Au cours de cette étude, nous avons cherché à déterminer l’implication de Washington dans la sécurité de l’Indonésie. Nous nous sommes demandé comment les États-Unis pouvaient revenir dans le jeu politico-sécuritaire indonésien par le biais d’une cause devenue commune, la sécurité maritime. Après avoir examiné l’historique de la relation de l’Indonésie avec l’élément maritime et l’émergence de menaces liées au domaine maritime, nous avons conclu que la sécurisation du domaine maritime apparaît alors comme un leitmotiv sécuritaire commun pour Washington et Jakarta. Confrontée aux errements de la coopération régionale et aux difficultés relatives à sa géographie et à son déficit capacitaire, la sécurisation du domaine maritime indonésien passe donc par l’implication d’un acteur extérieur. En réussissant à convaincre leurs homologues de Jakarta de la nécessité de sécuriser le domaine maritime, les hommes et femmes du Ministère de la Défense, du Département d’État et des administrations américaines ont permis à Washington de revenir dans le jeu sécuritaire indonésien par le biais d’une coopération devenue essentielle pour les deux partenaires. / In this study, we tried to determine the exact level of involvement of Washington in Indonesia’s security. We wondered how United States could go back in Indonesian political and security games through a common cause, maritime security.. After considering indonesian maritime history and the rise of threats to maritime domain, we concluded that the securitisation of maritime realm appears as a security leitmotiv for both Washington and Jakarta. Facing with the vagaries of regional cooperation and with difficulties related to the archipelagic geography of the country and the lack of capacity, securising indonesian maritime domain requires the involvement of an external actor. By succeeding in persuading their counterparts in Jakarta of the necessity of securing the maritime domain, men and women of the U.S. Department of Defense, State Department and other agencies have allowed Washington to be back into Indonesia’s security game through an all-out cooperation.

Au cours de cette étude, nous avons cherché  à déterminer le niveau et les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne. Nous nous sommes demandés si la Corée du Sud ne pourrait pas se présenter comme un État pivot capable de faire le lien entre des états ou des partenaires antagonistes, aussi bien en Asie du Nord-Est qu’en Asie du Sud-Est. Aussi après avoir examiné les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne nous avons conclu que le pays était une puissance moyenne traditionnelle n’ayant pas encore acquis le statut de puissance régionale et qu’en ce sens elle constituait une puissance atypique. Confrontée aux trois grandes puissances que sont la Chine, les Etats-Unis et le Japon, la Corée du Sud ne dispose que d’une marge de manœuvre très étroite pour affirmer sa présence internationale. Le développement de sa présence en Asie du Sud-Est est donc devenu en l’espace de quelques années un impératif de sa politique étrangère du pays. A l’instar du Japon d’après-guerre, le Sud-Est asiatique constitue une aire d’apprentissage privilégiée pour la diplomatie sud-coréenne et pour son action extérieure. / In this study, we tried to determine the exact level and means of the South Korean power. We wondered if South Korea could present itself as a pivotal state that is able to bridge antagonistic partners, both in Northeast and Southeast Asia. After considering the aspects of the South Korean power we concluded that the country is a traditional middle size power that has not yet acquired the status of regional power. In that sense the country is an untypical power. Facing three major powers such as China, the United States and Japan, South Korea has only a very narrow latitude to establish its international presence. Therefore developing its presence in Southeast Asia has become in just a few years an priority of its foreign Policy. For South Korea Southeast Asia is a privileged place where to learn and to develop its own external action, like it was for the post war Japan. Eventually, a unified Korea with the North Korean nuclear arsenal could weigh as much as demographically declining Japan. However as long as the anachronism of the separation will remain, South Korea will continue to grow alone regionally and in the international stage and will seek for external alliances.

