本研究的主要目的是探討會計師事務所審計人員對衍生性金融商品(DFI)的財務報導與查核能力，並分析可能影響此項能力的因素。另一目的則是希望探討審計人員對財務會計準則公報第二十七號的意見及看法，以及對這號公報的瞭解程度。本研究以問卷為蒐集資料的工具，在139份回收的問卷中，只有24位審計人員不知道什麼是DFI，約有九成的審計人員認為查核含有從事DFI交易公司之財務報表之審體審計風險較沒有從事此類交易的公司高。造成審計人員對DFI財務報導的認知程度差異的原因，經統計檢定後，有下列幾項： （1） 審計人員在事務所擔任的職位， （2） 審計人員認定衍生性金融商品的能力，以及 （3） 審計人員是否曾經查過衍生性金融商品。 造成審計人員對DFI財務報導查核能力差異的原因經統計檢定後，有下 列幾項： （1） 事務所的規模， （2） 審計人員之最高學歷， （3） 審計人員是否已取得會計師資格， （4） 審計人員在事務所擔任的職位， （5） 審計人員認定衍生性金融商品的能力， （6） 審計人員對衍生性金融商品的熟悉程度，以及 （7） 審計人員是否曾經查過衍生性金融商品。 審計人員是否曾查核過DFI並不會影響其對第二十七號公報的熟悉程度。此外，約三成的審計人員認為「各類商品之財務風險」與「商品之公平市價」是其依照此號公報查核DFI時最難決定之項目。至於審計人員如何驗證客戶在財務報表上所揭露關於DFI的公平價值，約各有三成的審計人員取得之方式為「採用公開市場之成交價」、「向銀行詢價」。 值得注意的是，在瞭解第二十七號公報的審計人員當中，只有約半數認為依照第二十七號公報揭露DFI，能幫助閱表者評估風險；同樣地，也只有半數的審計人員認為第二十七號公報能對他們在查核DFI時提供更明確的指引。審計人員是否曾經查核過DFI不會影響他們對這兩個問題的看法。 / In this study, the author investigated the degree of auditors' cognition and audit ability on derivative financial instruments (DFI) in Taiwan and he studied some factors that might affect these abilities. Besides, the author also investigated auditors' opinions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 27 in ROC. The author used questionnaire as a tool in gathering data. Factors that might affect auditors' cognition of DFI are as follows: (1) The current job position of auditors. (2) The auditors' abilities to recognize DFI. (3) The auditors' experiences of auditing DFI. Factors that might affect auditors' audit ability of DFI are as follows: (1) Firm size. (2) The highest education auditors received. (3) Whether they have got CPA license. (4) The current job position of auditors. (5) The auditors' abilities to recognize DFI. (6) The auditors' experiences of auditing DFI. (7) The extent of auditors' familiarity toward DFI. Auditors' opinions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 27 in ROC can be concluded as follows: (1) Only half of the auditors who understand this statement think it can help them to audit DFI related disclosures. (2) Whether auditors have audited DFI doesn't affect the extent of auditors' familiarity toward DFI. (3) "Financial risk" and " fair value of DFI" are two of the most difficult items to decide when auditors audit DFI.

本研究係針對會計師及會計系學生之不當學習行為是否會影響其日後對一般工作不道德行為與審計專業不道德行為之認知與意圖進行探討，並試圖瞭解兩者形成從事審計專業不道德行為意圖之考慮因素。 本研究係以問卷方式蒐集資料，其中，會計師樣本係從台北市會計師公會登錄之會計師進行隨機選取，學生樣本則係從北部四所大學會計系四年級學生為對象進行問卷調查。研究結果顯示： 一、 會計師相對於會計系學生而言，較能確定不會從事審計不道德行為，且對於不當學習行為之認知亦較學生嚴重。 二、 會計師與會計系學生若認為他人亦有從事審計不道德行為之意圖時，就愈有可能從事該審計不道德行為；且不論是會計師或是會計系學生，曾經做過愈多不當學習行為者，就愈可能存有從事審計不道德行為之意圖。 三、 對於不當學習行為認知愈不嚴重之會計師，對於一般工作不道德行為之認知亦愈不嚴重；而對不當學習行為的認知愈不嚴重之會計系學生，對於一般工作不道德行為或是對審計專業不道德行為之認知亦愈不嚴重。 / This research was aimed to examine relationship among academic misconduct, improper business practice and morally questionable behavior in auditing of CPAs and auditing students. In addition, this research also examined the factors affecting the intention of CPAs and auditing students to behave unethically in auditing. The data were collected by questionnaires. The CPA samples were chosen randomly from CPAs registered in the CPA Association of Taipei City and the student samples were auditing students from four universities in northern Taiwan. Empirical results were summarized as follows: 1. CPAs appeared more certain about refraining from morally questionable behavior in auditing and perceived academic misconduct more seriously than auditing students. 2. When CPAs or auditing students deemed that others would breach ethics in auditing, they appeared to be more prone to do the same. Besides, if they had committed academic misconduct previously, it was more likely for them to choose morally questionable behavior in auditing. 3. CPAs who took academic misconduct less seriously perceived improper business practice less seriously. Auditing students who took academic misconduct less seriously perceived improper business practice and morally questionable behavior in auditing less seriously.

