本研究目的在探究我國性別工作平等法規之制度變遷過程，並利用歷史制度主義觀點分析法規制度的「變與不變」與行動者的「動與不動」之間是如何交錯影響，以型塑出法制最後的變遷樣貌。 在整理既有研究中發現到，以往針對性別工作平等制度之研究方向，多從立法機關、民間團體或企業組織等單一角度探究行動者在此制度變遷過程中的態度與行動策略，如此實失之偏頗；有些研究更甚少注意到制度環境系絡本身等各項限制的重要性，因此本研究以Mahoney（2001）路徑依賴之分析架構將個案約略分為五大階段，並以此進行探討。 由於臺灣在戒嚴時期的政經環境限制了當局者的偏好，在強調經濟發展的前提之下，初始勞動法制中有關工作平權的保障仍存有諸多缺失，對於婦女勞動者的保障更是貧乏。即使解嚴後民眾自覺性地反抗並擬定草案送審，當局者在關鍵時刻下依舊選擇漠視，制度也因此僵固不前。雖然路徑依賴之自我遞增特性讓我國婦女勞動權益一再受到漠視，但是隨著時間序列的持續發展，不論是社會環境發生改變，抑或制度內部出現變化，這些反應與逆反應都是重新啟動制度變革的動力。相關行動者與系絡、制度等因素的互動激盪，不但會改變行動者的決定，進而也會使制度最後的樣貌產生轉變，而我國兩性工作平等法規的變革也就是在這些多重因素與複雜時空的交錯之下所產生。 然而本研究發現到歷史制度主義中的制度變遷不一定只會從原有設計當中進行調整，透過此個案發現到，之所以促發此一制度有進行變革的動力，是從民間團體主動提出設立「兩性工作平等法」此一新興法規所致，因此制度不但可以如過去研究般「從既存設計下手進行內部變革」，但也可以如本研究個案一樣，利用「新增外來規範」的方式來強化整體制度之意義。 任何制度在先前的運行，以及行動者本身的有限理性，都會影響到事物後續的發展。由於因果關係的複雜，制度並非隨時處於穩定均衡之狀態，任何的不可預測性都有可能會破壞既有制度。再者，行動者意圖與非意圖的結果，也會造成個體與制度之間的關係有所轉變，也就是因為這種因果不確定（quirks of fate）的特性，形成了各種意外的組合，因此，唯有系統性地分析事件與過程的時間次序，才真正有助於我們瞭解複雜的社會動態。

義烏人稠地薄，農民的生活困苦，窮山惡水逼出了綿延數百年的「敲糖換雞毛」傳統。「雞毛換糖」是義烏早期特有的商貿文化，義烏人長期在「撥浪鼓文化」下進行的小商品交易，逐漸形成義烏人不畏艱辛、重商尚利、敢闖敢衝的精神表徵。在其「重商尚利」的市場觀下，造就成今日繁榮的義烏。 義烏小商品市場的發展是「市場先發、經貿主導」，其交易市場型態從早期的區域性集散性市場到中國大陸集散批發市場，再發展到國際性小商品交易、批發中心。政府充分利用市場資源，而帶動經濟社會的整體發展。政府在經濟發展過程中扮演極重要的角色。整體而言，政府是先受到民間誘發性制度變遷的影響，後而產生強制性的制度變遷作為，政府與市場之間的良好互動是義烏特有的發展模式與經驗，現為中國大陸其他城市效法的對象。政府與市場的相互配合，使義烏人民的創造力得到最大能量的釋放，得以充分發展當地經濟；培育出中國大陸乃至於是亞洲最大的小商品市場。 義烏小商品市場的形成屬自發性行為，是先有而市後有場，打破原有經濟社會體制上的制約。政府為培育市場主體及配合市場的發展，為市場發展創造先決條件，運用各項產經政策，以引導市場的發展，同時積極參與市場建設，促進市場的擴張和升級。由於政府積極性的作為，使義烏小商品市場成為中國大陸批發市場的龍頭及國際知名的小商品交易中心，贏得「小商品海洋、購物者天堂」之美稱。 義烏小商品市場的發展，從第一代的湖清門市場到第五代的國際商貿城，再加上各式會展，其中以義烏中國小商品博覽會最著名。義烏整體經濟表現為制度創新和制度安排的綜合具體呈現。在與國際如何接軌的運作下，是義烏未來經濟增長的主軸。在此主軸戰線下，須加強發展現代化服務產業，提昇義烏小商品國際交易中心的地位；強化製造業產業競爭力，提昇整體經濟社會水平。為適應國際化的要求，須持續推動政府管理創新，進一步改善政府的公共服務和涉外經濟管理能力。使義烏在中國大陸和世界小商品批發市場的發展更具重要性。

長期以來制度與發展在許多研究中被討論兩者的關係與相互影響。在全球化的衝擊下，相信自由市場促進發展的論調相對的被接納並推廣，淡化了制度的影響力，然而從歐洲足球制度變遷至今，卻沒有呈現這樣的景象。 本研究的三個案例中，採取對市場毫無保留的俱樂部難以獲得良好表現，相對的對市場沒有完全接納或甚至拒絕市場的俱樂部，可以維持一個更加穩定的表現，過去討論運動發展時角色定位並不清楚的球會管理，將分析其利益導向與決策背後的邏輯，發現了全球化下的自由球員市場只能算是一個制度環境，而球會管理治理本身的制度選擇才是決定俱樂部發展的主因；不同的誘因結構限制了各自球會代理人的制度選擇，也直接的影響了不同治理下的俱樂部發展，進而勾勒出歐洲足球競爭的基本風貌。 / The relation and inter-influences of institutions and developments have long been the discussion in many studies. Under the impact of Globalization, many adapted and promoted the arguments that believed free market stimulated the development and lowered the weights of institutions. But from the institutional change of European football, there’s another picture. During the