以第二至第六章探討後的心得整理出適用經理人法規範時可能碰觸的鄰接問題，例如公司依照民法第五五三條選任的經理人得否依照公司之登記及認許辦法登記之？又例如民法經理權範圍與公司法經理權範圍的設計是否應有分別？以及勞動法規、證券交易法規或或者銀行法規如何認定經理人？這些特別法中與經理人概念鄰接的身分概念為何？如何解釋和適用法律？等等。二十一世紀經理人在公司法與民法之間如何適從？ 第八章結論。沿著本研究各章問題意識的發展，整合各章的發現和主張，歸納出本研究的心得和見解。

建構優質的電子化政府，首要條件是提供民眾整合型一站式服務的入口網站，達成一站式服務，除共用基礎設施服務外，應具備介接整合各機關資訊與線上服務的能力。過往政府推動電子化政府，雖然已獲得相當成就，但各機關資訊系統整合程度不足，多數服務尚無法提供跨機關主動服務，本研究是藉由文獻的蒐集與研究，並以創新的思維，提出政府主動服務的經營模式，並採個案研究方法，驗證所提出之模式的可行性，因此，在研究方法上，將著重現實現象的整理與未來環境、機制的設計，即採行從當前環境到期望環境藍圖(From AS-IS to TO-BE)策略分析的研究模式。 本研究結果發現：1.各國政府以實現「全政府」作為主要策略，顯示推動資訊系統整合仍為主要工作。2.藉由Web2.0 使用戶間強大連結力，企業可以快速產生新的商業模式，提升企業網站的知名度與使用度。3.本研究提出改變電子化政府服務型態的三要素，資訊代理人、以家戶為主體、為顧客提供Web2.0平台。4. 本研究將網站的服務分為九種型態，提供網站服務轉型參考。5.本研究提出以CRM建構前瞻性主動服務的理念，整合內部資訊與顧客喜好，主動提供顧客服務。 政府Myegov入口網與民眾e管家，本研究提出主動服務的改造建議有：1.Myegov入口網應提供元件共享、資訊透過RSS互通。2.提供跨機關主題式服務、提供民眾可自行訂製、設計自己符合自己需要的e政府管家。3.以「家」為主體的理念，引導政府透過政府共享式服務平台，主動整合後台資訊系統。4.運用資料倉儲系統，建立市民關係管理共享式資料庫，提供民眾前瞻性主動服務。 / In order to construct a high-quality e-government, an integrated one-stop-shop service portal must be provided to the general public. In addition to sharing the services of IT infrastructure, to achieve the integrated one-stop service is also necessary to provide interfaces for all departments so that their information and services can be integrated. In the past, the government has reached many achievements in transforming many of the governmental related processes electronically. However, the integrated information system between different levels and/or ministries is not enough to provide the general public certain interdepartmental services actively. It is the hope of this research to discover an efficient strategy to push for better proactive e-government service model and to provide such strategy to the government for further reference. According to this research is hoping to use innovative thinking to come up the proactive e-government service model based on the collection and research of various documents and literature. This study will also use related e-government research cases for feasibility study on the model proposed. As such, this research stressed on current condition and future context, the design of mechanism, employing in “As-Is to To-Be” strategic analysis research model. This result of study is found: 1.The governments of various countries promote the e-government's main strategy as the future service was still realizing on the information-intensive society of “the whole government”. It shows that various countries are pushing the work on information system integration. 2. Web2.0 is not only a new information technology, but the mechanism that enterprises are used for interacting with end user and offer the space to user by sharing information at the same time. According to leverage the linkage through powerful strength on Web2.0 service use, enterprises can produce the new business model timely and improving enterprise website’s popularity and utilized degree. 3. To create the innovative e-government service, this research proposed three key elements to change government's service type and performance measurement, including “the information agent”, “relies mainly on family one”, “offers Web2.0 service platform to customer”. 4. This research based on web information providing method and service attribute to defined the nine kinds of service model to transforming the portal service as proactive service type. 5. The research proposed and constructed the “customer first” proactive service theory and integrated the customer relevant information and favor internally to providing many of services proactively. Moreover, based on Myegov portal and e-housekeeper, the research proposed active service transformation items are: 1. Myegov portal should provide Portlet-based shared components, RSS subscribing and exchanging service. 2. Offering the topic type’s Blog service by cross departments; offering general public to define, design their own custom e-housekeeper services through e-government. 3. According to “the family” theme’s concept, government should provide the integrated back-end IT system through the shared service platform actively. 4. Use the data warehouse system to gather the department and people relevant information, and build up the shared database on customer relationship management system to provide the “customer first” proactive service.

