Risken för krig ökar om stater inte vidtar åtgärder mot hot från andra stater. Samtidigt finns en otydlighet i form av att forskare har kommit till delvis kontrasterande slutsatser om vad stater verkligen gör när de utsätts för militära hot. Två välkända teorier på området säger emot varandra. Stephen Walts teori säger att stater rustar militärt och ingår allianser för att stå emot hotande stater-de hotbalanserar. Randall Schwellers teori kontrasterar mot detta och säger att staters inrikes motstånd mot att satsa på sitt militära försvar många gånger leder till att de inte hotbalanserar på ett effektivt sätt- de underbalanserar. Båda teorierna har av efterföljande forskare kritiserats men även fått stöd. Denna studie använder tidigare forskning om de två teorierna för att pröva dem på ett sätt som tar hänsyn till kritiken i denna. Adam Liffs analysverktyg används därför att mäta åtgärder som vidtas i fallet Sverige mot det ryska militära hotet. Studiens visar att de prövade teorierna får stöd på olika sätt. Sverige hotbalanser genom att vidta åtgärder för att stå emot de Rysslands offensiva militära kapaciteter först efter att den ryska ledningens intentioner uppfattas som skadliga för Sveriges intressen. Underbalanseringsteorin får starkast stöd genom Sverige att inte ingår bindande försvarsöverenskommelser.

The diploma thesis focuses on great power politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The studied phenomenon is viewed through the lens of defensive, offensive a neoclassical realist perspective. The key goal of the thesis is to determine, whether contemporary streams of the realist international relations tradition can provide plausible explanation of great powers relations. The research is also embedded in the fourth great debate, which entered the international relations discipline during the course of 80's, and as such it tries to reflect current ontological and epistemological debate. Research results then show that realism is still a valid scientific discourse. On the other hand, neoclassical realism's research agenda, as is shown, takes over other theoretical perspectives features.

Examining any topic in the Middle East requires a general knowledge because of the region's complexity and dynamics. Important characteristics is the link of Islam and politics, because this relation shaped political establishment of states. The strategic location and rich natural resources of this part of the world were tempting also for the global superpowers whose engagement divided the Middle Eastern states, particularly during the Cold War. An analysis of the factors and events that led to the formation of alliances and rivalries in the Middle East is the goal of this work. Research will focus on alliances of Iran and its Shia allies on the one hand and Saudi Arabia with the rest of Sunni monarchies on the other. Unlike other alliances mentioned in the work, these two blocks have long term character. They are also specific because of sectarian differences, their stance towards the United States and Israel and shared responses to emerging threats. Historical development of Middle Eastern alliances begins with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, continues with the both World wars, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Islamic revolution in Iran and other milestones which were meaningful in shaping inter-state relations in the region. The modern period moves from invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to...

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The New Great Game is a geopolitical competition between regional stakeholders over energy resources in Central Asia. The author seeks to use the expected utility voting model based on Black's median voter theorem for forecasting the New Great Game in Central Asia. To judge the external validity of the voting model, the author uses data from the Correlates of War project data set, to formulate three distinct models based only on the numbers in 1992 and 1993. Capabilities and alliance data were used to develop balance of power positions and compare the outcome of 100 simulations to the actual outcome in 2000 based on Correlates of War project data. This allows us to judge whether the emergence of Russia's weak advantage as well as the continuation of the competition in the New Great Game as of 2000 could have been predicted based on what was known in 1992 and 1993. By using only one year's data to forecast the New Great Game, we are able to eliminate historical and researcher bias and judge the applicability of the model in global policy and strategic analysis.