Dès le sixième siècle avant J.-C. l’homme a été défini comme un « être d’une certaine hauteur, dont la forme de la main est différente de celle du pied, qui possède des cheveux et des dents, et qui peut se déplacer vite et debout ». Il prit alors deux formes de statut : celui de ren pour désigner un homme de vertu ou qui exerce une fonction publique ou privée ; et celui de min pour désigner celui qui n’exerce aucune fonction publique. La société chinoise s’est construite sur cette séparation : les ren, encadré par leur vertu, doivent rendre service aux min et à la société ; et les min disposent de certains droits fondamentaux vis-à-vis des ren. De ce fait, la Chine traditionnelle a mis en place deux mécanismes de protection de ceux-ci : la requête individuelle que les min peuvent utiliser pour valoir leurs droits fondamentaux contre des actes ou des hommes public qui leur ont porté atteinte, et le zuiji zhao par lequel les empereurs s’auto-punissent. Avec le temps, trois formes du contrôle de conformité des actes publics ont été successivement mise en place. A la fin de la dynastie des Qing les droits humains fondamentaux chinois seront confrontés aux droits de l'homme occidentaux auxquels les chinois s’identifièrent parce qu’ils correspondaient à leur tradition temporairement écartée. Trois réformes politico-juridiques principales furent engagées successivement par les Chinois afin de la rétablir et de la concilier avec les théories et les expériences occidentales dans ce domaine. Le point culminant de cette rencontre fut la participation chinoise àl’élaboration de la DUDH et la nomination de son représentant comme vice-président de son comité d’élaboration. En 1949 la République populaire de Chine remplaça la République de Chine. Dans un premier temps ses dirigeants se montrèrent assez sensibles aux droits de l'homme et à leur protection ; mais la Révolution culturelle anéantit cette démarche, créant une situation dont la Chine d’aujourd’hui souffre encore. Ces dernières années, les droits de l'homme connaissent en Chine une forme de renaissance qui se traduit dans les domaines législatif, éducatif, administratif et judiciaire. Le caractère encourageant et constructif de ce mouvement, qui s’appuie sur les exemples étrangers et sur certains progrès régionaux, mais qui se fonde sur les traditions principalement confucéennes chinoises, laisse envisager une protection des droits de l’homme dans le pays analogue à celle qui est garantie dans les pays les plus avancés. / The concept of human being was defined in China since the sixth century B.C. as "a living organism which has a certain height, its hands are different from its feet,covered by hair and has developed teeth, capable of moving quickly in an uprightposture". Since then, two categories of men were defined: the ren, to designate a virtuous man or somebody who xercises public or private functions; and the min, to designate men who have no public power. The Chinese society was built on thisdistinction: the ren, known by their virtuosity, might offer their services to the min and the society itself, and the min have some fundamental rights towards ren population. For that reason, ancient China set up two protection mechanisms: min’sindividual queries to request the respect of their fundamental rights against actions from public agents, and the zuiji zhao, mechanism used by the emperors to punish themselves. Over time, three compliance control mechanisms were developed. By the end of the Qing Dynasty, this Chinese approach to fundamental human rights was compared to Western approach to human rights by the Chinese population, who recognized themselves in the western approach, following the disturbance in the Chinese tradition led by the Manchu. For the re-establishment of Chinese tradition, three main political and legal reforms were carried out by the Chinese in order to restore their tradition, abandoned by the Manchus, and to conciliate Western theories and experiences with Chinese approach. A turning point was achieved with thecontribution of China in the development of UDHR, and the nomination of the Chinese representative as vice president of the redaction committee.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China???s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China-Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government???s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ???fit??? between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature.

Le Vietnam du Doi Moi poursuit sa libéralisation économique tout en consolidant le système politique hérité du marxisme-léninisme. Ce paradoxe influence considérablement son processus d'intégration économique internationale et se manifeste particulièrement dans le commerce des services. La manière dans laquelle le Vietnam reconnaît le principe de non-discrimination via les traités bilatéraux, plurilatéraux et multilatéraux, tant sous l'angle du commerce des services que sous l'angle de l'investissement, le prouve. Par ailleurs, dans le souci d'accélérer le développement économique, d'importantes réformes relatives au droit des affaires ont supprimé des discriminations substantielles entre les opérateurs économiques. Cependant, en raison de l'insuffisance de l'adapatation structurelle, la mise en oeuvre du principe de non-discrimination pose toujours de nombreuses difficultés. / Vietnam of Doi Moi pursues economic liberalization while strengthening the political system initiated from Marxism-Leninism. This paradox significantly influences its international economic integration process and manifests itself especially in the domain of trade in services. This is demonstrated by the manner in which Vietnam recognizes the principle of non-discrimination, through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral agreements, in trade in services as well as in investements. Besides, in order to accelerate economic development, important reforms on business law have removed substancial discriminations between economic operators. However, the insufficient ajustement on structural matters still poses many problems for the implementation of the principle of non-discrimonation.

