A l'origine de l'étude se trouve un paradoxe ; alors que l'analyse économique met en avant la nécessité de réglementer les activités dangereuses pour l'environnement et les hommes, on voit émerger dans la plupart des pays développés des systèmes hybrides, de plus en plus complexes, mêlant réglementation et responsabilité civile pour traiter ces problématiques. Pour expliquer ce décalage entre théorie économique et évolution juridique, la première partie de la thèse revient sur les fondements de l'économie de l'environnement et propose une approche opérationnelle qui permet de déterminer l'efficacité de chaque institution – propriété, responsabilité et réglementation – selon les caractéristiques des situations et des risques envisagés. Ce faisant, elle aboutit à la conclusion que seul un système combinant les institutions de la responsabilité civile et de la réglementation publique des activités risquées est à même de promouvoir le développement tout en maîtrisant ses dangers. Confrontant cette théorie nouvelle au cas français, la thèse met en évidence les interactions des deux acteurs clés du système, le juge et le régulateur, et observe l'influence positive et réciproque de l'un sur l'autre. A l'aide d'une base de données unique regroupant l'ensemble des litiges environnementaux traités devant la Cour de Cassation et le Conseil d'Etat au cours des soixante dernières années, la seconde partie éclaircit les rôles de chaque institution et démontre que loin d'être paradoxal, le système français a évolué spontanément vers davantage de cohérence et d'efficacité grâce à l'information diffusée par les tribunaux. / Most developed countries use a mix of public regulation and civil liability to cope with environmental risks and damages. Though, a vast majority of economic scholars tend to favour a regime of pure regulation in the domain of environmental accidents, arguing that liability cannot provide incentives for polluters and potential injurers to take socially desirable care. Our dissertation aims to answer this paradox between legal reality and economic theory. In the first part of our study, we develop an operational approach of the concept of externality based on the concrete characteristics that represent an impediment to individual cooperation and thus to the application of property rights. This method allows us to compare the efficiency of public regulation and civil liability and to reach a clear-cut conclusion: in the most complex situations, neither regulation nor liability is able to encourage socially desirable care and to ensure complete compensation for victims at the same time. In these situations, joint use of both legal instruments might be superior to regulation or liability alone because it enables each instrument to overcome the inefficiencies of the other, through interactions and informational transfers occurring between judges and regulators. In the second part, we test our theory in the French case. To observe the existence of institutional interactions between judges and regulators, we create a unique dataset gathering the whole litigations on environmental accidents from cases adjudicated by the Court of Cassation since 1956. Our econometric results show that joint use of regulation and liability emerged to promote economic efficiency of the legal system.

Il est très commun d’entendre dans les discussions sur l’urbanisme que la participation du public est nécessaire, mais la manière de faire participer reste encore sujette à énormément d’expérimentation et d’incertitudes. Cette étude s’intéresse au design institutionnel des processus de participation en urbanisme, sous l’angle de leurs effets de démocratisation. L’étude cherchera à identifier les aspects déterminants des processus de participation en urbanisme afin d’offrir, à ceux qui les conçoivent, un éclairage sur les implications des choix qu’ils effectuent. L’analyse se construira à partir de l’étude du fonctionnement concret d’une opération de planification concertée à Porto Alegre, dans le secteur Lomba do Pinheiro. Elle s’appuiera sur un découpage des modalités du processus élaboré à partir d’une revue des ouvrages techniques sur la participation en aménagement. Après avoir décrit la culture de la participation et de planification propre à Porto Alegre et comment celle-ci s’est construite, l’analyse décrira, à partir d’observations sur l’évolution du processus et de ses résultats, les effets du processus en termes d’impact sur l’espace bâti, de transformation des relations sociales et de possibilité de faire apparaître des conflits. Les conclusions feront voir l’importance des modalités plus informelles du travail des organisateurs, de même que la nécessité de mettre le projet au centre du processus afin d’établir un terrain commun. Le rôle crucial de la sélection des participants sera souligné. De fortes réserves seront exprimées quant à la pertinence de la transformation des relations sociales comme objectif pour les processus de planification concertée. / It is quite common, when discussing city planning, to call upon the necessity of public participation. However, the means by which the public participates are still mainly left to experimentation and uncertainty. This dissertation questions the institutional design of participation processes in city planning, from the angle of their democratization effects. It will tempt to identify determining aspects of public participation processes in city planning in order to offer, to those who design them, keys to