我國公開發行公司「雙簽制度」之功能，在於透過副簽會計師額外複核主辦會計師查核工作，以進一步通盤考量審計案件所面臨之審計風險情況，俾使審計案件最終風險下降至可容許範圍之內。然而，目前「雙簽制度」似乎已淪為橡皮圖章，實際功能未能發揮。故本研究擬針對副簽會計師複核工作與審計風險之關聯性，進行認知上的調查與實際執行成果之實證，並探討「雙簽制度」之本質，以尋求問題癥結所在與改善方向。 　　本研究係以問卷方式蒐集原始資料。研究對象則為公開發行、上櫃及上市公司之副簽會計師，並由其自行隨機選取一家其簽證之公開發行、上櫃或上市公司為測試樣本。原始資料蒐集完成後，本研究採平均數比較及變異數分析之統計方法，來辨認副簽會計師認為影響其複核工作之主要因素是否為與審計風險有關因素。採用複迴歸、逐步迴歸及因素分析等統計方法，來驗證目前副簽會計師實際複核工作與審計風險有關因素之關聯性。 　　本研究發現，副簽會計師一般認為與審計風險有關因素係影響其複核程度之主要因素。然而，目前副簽會計師實際複核工作，並未充分考慮與審計風險有關因素之影響，故驗證目前「雙簽制度」功能不彰之現象。本研究另外從立法本意、目的、責任、資格、角色、範圍、程序、重點、選任方式、時機、文件要求等十一項目，探討「雙簽制度」之本質。並提出下列改善方向：一、會計師法律責任之落實；二、主管機關積極加強管制；三、同業評鑑同時配合；四、教育宣導訓示。

本研究主要探討審計品質與盈餘反應係數之關係，擬回達下列之研究問題：接受高品質會計師事務所查核之公司，其盈餘反應係數是否較接受低品質會計師事務所查核之公司為高。 　　本論文以台灣股票市場民國70年至82年之更換會計師公司為樣本，首先採用未預期盈餘(UE)與股票市場累積異常報酬(CAR)的簡單迴歸分析，嘗試驗證盈餘資訊與股票報酬間之關係；採用盈餘反應係數決定因素的複迴歸分析探討審計品質是否會影響盈餘反應係數。實證結果顯示： 　　一、如以曾經由六大會計師事務所查核財務報表更換為非六大會計師事務所之上市公司，或曾經由非六大會計師事務所更換為六大會計師事務所查核簽證財務報表之上市公司為樣本公司，台灣股票市場之未預期盈餘與異常報酬間方向是一致的，但並不具統計顯著性。 　　二、審計品質是否會影響盈餘反應係數之實證結果：六大會計師事務所客戶之盈餘反應係數是大於非六大的客戶，但亦並不具顯著性。 　　換言之，以國內會計師事務所與美國六大結盟作為衡量高品質的審計品質，其與盈餘反應係數之關係並未如預期呈顯著的正相關。