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Throughout history, threats emerging from Iran's frontiers have significantly influenced its security policies towards Iraq. Given Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Iran's security environment has changed a great deal. Does Iran have a strategy for post-Saddam Iraq and, if so, what is it? With few exceptions, Kenneth Waltz's Realpolitik and balance-of-power theories have guided Iran's security policy decisions. The combined effects of Iran's formative history, individual and institutional agendas, and national interests form the foundation for a Realpolitik strategy aimed at preventing a resurgent "anti-Teheran" government in Iraq. Pragmatism, consensus, influence, and competition appear to be the watchwords for an assertive strategy built upon military prudence and cross-border, multi-disciplined engagement. Iran is putting its internal political and economic house in order so as to achieve greater effectiveness in the pursuit of its national interests vis-a-vis Iraq and the United States. While an alliance is unlikely, there is alignment with the U.S.-led coalition's strategic interests in Iraq. / Major, United States Marine Corps

本論文的問題意識在於，中國是否將與其古代帝國一樣，在力量強大時追求以武力或其他強制手段達成戰略目標，並試圖建立以其為核心的東亞勢力範圍與國際秩序，結果導致升高與周邊國家甚至美國在內的其他亞太強國的緊張關係與衝突發生機率，與其所宣稱的「和平發展/崛起」、「和諧世界」不符。 中國戰略菁英繼承了帝國時代遺留下來的天下觀、內政導向戰略文化與陸權性格等地緣戰略遺產。同時，缺乏海軍戰略傳統的中國也在1950年代從同為大陸強國的蘇聯之處承接了19、20世紀的法國、德國、蘇聯等歐陸國家發展出來的以劣抗優的大陸國家縱深防禦海軍戰略與積極防禦艦隊海戰戰略。這些遺產與當代外來海軍戰略共同促成了中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略。 在中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略中，古代天下觀在當代因為中國的國力迅速發展與中國戰略菁英的自信加強，而逐漸形成強調中國制度與文化優越性的新「中國中心主義」。此一新中國中心主義配合中國追求實現其領土主權聲索的現代「九州一統」周邊地緣政治密碼，壓倒日本、印度、東協等區域競爭對手，組織以其為核心的東亞地緣戰略領域的區域地緣政治密碼，以及中國自冷戰時期起就發展出的追求全球體系多極化與建立國際政治經濟新秩序，和在冷戰後希望消除美國於東亞的影響力，追求將亞太地緣政治次體系轉變為美中並立兩極結構的體系/次體系地緣政治密碼，使得中國難以成為一個維持現狀的國家。而中國的內政導向戰略文化雖然強調對內優先於對外，但其實際上具備相當重視權力政治與武力在國際事務中效用的強現實政治特徵和備戰本質。而中國的陸權性格與從蘇聯繼承而來的陸權式海洋地緣戰略，使當代中國的地緣戰略重心與方向皆位於東亞大陸與周邊海域，並未真正跨出亞太邊緣地區，只是將西太平洋的島鏈作為海上長城、島鏈周圍的海洋作為新的資源開發地區與戰略緩衝區，以此區隔與美國在亞太的勢力範圍，並按照安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作來組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域。 本論文認為中國擴大參與東亞整合的原因，只是為了因應目前其實力尚無法獨力以軍事、政治等強制性手段完成組織受其支配的東亞地緣戰略領域的戰略目的的間接戰略運用，目的是藉此極大化中國的利益，並取得東亞整合的主導權。中國並無意在傳統安全議題與領土爭端和周邊國家與其他亞太主要強國妥協，並利用多邊傳統安全國際建制達成地緣政治安排，促成亞太地緣政治均衡。中國的陸權式海洋地緣戰略雖然限於中國的海上戰略交通線控制能力，最終目的並不在取代美國成為體系中的新海權，但卻能嚴重威脅美國的海權地位，以及其他亞太主要強國和中國周邊中小型濱海國家的地緣政治利益。因此安西、靠北、爭東南的地緣戰略操作除了在北線地緣之外，皆激起其他次體系主要大國與東協的競爭性權力平衡反應。此種戰略反饋又使中國增強本身的競爭性權力平衡作為，難以形成達成均衡必要的協作性權力平衡。因此，中國的地緣戰略仍是傳統爭奪控制戰略交通線與要地的類型，不是為了追求和諧世界與地緣政治均衡的新類型，故無法促進目前不存在均衡的亞太地緣政治次體系達成均衡，反而可能升高與周邊國家甚至美國的衝突機率。 但是，中國受制於本身有限的戰略交通線控制能力，目前仍無法形成其他次體系主要強國真正的傳統安全威脅，更為了繼續實施經濟建設，必須盡力維持周邊國際環境的穩定。其他亞太主要強國為了繼續藉由與中國的交往獲得的龐大經濟利益，在中國還未成為真正戰略威脅的情況下，亦不願意真正與中國敵對，導致亞太地緣政治次體系的局勢將逐漸走向中國與海洋國家之間政治上經常引發緊張關係，但其他方面互動熱絡，不致立即引發武裝衝突危機的「冷和平」狀態，無法形成真正的地緣政治均衡。 關鍵字：中國、亞太地緣政治次體系、權力平衡、地緣政治均衡、地緣政治密碼、戰略文化、地緣戰略 / The research question of this dissertation is that whether China might seek to apply coercive measures to create an East Asia Geostrategic Realm and to dominate the turf by itself, which just like what pre-modern China’s Empires did. Because of the increasing possibility of armed conflicts between China and other regional powers, including the United States, these measures will put the international security of the Asia-Pacific region in jeopardy. Furthermore, this is not according to what China’s claim on “peaceful development/rising” or the so-called “harmonious world.” Modern Chinese strategic elites inherit three main geo-strategic legacies such as the Chinese traditional concept of “Tianxia” (天下觀), domestic-oriented strategic culture, and national land-power nature in China’s history. China also receives the European thought of continental-oriented naval strategy from the Soviet Union while Maoist China built its navy which supported by the Soviet’s help in the 1950s. These legacies and foreign naval strategic thought not only shape modern China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy,” but also affect the nature, gravity, directions, and the major operations of the geo-strategy. Base on China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization, the self-confidential Chinese elites gradually transform the traditional concept of Tianxia into the new “Sino-centricism,” which stress on the superiority of China’s culture and