three cases of this study, club management is not vivid according to past discussions that the interest orientation and logic of decision-making will be analyzed. The free market of players is mere an institutional environment while the institutional selection behind the club management is the main point at the same time framing the development of the club. Different incentive mechanisms bounded each choice toward the institutional selection and directly influence the club development.

自1987年《村委會組織法》通過，中國的農村基層選舉，便如火如荼的遍地展開，即便制度和實踐上仍漏洞百出，但民主參與的價值已逐步在村民間散播，其地方統治的形式，也發生潛移默化的轉變。相較行之多年的村委選舉，城市的居民委會選舉，無論在制度規範、居民參與等各層面，均遠遠遜色，那麼從「村委會」改制為「居委會」的原因究竟何在？看似簡單清楚的現代化、城市化過程，背後是否隱藏著政治動機？此即本文探索的關鍵。 因此，本研究的重心在於中國「地方菁英」及「基層自治」間的相互關係，特別凸顯新制度採行所造成的治理困境，藉以探討「村改居」此類制度變遷的原因。首先，分析村、居委會制度上的統治結構後，吾人發現，透過村、居委會制度差異，促使基層政府有制度誘因去打破村委會結構而改變現況，選擇更利己的遊戲場域，因而形成撤村改居的制度變遷，撤村改居之後，基層權力結構從過去兩元權力轉為黨政一元權力，權力集中於政府手中，居委會結構下將更有利地方菁英解決村委會時的治理困境以及權力分化的問題。 因此，吾人認為若統治結構不變，則基層「村-鄉/鎮兩級關係」及「村-黨兩委關係」間的政治治理困境將極易產生，即便透過更換當事雙方，也無法徹底化解此類僵局，釜底抽薪之道在進行「村改居」的改制。換言之，村改居的制度變遷乃出於地方菁英為解決治理困境、有效行政控制所進行的有意識的制度選擇。但卻因此規避村委選舉所產生的制度約束，造成民主化的倒退。換言之，本研究將透過制度變遷理論來觀察中國大陸的基層治理，試圖經由改制過程與西方的制度變遷理論對話，參照中國政治發展的經驗，發掘不同於西方發展經驗的理論模型。

台商乃是兩岸政治經濟下，不同「身份資本」所孕育出來的特殊群體，特別是大陸特殊制度環境及大陸對台商制度規範下，所造成的高交易成本，使得台商為因應而運用下列三種方式 以降低交易成本：非制度化管道、制度化管道、抗衡促使制度變遷，進而參與制度創新的過程。 　　但在加入WTO之後，面對制度化及法制化的大陸制度環境變遷，台商應著重後二種的管道來降低大陸的高交易成本。 　　本文採用新制度經濟學中的交易成本理論來分析大陸對台商的制度規範及台商因應策略。 / Taiwanese investors are particular group who come from different “Capital of identity “ between Mainland China and Taiwan. Under high transaction cost caused by particular institution in China and China’s institutional regulation on Taiwanese investors, they have to take non-institutional way, institutional way and the way that they against current institution to improve institutional change and then join the procedure of institutional innovation in China. So, they can bring the transaction cost down. But after both sides have entered WTO and Taiwanese investors have to obey the regulation of WTO and they should put emphasis on latter two ways, that is institutional way and the way that they against current institution to improve institutional change and then join the procedure of institutional innovation in China to bring their transaction cost down. This dissertation analyzes the Taiwanese investors under Mainland China’s institutional regulation and their survival strategy in Transaction cost approach.