understanding the implications of their choices. The analysis will be based on the study of the day-to-day operations of a collaborative planning process in the Lomba do Pinheiro district of Porto Alegre. It will use a sectioning of process components built from a review of technical books on participation in design Having depicted Porto Alegre’s specific participation and planning culture and how it was constructed, the analysis will, by observing the evolution of the process and its result, describe the process’ effects in terms of impacts on the built environment, on the transformation of social relations, and on the possibility of making conflicts apparent. Conclusions will reveal the significance of informal aspects in the work of facilitators as well as the necessity to put the project at the center of the process in order to establish a common ground. The crucial role placed by the selection of participants will be outlined. Strong doubts will be expressed on the relevance of the transformation of social relation as a goal of collaborative planning.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des coalitions procédurales. L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche. / This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions. The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor. In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country’s politics and a description of the Chambers’ organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research.

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A component of the regulatory system is regulatory governance, namely the set of safeguards that limit discretionary actions of the regulator. In Brazil, one of the safeguards is the institutional design of regulatory agencies. This design consists of a series of factors among which stands out autonomy, commonly divided into administrative, financial and political. The ultimate goal of this study is to evaluate the financial autonomy of federal regulatory agencies. The greater financial autonomy is, the more robust regulatory governance tends to be, because the institutional design plays a better role as safeguard. Strengthened governance contributes to the stability of rules, reduces regulatory risk and enhances the attraction of private investments, which ultimately leverage the country's economic development. To achieve the ultimate goal, it will be held an exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research. The means used are bibliographic, documentary and multiple cases. Each case is selected in a non-probabilistic way by typicality and accessibility, in that order, in order to reach contrasting results (theoretical replication). These criteria determine the choice of all federal regulatory agencies, with the exception of ANAC, because of the accessibility of its budgetary and financial data. Thus, from data of ANEEL, ANATEL, ANP, ANVISA, ANS, ANA, ANTAQ, ANTT and ANCINE for the years 2002 to 2010, four indicators are calculated: budget availability, budget execution, financial execution, and budget and financial overlay. The averages of these partial indicators comprise a comprehensive indicator of financial autonomy. The results are compared between the agencies, between the generations of the agencies and between the sectors of activity of the agencies, using the technique of analysis of variance with a significance level of five percent. The evaluation of the financial autonomy of federal regulatory agencies is unexpected. Rejecting the initial hypotheses, the regulatory agencies of first generation have inferior results to those agencies from second and third generation, and infrastructure agencies have inferior results to social agencies. These results highlight the need to revise the model of budgetary and financial management designed for federal regulatory agencies. The legal provision of own sources of funds is not sufficient to ensure the financial autonomy of agencies to the extent that the central government makes use of increasingly frequent resources impoundments. / O sistema regulatório varia conforme a dotação institucional do país. Um componente do sistema regulatório é a governança regulatória, isto é, o conjunto de salvaguardas que limita ações discricionárias do regulador. No caso brasileiro, uma das salvaguardas é o desenho institucional das agências reguladoras. Este desenho é formado por uma série de elementos entre os quais se destaca a autonomia, comumente dividida em administrativa, financeira e política. O objetivo final deste estudo é avaliar a autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras federais. Quanto maior a autonomia financeira, mais robusta tende a ser a governança regulatória, pois melhor é o papel desempenhado pelo desenho institucional das agências como salvaguarda. Fortalecida, a governança contribui para a estabilidade de regras, reduz o risco regulatório e potencializa a atração de investimentos privados, o que, em última análise, alavanca o desenvolvimento econômico do país. Para alcançar o objetivo final, realiza-se pesquisa exploratória, descritiva e explicativa. Os meios utilizados são bibliográficos, documentais e estudo de múltiplos casos. Cada caso é selecionado de forma não probabilística por tipicidade e por acessibilidade, nesta ordem, a fim de se chegar a resultados contrastantes (replicação teórica). Estes critérios determinam a escolha de todas as agências reguladoras federais, com exceção da ANAC, em virtude da