politico-economic systems. In terms of the geopolitical codes of modern China, they pursue the realization of territorial claims for the purpose of “union” on the local level; overwhelming the competitions of leadership in East Asia from Japan, India, and the ASEAN for creating a Chinese-dominated East Asian Geostrategic Realm on the regional level; pursuing multi-polarization of the international system and, establishing new international politico-economic orders on the systemic level, and dispel the influence of United States in East Asia by transforming the Asia-Pacific geopolitical structure into a bipolarity on the sub-systemic level. Over all, these three levels of geopolitical codes and the new “Sino-centricism” would not make China be a status-quo power in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. Additionally, with regard to the domestic-oriented strategic culture, although it stresses the priority of domestics, it also values power politics and the effectiveness of forces in the international politics. The domestic-oriented strategic culture of China, therefore, has the strong characteristics of hard “realpolitik” and “parabellum”. China’s traditional land-power nature aside, its continental-oriented naval strategy is developed from the thought of the Soviet naval strategy and put the gravity and directions of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” in East Asian continent. China does not go beyond the “Asia-Pacific Rim” actually. What China does is using the “two island-chain” defense in West Pacific as a “Great Wall at Sea,” and the seas around the island chains as strategic buffer zone to distinguish the sphere of influence between China and the United States. China applies the strategic principles of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast” to organize the region in the west of the island chains and shaping its dominance in the East Asian Geostrategic Realm. The dissertation argues that since China cannot organize the East Asian Strategic Realm by political and military means at present, China’s participations in East Asian integrations are indirect strategic behavior. The purposes of indirect approaches are to utilize China’s economic interests and to obtain the leadership of East Asian integrations. China would not like to compromise with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific Powers on highly sensitive traditional security issues, like territorial disputes essentially. Nor does China attempt to shape multi-pole geopolitical arrangements to achieve the geopolitical equilibrium of Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Sub-system by applying multi-pole international regimes. Furthermore, the purpose of China’s “Land-Power Maritime Geo-strategy” is not to replace the United States as the Sea Power in the system just because China lacks the ability of controlling global strategic sea lines of communications. The Chinese naval strategy of active layer defense can still seriously threaten the Sea Power status of the United States and the important geopolitical interests of China’s neighbors. Therefore, the implementations of aforesaid geo-strategy of “stabilizing West, relying on North, competing for the Southeast,” seriously raise “adversary balance of power” in both West and Southeast fronts due to the convergences of geopolitical interests between China and other powers. Nevertheless, the adversary balancing feedback of other Asia-Pacific powers and even the ASEAN countries enhance China’s adversary behavior as well. This reciprocal process cannot create the necessary “associational balance of power” of geopolitical equilibrium. In other words, China’s geo-strategy belongs to the “traditional” type, which stresses the importance of controlling strategic communication in the Asia-Pacific region. It is not the “new” type of pursuing “harmonious world” and geopolitical equilibrium. Therefore, China’s geo-strategy cannot advance the equilibrium of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. On the contrary, it may raise the possibility of conflicts between China and Asia-Pacific countries, even the United States. China is not deemed as major traditional threat by other major Asia-Pacific regional powers due to lacking the capabilities of controlling strategic communication of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system. China must do its best to maintain the stability of the surrounding international environment to continue its economic development. Other