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

過去研究說明具產業專長之會計師仍能在客戶財務資訊不完整情況下，利用其行業特定知識與較高技術能力執行完善的審計工作(Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006)。本論文定義資訊不確定性為客戶之財務資訊無法幫助預測公司的價值(Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009)。本論文推論若公司的財務報表具有不確定性會需要聘請產業專長會計師以減緩資訊不確定性的程度，並進一步研究具資訊不確定性公司若由非產業專長更換為產業專長會計師是否能提升其審計品質。由於審計工作目的在於提供資訊品質的確認(Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008)，審計人員會依據審計客戶的環境，設計和執行適當的審計計劃以減輕資訊不確定性情況。本論文以會計師角度建立一資訊不確定性架構，進一步將資訊不確定性分為基本價值波動不確定性與資訊品質不確定性，並推論產業專長會計師比較能在資訊品質不確定性中發揮其價值。本論文分為兩部分：第一部分檢驗資訊不確定性是否會影響產業專長會計師之選任，第二部分則檢測具資訊不確定性之審計客戶若選擇產業專長會計師之後，其審計品質是否會提升。 / Previous studies establish that a specialist auditor has more industry-specific knowledge and higher technological capability that can pertinently benefit situations in which client financial information is incomplete (Thibodeau 2003; Moroney 2007; Hammersley 2006). In this paper, we define information uncertainty as the ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information concerning a firm’s value (Zhang 2006; Autore et al. 2009). Because some financial statements present information in uncertain terms, we infer that companies whose financial statements provide uncertain information demand specialist auditors to alleviate the extent of information uncertainty. We further examine the improvements on audit quality made by those companies under information uncertainty which chose to switch from non-specialist auditors to specialist ones. As an assurance of information quality (Dye 1993; Knechel et al. 2008), an auditor, based on his knowledge of the auditee and its environment, will alleviate the uncertainty level of the auditee’s financial information through designing and executing an appropriate audit plan. We build a framework of information uncertainty and develop comprehensive measurements of information uncertainty from the auditor’s point of view. Moreover, this study disentangles the information uncertainty effects into fundamental volatility uncertainty and information quality uncertainty, and proposes that specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than under fundamental volatility uncertainty. In the first part of this study, we examine the auditors chosen by companies whose financial statements are characterized by information uncertainty. Previous studies on auditor choice address many reasons why companies switch their auditors (Lennox 2000; Carcello and Neal 2003; Blouin et al. 2007). Information uncertainty makes stakeholders lower their reliance upon company financials and even downgrade the filers, triggering negative stock price reactions (Merton 1987; Beneish et al. 2005; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). Based on prior research, we can infer that a company under information uncertainty chooses to hire a specialist auditor to signal the credibility of the financial statements and improve market perception. We hypothesize that companies suffering uncertainty demand specialist auditors to alleviate their information uncertainty. The auditor’s information role is to ensure the reliability of financial information, and a specialist auditor is equipped with superior audit knowledge and technology. Therefore, we further infer that a company whose specific information uncertainty is attributable to information quality issues (rather than fundamental volatility issues) is more inclined to choose a specialist auditor. This is because a specialist auditor improves the credibility of financial information instead of being involved with the client’s business decisions. We use an auditor switching sample of U.S. companies from 2001-2009 to examine whether the information uncertainty is an issue of auditor choice or not. Consistent with our conjecture, companies under information uncertainty prefer to hire specialist auditors. Evidence partially supports that relative to companies under fundamental volatility uncertainty, companies suffering information quality uncertainty are more inclined to choose specialist auditors. In the second part of this study, we find evidence for the economic consequences of upgrading switches to a specialist auditor when the company is experiencing information uncertainty. After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX), many companies began to take the cost-effect issue into consideration; they ultimately decided to go private (Zhang 2006; Engel et al. 2007) in order to avoid the high-cost of Section 404 or switch to a non-Big N audit firm (Calderon et al. 2007). There's no such thing as free lunch; the specialist auditor usually has greater ability and concomitant higher charges (Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000; Francis et al. 2005; Cahan et al. 2008). It is natural to question whether every company needs to engage specialist auditors if it has to pay high audit fees. In this paper, we attempt to determine in which circumstances specialist auditors can make a significant difference in improving audit quality. We investigate the relationship between auditor specialization and audit quality in an information uncertainty setting using an auditor switching sample taken from 2001 to 2009 in the United States. We examine ex post facto whether (1) specialist auditors improve audit quality more than their non-specialist counterparts; and (2) specialist auditors manifest their merits more under information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. Since the value of auditor industry specialization is reflected by the perceived and actual audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003; Nagy 2005), we examine both earnings response coefficient (ERC) and accruals quality to proxy audit quality (DAC). In both models, the audit quality of companies that suffer fundamental volatility uncertainty along with comprehensive uncertainty is not enhanced substantially following upgrade switching to a specialist auditor. We find strong empirical results that demonstrate companies under information quality uncertainty show significant improvements in audit quality after switching to specialist auditors. However, specialist auditors are significantly more capable of mitigating the information quality uncertainty than the fundamental volatility uncertainty. That is, auditor specialization is a critical solution when companies encounter information quality uncertainty.

