Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

L'intérêt de l'humanité pour la connaissance se joue sur deux fronts : celui de la réduction de l'ignorance, et celui de l'action tant individuelle que collective. Aussi la manière dont nous acquérons le savoir est-elle essentielle, parce qu'elle préjuge aussi bien de notre perception du monde que de notre conscience de nous-mêmes et de la société. Car si, avec la raison comme alliée, l'homme se découvre des potentialités illimitées, nous aurions pourtant tort de passe outre une stricte réalité, celle de notre ignorance infinie, celle, au fond, de notre incapacité à cerner, de façon sûre et certaine, quoi que ce soit de ce monde complexe et en évolution constante qui nous accueille. C'est pourquoi, pour Karl Popper, toute rationalité véritable doit être critique, c'est-à-dire pluraliste et débattante, seule façon de considérer objectivement l'écart qui nous sépare de la vérité et, par suite, d'agir avec prudence et discernement, dans l'intérêt de la science comme dans celui de la collectivité. / Our interest for knowledge is based on two essential principles : the first one aims at reducing ignorance while the second one emphasizes individual and collective actions. So, the way we acquire knowledge is essential as it foresees at the same time our perception of the world as well as our being aware of our existence and that of the society as a whole. Indeed, if the Man uses reason his ally, he will discover unlimited potentialities, then we will be mistaken in not taking in consideration this strict reality of our unlimited ignorance, the one that, in reality, anf from the bottom of our not being able to certainly and surely encircle anything in this fast-growing world that dewells us. That is why Karl Popper, any real rationality has to be critical, it means pluralist and debating. That is the only way to separate the gap between us and the truth, and then, lead us to act with caution and discernment ib the interest of science and in the interest of the community.

La thèse propose une nouvelle théorie de l’argumentation – bidimensionnelle – reposant sur deux paramètres :la force et l’orientation. Quatre types de marqueurs sont identifiés, articulés autour de ces deux paramètres. <p>Le chapitre 1 porte sur le réductionnisme topique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments sont défaisables, c’est-à-dire réfutables.<p>Le chapitre 2 retrace l’histoire du réductionnisme logique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments valides sont indéfaisables. L’argument étudié est la définition.<p>Le chapitre 3 présente la théorie bidimensionnelle, qui explique à la fois les arguments défaisables et indéfaisables.<p>Les chapitre 3 et 4 sont une application de la théorie bidimensionnelle de l’argumentation.<p>Le chapitre 4 étudie l’argument appelé présomption. <p>Le chapitre 5 offre un traitement nouveau de l’argument a fortiori.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Jakub Mihálik: Consciousness in Nature. A Russellian Approach Abstract: This thesis attempts to provide a philosophical answer to the question of how phenomenal consciousness, or experience, can exist in the physical world, i.e. in the world as it is described by science. The thesis has three parts: In the first part (chapter 1) I explicate the concept of phenomenal consciousness and contrast it with other concepts of consciousness common in the literature. Moreover, I suggest that the project pursued in this thesis can be naturally viewed as a part of the more general project of trying to find a stereoscopic view of man, taken by Wilfrid Sellars to be a crucial task for contemporary philosophy. In the second part of the thesis (chapters 2 to 4) I offer a detailed evaluation of the attempts at a materialist reduction of consciousness. While in chapter 2 I explore and critique the approach of apriori physicalism (Dennett, Lewis, Rey, etc.), in chapters 3 and 4, I focus on the more recent doctrine of a posteriori physicalism and especially its most prominent variety called the phenomenal concept strategy (Loar, Papineau, Levin, Schroer, etc.). One problem with a posteriori physicalism is that, as Nida-Rümelin, Goff and others argue, the view cannot make sense of the plausible thesis that our phenomenal...

The mission over the last few decades, especially of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, has focused on “confessionalism”. In this specific sense of mission growth—numeric growth— has been a priority, and, unfortunately, not caring for “broken” people. The emphasis has been placed on the age-old proclamation of the “truth”, at the expense of social involvement, as it seems that “truth” transcends the needs of people, even of Christians. This has led to the restricting of the scope of pastoral care, and has limited it to an “applied theology”, where the Old Testament and New Testament studies have dictated its structure and methodology. Within Adventism its view and use of Scripture has dominated its ministry, indicating a number of different methods and approaches. These differences in both the conservative and the liberal orientations only represent their own possibilities. These approaches are the result of a basic understanding of Scripture as a body of divine teachings that needs to be accepted, believed, and obeyed. Consequently, this perception has moved the focus away from caring to the “so-called” correct doctrine of “truth” and proclamation. Postmodernism, however, is challenging the assumptions of modernism and is now confronting us with the understanding that there is no “objective truth”, and that there cannot be a completely detached observer. We observe reality, experience and Scripture not objectively, but rather discern them through the eyes of our own context, experience and history. The thesis, therefore, postulates as useful, just and proper that we experience reality in a narrative fashion within a secular postmodern world. It is through stories that we grasp and appreciate the important factors in our lives. Consequently, a narrative approach is appraised as being a more meaningful tool in approaching Scripture and pastoral care. Narratives are like rituals, they preserve the memory of past events in a way that they still have power for us in the present. As Jesus is a servant of everybody His narratives are transposed and they become accounts of our involvement in the lives of our fellow “sufferers”. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Practical Theology)

