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「論董事法律上地位與權限」盧俊誠, LU, JUM-CHEN Unknown Date (has links)
本論文一冊,約十二萬言,共分六章,茲扼要說明內容:
第一章:「緒論」:就本論文之研究動機及研究方法、範圍,加以說明及界定。
第二章:「經營判斷法則之背景及功能」:說明法則之起源,立論背景及對公司經營
所產生之功能。
第三章:「美國法上傳統經營判斷法則之適用」:分析評述美國法上如何適用經營判
斷法則來規範董事之行為及其責任之界定。及該法則之適用範圍。
第四章:「日本法上經營判斷法則之適用」:說明日本法上該法則之運用情形,同時
就我國法上應如何適用此法則加以評析。
第五章:「股東代表訴訟與經營判斷法則」:說明美國法如何利用攻擊性之經營判斷
法則經止代表訴訟,並評析此用法於我國適用之否行性。
第六章:「結論」:提供我國法院利用經營判斷法則審查董事行為之方法
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企業併購下目標公司董事之受任人義務 / The fiduciary duty of the directors under mergers and acquisitions林芝君 Unknown Date (has links)
現代公司走向公開發行後,公司由廣大而分散的投資股東所有,投資股東雖擁有公司所有權,卻無多餘的心力與能力去參與公司經營,公司經營交由專業經營者,於是產生企業經營與所有分離之情況,在企業經營與所有分離下,股東與經營者間乃出現代理問題,為解決代理問題,本人勢必要付出代理成本,近年來十分熱門的公司治理議題亦致力於降低代理成本問題,並從董事責任之加強著手,故而建立與釐清董事之受任人義務內涵,乃一重要的課題。
董事之受任人義務內涵,可分為注意義務與忠實義務兩個子義務,前者主要著重於董事之行為標準,後者則是關於董事與公司間有利益衝突時,董事應以公司利益為先之義務。本文先就美國相關規定分析介紹,再進一步探討我國公司法就董事受任人義務規範之不足之處,以提出相關建議。接著本文就董事對股東揭露義務將特予介紹,蓋股東必須在充足資訊揭露下才能做出最適的決定,而董事不僅是能以最低成本提供股東資訊者,且從董事與股東之受託人關係觀之,亦可作為應為股東利益最大化而提供資訊之合理性基礎。
董事相關受任人義務內涵在併購過程中是否會有所不同,亦為本文關注之重點,故區分為合意併購與敵意併購兩種情況加以分析。合意併購時著重於探討董事如何於併購過程中為公司及股東爭取最佳的利益,並藉由分析我國實務判決提出若干建議。敵意併購時則著重分析目標公司董事採行之防禦措施適法性,期能藉由參考美國實務上審查標準,將來可引用作為我國處理相關案例之一套準據。 / When corporations go public, a large number of investment shareholders who separate around everywhere own the corporation. Because shareholders don’t have enough time and talent to corporate the company, they deliver the works to professional managers. It appears “Separation of business and all”. At the same time, there come conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent, which called agency problems. In order to produce the agency problems, the principal has to pay for some costs which called agency costs. Recently, the popular corporate governance issue has emphasized the importance of the liabilities of the directors. Hence, to figure out how to build directors’ responsibilities and to know the content of fiduciary duty of the directors is a significant issue.
Fiduciary duty of the directors consists of two sub content: duty of care and duty of loyalty. The former focuses on the level of attention of the directors take when they conduct. And the later focuses on when it faces the conflicts of interest between the company and the directors, the directors should take the company’s interest for priority. In this paper, I try to analysis the lack of the fiduciary duty standard in our country through comparing the U.S relevant standard, and to give some personal suggestion. Then I want to introduce the obligation of disclose of the directors. Because the shareholders need plenty of information to help them making informed decisions. Usually the directors can provide information under relatively low cost, and the fiduciary relationship between the directors and the shareholders gives a good reason to provide any necessary information to improve the shareholders’ best interest.