由中央與地方之間財政關係中權力不對等與對利益要求的目標不一致以及委託代理結構中委託人與代理人同樣存在著資訊不對稱與目標不一致的特性。是以中國大陸中央與地方之間必然存在著委託代理問題，代理人常常只會追求著自己的目標，甚至會損害整體利益，中國大陸中央與地方之間的一切矛盾與問題起源自中央權力大過地方，因此中央動輒使用「決定」與通知這類的行政性指令，取代應該經由制度或是法制的模式來調整諸如財政管理體制等政策，造成地方擁有較多的資訊，但在權力上卻無法脫離中央而獨立。換言之，地方在某些程度上仍受中央所控制，在分稅制實施之後，中央與地方雖然各自有其所屬的稅種，但中央與地方共享稅的分成比例以及何種稅種屬中央抑或地方，這些事項縱然不致於全盤由中央決定，但未來中央與地方定會共同協議與決定財政資源的分配比例。 是以由委託代理理論來驗證中國大陸中央與地方之間的財政關係，本論文發現中央與地方之間所產生種種問題，乃是因為缺乏制度化以及法制化所致，中共中央以行政性指令來達到其分權、集權的目的，這些措施卻不能真正解決問題。制度變遷與經濟發展係為促進中國大陸經濟成長及中央、地方之間財政資源配置產生變動的重要誘因。在此前提下，制度變遷促成市場機能逐漸恢復，以及經濟發展使得生產、就業結構改變。是以由中國大陸的財政收入結構產生根本的改變、中央與地方對於財政資源的配置仍未訂定合理的比例，以及中央政府仍然能夠主導資源配置這三方面觀之，未來只有在中央主導下與地方協調共同決定財政資源的分配比例，這是本論文研究的發現。

自從民國89年農業發展條例修正後，新的農舍制度已經運行了六個寒暑，但由統計上的數據可得知個別農舍依然是農民們興建農舍時的主要選擇，顯見政府所欲提倡的集村興建農舍有其實施上的弱點。而在真正完成的集村農舍當中，起造人入住的真正目的，又多半與實際的農業經營管理無關。因此，集村農舍制度於制度設計與制度執行方面可能出現了若干的問題，導致政策實施的結果與政策初始的期望落差甚大。由於集村農舍制度的成效有限，反而更加襯托出個別農舍的備受青睞，這又明顯異於多數學者、官員對於個別農舍所持的負面態度。因此，吾人欲從這兩個並行制度的制度內容出發，以實際的案例進行農舍制度在規則、組織、執行層面的比較分析，據以提出下列的結論與建議。 一、研究結論 （一）個別農舍在搜尋成本、監督成本、執行成本、時間成本等交易成本上遠較集村農舍來得低廉，加上政府提供給集村農舍的誘因相對不足與個別農舍選擇的高度自由，使得目前農民在申請興建農舍時仍以個別農舍為主要的選擇。 （二）個別農舍有建築樣式的選擇自由、交易成本較低等優點，也有容易成為治安死角、公共設施不足等缺點；而集村農舍相對的有建築樣式的選擇不自由、交易成本較高等缺點，以及能夠守望相助、公共設施充足等優點。 （三）作為中央政府政策代理者的地方政府，時常會缺乏對於制度變遷的適應性（adaptation）與執行時的專業能力，加上又必須面對執政權力來源的選民壓力，所以其執行成效往往在中央政府之期待與地方選民之要求間做拉扯，而很有可能因此偏離了政策的原始理念。 二、政策建議 （一）儘速檢討集村農舍制度的偏差以回歸原始之優良理念，並僅允許集村結合原有的鄉村區去作興建，而不准許蛙躍式的、點狀式的集村興建。 （二）現在多數的個別農舍都是屬於別墅型的個別農舍與居住型的個別農舍，而與真正的農業生產經營沒什麼相關性，因此這些不符合農舍原始定義的個別農舍，應該沒有再繼續申請興建的理由，僅有農用型的個別農舍可以有限度的開放興建。 （三）目前農舍管理所面臨到的難題，多少都與完全地開放自然人進入農地市場有關，而在農發條例因為諸多現實的政治因素而難以付諸修改的情況之下，唯有從嚴認定欲申請興建農舍者的資格、加強稽查農舍的違規情形、取消部分農舍不合理的稅賦優惠，才有可能減少機會行為的發生與農舍的不斷蔓延。 （四）在中央政府組織ㄧ個事權統一的農地與農舍的主管機關，以減少目前農舍主管機關業務重疊的情形，並在地方政府正式設立一個專責農地與農舍問題的聯合審查小組，且直接地向中央的主管機關負責，以降低代理問題產生的機會。 