major Asia-Pacific powers would like to obtain huge economic interests by engaging with China. As a result, the security of Asia-Pacific geopolitical sub-system will gradually develop into a “cold peace” situation, but not the situation of geopolitical equilibrium. The “cold peace” is a situation not only can fill with geopolitical tensions between China and other major Asia-Pacific powers, but also can interact closely with each other on social, economic, cultural and other dimensions, which prevent the crisis of the outbreak of immediate armed conflicts in the region. Key Words: China, Asia-Pacific Geopolitical Subsystem, Balance of Power, Geopolitical Equilibrium, Geopolitical Code, Strategic Culture, Geo-strategy

L’émergence de la Chine dans le système international post-guerre froide pose un défi pour la position hégémonique des États-Unis et l’ordre mondial libéral. Lorsqu’ils tentent d’expliquer ce défi, les spécialistes tendent à se concentrer uniquement soit sur le hard power chinois (en particulier, sa puissance militaire) soit sur son soft power (l’attrait de sa culture et idéologie). Cette thèse développe un cadre d’analyse alternatif inspiré de la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu, articulé autour de la notion de pouvoir symbolique. Elle conçoit la politique internationale en termes d’une lutte symbolique (entre, par exemple, une orthodoxie et une hétérodoxie) dont l’issue est déterminée par au moins trois facteurs cruciaux : contexte, capital et lieux communs. Ce cadre est appliqué à l’analyse du nouveau rôle de la Chine dans le monde depuis la fin de la guerre froide, lequel est indiscutablement l’un des développements les plus remarquables des relations internationales des temps modernes. La thèse démontre que la Chine ne défie pas l’hégémonie des États-Unis et l’ordre mondial libéral au sens conventionnel de la puissance matérielle ou de l’idéologie, mais plutôt au niveau symbolique. La thèse soutient que la conjonction des trois facteurs susmentionnés a été nécessaire à l’influence mondiale de la Chine : (1) la crise de légitimation des États-Unis (sur les plan économique, politique et idéologique), couplée à l’extraordinaire ascension de nouvelles puissances dans le système international comme la Chine, ont créé un contexte historique favorable ou « condition de possibilité »; (2) l’énorme capital symbolique accumulé par la Chine, en raison non seulement de son nouveau statut de grande puissance, mais aussi de son approche pragmatique des questions nationales et internationales, en a fait une source d’inspiration convoitée mondialement ; (3) la mobilisation stratégique par la Chine de son capital symbolique, sous la forme d’un ensemble de lieux communs ‘rhétoriques’, a grandement contribué à légitimer sa puissance, en particulier aux yeux des élites dirigeantes dans le monde en développement, dissimulant ainsi le caractère asymétrique et arbitraire de ses relations. Ensemble, ces trois éléments –contexte, capital, lieux communs– expliquent le pouvoir symbolique de la Chine, c’est-à-dire la perception selon laquelle, contrairement aux États-Unis, elle propose des réponses pertinentes et cohérentes aux problèmes d’organisation sociale, économique et politique de ce monde. L’ascension de la Chine remet ainsi en question le « méta-capital » des États-Unis, c’est-à-dire son monopole sur la production du capital économique, social, culturel et symbolique. L’accent mis sur cette dimension symbolique de la lutte pour définir et imposer la « vision légitime du monde social et ses divisions » révèle une rupture avec la pratique conventionnelle de la politique des grandes puissances, au profit d’une transformation pacifique du système international et d’une diplomatie symbolique. Cet accent sur le pouvoir symbolique ouvre des avenues prometteuses pour l’étude du changement et des sources d’autorité sur la scène politique mondiale, traditionnellement définie comme « anarchique ». / China’s rise within the international system in the post-Cold War era challenges the hegemonic position of the United States and the Western liberal order. In trying to explain this challenge, scholars tend to either focus on Chinese hard power (in particular, its military power) or on its soft power (the attractiveness of its culture and ideology). This thesis develops an alternative Bourdieu-inspired framework addressing symbolic power. It conceptualizes international politics in terms of a symbolic struggle (such as that between