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Im SpiegelSchmidt, Johannes, Rosenthal, Michael 07 November 2013 (has links) (PDF)
Es gibt Situationen, in denen das Leben seine Glaubwürdigkeit verliert. Lukian erfährt dies am eigenen Leib. Er kann nicht glauben, dass sein Großvater gestorben ist. Und dann liegt da auf einmal diese geheimnisvolle Papierrolle unter seinem Bett. Ihr Inhalt stellt all das in Frage, was Lukian bisher selbstverständlich erschien. Was ist der Mensch – nur eine Marionette in einem großen Theaterstück? Die Suche nach Antworten treibt ihn auf eine abenteuerliche Reise zu den Wurzeln unserer Kultur. Er trifft auf die großen Denker der Vergangenheit und diskutiert mit ihnen über die Freiheit des Willens und die Existenz des Ichs. Ein kleiner, unscheinbarer Spiegel begleitet ihn dabei. Zunächst erscheinen in ihm nur rätselhafte Umrisse. Doch nichts bleibt, wie es ist – auf dem Weg zum Ende der Welt.
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Vakarų mąstymo kritika: F. Rosenzweigas ir M. Heideggeris / A Critique of West Thought : M. Heidegger and Fr. RosenzweigGajauskas, Auridas 04 March 2009 (has links)
Magistrinio darbo problematikos formulavimas vadovaujasi prielaida, jog dalis moderniosios filosofijos projektų formavosi kaip reakcija į Vakarų Europos mąstymo tradiciją, kurios formuojantį pagrindą sudarė filosofija. Dėl šios priežasties neatsiejamu šių projektų egzistavimo požymiu laikytina nuosekli filosofijos istorijos kritika, tuo pačiu pateikianti alternatyvius filosofijos supratimo orientyrus. Tokiu radikaliu filosofijos sąjūdžiu, XX a. laikomas egzistencializmas. Magistriniam darbui pasirinktos dvi filosofų figūros: Rosenzweigas ir Heideggeris. Abu filosofai kritiškai reflektavo filosofijos istoriją bei abu pateikė alternatyvius mąstymo projektus. Pagrindiniu Vakarų tradicijos kritikos bei naujo mąstymo suformulavimo svarbiausiu aspektu laikome fundamentalų „pirminių mąstymo prielaidų” perklausimą. Atlikęs tokį perklausimą bei taip atsiribojęs nuo „mąstymo metafizikos”, Rosenzweigas susikuria naujas prieigas prie tikėjimo problematikos. Panaudodamas Johano Wolfgango Geothes profenomeno sampratos bei savo mokytojo – Hermanno Coheno diferencialinės matematikos teorijos idėjas, jis pateikia trijų (metafizinio Dievo, metaloginio pasaulio ir metaetinio žmogaus) profenomenų aprašymą. Metaetinio žmogaus sąmonės struktūros gretinimas su „naujojo mąstymo” (tokį pavadinimą Rosenzweigas pats prisiskiria savo filosofijai) pirminėmis prielaidomis, atveda prie dialoginės (Zwiesprache) apreiškimo (Offenbarung) sąmonės struktūros aprašymo. Tik apreiškimo sąmonei atsiveria pirmapradė... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The formulation of theme in this paper is followed the assumption that a part of projects of modern philosophy were generated as a reaction to the tradition of Western Europe thinking, which was influenced by philosophy. That is the reason why coherent criticism of history of philosophy, in the same time giving the perception guides of philosophy, is considered as a concurrent attribute of that project existence. Existentialism of the 20th century is considered as such radical movement of philosophy. Two philosophical figures were chosen from this general context: Rosenzweig and Heidegger. Both thinkers made critical reflections on history of philosophy and both give the alternative projects of thinking. The fundamental reasking of „prime thought assumptions” is considered as an important aspect of main criticism of Western tradition and the formulation of new thinking. After this performed reasking and disassociation from “metaphysics of thought”, Rosenzweig creates new approaches to the faith theme. Using the prophenomenon perception of Johan Wolfgang Geothe and his teachers, Herman Cohen’s ideas about diferencial mathematics theory, he presents description of three prophenomenon (metaphysical God, metalogical world and metaethical man). The comparison of consequence’s structure of metaethical man with prime assumptions of “new thought” (this definition Rosenzweig attributes to his own philosophy) leads to description of dialogical (Zwiesprache) revelational (Offenbarung)... [to full text]
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Responsibility, spontaneity and libertyvan Zwol, Erik January 2009 (has links)
Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.
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Situerad Moral : Är det tanken som räknas? / Situated Morals : Is it the thought that counts?Molander, Fanny January 2020 (has links)
Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram. / How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed.