If the fiduciary duty of the directors would be different during the takeover process is also what this paper wants to emphasize. In this paper I divided takeover into merger agreement and hostile takeover, and discuss under these two kind of takeover how should the directors conduct to meet the duty. When talking about merger agreement I focus on how the directors to seek for the best interest of the company and the shareholders during the whole merger course. And I try to give some suggestion through discussing one court judgment. Finally, when talking about hostile takeover I will emphasize on the anti-takeover conducts which the directors make, and try to analysis these conducts’ legality. Meanwhile I hope that with critiques and dissertations from American scholars and experts as reference can provide our court some useful and specific criterion in the future.
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董事受託義務與經營判斷法則之研究 / A study on the Fiduciary Duty and the Business Judgment Rule劉耀文, Liu, Yao Wen Unknown Date (has links)
近年來,國際經濟危機層出不窮,產生各式各樣之公司治理問題;全球化之企業經營模式的崛起與迅速發展,企業之經營從國內走向國際,使得公司治理成為國際性之重要議題,美國之公司治理模式的移植亦於世界各國蔚為風潮。
公司治理之架構下,鑑於所有權與經營權分離原則,掌握公司經營權限之董事係公司核心,為避免擴大董事之經營權限的同時,會損及公司與股東之利益,美國法對於董事乃課以受託義務,其內涵包含忠實義務、注意義務與善意義務。然基於商業環境詭譎多變且有限司法審查能力,如董事必須為做出失誤經營決策負擔法律責任,將造成具有能力之人不願意擔任董事而不利於經濟社會之發展,故美國法院判決乃發展出經營判斷法則。經營判斷法則係推定董事係立於充分資訊、出於善意且誠實確信其係為公司之最佳利益,當原告主張董事違反受託義務時,應負有先行舉證證明董事行為不符合經營判斷法則之構成要件。
我國公司法第23條係忠實義務與注意義務之規定,惟對於經營判斷法則尚無明文規範,學說見解對於我國是否應引進經營判斷法則仍有爭議,法院實務雖早已援用經營判斷法則作為公司經營者之責任標準,卻存在諸多誤解導致誤將該法則視為行為標準。因此,似有必要重新審視經營判斷法則之定位,故本文嘗試提出對於經營判斷法則於我國之應用的見解與省思。然經營判斷法則與我國現有法制應如何相互融合仍有待立法配合與後續觀察。 / In recent years, the world has been engulfed by international economic crises, resulting in a wide range of corporate governance matters. The rise and rapid development of the global business model has made the management of enterprises go from a single country toward the whole world, making corporate governance an important international issue. The transplantation of corporate governance of America legal model has emerged as a global trend.
Under the framework of corporate governance and in view of the principle of separation of ownership and control, the directors empowered decision-making authority are the core of the company. To avoid the expanding of directors’ decision-making authority and protect the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders, the directors has fiduciary duty which includes duty of loyalty, duty of care and duty of good faith. However, based on the complexity of the business environment and the limit of the capability of the judicial review, if the directors burden the responsibility for making wrong decisions will make capable people unwell to be directors and affect the development of the economy. The business judgment rule is the presumption that in making decisions not involving self-interest and self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best interest.
Article 23 of Taiwan Company Act is the regulation of duty of loyalty and duty of care. However, the business judgment rule is not regulated in Taiwan Company Act. The opinion of whether the business judgment rule should be introduced to Taiwan is still controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the position of the business judgment rule in Taiwan legal structure and this article attempts to provide points of view in the issue. Last but not least, the interaction of business judgment rule and Taiwan legal structure still needs the cooperation of the legislation and following observation.
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論股份有限公司經營者與公司間利益衝突交易—以關係人交易為核心吳姿璉, Wu, Tzu-Lien Unknown Date (has links)
No description available.