acessibilidade de seus dados orçamentários e financeiros. Assim, a partir dos dados da ANEEL, ANATEL, ANP, ANVISA, ANS, ANA, ANTAQ, ANTT e ANCINE referentes aos anos de 2002 a 2010, são calculados quatro indicadores: de disponibilidade orçamentária, de execução orçamentária, de execução financeira e de sobreposição orçamentária e financeira. As médias aritméticas desses indicadores parciais compõem um indicador global de autonomia financeira. Os resultados encontrados são comparados entre as agências, entre as gerações das agências e entre os setores de atuação das agências, utilizando-se a técnica da análise de variância a um nível de significância de cinco por cento. A avaliação da autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras federais é surpreendente. Rejeitando as hipóteses iniciais, as agências reguladoras de primeira geração obtêm resultados inferiores às agências de segunda e terceira geração, e as agências de infraestrutura resultados inferiores às agências sociais. Estes resultados evidenciam a necessidade de revisão do modelo de gestão orçamentária e financeira concebido para as agências reguladoras federais. A previsão legal de fontes próprias de recursos não é suficiente para assegurar a autonomia financeira das agências na medida em que o governo central faz uso cada vez mais frequente de contingenciamentos de recursos.

Over the last decade, a confluence of strategic and security concerns has threatened the European Union’s survival both within and beyond its political dimension. As a result, security and defence have risen to the top of the EU’s political agenda, culminating in the approval of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The EUGS represented a watershed moment in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: the EU agreed on ambitious levels of security and defence. The new policy is based on supporting capacity building among member states through instruments such as PESCO. Nonetheless, these instruments have caused variations in patterns of member state behaviour that have enhanced defense integration. This research aims to understand what was the PESCO institutional effect on Member States' preferences and how it has affected the European security and defense goals. The research highlights the role of European agencies and how they contributed to solve collective action problem through a ‘forum effect' on participants, using pro-actively the task of assessing co-operative projects proposals. As a result, PESCO’s institutional effect led to cooperative outcomes between nations that allowed them to overcome coordination dilemmas, namely uncertainty about the willingness to contribute to a common project, which is typical of defense cooperation. Here, we used Rational Choice Institutionalism theory to investigate the PESCO project structure and its interaction with the European Defence policy. Cooperation between participating member states is presented within a cooperative game action, as part of a theoretical approach to game theory. It explains formally how PESCO entails elements to overcome collective action problem among participating member states, while emphasising the institutional design that promoted the European interests, and how this has led to more Europeanised security and defence. Findings are interpreted under the Differentiated integration concept.

In this thesis I conduct a comparative analysis of the influence of socioeconomic actors, business and labor, on public policy in Germany and the United States, specifically public policy that has an impact on economic inequality. The objective of this study is to gain a better understanding of how institutional constructs may determine the level of influence by different socioeconomic actors on public policy. In particular, I examine the link between institutional design and economic inequality, specifically the relative influence of business interests in varying types of capitalist economies and democratic systems, and assess those facets of institutional design that may facilitate the channeling of business influence in policy making. I explore institutional changes in the German political and economic system beginning in the late 1980s to determine whether these changes have altered the policy making process over time, and analyze similarities with institutional changes that have taken place in the United States beginning in the late 1970s to present. Further, I examine whether shifts in institutional design indicate that the German system is transitioning towards a more liberal model similar to that of the United States, and consider what effects this may have on the level of economic inequality in Germany. To conduct my analysis I use the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework; based on the IAD framework I create a conceptual map of the channels by which socioeconomic actors are involved in the policy making process. I evaluate the policy-making process in both formal and informal policy arenas. The policy areas analyzed include corporate governance, industrial relations, and tax, welfare and minimum wage policy during the selected time periods. The analysis shows that the institutional designs that produced the selected policies benefit business interests and may contribute towards economic inequality. The larger goal is to develop research that will build a theoretical foundation to help us identify how these systems may be improved to produce a more equitable allocation of economic resources.