orthodoxy and heterodoxy) whose outcome is determined by at least three crucial factors: context, capital and commonplaces. The framework is applied to the analysis of China’s new world role, which is arguably one of the most remarkable developments in modern international relations. The thesis shows that China does not challenge U.S. hegemonic position and the Western liberal order in the conventional sense of material power or ideology, but rather at the symbolic level. The thesis argues that the combination of the three above-mentioned factors has been necessary to China’s worldwide influence : (1) the legitimation crisis of the United States (economically, politically and ideologically), paired with the extraordinary rise of new illiberal powers on the world scene such as China, created a favourable historical context or “condition of possibility”; (2) the huge amount of symbolic capital accumulated by China, not only because of its new status as a great power, but also because of the success of its pragmatic approach to national and international issues, made it become a source of inspiration for countries across the world; (3) the strategic mobilization by China of its symbolic capital, in the form of ‘rhetorical’ commonplaces, greatly contributed to legitimize its power, especially in the eyes of ruling elites in the developing world, thereby dissimulating the asymmetric and arbitrary nature of the Chinese power and relations. Together, these three components -context, capital, and commonplaces- explain the emergence of China as a symbolic power, i.e. the perception that, unlike the United States, China now has the authority to speak the truth and to define causes of and remedies for certain problems and crises. China’s rise challenges the Unites States’ ‘meta-capital’, that is, its monopoly on the production of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital. The focus on this symbolic dimension as a ‘weapon’ in the struggle to define and impose the “legitimate vision of the social world and its divisions” reveals a rupture in the conventional practice of great powers politics, pointing to a peaceful transformation of the international system and symbolic diplomacy. It shows that a focus on symbolic power opens promising avenues for the study of change and sources of authority in world politics, traditionally defined as “anarchic”.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Section 71(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has introduced into South African company law a provision which for the first time permits the board of directors to remove another director from office in certain specific instances. A further significant innovation in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is contained in section 162, which empowers a court to make an order declaring a director delinquent or placing him under probation in specific instances. The effect of section 162 is that a court is empowered to remove a director from the board of directors. The focus of this thesis is the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and by the judiciary. The thesis explores the underpinning philosophy of the statutory provisions relating to the removal of directors from office. It also examines the impact of the power given to the board of directors and to the courts to remove a director from office. The grounds and the procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary are examined. The fiduciary duties applicable to directors in removing a director from the board of directors are also explored. In addition, this thesis examines the removal of directors holding multiple positions or capacities in relation to a company, such as an employee or a shareholder with loaded voting rights. The remedies which may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors are examined. Recommendations are made to strengthen and improve the provisions in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 relating to the removal of directors from office by the board of directors and the judiciary. Amendments to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are suggested to remove ambiguities; to guard against the abuse of sections 71(3) and 162; to improve the grounds and procedures for the removal of directors by the board of directors and the judiciary, and to enhance the remedies that may be relied on by a director who has been removed from office by the board of directors. / Artikel 