監察制度（control system）是民主體制中重要的監督機制，主要的功能是監督行政和保障人權，隨著第三波民主化的發展，從一九八０年代開始，監察使制度（ombudsman system）快速擴散至全世界，形成一股「監察風潮」（Ombudsmania）。在民主國家中，我國與芬蘭都是實施監察制度較悠久的國家，僅次於瑞典。無獨有偶，兩國都在一九九０年至二０００年進行一連串的憲政改革，修憲後我國政府體制從修正式的內閣制（Parliamentarism）轉變為半總統制（Semi-Presidentialism），而芬蘭則從典型的半總統制傾向議會內閣制。同時在憲政改革的過程中，兩國的監察制度也都有許多的變革。 本文是從權力分立原則（Doctrine of Separation of Powers）、有限政府（Limited Government）和第四權（The Fourth Branch of Power）概念等監察理論作為法理基礎，並以法制研究途徑（Legal-Institutional Approach）和新制度主義（New Institutionalism）作為分析架構，從靜態的法制層面和動態的運作層面，探討我國的監察制度和芬蘭的國會監察使制度，以及兩國在二０００年憲政改革之後的運作情況，以瞭解兩國制度之特色及優劣，並且針對中、芬兩國基本國情、監察制度的基本差異、制度與制度變遷、實務運作與案件、實施成效等幾個面向來作分析比較，剖析其間之異同及其原因。 再者，本文也根據國際性比較與芬蘭國會監察使制度之優點和成功經驗，歸納出監察制度實施成功之條件，包括：（一）監察使「權威」（authority）的建立。（二）具備獨立性、中立性和專業性的特性。（三）健全的國家廉政體系。（四）國會的支持與配合。（五）政治人物對監察使和監察制度的尊重。（六）監察使與外界建立良好的互動關係。並進一步評估我國現行監察制度之問題，主要有下列幾項：（一）形式獨立但實質獨立性不足。（二）監察院的權威未建立。（三）部分監委人選不適任。（四）監察院的功能有待提升。（五）缺乏行銷以及與外界互動不足。 最後，筆者針對以上缺失，分別從監察院的定位、組織規模、監委選任、特殊監察使的設立、監察院的職權、監察院的預算、人權保障、與外界互動、對監委的監督等幾個面向，提出具體改革之建議。 / The control system is an important mechanism in democracy to supervise administration and to protect human rights. Since 1980, with the development of the third wave democratization, the ombudsman system rapidly disseminate to all parts of world, forming the phenomenon of “Ombudsmania”. Among the democratic countries, the control system has been carried out for long in both ROC and Finland, only shorter than Sweden Coincidently, both countries underwent a series of constitutional reform during 1990 to 2000. Thereafter, ROC transformed from the revised Parliamentarism to the Semi-Presidentialism, while Finland turned from the classical Semi-Presidentialism to the parliamentarism. The control systems of both countries have also changed a lot during the constitutional reform. Based on the control theories including concepts of Doctrine of Separation of Powers, Limited Government, and The Fourth Branch of Power as the legal basis, this article utilized the Legal-Institutional Approach and the analysis constructs of New Institutionalism to explore the ROC’s control system and parliamentary ombudsman system of Finland, as well as their operation after the post-constitutional reform in 2000, from the static legislative level and the dynamic operational level. This provided understanding of the characteristics and evaluations of the systems in both countries. Moreover, we focused on the aspects of the essential differences in cultures and in the control systems, the evolution of the systems, the functioning, the cases, and their outcomes to analyze the reasons for the differences between the two systems. Furthermore, based on the international comparison and the success experience in parliamentary ombudsman of Finland, the conditions required for successful practice of the control system was involved: (1) establishment of the authority of the ombudsman, (2) the independent, neutral, and professional characteristics, (3) The national integrity system, (4) the support and cooperation of the parliament, (5) The respect of the politicians to the ombudsman and to the control system, and (6) The well-established interaction between the ombudsman and the outside. Further evaluation found the major problems in the present control system in ROC, including (1) lack of the substantial independence, (2) not established authority, (3) the incapability of some Control Yuan members, (4) the necessity to improve the functions of the Control Yuan, (5) the deficiency of marketing and of interaction with the outside. Finally, for the weakness mentioned above, I proposed the concrete recommendation for reformation, from the aspects of the position of the Control Yuan, the dimension of the organization, the election of the committee members, the establishment of specific Ombudsman, the powers and the budgets for the Control Yuan, the protection of human rights, the interactions with the outside, and the administrations of the committee members.