關鍵詞: 個別農舍、集村農舍、交易成本、雙重代理、制度變遷、自我執行 、第三者執行 / The implementation of farmhouse institution has been 6 years since year 2000. From the official statistics, the individual farmhouse is still the main choice for farmers. This reveals that the cluster farmhouse which adopts and promotes by government authority has some shortcomings. In addition, the owners who own cluster farmhouse are nothing to do with agricultural operation. These may result from the rules and enforcement of cluster farmhouse. Therefore, this study conducts a comparative analysis of formal and informal rules of individual and cluster farmhouse so as to understand the reasons why farmers do not choose the cluster farmhouse with incentives provided by central government. The main conclusion and policy suggestions for farmhouse are as follows: 1. The transaction costs including searching cost, policing cost and enforcement costs for individual farmhouse is much low than that for cluster farmhouse. In addition, the incentive provided from government for cluster farmhouse is not enough. The above two reasons lead to the result that individual farmhouse is the main choice for farmers. 2. The advantage of individual farmhouse is the freedom of varied style choice and low transaction cost while its shortcoming is safety problem and lack of public facilities. The advantage and shortcoming of cluster farmhouse are opposite from individual farmhouse. 3. The implementation of farmhouse is influence by the lack of adaptation of local government, professional comprehensive and election pressure so that the implantation is different from the original basic concept of farmhouse. 4. Policy recommendation: （1） To review the original basic concept of farmhouse and to encourage the cluster farmhouse together with country district rather the scatter development. （2） To review the definition of farmhouse so that all the farmhouse can be use for agricultural function instead of accommodation. （3） To cancel the tax exemption for farmhouse that is not use for agriculture so as to prevent the opportunity behaviors. （4） To unify the responsible authority in central government so as to prevent the agency problems of implementation.

