The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

The dissertation consists of an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 CC. The analysis focuses on the significance of the different interpretative approaches adopted by the members of the Court in analysing section 241(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Afii.ca Act 200 of 1993. The theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation are first briefly discussed. This is followed by a description of the four respective judgments in the decision. The case is then analysed in respect of section 3 5, Chapter 3 and the Constitution itself in order to determine the significance. The jurisprudence of the Court (developed in its first eight decisions) is evaluated to assess the approach of the Constitutional Court to Chapter 3 and the remainder of the Constitution respectively. The conclusion is reached that the Court has endorsed a generous/purposive approach to constitutional interpretation and that this extends to the entire text of the Constitution. / Law / LL.M.

L'interprétation constitutionnelle est une question récurrente dans le monde moderne. Le droit étant sujet à interprétation de la part de tout un chacun (juges, doctrine, simples citoyens), au point que «Juristes et simples citoyens acceptent et affirment (ou mettent en doute et refusent) des propositions sur ce que «dit le droit» de leur nation ou de leur État» (Ronald Dworkin). La question se pose de savoir qui, parmi ces différents acteurs, est le plus légitime pour affirmer une interprétation finaliste du droit s'imposant à tous. Au centre de cette interrogation, se trouve le juge constitutionnel, interprète habilité, ses jugements et les critiques visant ceux-ci. Mais l'interprétation prononcée par ce juge est parfois, voire souvent, mal acceptée, ce qui participe à l'affaiblissement de son autorité dans un système juridique concurrentiel marqué par le pluralisme tant au stade de la procédure de production qu'à celui de l'application du droit. Ainsi, si le juge a le privilège du rôle de juger, il a aussi la nécessaire vocation à être à son tour jugé. Cette nécessité s'explique par le fait que«Tout pouvoir est méchant dès qu'on le laisse faire [mais devient] sage dès qu'il se sent jugé.» (Alain). Dans ce contexte, la question de méthodes et outils utilisés par le juge-interprète devient elle aussi centrale car ceux-ci sont scrutés par tous, souvent au détriment d travail interprétatif complexe de ce juge. Parmi les outils et méthodes d'interprétation utilisés par celui-ci, se trouve l'usage des travaux préparatoires. En tant que supports d'une méthode d'interprétation juridique, ceux-ci posent problème. Au-delà de la question de la définition de la notion de travaux préparatoires, il convient de s'interroger sur le rôle, la force et la valeur de ces derniers dans l'interprétation constitutionnelle. Ainsi, cette thèse se donne pour objectif de tenter, du moins, d'apporter un début de réponse à ce questions, à travers une réflexion d'ensemble sur cette méthode d'interprétation dont le débat remonte, du moins, au Moyen Age. / Constitutional interpretation has become a recurrent issue in modern world. Since the law is subject to interpretation by anyone (judges, doctrine. ordinary citizens), so that "jurists and ordinary citizens accept and affirm (or doubt and refuse) proposals on what the 'law says' of their nation or their state" (Ronald Dworkin), the question is who, among these various actors, is the most legitimate to affirm a finalist interpretation of the law imposing itself on everyone. At the center of this question is the constitutional judge, the empowered interpreter, his judgments and the criticisms raised by the latter. But the judge's interpretation is sometimes. even often, poorly accepte1 which contributes to the weakening of his authority in a competitive legal system marked by pluralism, bath at the stage of the production procedure and al that of the application of the law. Thus, if the judge has the privilege to judge, he also has the necessary vocation to b in turn judged. This necessity is explained by the fact that "Ali power is wicked as long as it can, [but becomes] wise when it feels judged (Alain). In such a context, the question of methods and tools used by the interpreting judge also becomes central because the latter are scrutinized by everyone, often at the expense of the complex interpretative work of the judge. Among these tools and methods c interpretation used by the judge is the use of preparatory work (Hansard). As the basis of a legal interpretation method, the latter become problematic. Beyond the question of the definition of the concept of preparatory work, it should be raised the questions of the role, fore and value of the latter in constitutional interpretation. Thus, this paper aims to try to give an initial answer to these questions, through general reflection on this interpretation method that has been debated, at least, from the Middle Ages.