Une bourse d'études du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines (CRSH) a été accordée à l'auteur pour la réalisation de ce projet de recherche. / Suite à l’étude de la genèse de deux régimes occupant une place fondamentale en droit du travail québécois, soit le régime public de réparation des lésions professionnelles institué par la Loi sur les accidents du travail et les maladies professionnelles, et l’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable, issue du droit à l’égalité consacré à l’article 10 de la Charte québécoise, ce mémoire s’intéresse au déploiement du conflit normatif et du conflit juridictionnel découlant de l’évolution en parallèle de ces deux sources d’obligations pour les employeurs, dont l’objet est la réintégration et le maintien du lien d’emploi du salarié atteint d’un handicap. Cette étude propose ensuite d’explorer les conséquences juridiques de la solution retenue par la Cour d’appel du Québec, dans l’arrêt Caron rendu en juin 2015, laquelle décide de juxtaposer une obligation d’accommodement raisonnable au régime public de réparation des lésions professionnelles. Ainsi, ce mémoire met en évidence les conséquences en droit constitutionnel canadien et quasi constitutionnel québécois de la démarche utilisée dans l’arrêt Caron et des résultats auxquels elle a conduit, en recentrant la place du droit à l’égalité en droit public et en discutant de ses impacts sur la séparation des pouvoirs. En outre, ce revirement jurisprudentiel engendre maintes difficultés au regard de la particularité du droit administratif, plus spécifiquement quant au rôle et aux pouvoirs limités de la C.N.E.S.S.T. et du T.A.T.-D.S.S.T. Enfin, cette analyse fait ressortir que la solution retenue par la Cour d’appel porte atteinte à l’équilibre que s’efforce de maintenir ce régime public reposant sur un important compromis social. / Following the review of the genesis of two fundamental regimes in Quebec labour law, the public system that provides repairs to injured workers, established by the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, and the duty to provide reasonable accommodation arising from the right to equality under section 10 of the Quebec Charter, this thesis focuses on the development of the normative conflict and the jurisdictional conflict stemming from the parallel evolution of these two sources of obligations for employers. Both of these are based on the reinstatement of disabled workers and the continuation of their employment relationship. This study proposes to explore the legal consequences of the solution adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Caron’s case, dated June 2015, in which the Court decided to overlay the employer’s duty to accommodate onto the Workers’ Compensation public system. Thus, emphasizing on the role that the right to equality plays in public law and discussing its impact on the separation of powers, this thesis shows the consequences from the approach used in the Caron judgment and its particular results through Canadian constitutional and Quebec quasi-constitutional principles. Furthermore, this significant change gives rise to many difficulties regarding the particularities of administrative law, and more specifically, the role and the limited powers of C.N.E.S.S.T. and T.A.T.-D.S.S.T. Finally, this analysis highlights that the solution held by the Court of Appeal infringes on the balance attempted by the public system based on an important social compromise.

Dans sa thèse, l’auteure analyse la fonction du système judiciaire dans le système juridique selon une double perspective historique et sociologique. Cette approche possède un potentiel euristique important, car elle révèle que la place réservée à la production judiciaire du droit se modifie au gré de la conception que se fait la société de l’origine et de la légitimité du droit. Grâce à la méthodologie proposée par la théorie des systèmes, il est possible d’analyser le phénomène de la montée en puissance des juges dans sa dimension scientifique, en substituant une interprétation sociologique à celle, traditionnelle, formulée par la science politique. Grâce à une réappropriation de la justice par la science juridique, la production judiciaire du droit peut être étudiée dans une perspective systémique. Celle-ci démontre la situation névralgique occupée par la fonction de juger dans le système juridique. Par le biais d’un retour aux sources de la fonction de juger, l’auteur identifie les stratégies empruntées par les titulaires de cette fonction pour maintenir et légitimer leur position dans l’organisation du système juridique. La thèse démontre que le discours judiciaire de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la norme d’indépendance judiciaire homologue la théorie de la place centrale du système judiciaire dans le système juridique. La thèse conclut enfin que des conditions sociologiques sont nécessaires pour assurer l’indépendance judiciaire et garantir la primauté du droit. Ces conditions sont la différenciation sociale, une structure de programme juridique conditionnelle et la limitation de la responsabilité des juges pour l’impact de leurs décisions dans le système social. / This thesis examines the function of the judiciary in the legal system in a historical and sociological perspective. Through the lens of history and sociology, the author reviews and considers the changes in the role of the judge in the development of law. The heuristic benefit of this approach borrowed from history and systemic theory, is invaluable. Firstly, it demonstrates that the place reserved for the judicial creation of law in the legal system is tributary to what is considered as the source and legitimacy of law. Secondly, it sets in an evolutionary perspective the significant changes that occurred in the development of law and the judicial function. The characterization of the judicial function evolves from a political science’s viewpoint to a legal perspective. Through this reappropriation by the legal science, the judicial production of law can now be examined in its systemic function. As well, exploration of the sources of the function of justice renders possible and understanding of the rationale used by judges throughout history to legitimize their position in the legal system. The thesis supports the proposition that, along with legal conditions relating to the status of judges, a set of sociological conditions must exist in order for judicial independence to be fully protected and the rule of law upheld. These conditions are social differentiation, a structure of conditional programs for law, and limitation in the social system of the responsibility and accountability of judges following the fulfillment of their judicial function. Finally, in the final stage of her socio-historical research, the author demonstrates how the current judicial interpretation of the conditions for judicial independence enhances the theoretical foundations that situate the judicial function at the centre of the legal system.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.

