We all have stories to share, to build, to pass around, to inherit, and to create. This story - the one I piece together now - is about a Thai-/Bengali-/Muslim-/American-/Feminist looking for home, looking to manage the tension and conflict of wanting to belong to her family and to her feminist community. This thesis focuses on the seemingly conflicting obligations to kinship on the one hand and to feminist practice on the other, a conflict where being a good scholar or activist is directly in opposition to being a good Asian daughter. In order to understand how and why these communities appear at odds with one another, I examine how the material spaces and psychological realities inhabited by specific hyphenated, fragmented subjects are represented (and misrepresented) in both popular culture and practical politics, arguing against images of the hybrid body that bracket its lived tensions. I argue that fantasies of home as an unconditional site of belonging and comfort distract us from the multiple communities to which hyphenated subjects must move between. Hyphenated Asian-/American bodies often find ourselves torn between nativism and assimilationism - having to neutralize, forsake, or discard parts of our identities. Thus, I reduce complicated, difficult ideas of being to the size of a thimble, to a question of loyalty between my Asian-/American history and my American-/feminist future, between my familial background and the issues that have become foregrounded for me during college, between the home from which I originate and the new home to which I wish to belong. To move with fluidity, I must - in collaboration with others - invent new stories of identity and belonging.

På senare tid har de uppmärksammade härjningarna och våldsamma metoderna som används av Islamiska Staten i Irak och Syrien (ISIS) bidragit till en ökad oro och diskussion om vad som får muslimska ungdomar ifrån väst att ansluta sig till sådana hänsynslösa organisationer. Mot bakgrund av detta ville jag undersöka vilka tankar och antaganden som konstruerar en muslimsk ungdoms världsbild avseende identitet och tillhörighet. Denna studie syftar därför till att uppnå ökad förståelse för hur fenomenet radikalisering kan relateras till identitetsskapande hos muslimska ungdomar och vilka processer i identitetsskapandet som kan utgöra en risk för vägen mot radikalisering. För att lyckas med detta har jag utfört semistrukturerade utforskande djupintervjuer med muslimska ungdomar i Malmö. Min avsikt med denna studie har inte varit att utgå från att alla muslimska ungdomar är, eller har potential för att bli radikaliserade. Min avsikt har snarare varit att utforska hur identitet och tillhörighet kan säga något om vägar (pathways) till radikalisering oavsett av religiös tillhörighet. För att analysera informanternas berättelser har begrepp och ramverk från Social identitetsteori använts. Studien påvisar en stabil grund för bi-kulturell identifiering med en svensk och en muslimsk kontext bland ungdomarna som ingått i denna studie. Samtidigt går det att spåra en kluvenhet i att på grund av sin religiösa identitet inte alltid accepteras fullt ut i alla sammanhang och en känsla av medialt utpekande av muslimer som grupp. Informanternas berättelser synliggör också en upplevd intern konflikt bland muslimska samfund då terrorism som utförs i islams namn tvingar medlemmar i gruppen att både internt och externt markera ställningstagande i frågan om religiöst motiverat våld och terrorism. Denna konflikt i kombination med ett upplevt utanförskap som svensk muslim kan i sig vara grunden för att vissa ungdomar vänder sig in i andra delar av den muslimska gruppen för att söka acceptans och bekräftelse. I denna process finner en del av dessa ungdomar radikala och extrema rörelser. Dessa rörelser är isolerade från omvärldens intryck vilket möjliggör för extremism att gro. När medlemmar inom en sådan grupp vill öka sin status kan beteende och handlingar eskalera vilket kan leda till våld och terrorism. Ett sätt att förhindra denna väg mot radikalisering av unga muslimer skulle således kunna vara att skapa förutsättningar för muslimska ungdomar att kunna känna tillhörighet i sina olika sociala identiteter som både svensk och muslim. / As the brutality and violent means of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become evident a general concern and public discussion has emerged about what makes young Muslims from the Western world to join such devious organizations. In light of this I wanted to examine the thoughts and assumptions that constructs the feelings of identity and belonging of young Muslims in the city of Malmo. This study thus aims to create a wider understanding of how the phenomenon of radicalization can be related to identities of Muslim youth and how the processes of forming identity can compose a risk for the individual to find pathways to radicalization. To accomplish this explorative semi-structured interviews with young Muslims in Malmo was conducted. My intention with this study has not been to assume that all Muslim youth is, or has the potential to become radicalized. My intention rather has been to explore how identity and belonging can tell something about routes (pathways) to radicalization regardless of religious affiliation. To analyze the stories of the young Muslims who participated in this study concepts and frameworks from Social Identity Theory has been applied. This study shows that among the young Muslims participating in this study there is a stable basis for a bi-cultural identification with both a Swedish and a Muslim context. It is though possible to trace some ambivalence in the bi-cultural identity of these individuals as their experience as being Muslims e.g. their religious identity are not always compatible or fully accepted in all contexts. Additionally the participants also perceive that Muslims as a group is being publicly singled out and criticized by media. The stories also reveals a perceived internal conflict among Muslim communities as terrorism conducted in the name of Islam compels members of the Muslim group to both internally and externally mark position concerning religiously motived violence and terrorism. This conflict joint with the experience of exclusion among Swedish Muslim can potentially become the reason for some young Muslims to turn into the wide range of Muslim communities in search for acceptance and affirmation. In this process some individuals will find radical and extremist movements. The isolation these movements/groups experience from outside impressions then enables extremism to flourish inside the group. When members of such a group strives to improve individual status the behavior and actions of the group can escalate which in turn can result in violence and terrorism. Thus to avoid this pathway to radicalization the solution lies in creating conditions that allows for young Muslims to feel belonging and inclusion in their bi-cultural identities as being both Swedish and Muslims.