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敵意併購中目標公司的董事義務蔡景聖 Unknown Date (has links)
併購是企業外部成長的主要方式,但不是每個併購活動都是兩廂情願的,因此,當併購者違反被併購者的意願而為併購行為時,敵意併購就此產生。敵意併購所採取最主要的方式,即為公開收購制度,故本文先介紹歐美主要國家的公開收購制度,再檢視我國現行法下公開收購制度,以瞭解現行公開收購制度的利弊得失。
其次,針對敵意併購的防禦,美國法制上已發展出一系列的反併購法,這些法制雖然有些被聯邦法院宣告違憲,但仍有符合憲法規範者,迄今,已發展到第三代的反併購法。除此之外,企業在實務上也開始發展出各式各樣的防禦措施,有的是在敵意併購者出現前就事先準備,有的是在敵意併購者出現後才緊急採用,無論如何,這些防禦措施在敵意併購盛行的美國,也相對應的發展成熟。然而,在敵意併購還在萌芽階段的我國而言,由於法律的規範,並不是所有的防禦措施皆符合我國法律。更甚者,在現行法的規範下,有些防禦措施雖然符合我國法規範,但卻受到其他的限制而實用性甚低,在現行規範下幾乎沒有行使的空間,因此,本文試探究美國法上幾種基本的防禦措施在我國法上的可行性,期望能獲悉各種防禦措施在我國法上的合法性及可能性。
再者,需先瞭解公司法第二十三條第一項課與董事受任人義務之內涵。公司法對於忠實義務規範的較為具體,即董事在有利益衝突時,需以公司的利益為優先考量,同時又有具體的行為規範,例如公司法第二0六條準用第一七八條利害董事的迴避、第二二三條監察人代董事為行為、第二0九條董事競業禁止、第一九六條董事報酬等具體規範。相較於此,董事的注意義務僅抽象的要求董事在處理公司事務時,需要盡善良管理人的注意義務。然而,對於善良管理人的注意義務內涵為何,則須待法院在具體個案中形成。針對受任人義務,英美法上發展出經營判斷法則,針對董事對公司之經營判斷事項為誠信、無利益衝突、無濫用裁量權、必盡到合理注意時,推定董事之決策為適法,法院不再對該經營判斷事項為事後的審查。
美國法上,在審查目標公司的董事義務時區分為:主要目的審查、Unocal雙叉審查、Revlon案審查標準、Blasius案審查標準及股東外利害關係人利益權衡標準。在我國企業併購法第五條、第六條並沒有規範到目標公司的董事義務,但上開外國標準及企業併購法對董事決策時要求的行為規範,可以做為我國將來立法時的參考。在現行法未規範的情形下,本文認為公司法中未規定的業務決策,未必皆應依照公司法第二0九條規定由董事會決策;並且,公司重大事項應區分為提案權及決策權,而將防禦措施的提案權交由董事會,並將防禦措施的決策權交由股東會決定。董事會在股東會授權下,決定行使何種防禦措施,以迅速、機密之手段達到防禦的目的。因此,董事在提案前需盡到調查之能事,確認敵意併購的結果對公司不利,在股東會同意防禦行為時,所採取的防禦措施應優先保障股東最大利益,以盡目標公司的董事義務。
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美國母子公司合併子公司少數股東保護之研究—兼評台灣實務案例與相關規範設計之缺憾盧曉彥, Lu, Hsiao-Yen Unknown Date (has links)
本文研究重點係母子公司合併時子公司少數股東權益保障的爭議問題,並嘗試從美國法之觀點檢討我國母子公司合併案例與相關之規範設計。
從美國德拉瓦州法院對於母子公司合併規範模式之演變,應可察覺一國法制總體面因素的變化,以及合併基礎法制變遷,對於母子公司合併規範設計之影響。總體面因素諸如當代公共政策的游移、投資人與市場周邊機制之成熟度、公司內部治理機制的健全、社會思潮的偏向等;合併基礎法制幾個重大變遷,包括可決合併門檻多數決原則之確立、簡易以及制式現金逐出合併之陸續完成立法等,在在都影響了法院對於母子公司合併之規範態度。法院的態度變化,也顯現在子公司少數股東所擁有之兩項救濟,亦即股份收買請求權以及違反受任人義務訴訟救濟,在近一世紀以來,其起初係平行發展、繼而相互競爭至目前走向調和之變遷過程。而在過程中,違反受任人義務的內涵與課責標準一直持續變化,連帶地也影響股份收買請求權理論基礎的汰換、調整與新生。
德拉瓦州法院對於母子公司合併的處理方式,是區分簡易合併與制式合併而適用不同的規範模式。制式合併係適用「財產法則」概念下之常規交易審查模式,違反常規交易標準即屬違反受任人義務;簡易合併則因為協商成本太高,所以適用「補償法則」,以股份收買請求權為唯一救濟。此項規範模式,很顯然地是一種妥協之處理方式。尤其股份收買請求權之相關配套設計,包括評價得否採計合併綜效、救濟成本之負擔方式以及程序障礙設計猶存諸多問題,採取「補償法則」背後的考量因素或許正是為便利母公司執行合併。