我國關係人交易普遍且具重要性，而過去研究顯示關係人交易會對公司產生負面效果，且關係人交易之查核具有困難度，因此本研究以關係人交易較多且查核風險較高之高科技公司為研究對象，將關係人交易分為關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款與關係人應付款等四項類別，探討關係人交易與審計品質的關係。進一步探討當關係人交易分為發行公司與關係人皆受相同會計師查核與受不同會計師查核兩類型，對發行公司財務報表審計品質的影響。實證結果發現：關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與審計品質呈負向關係；關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與關係人應收款兩造受不同會計師查核者，對其發行公司財務報表審計品質之負面影響較兩造受相同會計師查核者強。 / Related party transactions are common and important in Taiwan, and empirical studies in Taiwan show that related party transactions have negative impact on earnings management and company performance. Based on auditing standards and literature, related party transactions are difficult to audit, and high technology firms have more related party transactions which may result in higher audit risk than other industry. Therefore, we investigate the association between related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) and audit quality (proxied by accrual quality) in high technology firms, and find that sales to related parties and purchases from related parties have negative impact on audit quality. Next, we investigate the impact of related party transactions audited by the same auditor or different auditors. Empirical results show that sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties audited by different auditors show stronger negative impacts on audit quality than those audited by same auditors.

非審計服務究竟是否會影響會計師獨立性，長久以來即為各界關注焦點。本研究第一部分將驗證非審計服務對會計師獨立性的影響。此外，有別於美國要求全面揭露審計、非審計公費資訊，我國規定公開發行公司若符合一定門檻應揭露支付給會計師的各項公費資訊，本研究第二部份將探討我國採門檻制的公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊的公司，其會計師的獨立性是否會不同於無需揭露公司。最後一部份則為市場反應測試，探討市場是否能對公費資訊進行判斷，判斷公司刻意隱藏的情形並給予負面的評價。 實證果發現非審計服務的提供對會計師獨立性產生負面影響，而在我國採門檻制公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊公司進行盈餘管理的可能性越大，若我國之公費揭露政策若能改為全面性揭露將對會計師獨立產生正面影響。此外，市場反應部份結果顯示投資人並未考慮公費資訊的內涵。 關鍵詞：非審計服務、門檻制公費揭露、會計師獨立性、裁量性應計 / Whether or not the purchase of non audit services (NAS) impairs audit independence is the focus of a growing body of accounting research in the U.S. Using the data of Taiwanese list firms, this paper examines whether the association holds in environment other than that of the United States. In addition, compared to that in the U.S., Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau requires firm to disclose information on the audit and nonaudit fees under some circumstances. The second objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore whether some firms meeting the disclosure threshold have an incentive to avoid the disclosure requirement by concealing audit fee from external investors and regulators, and whether there is difference in the independence between firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise and firms disclosing nonaudit fees. Finally, I investigate whether premium given by market participants varies among these two groups. We find that the purchase of NAS impairs audit independence, consistent with prior studies. We also document that firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise are more likely to conduct earnings management relative to other firms, as predicted. Finally, our empirical results show that market participants are not able to distinguish these two groups. Key words: non-audit services, disclosure threshold, audit independence, discretionary accruals