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Le discours politique et ses sources doctrinales dans les chroniques florentines du XIVe siècle / The political discourse and its doctrinal sources in Fourteenth century Florentine chroniclesValligny, Anne-Claire 23 March 2013 (has links)
Cette étude porte sur un corpus de chroniques du XIVe siècle qui comprend les trois principaux textes historiographiques florentins en langue vulgaire de cette période – Cronica delle cose occorrenti ne’ tempi suoi de Dino Compagni, Nuova Cronica de Giovanni Villani et Cronaca fiorentina de Marchionne di Coppo Stefani – et se fixe pour objet l’analyse des principaux concepts employés pour décrire le fonctionnement de la cité et ses enjeux, ainsi que l’identification des sources présentes dans les chroniques. L’analyse prend en compte à la fois l’écriture du fait politique et la valeur de celui-ci dans l’élaboration du discours de la cité.Pour mettre en évidence ce qui transparaît des principaux rouages politiques de la cité, les textes du corpus sont abordés selon les trois axes suivants : les rapports entre cité et citoyens dans le contexte de l’affirmation de la souveraineté du Comune et en regard des notions d’unité et de division ; la question de la liberté à Florence, ses principes fondamentaux, ses formes et ses représentations, par opposition à la tyrannie ; les liens entre cité céleste et cité des hommes à partir de l’analyse de la réception des signes célestes et des notions de providence, fortune et libre arbitre. L’approche retenue s’arrête sur les enjeux et les représentations propres à chacun de ces axes.De cette analyse conceptuelle il ressort que les trois sources principales du discours de la cité sont les auteurs de l’Antiquité gréco-romaine, la théologie chrétienne et le droit. On trouve également des sources contemporaines des chroniqueurs : textes officiels et documents produits par la cité, auteurs de référence pour la période comme Dante Alighieri. / This study focuses on a corpus of chronicles of the Fourteenth century consisting in three main historiographical Florentine texts written in vernacular in this period, namely Cronica delle cose occorrenti ne’ tempi suoi by Dino Compagni, Nuova Cronica by Giovanni Villani and Cronaca fiorentina by Marchionne di Coppo Stefani. It aims at analyzing the principal concepts describing the running of the city and its stakes, as well as identifying the sources present in these chronicles. The analysis takes in account both the operation of writing the political experience and its value in elaborating the discourse on the city.To highlight what can be seen from the main aspects of political machinery in the city, the approach to the texts is threefold : the connections between city and citizens both in the context of the Comune’s increasing sovereignty and in the light of the concepts of unity and division ; the question of freedom in Florence, its fundamental principles, its forms and representations, in opposition to tyranny ; the links between the celestial city and the city of men based on the analysis of the reading of celestial omens and the concepts of Providence, Fortune and Free Will. The approach chosen concentrates on the stakes and representations peculiar to each of those subjects.From this conceptual analysis it emerges that the three main sources to the discourse on the city are the authors of Classical Antiquity, Christian Theology and Law. Contemporary sources of the chroniclers also can be found : official texts and documents produced by the city, noted authors in the period as, for instance, Dante Alighieri.
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Métaéthique de la croyance : une défense pragmatiste de la responsabilité et de l’autonomie mentaleMontplaisir, Samuel 08 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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Role empatie v etickém jednání / The Role of Empathy in Ethical BehaviourNovák, Lukáš January 2018 (has links)
More than two hundred years ago David Hume together with his fellow philosopher Adam Smith posited, that ethical behaviour arises from so called: "moral sense". In the other words, they share the same idea, that passions are principle evoking and guiding human behaviour. Hume claim: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (…). It is possible that this statement - among others - woke up from the 'dogmatic dream' one of the greatest philosophers of all time - Immanuel Kant, who propose, - contrary to Hume - that reason but not necessary passions can determinate human actions. In the question of what rule the passions in ethics have, it seems to be helpful to use the knowledge which follows from recent science. During this thesis we will use methods such as: comparison, analysis and synthesis. Main aim of this thesis will be to deal with the following question: what relationship can be observed between empathy, "moral sense" and ethical behaviour in perspective of recent science. This enquiry will therefore try to deal with the old question: what the the relationship between reason, passions and ethical behaviour is.