Quality assurance has been a vexed and troubled journey for private providers in South Africa in a complex and burdensome educational environment. It is well recognised that private providers are significant role-players in the provision of education and training in South Africa and the stated intention is to create a more enabling regulatory framework The focus of this thesis is on the private providers at the post-school level. The quality assurance regime was examined and contextualised to analyse what is required, and to determine how the private provider is impacted by the regulatory requirements for the establishment and operation of a private tuition provider in South Africa. The experience of private providers, CEOs of professional bodies, ETQA managers and ETD practitioners was investigated using a mixed methods research approach. The conclusion is a call for a far more streamlined system with a centralised oversight body, greater stakeholder consultation, less political interference and a deeper appreciation for the contribution that private providers make to the education of learners in South Africa. / Educational Leadership and Management / D. Ed. (Education Management)

公共政策是藉由重大公共議題的討論來分析政府活動的一種研究途徑，將公共政策的過程切割成議題設定、政策規劃、政策合法化、政策執行、政策評估及政策終結等階段，雖可以獲致清晰的流程架構，但此一單向的線性思考方式，不但簡化了政策問題解決的複雜性，亦會喪失政策過程的動態本質。再者，公共政策的研究領域日益蓬勃壯大，研究途徑與方法亦漸趨多元發展，理論概念與分析架構的整合自然日趨重要，如此將有助於研究者將研究議題與經驗資料作最佳的組合。是以，本研究採取非線性的政策動態概念，對政策的演變作一有系統性的探索，在融合有關政策變遷的各種觀點後，提出「政策體系」的理論概念，建立「宏觀」的分析架構作為探索政策變遷現象的基礎。 政策體系乃是以政策過程為焦點，所有與政策性質相關的要素，都可視為政策體系的構成要素。首先，政策是在開放的體系中形成、維持、接續與終結，自環境中汲取養分同時受到環境的限制，由此觀之，外在環境因素是政策體系中不可忽略的一環。其次，討論政策體系自然不能遺漏政策本身的因素，政策乃為解決社會問題而生，沒有社會問題的存在，當然就不會有政策制定的需求，另一方面，政策本身的組構方式則是攸關問題的解決與否。再者，在民主體制中，任何的政策形成與改變都必須取得正當性的依據，只有問題的存在並不保證一定會被政府所處理，必須通過政治結構的考驗才可能有政策產出。最後，政策體系是一個互動的體系，政策參與者之間就政策方案的選擇所從事的各種行為與活動，都可能影響最後的政策產出。歸納言之，一個完整的政策體系至少應該包括幾個要素：外在環境的因素、政策本身的特性、結構性因素的作用及政策行動者的互動行為，這些要素的互動作用會導致政策的變遷。 最後，政策是政府選擇目標與工具來解決社會問題的重要活動，它不是在真空中運作，而是不斷與社會進行互動的連續性過程，這也是政策走進歷史之前會出現變遷的原因，本研究雖然提出具有規範意涵的分析政策變遷的理論架構，但是基於「真實個案是檢驗理論效度的最佳途徑」的法則，本研究以民進黨首次執政時期所推動的停建核四政策個案為例，利用文本中所建立的分析架構來詮釋此一政策變遷的過程，並在結論中整合理論與個案的研究發現，就政策體系的各個面向提出幾個有關政策變遷的假設性命題，以供後續研究之參考與檢證，進而促成政策變遷知識的深化。 / Public policy is a research approach to analyze governmental activities by discussing public issues. However, in most articles, the policy process is seen as a logical succession of steps: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and policy termination. Although this progression of stages provides a clear and useful framework, it often obscures the complexities of public issues. In other words, most policies are not a process of linear development, from agenda setting to policy termination. Policy change is a common phenomenon. In this way, if we want to understand the dynamics of policy, it is helpful to take a nonlinear perspective. Policy change is used by a wide range of authors in public policy and other disciplines, but there is no consensus on what the definition of policy change is. In fact, this question has