Les attentats du 7 juillet 2005 à Londres ont causé un choc et un effroi dans la société britannique non seulement à cause du nombre important des victimes mais aussi en raison de la citoyenneté britannique des kamikazes. A l’exception de Germaine Lindsay qui était d’origine jamaïcaine, les autres membres de la cellule – Mohammed Siddiq Khan, Shehzad Tanweer et Hussib Hussain - étaient tous d’origine pakistanaise. Les kamikazes du 7 juillet 2005 n’étaient pas les seuls Britanniques d’origine pakistanaise impliqués dans des actes de terrorisme. Avant 2005, ils étaient nombreux à aller combattre auprès d’organisations djihadistes pakistanaises au Cachemire ou à commettre des tentatives d’attentat sur le sol britannique, comme ce fut le cas de la cellule de Luton en 2004. Après 2005, d’autres cellules, comme celle de Birmingham en 2011, ont essayé de commettre des attentats à une plus grande échelle. L’origine pakistanaise des auteurs, leur intérêt pour le conflit au Cachemire et leur entrainement paramilitaire dans les camps d’organisations djihadistes pakistanaises sont autant d'éléments communs qui nous ont conduit à nous interroger sur la nature de la radicalisation violente en Grande-Bretagne. Cette thèse examine la dimension pakistanaise de la radicalisation islamiste violente en Grande-Bretagne en se basant sur la théorie des mouvements sociaux, notamment le modèle de Quintan Wiktorowicz, selon lequel la radicalisation est le fruit de griefs politiques, socio-économiques et d’idéologie. Elle s’appuie sur dix études de cas : trois organisations djihadistes pakistanaises (Lashkar e-Toiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen et Jaish e-Mohammed), trois organisations extrémistes transnationales (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun et Supporters of Sharia) et quatre mouvements de l’islam sud-asiatiques (Ahl e-Hadith, déobandi, Tablighi Jamaat et Jamaat e-Islami). La thèse démontre qu’il y a une dimension spécifiquement pakistanaise de la radicalisation islamiste violente en Grande-Bretagne en raison de l’histoire coloniale, le conflit au Cachemire, la « guerre contre la terreur » et l’intervention militaire en Afghanistan. / The 7 July 2005 London bombings caused shock and awe in the British society not only because of the important number of casualties, but also due to the British citizenship of the bombers. With the exception of Germaine Lindsay, who was of Jamaican descent, all the other members of the cell - Mohammed Siddiq Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hussib Hussain - had Pakistani background. The London bombers were not the only British Pakistanis who were involved in acts of terrorism. Before 2005, many went to fight alongside the Pakistani jihadi organisations in Kashmir or plotted against Britain such as the Luton cell in 2004. After 2005, other cells, like the one in Birmingham in 2011, planned attacks on a bigger scale on British soil. The Pakistani origin of the perpetrators, their interest in Kashmir and their paramilitary training in camps belonging to Pakistani jihadi organisations were common features that have raised questions about the nature of violent radicalisation in Britain. This thesis examines the Pakistani dimension of violent radicalisation in Britain by building on social movement theory, especially on Quintan Wiktorowicz’ model, according to which radicalisation is the result of political, socio-economic grievances and ideology. This research is based on ten case studies: three Pakistani jihadi organisations (Lashkar e-Toiba, Harakat ul-Mujahideen and Jaish e-Mohammed), three extremist transnational organisations (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun and Supporters of Sharia) and four South-Asian Islamic mouvements (Ahl e-Hadith, Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat and Jamaat e-Islami). The thesis shows that there is specifically a Pakistani dimension to the violent islamist radicalisation in Britain due to the colonial history, the conflict in Kashmir, the ‘’war on terror’’ and the military intervention in Afghanistan.

