本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.

有鑑於近年來伴隨著金融風暴，許多公司因經營不善而倒閉，加 上美國接二連三發生財報不實之弊案，例如：安隆案、美林證券案、 世界通訊案，以及2008 年發生的美國第4 大投資銀行雷曼兄弟因其 自行打造之衍生性金融商品－次級房貸證券風暴，而申請破產保護案 件所引發的全球金融海嘯，使得投資人為之卻步，對於證券市場信心 全失，國際組織及世界各國再度對於公司治理制度之推動，加以重 視，公司治理領域最受矚目的國際組織國際合作暨經濟發展組織陸續 提出公司治理原則。在我國亦發生有博達公司財報不實的弊案，因 此，我國也不落人後，除了已有學者探討公司治理制度之文獻，政府 及相關機構亦積極參與推動公司治理制度，初始係由台灣證券交易所 及櫃檯買賣中心經由其與上市、上櫃公司間之契約，要求公司設置獨 立董事及監察人之席次；其後經由證券交易法之修正，賦予主管機關 發佈相關命令，使得獨立董事有其法律上的地位，繼而引進審計委員 會制度，亦使我國公司法制進入另一個里程盃。 又因近年國內金融機構結構的變化，為了提高個別銀行的市佔 率，達到規模經濟，以具世界競爭力，出現金融控股公司之型態，以 及公司法等相關金融法制之發展，主要係於民國90 年制定之金融控 股公司法，亦使得傳統公司法制面臨改革與挑戰，如股東會、董事會 及監察人三權分立之原狀，為因應金融控股公司之控股性質，及多角 化經營，對於由其百分之百持股之子公司，因該子公司為一人公司， 僅有一個股東，即金融控股公司，因而由董事會代行股東會職權，似 乎瓦解了原三權分立之制衡設計；且一人公司之存在，對於其債權人 或相關利害關係人權益之保護是否足夠，亦有討論空間。 因此，擬從我國金融控股公司及其子公司之經營模式及組成結 構，論及一人公司治理相關議題，期能對於一人公司之債權人或相關 利害關係人權益之維護更佳周延。 關鍵字： 公司治理、獨立董事、審計委員會、金融控股公司、一人公司

Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.

會計師事務所的競爭是全球化的，在同質性高的服務之中，想要爭取到客戶，甚或提供較其他會計師事務所更能讓客戶滿意的服務，是其目前必須深思的問題。本研究利用企業流程資訊有機體(Process-Wide Information Organism, Tsaih et al.,2004 ) 中的分析方法論，並結合平衡計分卡(Balanced Scorecard)之觀念，針對國際型會計師事務所，將其現況描繪，並進行關鍵流程—審計業務流程的分析診斷，建立流程相關實作中之目標與績效衡量指標，以期找出其流程中可以改善之處，進而助其提升整體營運績效。

This study first examines whether equity-based compensation (i.e., stocks and options) is associated with audit committees’ oversight failures. I then examine whether this association between equity-based compensation and oversight failures is affected when firms initiate the clawback provisions in their compensation contracts. I use the likelihood of restatements, the incidence of internal control weaknesses (ICW), and earnings management measures to proxy for audit committees’ oversight failures. Based on a sample of 129 firms that voluntarily adopt the clawback provisions during 2003-09 and a matched sample created from the propensity score matching technique, I find several important results. First, larger amounts and portions of stocks and options are associated with higher restatement and ICW likelihood and greater earnings management. Second, equity-based compensation appears to harm audit committees' oversight effectiveness. However, the adoption of the clawback provisions significantly mitigates such negative effect. Finally, the clawback provisions are effective in reducing restatements, ICW, and earnings management only when these provisions are triggered by "bad faith" rather than restatements. Overall, my empirical results bear policy implications on audit committees’ compensation practice and the mandatory adoption of the clawback provisions.

本研究探討吹哨者保護制度對公司、員工與會計師產生之影響。模型結果顯示，完善的吹哨者保護制度可以提升員工的吹哨意願，進而使公司傾向誠實表達；完善的吹哨者保護制度可能增加或減少會計師的審計成本，會計師若預期公司因員工吹哨意願提高而傾向誠實表達，可降低審計成本，惟公司若不實表達且會計師並未經由查核發現時，會因為員工吹哨而產生商譽等重大損失。因此會計師於不同資本規模、客戶數量、事務所文化、員工素質等狀況下，會產生相異之審計成本變化。 / This study discusses the effect of Whistleblower protection system on firms, employees, and external auditors. Results of the models show that, a perfect Whistleblower protection system can motivate employees to blow the whistle and thus make the firm present honestly. A perfect Whistleblower protection system may increase or decrease external auditors’ audit costs. External auditors may decrease audit costs if they expect the firm will present honestly due to the enthusiasm of employees to blow the whistle, while external auditors may increase audit costs if they can’t afford the loss of goodwill when they couldn’t find the misstatement and the employee blowed the whistle. Therefore, external auditors have different changes in audit costs under different conditions, such as capital scale, number of clients, office culture and staff quality.