財產權的發展，具有將外部成本內部化，以及減輕租值消散的功能，同時也會影響誘因機制與市場行為，因此，建立可執行的財產權或契約系統，有助於降低交易成本，促進市場交易的效率。土地使用分區管制是政府用以界定財產權的一項重要工具，但在執行的過程中，會受到資訊不完全的因素所限制，而產生許多社會經濟衝突的問題，所以，在財產權界定不完全的情形下，分區管制制度的執行可能是一種負和、零和或正和的賽局。 在台灣的都市規劃管制制度下，土地使用分區管制一直被視為政府執行都市公共政策的重要工具，但是土地使用分區管制制度變遷的原因及對財產權配置的影響，很少被深入的探討，亦少有相關的實證研究予以論述說明。由於分區管制決策直接影響人民的土地財產權範圍，因此，以財產權為研究的焦點，連結制度及執行層面的動態分析，可以更深入地了解政策運作的過程，檢視分區管制制度設計的問題，藉以提供更佳的制度環境。本研究嘗試以新制度經濟學的基礎，基於財產權的觀點，連結制度變遷及執行層面的分析，研究所有權人及利益團體如何透過與政府的協商，改變土地使用分區管制制度，進而影響財產權配置的問題。在方法上，則透過賽局理論及個案研究，建立參與者行為互動模式及進行實證分析，以剖析制度變遷的原因及問題。 本研究除了進行以上所述的議題，亦同時關注制度選擇、容積移轉的問題，以及違規使用的行為，並將從一系列的行為分析中，進一步探究尋租行為對分區管制制度及經濟發展的影響。研究的結果，除了對分區管制制度提出具體的建議外，亦對制度變遷的行為及政府角色，提供更多的認知面向，值得作為都市研究的參考。 / Zoning institution is regarded as an important instrument for enforcing urban policy in Taiwan. Zoning not only control the quality of urban environment, but affect the price of real estate. However, the reasons of zoning institution changed and the factors influenced the assignment of property rights are very rarely investigated. The decision of zoning will directly influence the scope of landowners’ property rights. Thus, based upon the viewpoint of property rights, incorporated with institutional and enforcing dimension to conduct a dynamic analysis can deeply investigate the process of policy operation and the problems of institutional design so as to provide better institutional environment for zoning. This research, based on the property rights perspective and the approach of property rights analysis of New Institutional Economics, intend to investigate the change of zoning institution and its enforcement. The study pays special attention to the bargaining among private landowners, interest groups and government authority. In order to improve the institutional environment, this paper will also try to find the institutional problems in the process of enforcement through cases study. Cases study is used for further analysis the interaction among the actors participated so as to understand the processes of bargaining, re-assignment of property rights and the reasons of zoning institution changed. After the cases study, the research will address some suggestions of institutional design of zoning and try to review the policy of urban development and land use control in Taipei city. A promise suggestion on the institutional design of zoning will be provided for the reference of understanding and research on zoning institution and behaviors. In addition, the impact of the rent-seeking patterns and the production paths on the zoning behaviors resulting in the change of zoning institution are explored. The results of the research will make further suggestions to the issues of institutional design of zoning, and to the avoidance of the negative effects of rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, the source and process of institutional change of zoning related to rent-seeking behavior, and the ways government responds to the rent-seeking behaviors are provided for the reference of further study of urban planning.

目前台灣地區農村發展之生產與生活面功能係由農地重劃、農村社區土地重劃及農地興建農舍等三個制度執行來達成，其中透過農地重劃達經濟面之生產功能，而藉由農村社區土地重劃與農地興建農舍制度提供生活面之需求。然制度個別執行之結果，不僅導致生產農地之破壞與流失，亦增加農地利用之交易成本。面臨這些問題，生產農地之維護為當務之急。雖然長期以來農地重劃為維護農地生產力之主要制度，但由於農地重劃之發展受到制度變遷路徑相依之影響，不易因應社會變遷而改變其只具單一生產功能之制度內涵，故若要同時達到農村地區之生產與生活功能，或可透過農地重劃之制度調整解決問題並兼顧生產與生活功能之農村發展。 　　因此本研究基於制度變遷之理論基礎，針對台灣地區實施農地重劃之制度變遷進行分析，探討於社經環境變動過程，農地重劃所扮演角色之轉變，以為檢視現行農地重劃制度問題之基礎。並透過政府嘗試結合辦理農地重劃與農村社區土地重劃進行個案分析，揭示目前農村地區追求生產與生活功能同時兼備之必要性，以及於現行制度環境下，二個制度進行結合辦理之制度調整方向，產生了執行時程、重劃負擔及土地分配等問題與困難。故本研究進一步提出三個制度調整方案，利用ANP之多準則決策分析方法，評選出於多功能農地重劃之制度調整發展方向，為兼顧生產與生活等多功能目標之最佳制度調整方案。此外，針對多功能農地重劃制度之調整提出制度環境面與執行機制面之政策性建議，期望能對正在研擬與即將立法之農村再生條例草案中，整合型農地重劃之研擬與方向，提供於制度結合或制度創新上有所助益。 / Farmland consolidation institution in Taiwan has only been applied to improve the production environment during the past 50 years. Nowadays, due to the dramatic change of social and economic environment in Taiwan as well as the tendency of multifunctional rural community and agricultural development, the institution is due to proper consideration to be altered. In addition, the separately enforcement of three institutions i.e. farmland consolidation, building of farmhouse and rural community consolidation, results in the serious pollution of agricultural environment and the loss of high- quality farmland. How to adjust the current institution of farmland consolidation so as to reach the objectives of both better production and living environment in rural areas is an important issue. This study, based on the institutional change theory, investigates the changing role of farmland consolidation in Taiwan. Moreover, examines the problems of integrating farmland consolidation and rural community land readjustment at Shihfen area located in Tainan County Cigou Towship is examined. After literatures review and the investigation of farmhouse as well as farmland use problems, proposes three alternative institutions of farmland consolidation. Analytical Network Process (ANP) Approach is employed to evaluate. Furthermore, the criteria and implication of the choosing institution are discussed so as to benefit the framework of integrated farmland consolidation in the Bill of the Revival of Rural Community.