This paper aims to provide the grounds for a biopsychosocial understanding of the underpinnings of conspiracy theorist ideation by studying research articles from different scientific disciplines. Cross-disciplinary concurring results are presented and discussed, as well as some examples of how conspiracy theories have been used during the 20th century. Also discussed is how this is used in political discourse in the populist climate of today, with the rise of radical right-wing movements, the justification of “alternative facts” from higher governmental ranks, and religious fundamentalism, making it a societal issue of possible big magnitude. Neurological similarities was found between religiousness and proneness to conspiracy theory ideation, and the articles concerning neural correlates therefore stem from research on religious individuals due to the lack of neuro-biopsychological research on actual conspiracy theorists. Since conspiracy theory ideation has shown the ability to cause negative consequences it is also advised that governmental agencies and society as a whole revise its stance on populism and the spread of flawed information, in order to maintain an open society. Also presented are a few ideas on how to begin countering the rise of populism.

Majoriteten av jordens befolkning har profiler på något av den handfull av sociala nätverk som dominerar Internet. Samtidigt som dessa tjänster växer i dominans och användarantal upplevs det ofta att användarupplevelsen blir allt sämre. Kritik har bland annat riktats mot hur de låter desinformation spridas och hur de monetäriserar användardata för att sälja målstyrd reklam. Enshittification är ett fenomen som definierades av techjournalisten och -kritikern Cory Doctorow för att beskriva hur dessa plattformar aktivt gör upplevelsen sämre för användarna. Enshittification gör gällande att användare stannar på plattformar som exploaterar dem på grund av höga omställningskostnader, såväl ekonomiska som sociala, trots en uppenbar försämring av den digitala miljön. Forskningsarbetet som presenteras här är en teoriutvecklande kritisk studie av enshittification och hur det manifesteras inom sociala medieplattformar. Studiens syfte är att grunda fenomenet och etablera en dialog kring enshittification i en IS-kontext. Den erbjuder insikter i enshittifications underliggande orsaker och dess konsekvenser för användarna, men även i hur man kan motverka fenomenet. Studien argumenterar även för att kritisk teori behövs inom IS för att kunna analysera sådana här fenomen och relaterade sociala aspekter inom informationsteknik. / A majority of the world’s population today resides on social media. At the same time a small group of platforms dominate the social media landscape. While these services have experienced great growth both in terms of registered users and market dominance, they’ve also been heavily criticized for the way the user experience seems to have deteriorated over time, particularly in respect to how disinformation is spreading throughout the networks and the way these services monetize their users’ personal data. Enshittification is a phenomenon, coined by the tech journalist and -critic Cory Doctorow, that describes the way these platforms actively work to make the user experience worse. The phenomenon asserts that people will keep using services that exploit them due to high switching costs—of either personal or economic nature, or both—even though the user experience deteriorates. This study offers a grounding theory of enshittification as a phenomenon, along with a critical perspective of its manifestation in social networks. Its purpose is to create a definition of the phenomenon and to establish a dialogue within the research field of information systems. The study also offers greater insight into the underpinnings of enshittification and its consequences for the end users, along with a critical reflection over possible mitigation strategies. It also argues that critical theory is needed in the field of IS research in order to be able to analyze phenomenons like enshittification and similar social aspects that manifest themselves within information technology.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In this study, rhetorical analysis through the framework of victimage ritual is employed to analyze four Boko Haram messages on You Tube, five e-mail messages sent to journalists from leaders of Boko Haram, and a BlogSpot web page devoted to Boko Haram. The aim of this analysis is to understand the persuasive devices by which Boko Haram leaders create, express, and sustain their jurisprudence on acts of violence. The goal of this study is to understand how leaders of Boko Haram construct and express the group’s values, sway belief, and justify violence. The findings show that Boko Haram desire to redeem non-Muslims from perdition, liberate Muslims from persecution, protect Islam from criticism, and revenge perceived acts of injustices against Muslims. The group has embarked on this aim by allotting blame, vilifying the enemy-Other, pressing for a holy war, encouraging martyrdom, and alluding to an apocalypse. Boko Haram’s audience is made to believe that Allah has assigned Boko Haram the task to liberate and restore an Islamic haven in Nigeria. Therefore, opposition from the Nigerian government or Western forces is constructed as actions of evil, thus killing members of the opposition becomes a celestial and noble cause. This juxtaposition serves to encourage the violent Jihad which leaders of Boko Haram claims Allah assigned them to lead in the first place. As a result of this cyclical communication, media houses, along the Nigerian government, Christians and Western ideals become the symbolic evil, against which Muslims, sympathizers and would-be-recruits must unite. By locking Islam against the Nigerian government, Western ideals and Christianity in a characteristically hostile manner, Boko Haram precludes any real solution other than an orchestrated Jihad-crusade-or-cleanse model in which a possible coexistence of Muslims and the enemy-Other are denied, and the threat posed by the enemy-Other is eliminated through conversion or destruction. As a result, this study proposes that Boko Haram Internet messages Boko Haram’s mission reveals a movement of separatism, conservatism, and fascism. A movement based on the claim that its activism will establish a state in accordance with the dictates of Allah.