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The Light of Descartes in Rembrandts's Mature Self-PortraitsAllred, Melanie Kathleen 19 March 2020 (has links)
Rembrandt's use of light in his self-portraits has received an abundance of scholarly attention throughout the centuries--and for good reason. His light delights the eye and captivates the mind with its textural quality and dramatic presence. At a time of scientific inquiry and religious reformation that was reshaping the way individuals understood themselves and their relationship to God, Rembrandt's light may carry more intellectual significance than has previously been thought. Looking at Rembrandt's oeuvre of self-portraits chronologically, it is apparent that something happened in his life or in his understanding that caused him to change how he used light. A distinct and consistent shift can be observed in the location and intensity of light to the crown of the forehead. This change indicates that light held particular significance for Rembrandt and that its connection to the head was a signifier with intentional meaning. This meaning could have developed as a result of Rembrandt's exposure to and interest in the contemporary theological and philosophical debates of the seventeenth-century Netherlands, particularly those relating to the physical and eternal nature of the soul stemming from the writings of René Descartes. The relative religious and intellectual freedom of the Dutch Republic provided a safe place for Descartes to publish and defend his metaphysical ideas relating to the nature of the soul and know-ability of God through personal intellectual inquiry. The widespread disturbance to established thought caused by his ideas and methods sped their dissemination into the early seventeenth-century discourse. Rembrandt's associations with the educated elite, particularly Constantijn Huygens and Jan Six, increases the probability that he knew of this new philosophy and had the opportunity to consider its relevance to his own quest for self-knowledge. With his particular emphasis on self-exploration and expression, demonstrated through his prolific oeuvre of self-portraits, and his inclination toward emotive, complex, and interdenominational religious works, it follows that Rembrandt would be eager to embrace Descartes' metaphysics and demonstrate his awareness through his self-portraits. Light on the forehead becomes a metaphor for enlightenment and is the key to reading Rembrandt's late self-portraits through the lens of Cartesian influence.
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Im Spiegel: Eine philosophische Reise zu den Grenzen der WeltSchmidt, Johannes, Rosenthal, Michael 07 November 2013 (has links)
Es gibt Situationen, in denen das Leben seine Glaubwürdigkeit verliert. Lukian erfährt dies am eigenen Leib. Er kann nicht glauben, dass sein Großvater gestorben ist. Und dann liegt da auf einmal diese geheimnisvolle Papierrolle unter seinem Bett. Ihr Inhalt stellt all das in Frage, was Lukian bisher selbstverständlich erschien. Was ist der Mensch – nur eine Marionette in einem großen Theaterstück? Die Suche nach Antworten treibt ihn auf eine abenteuerliche Reise zu den Wurzeln unserer Kultur. Er trifft auf die großen Denker der Vergangenheit und diskutiert mit ihnen über die Freiheit des Willens und die Existenz des Ichs. Ein kleiner, unscheinbarer Spiegel begleitet ihn dabei. Zunächst erscheinen in ihm nur rätselhafte Umrisse. Doch nichts bleibt, wie es ist – auf dem Weg zum Ende der Welt.
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La responsabilité criminelle a-t-elle un avenir? : enquête sur les fondements philosophiques, juridiques et psychologiques de l’imputabilité pénale à l’ère des neurosciencesGilbert Tremblay, Ugo 04 1900 (has links)
La présente thèse a une vocation à la fois descriptive et prospective. Descriptive, d’une part, en ce qu’elle entend mettre au jour les fondements juridiques actuels de la responsabilité criminelle tout en déterminant l’étendue des rapports qu’ils entretiennent avec la notion philosophique de libre arbitre. Prospective, d’autre part, en ce qu’elle entend évaluer les chances de survie de ces fondements à la lumière de la nouvelle vision de l’homme qui se dégage des avancées récentes en neurosciences. Nous aurons pour ce faire à soupeser la vraisemblance de deux grandes prophéties concernant l’avenir de la responsabilité criminelle : l’une, que nous qualifierons de « scientiste », prétend que le concept juridique actuel de responsabilité criminelle est voué à tomber en désuétude en raison de son incompatibilité avec notre connaissance du cerveau. L’autre, que nous qualifierons de « légitimiste », prétend que c’est plutôt en modifiant les intuitions populaires en matière de responsabilité que les neurosciences bouleverseront l’édifice pénal. Dans les deux cas, nous découvrirons qu’une erreur de diagnostic quant au fonctionnement juridique et psychologique des jugements de responsabilité conduit à une erreur de pronostic. / This doctoral dissertation is both descriptive and prospective. Descriptive, on the one hand, by seeking to identify the current legal foundations of criminal responsibility and by trying to determinate the extent of their relationship with the philosophical notion of free will. Prospective, on the other hand, by seeking to evaluate the chances of survival of these foundations in the light of the new vision of man that emanates from advances in neuroscience. To this end, two great prophecies concerning the future of criminal responsibility will have to be weighed: one, which we will call ‘‘scientist’’, claims that the current legal concept of criminal responsibility is incompatible with what neuroscience teaches us and is, therefore, destined to fall into disuse. The other, which we will call ‘‘legitimist’’, claims that it is rather by altering the popular intuitions about responsibility that neuroscience will threat the penal edifice. In both cases, we will discover that a misdiagnosis concerning the legal and psychological functioning of the judgments of responsibility leads to an error of prognosis.
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