Submitted by Paulo Uzai Júnior null (paulouzai@gmail.com) on 2016-08-25T20:01:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 [final-final]Dissertação_Paulo Uzai Junior_Pos-Filosofia_ A relação mente-corpo em John Searle.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-08-29T17:17:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 uzaijunior_p_me_mar.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T17:17:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 uzaijunior_p_me_mar.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Há mais de três décadas, o filósofo estadunidense John Rogers Searle voltou-se para as questões de filosofia da mente, donde apresenta sua solução para os variados problemas acerca da natureza do mental. Sua primeiro incursão se deu com o livro Intentionality, onde seu principal objetivo não era, num primeiro momento, solucionar problemas referentes a essa questão, mas sim oferecer uma fundamentação conceitual mais sólido para sua teoria dos atos de fala. Contudo, a partir deste livro Searle se volta decisivamente para questões propriamente de filosofia da mente. Um de seus principais focos é a relação entre mente-corpo, onde ele acredita que a solução teórico-cenceitual para tal questão não é tão difícil quanto pensamos. Porém ele não deixa de abordar uma série de outros temas afins que julga de extrema importância na consolidação de seu escopo teórico, tal como o problema da causação mental e a subjetividade humana. Dessa forma, a presente dissertação tem por objetivo principal apresentar, discutir e avaliar criticamente a solução que Searle propõe a esses quatro problemas centrais da filosofia da mente: relação mente-corpo, causação mental, subjetividade e intencionalidade. Os três primeiros capítulos têm por objetivo mostrar como Searle enxerga essas questões, ou seja, o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada. No capítulo quatro iremos apresentar as principais críticas à solução de John Searle, focando-nos numa abordagem temática. Dessa forma, apresentaremos críticas a esses quatro temas que Searle julga serem essenciais em filosofia da mente e sobre o qual construiu seu naturalismo biológico. Por fim, faremos uma avaliação crítica do que foi apresentado. Com isso iremos analisar qual o peso das críticas feitas à filosofia searlena, o que acreditamos estar correto nela e o que discordamos. / There is more than thirty years, the American philosopher John Rogers Searle turned around to the questions of philosophy of mind, whence presents his solution to varied problems about the nature of mental. His first incursion occurred with the book Intentionality, where your main objective was not to solve, at first, problems relating to this issue, but rather to offer a theoretical grounding more solid to his theory of speech acts. However, from this book Searle turns to questions specifically of philosophy of mind. One of his main focus is the relationship between mind-body, where he believes that the solution theoretical-conceptual for that question is not so difficult as we thought. Nevertheless he is not leave of to broach a number of other related topics that he considers of utmost importance in the consolidation of his theoretical scope, such as the causation mental problem and the human subjectivity. Thereby, the present dissertation have for main objective to show, to discuss and critically evaluate the solution that Searle proposes these four central problems of the philosophy of mind: mind-body relationship, mental causation, subjectivity and intentionality. The first three chapters aims to show as Searle see these questions, in other words, what he believes to be wrong in philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution. In chapter four, we will go to show the main critics to John Searle's solution, focusing in a thematic approach. Thus we will present critics of these four subjects that Searle believes to be essentials in philosophy of mind, about which built your biological naturalism. Lastly, we will make a critically evaluate of what was presented. Therewith we will go to analyze the what weight of criticisms to Searle's philosophy, what qe believe to be right and what we disagree.

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In the course of this thesis, decisive problematizations, in the Foucauldian sense, around Viktor Šklovskij’s early Russian Formalism shall be the object of re-problematizations. More precisely, a careful look will be taken at re-problematizations around theoretical aspects regarding Šklovskij’s paradigmatic reductionist model, primarily as it is introduced in his article Art as device (1917), described most notably by Aage Hansen-Löve and Wolf Schmid in Der Russische Formalismus (1978) and Slavische Erzähltheorie (2010), Elemente der Narratologie (2014) as well as Grundthemen der Literaturwissenschaft: Erzählen (2018) respectively. The thesis will distinguish four main problematizations divided into two parts, taking the Marxist-Leninist debate on Formalism stirred by People’s Commissar Trotsky and the Nietzschean Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy characteristic of Russian Modernism as its starting points, encompassing the problematizations as a whole. The initial part of the thesis will address re-problematizations around Šklovskij’s formalist polemics with and misinterpretation of Alexandr Potebnja’s Humboldtian theories, as they appear chiefly in the monograph Thought and Language (1862), in order to illustrate how Šklovskij’s frames a continuum with Potebnja descending from the teachings of Wilhelm von Humboldt. The re-problematizations shall be underpinned by Victor Erlich in Russian Formalism. History – Doctrine (1980), Jacqueline Fontaine in La « innere Form » : de Potebnja aux formalistes (2006) and Serge Tchougounnikov in The formal method in Germany and Russia: the beginnings of European psycholinguistics (2018). The second part of the thesis will foreground the (French) (post)structuralist discourse which, according to this thesis, shapes the formation of problematizations around Šklovskij’s immanent reductionism against the backdrop of Boris Tomaševskij’s interpretation of Formalism in Teorija literatury. Poetika (1925) and also the ideological exchange of the 1920s, assuming this backdrop as part of a definitive understanding and materialist critique of Šklovskij’s reductionist terminology, the homogeneity of its outcome, and what Wolf Schmid calls its anti-substantialism particularly in regards to the binary concept fabula and sjužet. The re-problematizations evolve around what is taken as a materialist solution to these problematizations, which annulls the Aristotelian significance of sjužet as energeia by replacing it with ergon. The discussion will take its point of departure in Göran Sonesson’s article Semiotics of art, life, and thought: Three scenarios for (post)modernity (2011) and search the basis for Sonesson’s argument in Roland Barthes’ article Ecrivains et écrivants (1960). By highlighting Šklovskij’s early Formalism as a mode of experiencing Art on its own terms, this thesis aims to revive its aesthetic principle and the question whether it can enlighten modern literary science.

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