本研究以文獻分析法及實地訪談法等方式，以剖析台灣原住民族土地財產權制度從共同所有到個別所有的演變關係。研究主題包括：一、明析原住民族土地財產權制度演變歷程的要因與結果；二、明析日治時期迄今，不同統治者標舉「理蕃」政策或山地政策所隱含的決策目的，及統治者實現其決策目的採取的行為措施，暨這些決策目的與行為措施如何影響原住民族土地財產權制度演變；三、明析原住民族土地財產權制度演變的結果，對於原住民族的發展造成何種影響。 透過上述研究主題，希望達成三點目的：一、分析日治時期迄今，原住民族土地財產權制度從共同所有演變為個別所有的過程、原因與結果，俾能連貫相關文獻的成果；二、分析日治時期迄今，統治政權賦予原住民族土地權利所隱含的決策目的、採取的行為措施，及其影響原住民族土地財產權制度演變之進程，以檢討「理蕃」政策或山地政策是否達成為原住民族謀求福祉的目標；三、分析原住民族土地財產權制度演變對於原住民族發展的影響，以供未來重新建構原住民族土地財產權制度的參考。 研究進行期間，除蒐集並整理研析關於原住民族土地財產權制度之相關文獻，作為建立研究架構及佐證研究內容之基礎外，更深入山地鄉瞭解原住民族對土地財產權問題之意見，俾使論證內容更為周延有據。茲摘述研究發現如次： 一、日治初期原住民族社會慣行的土地財產權制度方面 （一）部落為領域內土地財產權最大的共同所有團體。 （二）部落內耕地、獵地或漁區歸屬組成部落之社經團體共同所有。 （三）組成社經團體之家族（家庭）享有其範圍內土地之使用、收益權。 （四）共同所有之土地財產權，無繼受問題；惟土地之支配、管理者隨部落或社經團體之領導者更迭而變更。 （五）土地之使用、收益權，依各族群之家產法則繼受。 二、土地財產權制度演變對於原住民族發展之影響方面 （一）原住民族產權領域急遽限縮，個別原住民使用保留地的權利範圍亦趨於微小，平均每人不超過3甲土地。 （二）原住民族土地利用型態，由日治初期之「半耕、半獵」變成目前的定耕農業。 （三）原住民族與平地人民的所得差距，益趨擴大，且所得來源以非農業收入為主。另者，山地原住民仰賴保留地為生甚深，但其土地生產力仍屬偏低。顯示賦予原住民族土地財產權個別所有，仍無法提昇其經濟能力。 三、不同時期政府政策影響原住民族土地財產權制度演變之比較方面 （一）日治時期統治者之「理蕃」政策以攫取山地資源，回饋其宗主國經濟需求為要；光復時期統治者之山地政策在於維持原住民族社會安定，以鞏固政權為要。 （二）日治時期統治者之決策措施為「理蕃」措施；光復時期統治者之決策措施為山地政策措施。 （三）日治時期統治者之執行機制，以武力裝備的山地警察為主；光復時期統治者以不具武力裝備的一般行政機關為之。 四、詮釋分析觀點之事實方面 （一）制度的建立與發展具有累積性的「相互依存」特性，因此日治時期形成高砂族保留地制度授予保留地個別使用權，或光復時期形成原住民保留地制度賦予保留地個別產權，不同時期政府均事先實施相關「理蕃」措施或山地政策措施配合之。 （二）「資源攫取」為影響殖民政府是否實踐、落實「給予一定土地，使其耕種就業」之「理蕃」政策理想的重要因素。 （三）「政權鞏固」為影響政府實踐、落實「改善原住民族生計能力，提高其地位」之山地政策理想，及積極進行增劃編保留地的重要因素。 （四）殖民政府或我政府在面對各種主客觀條件時，均會權衡利弊得失而採取不同方法、手段、措施來趨利避禍、自求多福，以謀求自身最大的福祉與利益。 （五）在原住民族土地財產權演變過程中，因統治者界定高砂族保留地時缺乏考量原住民族傳統土地財產權觀念，且這些觀念仍發揮指導原住民族使用土地的作用，因此殖民政府根本未能有效監督、管理高砂族越界開墾之情事。 綜合本研究之論證與分析，歸納下列幾點結論： 一、日治初期原住民族社會以部落及部落內各種社經組織共同所有土地財產權，而組織成員則享有土地之使用、收益權能，並透過這套原住民族社會公認的土地財產權制度約束其內部的行為規範，達到維持社會秩序，減低護衛土地財產權的交易成本功效。 二、從討論分析瞭解，不同時期政府實施「理蕃」政策及山地政策的結果，未能達成為原住民族謀福祉的政策理想。其因在於，「理蕃」政策以掠奪山地利源為要；而山地政策以鞏固政權為考量，均在謀求統治者自身最大的利益，造成原住民族權益的損失。 三、日治時期迄今，原住民族土地財產權制度從共同所有演變為個別所有的結果，造成原住民族土地財產權不斷流失，且未能有效提昇其經濟能力，使得原住民族之地位日趨沒落。因此，保留地制度及保留地財產權型態允宜適度調整，未來可考量留設一定面積保留地，土地財產權改賦原住民族共同所有，以確保原住民族賴以生存的機盤，並維護其文化存續發展。 四、原住民族土地財產權制度變遷的過程，衍生原住民族與平地人民對於保留地財產權之爭議，政府宜妥適圓滿解決，創造族群共榮的多元社會。 五、本研究以「資源攫取」、「政權鞏固」及「制度相依」等因素分析原住民族土地財產權制度演變的觀點，均能從相關事實獲得合理詮釋。 / This dissertation conducted extensive literature research and field interviews in an attempt to explore the changes from the tribe ownership to the private ownership system of Taiwan aborigines’ land ownership right. The themes and the expected accomplishments of this research include the following: 1. To study the history and current status of Taiwan aboriginal land ownership right, to analyze the causes and consequences of the changes in the past, and to verify the findings with other scholars’ arguments in the literature. 2. To study the ruling mentality, rationale, policies and regulations towards Taiwan aborigines from the Japanese occupants to the ROC government, to analyze the impacts of these policies on Taiwan aboriginal land ownership right, and to explore whether Taiwan aborigines have benefited from such policies and regulations. 