民國94年底，證券交易法修正通過後，正式引進獨立董事制度。近年來，只要談到公司治理，一定會提到獨立董事制度，其實在證券交易法修正通過前，台灣證券交易所與櫃檯買賣中心於民國91年起，就已經透過上市、上櫃契約之方式，要求新申請上市、上櫃之公開發行公司須設置二名獨立董事與一名獨立監察人。因此，雖然證券交易法有關獨立董事相關條文之施行日期為民國96年1月1日，然目前實務上已有獨立董事之存在。從目前政策走向可知，主管機關因我國監察人成效不彰，故欲引進由獨立董事所組成之審計委員會取代監察人。然而，獨立董事制度係起源於美國，美國之公司內部組織與我國不同，若欲採用審計委員會取代監察人，並非增加幾個條文即可達到預期之效果。本文著眼於此，第二章從美國獨立董事緣起之背景、運作方式、公司內部結構談起。第三章進一步探討我國股份有限公司內部監察機制所存在之問題。第四章係以美日獨立董事制度為基礎，擬從制度面之大方向來檢討證券交易法新修正條文是否完善，而能發揮預期監督機能。然後再個別針對證券交易法新修正條文，提出其可能未盡理想、或滯礙難行之處。第五章分析證券交易法修正通過後，我國現行之公司內部監察制度之態樣，並分別就公司法與證券交易法，提出本文認為適宜之改造方向。

從美國的安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)、全錄公司(Xerox)，義大利的帕瑪列(Parmalat)，相關專業機構包括安達信(Arthur Andersen)、美林證券(Merrill Lynch)、花旗銀行(Citibank)；到臺灣的太電、博達、訊碟….等，一連串上市公司及專業機構爆發財務弊案，投資大眾人心惶惶。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見，在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色，社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待，但弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑。因此，一般而言，弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後，會計師姓名就會與「審計品質不佳」劃上等號，因此先前由被懲處之會計師所簽證之其他受查公司，不論有無類似弊病，都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而，究竟懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而提升會計師之審計品質？被懲戒之會計師是否真代表其審計品質較低？則無法得知，此即為本研究欲探討的議題。 本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度大小將會計師之審計品質予以量化，並參考Nagy(2005)的研究模式，將樣本分為會計師更換前後期，並對獨立及配對樣本作分析，以探討因懲戒而更換會計師對審計品質之影響。研究結果發現，在更換會計師的前提下，即便懲戒更換會計師並未能顯著抑制公司對於正向裁決性應計數之報導幅度，卻能避免一般情況下更換會計師對審計品質所造成的負面情形。另外，研究結果顯示，會計師長任期(6年以上)審計品質較高；會計師短任期(2年以下)且更動過於頻繁的情況下審計品質較低。在懲戒程度與審計品質之關係方面，研究結果顯示，會計師懲戒輕重程度未與會計師審計品質高低一致；而受警告及申誡懲戒但未被客戶更換之會計師在懲戒後次期，傾向調低公司盈餘，查核工作態度變保守，但審計品質並未提升。再者，本研究發現，受懲戒而更換會計師之效果大致而言並不受客戶談判籌碼的影響。最後，就單一時點(PC=0)的會計師審計品質而言，會計師被懲戒與否其審計品質並未有顯著不同；然將樣本群組進行分析後，發現有三位至四位被懲戒會計師其審計品質顯著不佳，而被懲戒之會計師中，即使差異未達顯著，卻是幾乎每2人就有1人審計品質較一般會計師低，因此懲戒制度基本上具適當性。基於以上發現，本研究肯定會計師懲戒制度對審計品質提升之效用。 總而言之，懲戒制度在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益，不僅處分已違法之會計師，對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味，因此實有其存在之必要。然其制度設立之適當性，可由懲戒制度實施案例之相關研究略知一二，主管機關應參考學者研究，找出目前會計師懲戒制度效用不彰的癥結點，進行改善，以增進大眾利益，符合社會期待。 / rom USA to Taiwan, lots of frauds upset investors in recent years. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure to make decisions. However, with so many frauds broke up, accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality are being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators’ administrative power. Nevertheless, does the sanction system actually protect or enhance accountants’ audit quality as it is originally set up for？Do the punished accountants really provide lower quality on the audit they perform? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study. The study quantifies accountants’ audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals of the financial statements of their audit clients. Referring to the research model of Nagy(2005), we classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants. Moreover, the study matches each observation sample with a paired sample and analyzes whether the sanction has affected the audit quality. The study concludes that the sanction system is appropriate basically. The results approve that the accountant sanction system in Taiwan is somewhat effective on improving audit quality. In short, the purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts others. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to these findings and solve the problems that diminish the effect of the sanction system. After all, the sanction system may be able to offer investors a more matured investment environment and achieve their expectations.