Cette étude comparative entre la France et l’Espagne oppose deux systèmesconstitutionnels, s’organisant de deux manières différentes. En France, l’interprétationconstitutionnelle s’élabore selon une collaboration absolue des interprètes. La juridictionconstitutionnelle n’a pas les moyens d’agir directement sur l’interprétation élaborée par lesjuges ordinaires. En Espagne, la collaboration est en revanche relative, puisque la juridictionconstitutionnelle peut être saisie directement par les justiciables. La comparaison permet deprocéder à une modélisation du contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois autour du critère del’interprétation conforme des lois à la Constitution. Cette modélisation part des influencesétrangères qui s’exercent sur l’organisation des systèmes constitutionnels comparés. Elle sepoursuit par l’adaptation de ces systèmes au phénomène d’européanisation du droit. Elles’achève par la recherche d’une optimisation de la collaboration entre interprètes. / This comparative study between France and Spain bring into conflict twoconstitutional systems, with two distinct organization. In France, the constitutionalinterpretation is built by an absolute collaboration of the interpreters. The constitutionaljurisdiction don’t have the resources for acting directly on the ordinary judges’sinterpretation. However, the collaboration is relative in Spain, for the reason that theconstitutional court can be directly seised by the litigant. The comparison allows to proceedfor a modelization of the constitutionality review of laws around the interpretation inconformity with the Constitution’s criterion. This modelization start from the foreigninfluences on the organization of the comparative constitutional systems. It continues by theadaptation of these systems to the europeanisation of law. It ends with the search of anoptimisation of the collaboration of the interpreters.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Donata Aparecida Campos de Barros.pdf: 376264 bytes, checksum: f7dc15c8672941cfef1cbc26283fbf7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-12 / The context in which the current discussion is situated about juridical principles and basic rights, central in contemporary theory of the right, is what we intend to show with the Brazilian contribution given by Willis Santiago Gerra Filho, according which, the fenomenology would offer the best preparation for the necessary overcoming of the formalistic positivism, without relapsing into some form equally already surpassed of jusnaturalism. Like scholar of the Right in our country, Willis Santiago Guerra Filho faces like a challenge the imperative of renewal of the legal national order, because is totally new the base on which it links. The pledge of the Author is to re-interpret the Native Right as a whole, according the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil , which presupposes an interpretative activity of the Basic Law itself, but without the rancidness of the legal operators who do not realize in the objective way as they conceive the Right, such as it was a machine with which it takes place, when if it was like that, they would be the pieces of this producing gear of a pseudo knowledge, of disciplinary character. Admirer of Husserl, who preaches that nothing exists of cognitive content in this production of knowledge, because knowledge, for him, is an evidence and truth, created from the intuition, whole and completely understood, what is lost to the being broken the link with the domain of the objects about which we should be informed, our Author goes decidedly for the good field of the pre-scientific verification, in order to value the original right of these evidences, before rejected and, from there, the essential connection to be able to search between the sciences / O contexto em que se situa o debate actual sobre princípios jurídicos e direitos fundamentais, central em teoria do direito contemporânea, é o que se pretende mostrar com a contribuição brasileira dada por Willis Santiago Guerra Filho, segundo o qual, a fenomenologia ofereceria a melhor preparação para a necessária superação do positivismo formalista, sem recair em alguma forma igualmente já superada de jusnaturalismo. Como estudioso do Direito em nosso país, Willis Santiago Guerra Filho encara como um desafio o imperativo de renovação da ordem jurídica nacional, por ser totalmente nova a base sobre a qual ela se assenta. O empenho do Autor é re-interpretar o Direito Pátrio como um todo, à luz da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil , o que pressupõe uma atividade interpretativa da própria Lei Fundamental, mas sem o ranço dos operadores jurídicos que não se dão conta do modo objetivante como concebem o Direito, tal como se fosse uma máquina com a qual se opera, quando se assim o fosse seriam eles as peças dessa engrenagem produtora de um pseudo-saber, de caráter disciplinador. Admirador de Husserl, que prega nada haver de conteúdo cognitivo nessa produção de saber, pois conhecimento, para ele, é evidência, verdade, criadas a partir da intuição, inteira e completamente entendida, que se perde ao ser rompido o elo com o domínio dos objetos sobre o qual deveríamos ser informados, nosso Autor parte decididamente para o bom campo da verificação pré-científica, a fim de valorizar o direito originário dessas evidências, antes desprezadas e, daí, poder-se buscar a conexão essencial entre as ciências