3. To study the overall impacts on Taiwan aborigines’ economical and cultural development, which was resulted from the changes to their land ownership right through the execution of different policies. The findings of this research could serve as recommendations to the government in setting up revised aboriginal land reservation policies for Taiwan aborigines. Through extensive literature research and field interviews with a few senior Taiwan aborigines about their memories, comments, and expectations with respect to aboriginal land ownership right, the following facts can be summarized: 1. The Land Ownership Right Before Japanese Occupancy a. The tribe leaders rule the land within a tribe’s territory. b. Each piece of farmland, hunting field, and fishing field belongs to a societal/economical group within a tribe. c. The societal/economical group has the right to farm or hunt on their assigned lands and owns the produce from the lands. d. Because the land is owned by a societal/economical group, there is no inheritance issue. The managing of the land is by the leader of the group. e. Traditionally members in a societal/economical group have the right to farm/hunt on a piece of land as well as to own the produce from the land. 2. The Impact of Land Ownership Right Changes on the Development of Taiwan Aborigines a. The land ownership right policies have limited the accessibility of Taiwan aborigines to land resources. Each aborigine has access to less than three aches of reserved land. b. The land reservation policy limited the aborigines to farm within their reserved land have changed the aborigines’ life style from half time farming and half time hunting to full time farming. c. Because productivity of each aborigine farm on his own reserved land is very low, the gap between the average income of aborigines and nonaborigines has been widening. Besides, the majority of aborigines’ income should come from non-agricultural sources. This reflects the fact that giving aborigines a piece of reserved land did not benefit them economically. 3. The Comparison of Different Land Ownership Right Policies by Different Governments a. The Japanese occupants’ aboriginal policy focused on seizing Taiwan’s mineral, forestry, and agricultural resources. While the ROC government’s aboriginal policy was only reactively trying to keep the stability of the aborigines. b. The Japanese occupant’s aboriginal policy was to “manage” Taiwan aborigines. While the ROC government’s aboriginal policy was a land reservation policy. c. The Japanese occupants ordered armed policemen to implement its aboriginal policy. While the ROC government’s aboriginal policy was executed by civilian officials in local governments. 4. Some Observations a. The Taiwan aboriginal policies by the ROC government and the Japanese occupants have its relationship. The Japanese occupants adopted land reservation policy for the aborigines, which led to private use of reserved lands. The ROC government has consequently adopted a more extensive land reservation policy for aborigines, which led to private ownership of reserved land by all aborigines. The policy of awarding private use privilege of land to aborigines by both governments had always been accompanied by the intention to manage the aborigines. b. Seizing Taiwan’s natural resources was the real agenda by the Japanese occupants behind their slogan of “awarding aborigines land to farm”. c. Maintaining the ROC government’s ruling power was the main interest behind her aboriginal policy of “improving aborigines’ quality of life and social status”. d. Even though the Japanese occupants and the ROC government chose different means and regulations to implement different aboriginal policies, avoiding pressures and satisfying their own agenda was what’s driving their aboriginal policies. e. The Japanese occupants did not appreciate Taiwan aborigines’ perception of land while awarding reserved lands to the aborigines. However the Taiwan aborigines disrespected the boundary of their reserved land, and the issue became unmanageable. Conclusions 1. Before the Japanese occupancy, Taiwan aboriginal tribes and the social/economical groups within the tribes rule the land they use. Members in a social/economical group have usage rights over a piece of land, and own the produce from that land. Because this system was well respected by all aborigines, there was little conflict or social cost with respect to land ownership right. 2. The past aboriginal policies failed to improve the aborigines’ quality of life. The interests of the two governments were either to seize Taiwan’s resources or to secure the ruling government’s political power. Taiwan aborigines’ welfare was sacrificed. 3. Taiwan aborigines’ perception about land ownership right changed from commonly owned by everybody to pieces of privately owned land. This reservation land policy for aborigines not only against the aborigines’ philosophy and lifestyle, but also violated economic principles of efficiency and productivity. Another conflict of interests arose due to competing over the reserved land to the aborigines by the nonaborigines. The land resources reserved for the aborigines have long been diminishing. Consequently, most Taiwan aborigines suffer from economic hardship and social disadvantage. 4. This research has explored the problems in the disputes land reservation policy for the aborigines. The following two recommendations are suggested: a. The government should actively resolve all over the reserved land for the aborigines. This can give back to the aborigines such land they deserve for generations. Resolving land disputes can also improve the relationship between all residence in Taiwan. b. Knowing the disadvantages of privately owning reserved land by aborigines, this research recommends that the government allocates additional portion from the total reserved land to the aborigines, which can be managed by aboriginal tribes and shared by all aborigines. Increasing the accessibility to more natural resources by aborigines will be a direct measure to improve Taiwan aborigines’ economic income, while in the same time, preserve their pride and cultural heritage. 5. This research has based on theories of “seizure of natural resources”, “securing governing power”, and “institutional dependence” to analyze the changes in Taiwan’s aboriginal land ownership right, and its negative impact to Taiwan aborigines’ life. Recommendations to government with respect to modifying the current aboriginal land policy were suggested.