not been systematically explored until now. Policy change is not simply a label, but is an important part of the policy process. It is worth drawing more attention to this phenomenon. The aim of this study is to construct an analytical framework of policy change. Within this framework, we distinguish between different types of policy change: policy succession and policy termination, firstly. And we can find some cues from policy change, including organization, statutes, budget, personnel, and media. Secondly, we use the concept of policy system to connect with policy change. This concept contains several elements: external environment, policy attributes, institutional factor, and policy networks. These elements interact with each other to produce policy change. We use this framework to analyze policy discontinuity for the fourth nuclear power plant in 2000. Finally, policy is essentially about government. The major activity of government is seen as choosing goals and instruments to solve social problems. Policy does not exist in a vacuum; it is made in a concrete environment. We should see policy as a continuing process of social action and interaction. This is why policy may be changed before it is terminated. Finally, we provide some hypotheses and suggestions for further research at the end of this study.

論文提要 論文名稱：新制度經濟學對當代行政改革之啟示 頁數：335 校（院）所組別：國立政治大學公共行政系碩士班 提要別：八十七學年第二學期碩士學位論文提要 研究生：謝俊義 提要內容： 指導教授：孫本初博士 自一九九三年美國高爾副總統的『國家績效評估報告』（Al Gore Report of the National Performance Review）明確呼籲建立「師法企業的政府」（business-like entreneurial government），於是政府再造（reinventing government）的風潮引起全球大規模的行政改革運動，儼然成為當代世界各國政府謀求提昇政府效率的救世主；在學術界對這些名詞的爭辯，逐漸以新公共管理(New Public Management,NPM)一詞來整合。在這一波的行政改革運動是以經濟市場理論作為政治與行政關係的區分模型，究其本質乃是受到公共選擇理論、主要代理人理論以及交易成本經濟學假定的強烈影響。新制度主義在近幾年受到社會科學家廣泛的重視，在國際關係、比較公共政策、健保政策、歐洲共同體的決策與整合、公共行政等社會科學領域中廣泛的被應用，本論文主要是將「新制度主義帶進入行政改革」（Bringing New Institutionalism back in Administrative Reform）的分析之中。 本論文的研究目的即欲以新制度主義的經濟學途徑來分析市場導向的行政改革，試圖釐清下列幾個主題： 1.區分新制度主義各個途徑的差異，並藉此釐清新制度經濟學的理論意涵。 2.以市場與層級節制間的關係來探討效率導向的行政改革。 3.從對官僚體制的挑戰、消費者主權、制度性的績效與誘因策略以及制度的選擇等四個構面來分析行政改革的制度效率面。 4.本文欲以制度的變遷、公部門的集體行動、行政改革制度的多元弔詭、制度的設計以及認知的轉向等制度分析面向，解析效率為導向的行政改革運動所可能存在的問題。 5.透過以上的分析提出新制度主義經濟學對行政改革的啟示及優缺點，並進而對新制度主義的未來提出建議。 本論文認為要重建公共行政的價值應立基於公共行政對社會服務的價值與回應性，而非解構官僚體系（debureaucratization）或授權（deregulation），如何使得政府運作更有價值，組織具有創造力、回應力與責任，這是現代化政府的要務。以新制度經濟學來探討組織理論的關係，如果忽略了關鍵性的組織機制如權力、認同與協調，在解釋組織與市場間的關係是不夠完全；因此，必須以組織目標、結合組織認同、物質報酬以及監督來激勵員工的需求，對於制度角色的認知不能僅是化約為「硬性市場界限」(hard market constraints)與「軟性官僚界限」(soft bureaucratic constraints)的兩極化發展，而是採取多元化制度的發展。此外，筆者在研究過程中發現新制度主義到目前為止亦僅是各學科對於舊制度論的反省與修正，對於這個領域還存有許多分歧，嚴謹地說，並不算是學科的典範，如果這個領域要欲在社會科學的社群中能尋求認同與突破，必須在方法論與理論基礎上能有所共識，以及建立學術的對話機制。 