A sociedade brasileira aguarda pacientemente e há anos uma real reforma que introduza a ética e a moral no meio político e faça valer a soberania de seu povo. De um lado, observa-se um Poder Legislativo com sérias dificuldades de quebrar sua inércia e cumprir o seu papel de concretizar a lei como expressão da vontade geral. De outro, um Poder Judiciário que busca suprir os anseios sociais dando efetividade aos direitos fundamentais colocados na Constituição Federal da República Brasileira de 1988. O presente estudo almeja analisar como o Estado brasileiro tem convivido com um intenso ativismo judicial ou judicialização da política e suas consequências para a democracia pátria. Para a eficácia de suas conclusões, limitou-se o campo de estudo à matéria eleitoral, dada sua cristalina correlação com o Estado Democrático de Direito. Foram selecionadas, deste modo, as recentes decisões dos Tribunais nacionais em temas eleitorais para averiguar os reflexos desta jurisprudência sobre as bases democráticas de nosso país. E, em assim procedendo, foram trazidos elementos para uma crítica fundamentada à tentativa do Poder Judiciário de moralizar as instituições políticas, buscando fornecer as bases para concluir se esse altivo movimento dos Tribunais logrou, de fato, o aprimoramento do regime democrático vigente, preservando a harmonia entre os Poderes, a unidade do ordenamento jurídico e a legitimidade das instituições da nação ou se, ao contrário, apenas soluções pontuais foram conquistadas, combatendo-se uma doença grave com remédios paliativos ao invés de atacar a real causa das mazelas que assolam o Estado Democrático de Direito brasileiro. / The Brazilian society waits patiently and for many years for a deep change that introduces ethics and moral to politics to renew the sovereignty of its people. On one hand, the Parliament presents serious difficulties in moving forward to fulfill its role of materializing the law as an expression of the general will. On the other hand, the judiciary tries to meet social expectations, providing effectiveness to basic rights constitutionally established. This study aims to analyze how the Brazilian State has been living with an intense judicial activism and a judicialization of its politics and its consequences to democracy. For the effectiveness of its conclusions, the object of the analysis was limited to electoral issue, due to its crystal clear relation with the Rule of Law. In this manner, some recent judicial decisions of the national Courts as regards electoral subjects were chosen to verify the consequences of this jurisprudence on the democratic foundations of our country. And, in so proceeding, many aspects were brought to enable a justified criticism to the judiciary attempt to moralize political institutions, trying to provide the basis for the following questions: have, in fact, this noble movement of the Courts succeeded in improving the current democratic Brazilian system, preserving the harmony between the Powers, the unity of the legal system and the legitimacy of the nation institutions?; or, on the opposite, only few hoc solutions have been conquered, fighting with a serious illness by ministering palliative drugs, instead of solving the real cause of the illness that plagues the State?

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Priscilla Milena Simonato.pdf: 508067 bytes, checksum: b08fa76ded48c56a5e55f75845435744 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-28 / This dissertation talks about the concept of economic dependence for getting the pension benefit for death. It aims to analyze who the insured s economic dependents are, according to the Federal Constitution. The pension benefit for Death, constitutionally provided, as well as listed in an ordinary law n. º 8.213/91, is a social security benefit granted to the insured dependents. However, the common law has created an exhaustive list of dependents who have the real social security benefits in case of death risk. This list of dependents, besides having the reliant presumption, violates, in many cases, the constitutional principles about the social justice and exact application of the principle of human dignity, which is a fundamental right and lead us to search the real concept of economic dependence through a constitutional interpretation / A presente dissertação versa sobre o conceito de dependência econômica para fins de concessão do benefício de pensão por morte. Visa analisar quem são os dependentes econômicos do segurado à luz da Constituição Federal. O benefício da Pensão por Morte, previsto constitucionalmente, bem como previsto na legislação ordinária n.º 8.213/91, é um benefício previdenciário concedido aos dependentes do segurado. No entanto, a legislação ordinária criou um rol taxativo de dependentes que fazem jus ao benefício previdenciário na ocorrência do risco morte. Tal rol de dependentes, por ter uma presunção de dependência, em muitos casos fere os preceitos constitucionais da busca da justiça social e a aplicação exata do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, direito este fundamental, o que leva na busca do real conceito da dependência econômico através de uma interpretação constitucional

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The issue of the vertical /or horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights (chapter 3) is a controversial one. The interim constitution deals with this controversy in a subtle way by avoiding direct horizontal operation of Chapter 3. Instead, it provides for the so-called 'seepage to horizontal relationships' in terms of section35{3). This apparently was a political compromise between the pro-vertical only and the pro-horizontal groups. The human rights history of this country justifies a Bill of Rights that would have both vertical and horizontal operation. However, in section 35 (3) there is potential for the values enshrined in the constitution and Chapter 3, and the spirit hereof, to permeate and filter through the entire legal system in all it's applications. It would seem, however, as demonstrated by the decision in De Klerk v Du Plessis, that the extent to which this filtering process will benefit individuals in their private relations, will depend on the interpretation given to section 35 (3) by the courts. If courts, as it happend in De Klerk's case fail to realise the full import of section 35 ( 3) aspects of the existing law which are unjust could remain and the process of creating a just, open and democratic society will be hampered. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.