本研究試圖將雙邊關係導入區域整合的解釋範疇，主要探討東南亞國家之間雙邊互動關係的解釋因素，以及東協對應成員國間衝突本質的制度建構，從而推進區域合作的進程。 從理論文獻與經驗事件，本研究運用「雙邊層次理論」（dyadic level theories）解釋東南亞國家間的互動現象，選擇「相對權力」、「軍事實力」、「政體類型」、「貿易互賴」、「經濟發展」作為開發中國家雙邊關係的解釋變數，用以理解東協成員國走向衝突與合作的選擇，並對「衝突－合作」的理論命題進行檢驗，據以提出適用於東協國家雙邊互動變異的解釋模式。本研究主張，開發中區域內雙邊關係受到國家屬性與相對特質的影響，爰須從個別國家互動交往的變遷軌跡予以觀察，其解釋變數將持續影響未來的整合道路。 在理論檢證的操作上，本研究參照「事件資料分析」（event-data analysis）方法，設計「雙邊互動的衝突—整合量表」（the Conflict-Integration Continuum, CIC），蒐集自1990年至2012年的「時間序列與橫斷面資料」（TSCS），並建置「東協成員國雙邊互動關係時間序列資料庫」（ASEAN-TSCS Data set）。透過資料庫分析和預測模型之建構，本研究釐清東協雙邊關係變異的解釋因素，並確認對於開發中國家間互動關係的影響關係。 為周延地理解東南亞次區域體系中單元層次（國家間互動）與整體層次（東協整合）的互動連結，本研究對東協歷年構建的安全制度與爭端解決機制進行文本分析，擇取區域內各組雙邊關係進行案例研究。透過對東協國家相對特質與互動事件的比較，進一步檢證次體系內國家間互動行為的關聯特徵，本研究期能為東南亞的整合研究提供一種理論啟示。 / This study aims to interpret regional integration through the lens of bilateral relations. It primarily addresses the factors in bilateral interactions between the Southeast Asian nations and delves into the process in which the ASEAN put forth an architecture to resolve the inherent conflicts between its member states to further promote regional cooperation. Based on theoretical literatures and historical events, this study uses dyadic-level theories to explain interactions among the Southeast Asian countries, chooses “Relative Power,” “Military Capability,” “Regime Types,” “Trade Interdependence,” and “Economic Development” as explanatory variables for bilateral relations between developing countries in this region for the purpose of understanding the choices made by the ASEAN member states towards either conflict or cooperation, and inspects the theoretical proposition of “conflict-cooperation” so as to put forth an explanatory model applicable for changes in the bilateral interactions between the ASEAN countries. The author argues that the bilateral relations in a developing region are not only influenced by the objective characteristics of each country, but also the relative relation to other countries. Therefore, observing the interactions between each individual country to others is required. The independent valuables are also dynamically influencing the approach of integration in the future. In terms of theoretical validation, a conflict-integration continuum (CIC) is designed for this paper with reference to event-data analysis approach, time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data between 1990 and 2012 is collected, and an ASEAN-TSCS data set is established. By means of database analysis and construction of a prediction model, this research clarifies the explanatory factors for changes in bilateral relations between ASEAN countries and determines the effects that they have on interactions among developing countries. For the purpose of comprehensively understanding interactive linkages between the unit level (interactions amongst nations) and the overall level (ASEAN integration) in the Southeast Asia sub-regional system, this paper performs a text analysis on security regimes and dispute settlement mechanisms constructed by the ASEAN over the years and selects bilateral relations of pairs in the region as case studies. In addition to the data-driven analysis above, comprehensive knowledge of the interactive linkages between individual country and the overall ASEAN are also required. Therefore, a text analysis on security regimes and dispute settlement mechanisms constructed by the ASEAN is also conducted in this thesis. Several pairs of countries are used as case studies to investigate the bilateral relations in this region. By comparing relative qualities and interactional events of ASEAN countries, correlative features of interactions among the countries in the subsystem are further validated, as such, this paper aims to provide a theoretical revelation for research on the integration of Southeast Asia.