目 錄 第壹章 緒 論-------------------------------------------------------------1-1 第一節 研究動機與目的------------------------------------------------1-1 第二節 研究方法與範圍------------------------------------------------1-6 第三節 相關名詞背景闡述---------------------------------------------1-11 第四節 研究流程與架構------------------------------------------------1-19 第貳章 相關文獻檢閱---------------------------------------------------2-1 第一節 新制度主義的興起---------------------------------------------2-1 第二節 新制度經濟學---------------------------------------------------2-20 第三節 新制度經濟學與新公共管理---------------------------------2-37 第四節 市場與層級節制------------------------------------------------2-55 第參章 制度的效率面---------------------------------------------------3-1 第一節 官僚體系的挑戰--------------------------------------------------3-1 第二節 消費者（顧客）主權--------------------------------------------3-19 第三節 制度性績效與誘因策略-----------------------------------------3-33 第四節 制度的策略性選擇-----------------------------------------------3-49 第肆章 制度的分析-------------------------------------------------------4-1 第一節 從組織重組到政府再造-----------------------------------------4-1 第二節 公部門的集體行動-----------------------------------------------4-22 第三節 行政改革制度的多元弔詭--------------------------------------4-41 第四節 制度的設計--------------------------------------------------------4-60 第五節 認知的轉向--------------------------------------------------------4-79 第伍章 綜合研究發現與建議--------------------------------------------5-1 第一節 新制度經濟學對行政改革之啟示-----------------------------5-1 第二節 新制度主義的批判與策進--------------------------------------5-17 參考書目---------------------------------------------------------------------註1 中文參考書目--------------------------------------------------------------註1 英文參考書目--------------------------------------------------------------註5 圖表目錄 壹、圖目錄 圖1-1：研究架構圖------------------------------------------------------------1-19 圖1-2：研究流程---- ----------------------------------------------------------1-20 圖2-1：交易成本架------------------------------------------------------------2-29 圖4-1：財貨的分類------------------------------------------------------------4-27 貳、表目錄 表1-1：國內新制度主義相關博碩士論文檢閱---------------------------1-8 表2-1：新舊制度論之差------------------------------------------------------2-3 表2-2：新制度主義各個途徑異同處---------------------------------------2-5 表2-3：新制度主義相關學派表徵------------------------------------------2-6 表2-4：新制度經濟學的多重面---------------------------------------------2-33 表2-5：對傳統公共行政學說的四項批判---------------------------------2-42 表2-6：新公共管理的學理基------------------------------------------------2-45 表2-7：新公共管理的四項模型---------------------------------------------2-49 表2-8：公共行政的研究途---------------------------------------------------2-52 表2-9：市場、層級節制與網路的特徵------------------------------------2-55 表2-10：組織的模式：市場、層級節制與區----------------------------2-70 表3-1：公私關係與服務傳遞的公民與顧客導向模型------------------3-23 表3-2：組織結構設計的方---------------------------------------------------3-58 表3-3：B.Guy Peters的四種治理模------------------------------------------3-58 表3-3：公部門改革的目的與手段------------------------------------------3-62 表3-4：策略與結果------------------------------------------------------------3-63 表4-1：二十世紀迄今美國總統設立行政改革委員會及計畫一覽---4-9 表4-2：我國政府遷台後行政改革的歷史演進---------------------------4-13 表4-3：維持長期共同集合資源制度設計的原則------------------------4-33 表4-4：承諾的兩種觀點：組織行為與理性選擇------------------------4-39 表4-5：轉換公部門的五項基因---------------------------------------------4-71 表4-6：制度設計的種類與方法---------------------------------------------4-76 表5-1：理性選擇學派與社會詮釋觀點的差異---------------------------5-23 表5-2：新制度主義的核心---------------------------------------------------5-27 表5-3：三種新制度主義型式的比較---------------------------------------5-29