71(3) van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 het ’n bepaling tot Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyreg toegevoeg wat die direksie vir die eerste keer in staat stel om ’n ander direkteur in sekere spesifieke gevalle uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. ’n Verdere belangrike vernuwing in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word in artikel 162 vervat, wat ’n hof magtig om ’n bevel uit te vaardig wat ’n direkteur misdadig verklaar of hom of haar in spesifieke gevalle aan ’n proeftydperk onderwerp. Die effek van artikel 162 is dat ’n hof by magte is om ’n direkteur uit die direksie te verwyder. Die fokus van hierdie tesis is die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en die regbank. Die tesis verken die onderliggende filosofie van die statutêre bepalings wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte verband hou. Dit ondersoek ook die impak van die bevoegdheid wat aan die direksie en die howe verleen word om ’n direkteur uit sy of haar amp te verwyder. Die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank word ondersoek. Die fidusiêre pligte van toepassing op direkteure by die verwydering van ’n direkteur uit die direksie word ook verken. Daarbenewens ondersoek hierdie tesis die verwydering van direkteure wat veelvuldige posisies of hoedanighede met betrekking tot ’n maatskappy beklee, soos ʼn werknemer of aandeelhouer met gelaaide stemregte. Die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur, wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is, kan steun, word ondersoek. Aanbevelings word gemaak om die bepalings in die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008, wat met die verwydering van direkteure uit hul ampte deur die direksie en regbank verband hou, te versterk en te verbeter. Wysigings aan die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word voorgestel om dubbelsinnighede uit te skakel; om teen die misbruik van artikels 71(3) en 162 te waak; om die gronde en prosedures vir die verwydering van direkteure deur die direksie en die regbank te verbeter, en om die regsmiddele waarop ’n direkteur wat deur die direksie uit sy of haar amp verwyder is kan steun, te versterk. / ISigaba 71(3) Somthetho weZinkampani 71 ka 2008 sewuze wangenisa emithethweni yezinkampani zaseNingizimu Afrika, umthetho ongowokuqala ovumela ibhodi labaqondisi ukuthi libe namandla wokugudluza omunye umqondisi esikhundleni sakhe ngaphansi kwezimo ezithile. Olunye ushintsho olusha kuMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 uqukethwe yiSigaba 162, wona ugunyaza inkantolo ukuthi ikhiphe umyalelo owazisa umqondisi ngokuthi unecala noma obeka umqondisi ngaphansi kophenyo, phecelezi “probation” ngesinye isikhathi. Inhloso yeSigaba 162 wukunikeza inkantolo igunya lokugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi. Impokophelo yale thisisi wukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi, bagudluzwe yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho/nobulungisa. Ithisisi ihlola ifilosofi yemithetho ekhishiwe emayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni zabo, Kanti futhi ihlola umthelela wamandla anikezwe ibhodi labaqondisi kanye nezinkantolo ukuthi zigudluze umqondisi esikhundleni. Izizathu kanye nengqubo elandelwayo mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho nazo ziyahlolwa. Imisebenzi emayelana nokuthembeka eyenziwa ngabaqondisi ukugudluza umqondisi kwibhodi labaqondisi nayo iyacwaningwa Ngaphezu kwalokhu, le thisisi .iphenya ukugudluzwa kwabaqondisi abaqokwe ezikhundleni eziningi noma abanegunya elithize ngokwengqubo yenkampani, enjengesisebenzi, phecelezi “employee” noma umabelwa-mashezi onamalungelo amaningi okuvota, phecelezi, “loaded with voting rights”. Izeluleko ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi ogudluzwe esikhundleni sakhe yibhodi labaqondisi nazo ziyahlolwa. Izincomo nazo ziyenziwa ngenhloso yokuqinisa kanye nokuthuthukiswa kwamandla oMthetho we-71 weZinkampani ka 2008, mayelana nokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi ezikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho. Izinguquko zoMthetho wama-71 weZinkampani ka 2008 ziqonde ukususa izixakaxaka, ukulwa nokudlelezelwa kweSigaba 71(3) kanye no 162, ukuthuthukisa izizathu kanye nezingqubo zokugudluzwa kwabaqondisi yibhodi labaqondisi kanye nomthetho, ukuqinisa izindlela zokulungisa ezingasetshenziswa wumqondisi osegudluziwe esikhundleni yibhodi labaqondisi. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.