近年來區域經濟整合風潮日漸蓬勃發展，十餘年前在中國大陸倡議下，與東協共組「中國－東協自由貿易區」。成立後該自貿區內擁有19億人口，區域生產總值近6兆美元，貿易總額達4.5兆美元，也是全球人口最多的自由貿易區。在雙邊歷經多年談判，即將正式成立自由貿易區的時點上，印尼卻發聲要求延遲實施「中國－東協自由貿易協定」（CAFTA），便使人感到疑惑與不解。究竟東協各國對於區域經濟整合的態度為何？印尼政府和企業是否做好了產業衝擊的評估報告，並提出因應之道？ 　　印尼國內自2009年中起感受到自貿區成立後將對國內產業帶來巨大衝擊，紛紛透過媒體和國會等管道，要求印尼政府暫緩全面實施零關稅。印尼政府亦評估將有228項產品會受到中國大陸產品的嚴重衝擊，而向東協秘書處遞函要求重新協商。嗣後自身考量重新協商曠日廢時、耗費大量勞力物力又緩不濟急，轉而尋求與中國大陸直接對話，雙邊就貨品關稅調降、貿易不均衡的處理方式及促進兩國產業合作等進行討論，最終獲得七項共識，其中中國大陸承諾當貿易不均衡的情況發生時，出超國將有義務增加對入超國的進口，並且協助對方產品的行銷推廣。印尼政府與中國大陸的直接對話所獲得的共識，普遍得到印尼國內的肯定，讓先前爭議問題暫時平歇。然印尼國內更關注協議的實際運作狀況，能否真正發揮效用，亦有待時間的考驗。 　　綜觀此次爭議，印尼官方和民間過往忽視產業的升級和轉型、未提前做好自貿區的因應準備，導致臨屆成立之日，才急的像熱鍋上的螞蟻。印尼擁有豐富的自然資源及充沛的勞動力，可說是未來經濟發展的耀眼新星，如能把握自貿區成立後的契機，結合中國大陸的技術及資金，雙邊進行優勢產業互補合作，兩國未來的發展將無可限量。2015年TPP及RCEP即將成立，屆時中國大陸、東協都將扮演更重要的角色，印尼如能做好完善的準備，相信將能乘著兩大區域貿易組織的翅膀，飛向更璀璨耀眼的明天。

軟權力等同一國之「吸引力」，Joseph S. Nye, Jr.解釋這種吸引力作為無形的概念，當雙方共用「共通價值」或責任義務，並使他方支持或願意為這些價值努力時，則謂軟權力發揮了作用。Nye更進一步談到，一國外交政策可透過合法性（legitimacy）與道德權威（moral authority）來展現軟權力，合法性意指為制度，而道德權威為一國外交手段與風格予以人的觀感。本文以Nye提出的軟權力定義，並從外交政策的角度研究冷戰後中國對東協如何運用軟權力、其目的為何、細節性的實踐內涵、以及中國軟權力得到怎樣的回饋與效果。 事實上，中國對軟權力的定義受到冷戰時期與東協交往經驗影響，與Nye的定義有所出入。中國認為即使拉攏東協的手段多偏向物質性的貿易投資、金援等合作方式，但是「互利」既為中國與東協雙方皆提倡的「共通價值」，則今日東協的民調或官員呈現的好感，亦可謂中國對東協運用之軟權力發生了作用。尤其中國在冷戰後江澤民、胡錦濤兩位領導人對東協積極提倡「新安全觀」、「和諧世界」等政策，呈現了中國展現其軟權力以追求崛起目標的戰略意圖，並且在國際組織的參與、國際法與聯合聲明的簽訂、公共與公民外交、東亞金融風暴等東協政經危機應對上給予東協即時的支持與協助，令東協與中國於冷戰後呈現未曾的友好關係，中國對東協運用軟權力其努力與成果可見一般。 然而中國對東協這樣仍深度建立在物質往來的軟權力，其未來發展亦受到本文從Nye提出無形的軟權力觀點進行檢視。本文提出中國軟權力應摒棄軟權力全然建立在硬權力之上的謬思，加強與東協的理念對話，並進一步發展一套能為國際社會廣泛認同之政治價值或規範，以此中國對東協軟權力或中國整體的軟權力才有化停滯為前進的動力。 / Soft Power is an attractive power of one state. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. explains the attraction as an invisible concept which makes both sides enjoy the “shared value,” and push one party to go along with the other’s purpose, then, the soft power is functional. Moreover, soft power can perform through its benign foreign policies when they seen as legitimate and having moral authority. Legitimacy means the institutions, and moral authority indicates the impression stirred by the tactics or the styles of foreign policies. This study adopts Nye’s soft power hypothesis as a framework to research the way China operates its soft power toward ASEAN, and the ultimate goal and effects it hopes to reach. In fact, China’s soft power is affected by the experiences engaging with ASEAN during the Cold War. China manipulates its practical trades, functional aids, and investments, and it also uses the mutual benefits as a token to form the “shared value” with ASEAN, that time, the soft power works automatically. Still other relevant evidences present as announcement from China’s leaders toward ASEAN, memberships in international organizations, obedience to international laws, aids on public and civil diplomacy, and well-known help to 1997 East Asia financial storm, etc. All of these proper supports lead to ASEAN’s appreciation, and reflect china’s soft power has gained the harvest. Even though China’s soft power toward ASEAN makes its own sense by now, in the long run, China’s soft power may sap due to its deviation from Nye’s definition. This study concludes that China should banish the fallacy which soft power completely roots in the foundation of hard power, and should improve the communication with ASEAN, then should develop its universal political values confirmed by the international society at last. Only in that approach can transform its soft power into a whole new tool, and can step forward to the next era.