我國勞工退休金新制自2005年7月1日開始實施，由過去的確定給付制改為具有確定提撥特色的「個人帳戶制」。對於勞工而言，確定提撥制和過去確定給付制不同之處在於承擔退休金投資風險的責任將由雇主轉由個人承擔。如何透過退休機制的設計以降低退休金的投資風險是近年來的重要議題，因此本文主要從個人偏好與風險的觀點探討保證投資收益率制度與制度轉換選擇權等兩個降低確定提撥制投資風險的重要配套措施。 在本論文的第一篇研究中發現，資產配置與國際投資對保證成本的影響頗大，在個人可選擇資產配置的情況下，高投資風險的資產選擇將造成政府未來龐大的或有負債。為了解決政府保證成本過高造成代內與代間的財富移轉，本文從使用者付費與個人效用的觀點探討保證投資收益率制度的設計，發現藉由設立保證投資收益上限可提升風險趨避者、損失趨避者與後悔趨避者等偏好下的預期效用，且能降低個人管理下方風險所需的提撥成本與退休計畫參加者所需繳交的保證費用，故建議政府可將投資收益率上限納入保證投資收益率制度，供退休計畫參加者選擇合於本身偏好的保證收益率上限。 在近來許多國家的公、民營退休體系由過去以確定給付制改為確定提撥制，為了降低在確定提撥制下的退休金投資風險，在美國的佛羅里達州之公務人員退休體系中，存在著可供個人選擇是否轉換到確定給付制的機制。在我國勞退新制中除了從過去的確定給付制改為確定提撥制外，亦輔以「年金保險制」供勞工選擇與轉換，若年金保險制具有確定給付制的特徵，則勞工等於是擁有一個從確定提撥轉換轉到確定給付制的選擇權，因此制度選擇權的探討對我國而言亦是相當地重要。在本論文的第二篇研究中發現，當風險趨避程度越高則轉換至確定給付制的機率越高，轉換到確定給付制的高峰期會出現在開始工作的初期與屆臨退休之際等兩段期間。隨著工作期間的延長，個人轉換到確定給付制的機率越低，但仍可有效地提升退休金的所得替代率與達到降低退休金下方風險的效果，在加入退休制度初期不得轉換的限制之後，會降低轉換到確定給付制的機率。 / The Labor Retirement Pension Act enacted in 2005 introduced defined contribution (DC) pension plan for substituting the traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan. In the defined contribution pension plan, the investment risk is transferred to the participants. However, the design of rate of return guarantee makes the investment risk less severe for participants. In the first essay, we find that the asset allocation and foreign investment have large impact on the guarantee cost: the high risky investment may result in large potential liability of the government in the future if participants have the investment portfolio choice. This study develops a framework to analyze design of rate of return guarantee from the financial engineering and user paid principle view. We find that the cap of investment return guarantee not only increases the expected utility of risk aversion, loss aversion and regret aversion, but also decreases the contribution cost to participant associated with managing the downside risk. Around the world, the defined contribution (DC) plans have been the primary trend of pension reform in the both public and private sector. In an attempt to decrease the investment risk associated with DC plan, the public employees are provided with an option to buy back DB plan in the Florida State of U.S.A. In the second essay, we find that the higher level of risk aversion is, the higher probability to buy back DB plan is. During the employee’s early years of service and as the employees near retirement, the probability to exercise the option is the highest. The probability to exercise the option is decreasing with the years of service being increasing; the option also increase the pension replacement rate as well as decrease the downside risk of pension. The probability to exercise the option is lower, when the option to buy back the DB plan is prohibited during the employee’s early years of service.