近年來，女權意識逐漸抬頭，女性在商業所扮演的角色也漸受重視，根據《第三期中國婦女社會地位調查主要數據報告》，中國女性的就業率及教育程度已逐年提升，女性在工作上的表現也不亞於男性。由於獨立董事與外部審計同為重要的治理機制，且在中國，獨立董事就有權對會計師事務所的聘任及審計公費的決定程序發表意見，因此，為了解性別多元化對董事會決策之影響，本研究以中國2006年-2011年的A股上市公司為研究對象，來探討女性獨立董事對會計師選擇及審計定價之影響。在控制其他變數之後，本研究發現，當公司有女性獨立董事且女性獨立董事比例越高時，越不傾向選擇國際四大或中國國內十大會計師事務所進行審計；另外，本研究也發現，女性獨立董事比例越高之公司，其審計公費越低。 / Independent director and external audit are both important corporate governance mechanisms. In China, independent directors are authorized to provide suggestions on auditor choice and the decision process of audit fees. Considering gender diversity of the board may affect the monitoring role performed by independent directors and the decision made by independent directors, we conduct a study using a sample of China A-shares over the period 2006 to 2011 to realize the relationship between female independent director and external audit, including auditor choice and audit fees. After controlling other variables, we find that corporations with female independent directors are less likely to choose Big4 and China local 10 as their audit firm than those without female independent directors. Furthermore, there is a significant negative relationship between female independent director ratio and audit fees. This may indicate that female independent directors can partly substitute the governance function of external audit and thus reduce audit fees and the possibility of choosing bigger audit firms.

金融秩序之維持基於金融機構的穩健運作，金融機構穩健運作之關鍵來自內部控制制度的落實，而此一制度係建構在公司治理—強化經營者責任上。2013年底，我國公司治理機制一項重大變革為審計委員會之設置要求。因此本研究即探討審計委員會與內部控制缺失之關聯性。以2013年至2015年上市櫃金融控股公司（包含其銀行和保險子公司）以及上市櫃和興櫃的銀行及保險公司為研究對象。 本研究發現：審計委員會與內部控制缺失具統計上的顯著關聯性。審計委員會的設立與內部控制缺失呈顯著負相關；監督者（獨立董監事及審計委員會成員）會計或財務專業的比例，並未與內部控制缺失成顯著負相關，拆出分獨立董監事和審計委員會兩項不同監督機制，其成員會計或財務專業的比例與內部控制缺失也並未呈現顯著的負相關；金融控股母公司的獨立董事同時兼任子公司獨立董事，則與較多的裁罰件數成顯著正相關。另外研究也發現，部分會計師事務所與金融業者內部控制缺失呈顯著的負相關。 綜上結果隱含以下推論：審計委員會監督功能發揮，將幫助金融業者減少內部控制缺失的發生，不過獨立董事在同一金控體系兼任多家公司獨立董事的情形，並未有較佳的監督效果出現。由於我國金融業者發生的內部控制缺失類型多樣，因此在審計委員的安排上，除了會計或財務專業的審計委員，也可廣納其他專業的專家學者擔任，另外會計師事務所也可扮演完善內部控制制度的一個輔助角色。 / To find out the effect of the audit committee on internal control, this study examines the association between audit committees and internal control deficiencies.The samples are listed financial holding companies including their bank and insurance subsidiaries, bank, and insurance companies in TWSE and OTC in Taiwan over the period from 2013 to 2015. I find that the audit committees are negatively associated with the internal control deficiencies. However, there is no association between the audit committees of accounting or financial expertise and internal control deficiencies. Besides, I find that the circumstances that the independent directors of the financial holding parent companies also serve as an independent directors of the subsidiaries are positively associated with more incidences of penalty cases. Taken together, the empirical result indicates the association between the audit committees and internal control deficiencies in Taiwan financial industry.

面對全球性之金融風暴危機對投資人與金融市場帶來劇烈的影響，各界開始呼籲查核報告應提供閱表者更多主要企業經營風險及不確定資訊，而英國為了因應國際審計觀念轉變的趨勢，參考國際審計準則自訂ISA 700 (UK and Ireland)以改善傳統查核報告型態未能揭露足夠查核相關資訊之缺點。新式查核報告中影響層面最廣的部分即為關鍵查核事項(key audit matter)之說明，故本研究以裁量性應計項目與非保守會計師查核意見做為審計品質之代理變數，探討關鍵查核事項與會計師審計品質水準間之關聯性。研究結果顯示，關鍵查核事項之揭露能降低管理者透過裁量性應計項目美化財務報表之可能性，亦即提升審計品質水準；但在非保守會計師查核意見代理變數項下，並未發現增加關鍵查核事項段落能影響會計師出具非保守查核意見之決策；另外，本研究亦未發現關鍵查核事項揭露數量與審計品質水準之正向關聯性。

本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。 研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015. Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions. The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.