Les pays d'Asie du Sud-Est ont, très tôt dans leur période post-coloniale, envisagé de se regrouper pour former une organisation régionale : l’Association des nations d’Asie du Sud-Est, dénommée l’ANASE ou, plus communément appelée par son sigle anglais, ASEAN. En nous appuyant sur l’exemple de l’ASEAN, nous aborderons le concept d’intégration régionale économique sous son angle juridique, en cherchant notamment à le distinguer des vocables contigus de régionalisme, régionalisation ou encore de coopération économique. Quelles sont les caractéristiques d'une intégration régionale? Ses manifestations? En dépit de l'hétérogénéité des organisations régionales ayant pour objectif de construire une intégration économique dans une région donnée, quels sont les points communs qu’un juriste peut observer? Comment décrypter l’ASEAN grâce au processus d’intégration économique qu’elle conduit et à la stratégie qu’elle a choisie? Quelles sont ses particularités? Quels défis doit-elle relever pour atteindre ses objectifs d’intégration à travers les trois dimensions communautaires : économique, politico-sécuritaire et socio-culturelle? De quels soutiens externes l’ASEAN peut-elle bénéficier pour renforcer son processus d’intégration régionale ? Le rapprochement entre pays d’Asie du Sud-Est s’appuie sur l’intergouvernementalité et la sauvegarde absolue de la souveraineté de ses Etats membres qui conduisent à privilégier le recours au droit souple plutôt qu’au droit dur dans leur production normative. L’approche adoptée prendra soin de se différencier de celles de l'économiste, du politiste ou du spécialiste des relations internationales et ouvrira sur des points de vue extra-européens. Les spécificités de l’ASEAN et sa dimension interne seront abordées dans un premier temps, tandis que la seconde partie couvrira la dynamique externe de l’intégration économique de l’ASEAN à partir d’un choix sélectif de partenariats (UE, accords de libre-échange, Banque asiatique du développement, APEC). / The countries located in Southeast Asia have, very soon, during the postcolonial period, foreseen to regroup to forming a regional organization named “ASEAN” (Association of nations of Southeast Asia). We would like to address the concept of economic regional integration from a legal perspective based on the example of ASEAN. This will in particular lead us to distinguish such a concept with other terms similar or very closed, such as regionalism, regionalization and economic cooperation. What are the features of regional integration? What are its manifestations? Despite all the diversity of regional organizations the purpose of which is to build an economic integration within a specific region, what are the common features that a lawyer can observe? How to reveal the ASEAN regional organization through the economic integration process it has launched and strategies chosen by it? What are its peculiarities? What are the challenges it has to face to achieve its integration goals through the following three dimensions: the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Political &Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community? What external support can ASEAN receive to strengthen its regional integration process? Southeast Asian countries look for a closer proximity between themselves on the basis of intergovernmentality and with the deep concern of recognition and protection of their sovereignty that lead to favor Soft law more than hard law in decision-making production. Our approach will be well differentiated from those adopted so far by the economists and political scientists or experts in international relations and will not be reductive to a Eurocentric viewpoint. The main features and the internal dimension of the ASEAN will be addressed in a first part, while the second part will be devoted to the external dynamic of the economic integration of the ASEAN based on a selective choice of partnerships (EU, free trade agreements, Asian Development Bank, APEC).