自從民國89年農業發展條例修正後，新的農舍制度已經運行了六個寒暑，但由統計上的數據可得知個別農舍依然是農民們興建農舍時的主要選擇，顯見政府所欲提倡的集村興建農舍有其實施上的弱點。而在真正完成的集村農舍當中，起造人入住的真正目的，又多半與實際的農業經營管理無關。因此，集村農舍制度於制度設計與制度執行方面可能出現了若干的問題，導致政策實施的結果與政策初始的期望落差甚大。由於集村農舍制度的成效有限，反而更加襯托出個別農舍的備受青睞，這又明顯異於多數學者、官員對於個別農舍所持的負面態度。因此，吾人欲從這兩個並行制度的制度內容出發，以實際的案例進行農舍制度在規則、組織、執行層面的比較分析，據以提出下列的結論與建議。 一、研究結論 （一）個別農舍在搜尋成本、監督成本、執行成本、時間成本等交易成本上遠較集村農舍來得低廉，加上政府提供給集村農舍的誘因相對不足與個別農舍選擇的高度自由，使得目前農民在申請興建農舍時仍以個別農舍為主要的選擇。 （二）個別農舍有建築樣式的選擇自由、交易成本較低等優點，也有容易成為治安死角、公共設施不足等缺點；而集村農舍相對的有建築樣式的選擇不自由、交易成本較高等缺點，以及能夠守望相助、公共設施充足等優點。 （三）作為中央政府政策代理者的地方政府，時常會缺乏對於制度變遷的適應性（adaptation）與執行時的專業能力，加上又必須面對執政權力來源的選民壓力，所以其執行成效往往在中央政府之期待與地方選民之要求間做拉扯，而很有可能因此偏離了政策的原始理念。 二、政策建議 （一）儘速檢討集村農舍制度的偏差以回歸原始之優良理念，並僅允許集村結合原有的鄉村區去作興建，而不准許蛙躍式的、點狀式的集村興建。 （二）現在多數的個別農舍都是屬於別墅型的個別農舍與居住型的個別農舍，而與真正的農業生產經營沒什麼相關性，因此這些不符合農舍原始定義的個別農舍，應該沒有再繼續申請興建的理由，僅有農用型的個別農舍可以有限度的開放興建。 （三）目前農舍管理所面臨到的難題，多少都與完全地開放自然人進入農地市場有關，而在農發條例因為諸多現實的政治因素而難以付諸修改的情況之下，唯有從嚴認定欲申請興建農舍者的資格、加強稽查農舍的違規情形、取消部分農舍不合理的稅賦優惠，才有可能減少機會行為的發生與農舍的不斷蔓延。 （四）在中央政府組織ㄧ個事權統一的農地與農舍的主管機關，以減少目前農舍主管機關業務重疊的情形，並在地方政府正式設立一個專責農地與農舍問題的聯合審查小組，且直接地向中央的主管機關負責，以降低代理問題產生的機會。 關鍵詞: 個別農舍、集村農舍、交易成本、雙重代理、制度變遷、自我執行 、第三者執行 / The implementation of farmhouse institution has been 6 years since year 2000. From the official statistics, the individual farmhouse is still the main choice for farmers. This reveals that the cluster farmhouse which adopts and promotes by government authority has some shortcomings. In addition, the owners who own cluster farmhouse are nothing to do with agricultural operation. These may result from the rules and enforcement of cluster farmhouse. Therefore, this study conducts a comparative analysis of formal and informal rules of individual and cluster farmhouse so as to understand the reasons why farmers do not choose the cluster farmhouse with incentives provided by central government. The main conclusion and policy suggestions for farmhouse are as follows: 1. The transaction costs including searching cost, policing cost and enforcement costs for individual farmhouse is much low than that for cluster farmhouse. In addition, the incentive provided from government for cluster farmhouse is not enough. The above two reasons lead to the result that individual farmhouse is the main choice for farmers. 2. The advantage of individual farmhouse is the freedom of varied style choice and low transaction cost while its shortcoming is safety problem and lack of public facilities. The advantage and shortcoming of cluster farmhouse are opposite from individual farmhouse. 3. The implementation of farmhouse is influence by the lack of adaptation of local government, professional comprehensive and election pressure so that the implantation is different from the original basic concept of farmhouse. 4. Policy recommendation: （1） To review the original basic concept of farmhouse and to encourage the cluster farmhouse together with country district rather the scatter development. （2） To review the definition of farmhouse so that all the farmhouse can be use for agricultural function instead of accommodation. （3） To cancel the tax exemption for farmhouse that is not use for agriculture so as to prevent the opportunity behaviors. （4） To unify the responsible authority in central government so as to prevent the agency problems of implementation.