從美國德拉瓦州公司法母子公司合併規範設計之歷史演變,比較我國目前現階段的母子公司合併規範之設計,大體說來,由於我國公司法與企業併購法之規範設計不利於子公司與母公司進行協商、再加上董事以及控制股東(亦即母公司)對於子公司之股東並無直接負受任人義務,在子公司股東無法對於不公平的合併對價,直接請求董事或母公司負擔損害賠償責任的情況下,將很難期待子公司的董事會盡力為子公司少數股東,向母公司爭取公平的合併對價。
換言之,由於我國受任人義務體系之不完備,少數股東縱然認為合併對價涉及不公情事,似乎也祇能依照民法侵權行為之規定,向董事或母公司請求損害賠償。按照民法第一八四條之規定,其舉證責任門檻事實上即相當於美國法對於簡易合併場合之規範。亦即是說,我國法似乎並無特別針對母子公司合併此項具有利益衝突之重大交易,提出任何有別於常規交易之差異規範,此即導致子公司少數股東僅能按照一般侵權行為之規範,請求母公司或董事負擔損害賠償責任,這對於少數股東而言,自是甚為不利。
短期而言,從經濟政策上係鼓勵合併,抑或從我國公司內部治理機制以及市場機制尚未健全發展至足以提供子公司相當之協商力量以與母公司抗衡的角度,我國似乎都無法在仿效美國於制式合併場合,建立偏向「財產法則」概念下之「近似常規交易協商模式」。因此,現階段或應思考從改善我國股份收買請求權設計開始著手。對此,ALI Principles與RMBCA有關股份收買請求權設計之立法例,我國應擇其優而加以援用。
長期而言,按照我國現階段的規範趨勢,似乎係在仿效美國法制,逐漸朝向市場導向之公司治理機制(market-oriented style of corporate governance),因此持續開拓我國資本市場的深度與廣度,以及建立適合於我國公司生態的公司內部治理機制,都將是繼續努力的目標。倘若未來我國市場之周邊機制與公司內部治理機制皆能發揮適當的治理功能,前述偏重於「補償法則」概念下規範模式之股份收買請求權設計,即有必要加以調整,以避免美國現階段在現金逐出合併場合所發生之「規範重疊」(regulation overlap)問題。
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員工持股計畫中受任人義務之研究 / A study of fiduciary duty under employee stock ownership plan李松諺 Unknown Date (has links)
員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創,在美國已行之多年,廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去,立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種,使員工必須長期持有股票,直到退休。然而在實務運作上,員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者,某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響,但在現行法制下,只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。
在台灣,員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用,但是發展了將近20年,只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位,也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多,但相對地也減低許多代理成本,至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題,若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度,使員工持股計畫的規模擴大,員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘,並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地,參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後,也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端,未雨綢繆。本文相信,一個有效率的員工持股計畫,可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information.
ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。I believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth.
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