區段徵收為目前政府大規模進行土地整體開發，促進都市發展，以及無償取得公共設施用地的重要舉措之一，為一種具有高度自償性之土地開發事業。由於區段徵收需要投入大量的資金與人力，在政府財政困窘及國內不動產市場自民國81 年以來，長期處於不景氣之故，其非但無法達成原先設定之有效減低公共支出之目的，反而需要額外編列預算以支應財務缺口。爰此，造成縣市政府往往視區段徵收為畏途，但礙於相關政策規範及都市發展須盡速取得必要之公共設施用地，而不得不予執行，從而導致惡性循環，因此，如何解決區段徵收財務問題，乃成為政府必須面對的最大困境與挑戰。 在政府財政狀態日益惡化，短期內又無法籌措區段徵收開發過程中龐大的資金需求，再加上地方專業人力不足之困境下，使得區段徵收之辦理型態有所演變，部分地方縣（市）政府遂逐步引進民間資源與活力（即BT模式），朝向由民間機構自行籌措資金並由該機構專業人員負責規劃與執行開發工作，政府從旁提供必要之行政協助。此外，開發所需總費用均先由民間機構墊付，而政府再以剩餘可建築土地來償付費用，藉此創新開發模式，以有效解決區段徵收有關資金籌措及開發後土地去化等至為關鍵之癥結問題。 然而BT模式在實務執行過程時，仍存在著法令、政策制定及實施方式等相關爭議，以致於無法有效大量推廣實施，本文藉由研究相關法令、文獻記載、分析目前實施案例、並透過訪談專家學者及整理相關問題等，說明區段徵收業務在走向政府委託民間機構、引進民間資源辦理區段徵收BT開發模式時，所需面對與管理之委託-代理關係，藉由代理理論，探討區段徵收實務執行層面中，可行的解決措施（包括誘因與監督機制），並建議區段徵收應與時俱進地檢討與修正相關配套措施，以利此項善用民間資源與活力，並具有突破性的土地開發委外機制能夠更臻完備，並可作為後續土地整體開發學術研究之重要參考。 綜合本研究之結論與建議，謹分述如次： 一、結論 （一）區段徵收機制基於政策、民意與制度之可行性，可以作階段性創新改革。 （二）現行區段徵收委外機制相關法制，尚欠完備。 （三）區段徵收委外辦理機制，應同時配套建構監控制度。 （四）區段徵收委外過程，應運用誘因機制，以避免代理問題產生。 （五）區段徵收BT開發模式，應可進一步強化學術研究與應用探討。 二、建議 （一）限期檢討修正區段徵收BT開發模式法制化工作。 （二）由中央與地方成立專案小組，全力協助BT得標廠商。 （三）加強BT開發模式之宣導，建構良好的溝通協調機制。 （四）根據現有兩案例開發結果，審慎評估策訂推廣實施計畫。 / Zone expropriation is presently the large-scale integrated land development carried out by the government to promote urban development. Acquiring land for public facilities without compensation is also an important measure to have high self-liquidation of land development enterprise. Because zone expropriation needs to invest in a great deal of funds and manpower, the government finance and the domestic real estate market were in a long-term depression from 1981 until 1992. Not only unable to reach the targeted profit margin to reduce the public expenses, additional budget is needed to deal with financial gap. Therefore, it makes the county and city government often look at zone expropriation as a dangerous choice to take. But hindrance related to policy standardization and urban development must acquire the necessary land for public facilities as soon as possible because there's no choice but to implement it. As a result, it leads to a vicious circle. Therefore, the government needs to face the greatest dilemma and challenge on how to settle the zone expropriation financial problems. The financial status of the government is worsening day by day. Within a short time the government was unable to raise funds for the huge financial requirement of the zone expropriation. In addition, professional manpower is also a dilemma, causing the handling pattern of zone expropriation to evolve to some extent. Partially the local county and city government gradually brings in non-government resources and vitality (private participation-BT mode). Non-government organizations voluntarily raise funds and professionals in private sectors manage the plans and implementation, while the government provides necessary administrative assistance. In addition, the development necessary for the total costs is paid first by the non-government organization, and the government excess land will be liquidated, thereby creating modes in effect of settling the zone expropriation's fund raising and developed land key problems. However in the implementation of the BT mode process, the decrees, policymaking and implementation methodology related to disputes are still kept. Because of the incapability to take effect the large number of widespread implementation, this writing discuss about the laws, research about decrees, document records, analysis of present case studies, and interviews of professional scholars and arrangements related to the problems. Zone expropriation business is illustrated in moving towards the government's entrusting of non-government organizations. The introduction of non-government resources to handle the zone expropriation BT development method is necessary for facing with the management of principal-agent relationship. By means of principal-agent theory, probing into the implementation dimension, feasible resolutions (including incentive and monitoring mechanism), and recommending the steady advancement of zone expropriation to review and amend about the formation of a complete set of measures, these are all for making good use of non-government resources and vitality, as well as to have a break through in the land development outsourcing mechanism to make them more perfect, and may make a follow-up for the land integrated development academic study of important references. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation: 1. Conclusions: (1)Gradual improvements can be made on the zone expropriation mechanism based on policy, public opinion and system feasibility. (2)The legal system regarding the current zone expropriation mechanism is still incomplete. The external committee handling zone expropriation should simultaneously form a complete construction monitoring system. (3)The external committee handling zone expropriation should utilize a financial incentive mechanism to avoid any problems. (4)A zone expropriation based on the BT model should go further in strengthening academic research and application 2. Recommendations: (1)Establish a deadline for reviewing the legal work for zone expropriation in the BT development model. (2)Allow the national and local relevant groups to fully assist the winning bidder for the BT project. (3)Strengthen guidance for the BT development model; construct a good communication mechanism. (4)Based on the development results of the above case studies, carefully appraise the presented implementation plan . Keywords: Zone Expropriation、Private Participation(BT Mode)、Principal-Agent Theory、Incentive Mechanism

中國新上市公司（Initial Public Offerings，以下簡稱IPO）上市後經營績效大幅衰退之現象時有所聞，IPO績效變化不僅影響投資者的利益，也攸關轉型經濟過程中，中國證券市場能否有效引導社會資源的配置。本研究調查2001年至2005年間，在中國深圳以及上海交易所A股市場IPO公司經營績效變化以及可能原因，延伸討論保薦制度及政治關聯對前述現象的影響。首先測試樣本公司上市前後經營績效之差異，並調整同業平均數。實證結果指出，上市後兩年ROA及ROE(無論是否調整產業因素)皆不如上市前兩年，杜邦分析發現獲利能力衰退是造成財務績效衰退的主因。 保薦制度於2004年2月1日正式施行，藉由提升保薦人及保薦機構的執業水準，以建立市場約束機制。本研究依保薦制度實施及政治關聯分別分組，採用分群組T檢定與Wilcoxon做差異分析。實證結果顯示保薦制度下IPO公司上市前的各項財務績效較佳，顯示其能篩選體質較好公司上市；而上市後績效衰退的情形也較為趨緩，中介機構制衡機制有所發揮。政治關聯度低的低國有股公司在上市前的各項財務績效指標較高國有股公司好，推論政治關聯可能影響上市機會，使其上市前需極大化自身績效；相對而言，上市後較難維持績效。 進一步分析績效衰退原因，本研究比較各期間IPO公司各項應計數變化。實證結果顯示。整體而言上市後總應計、流動應計數、營業相關應計數以IPO當年呈倒V型，有上市後反轉的現象，並與經營活動現金流量變動呈反向變動，推論與盈餘操縱有關；保薦制度的在應計數反轉現象沒有顯著抑止效果，而政治關聯度低的IPO公司亦沒有顯著操縱應計數的現象以極大化上市前經營績效。最後，代理問題探討中結果顯示，董監持股變動以及大股東持股變動與績效衰退顯著相關，符合利益一致假說。 / The article investigates whether there is a significant change in financial performance of firms after they went to public for the period between 2001 and 2005 in China A –share market. First, we use ROA and ROE as main performance index. The results indicate a significant decline in ROA and ROE. Following Du Pont framework, return on sales is the most important reason about the decline. Second, we find under new Sponsor’s System, IPO firms had better perfomanace before they went public and they suffered less declined after IPO. We also find the low political connection firms maximize financial performance before they went public to win the IPO opportunity, and they hardly maintain operating performance. At last, we examine the reason for financial performance decline. We compared the change between accruals and operating cashflow the period of IPO for inspecting wether earnings management existed. The empirical results indicate IPO firms maximize accruls when IPO.This study also indicates a significant correlation between post-IPO performance and agency problem.