Quid d’un principe constitutionnel concernant l’organisation institutionnelle de l’État, tel que la séparation des pouvoirs, dans la jurisprudence d’une cour internationale des droits de l’homme, telle que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ? S’il serait audacieux de prouver que le juge de Strasbourg applique une certaine théorie de séparation des pouvoirs, il est pourtant pertinent de répondre à la question de savoir si les solutions adoptées par le juge européen des droits de l’homme dessinent une vision cohérente de ce que doivent, selon lui, être les relations entre les pouvoirs. En outre, il ne faut pas faire abstraction du fait que la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs telle qu’elle est conçue dans l’État libéral contemporain n’implique la consécration que d’un socle minimal de solutions soit acquis. / What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutional organization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found in the jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the European Court of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it, nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions.

Dans un pays où le pouvoir se conquiert et ne se conserve que par la force, la fonction du président de la République est en République démocratique du Congo, celle d'un élu du peuple sans l'être réellement; de facto il exerce le pouvoir d'un monarque absolu. Depuis son accession à l'indépendance en juin 1960, la République démocratique du Congo a fait le choix de l'élection comme seul et unique moyen de dévolution du pouvoir politique, notamment de la fonction présidentielle; celle-ci n'a jamais connu d'alternance démocratique. A partir du coup d’État militaire du Lieutenant Général Mobutu, destituant en novembre 1965 Joseph Kasa­vubu, alors démocratiquement élu en juin 1960 par les deux Chambres du Parlement, le recours à la force s'est imposé dans les faits comme l'unique moyen par excellence d'accès au pouvoir. C'est dans cette optique, que s'explique la conquête du pouvoir de Laurent Désiré Kabila par les armes en mai 1997, et son remplacement par son fils, le Général major Joseph Kabila, qui à l'instar d'un prince, a hérité la présidence de la République en janvier 2001, alors que le Congo est une République théoriquement démocratique ! Devenue comme un grand village et une grande chefferie moderne, organisée autour d'un homme, ayant le monopole de l'autorité et revendiquant la grâce et la sacralité du pouvoir (chef) des chefferies traditionnelles, qu'il combine régulièrement avec les habitus patrimonialistes et monarchistes hérités du roi Léopold II, la République démocratique du Congo paraît être un Etat de droit que dans les textes. Le président congolais n'est autre qu'un monarque à la tête d'une République, il a personnalisé l’État, concentré tous les pouvoirs étatiques et exerce sa fonction sans admettre ou tolérer aucun contre-pouvoir. / In a country where power is conquered and maintained only by force, the office of President of the Republic is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that of an elected representative of the people without really being one; de facto he exercises the power of an absolute monarch. Since its independence in June 1960, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has chosen elections as the only means of devolving political power, particularly for the presidential office, which has never experimented democratic political change The use of force has become technically the ultimate means of accessing power since the military coup d'état in November 1965 by Lieutenant General Mobutu which finally deposed Joseph Kasa-Vubu who had been democratically elected in June 1960 by the two houses of Parliament. Laurent Désiré Kabila 's conquest relying on weapons power in May 1997 can then be explained. Then Major General Joseph Ka bila took over from his father. He inherited the presidency of the Republic of the Congo like a prince would do in January 2001, though Congo being a democratic republic! The Democratic Republic of Congo has become a great village and a great modern chiefdom, organized around a man, having the monopoly of authority and claiming the grace and sacredness of power (chief) of the traditional chiefdoms, which he regularly combines with the patrimonialist and monarchist habitus inherited from King Leopold Il, but it seems to be a State of law only in the texts. The Congolese president is none other than a monarch at the head of a Republic, he has personalized the state, concentrated ail state powers and exercised the presidential function without admitting or tolerating any counter-power.

<p>Local government is arguably the most significant sphere of government to lay citizens, as it is the point of contact of citizens with their government. Local government enables a direct link between the general public and the basic services that they are entitled to by means of their constitutional and legislatively entrenched rights. It is the only sphere of government that allows and encourages face-to-face engagement between citizens and their governors, providing the necessary platform for interaction, contact and communication. It is imperative therefore that this tier of government operate optimally and competently, as it represents a reflection of the operation of government wholly. Research unfortunately illustrates that public perceptions of local government are negative, with levels of trust in local government being substantially lower than those in provincial and national governments. The responsibility for failure to perform would lie squarely on the shoulders of those individuals leading any institution. The leading incumbents driving a municipality are the political and administrative heads, i.e. executive mayor and municipal manager.</p>

Dans sa thèse, l’auteure analyse la fonction du système judiciaire dans le système juridique selon une double perspective historique et sociologique. Cette approche possède un potentiel euristique important, car elle révèle que la place réservée à la production judiciaire du droit se modifie au gré de la conception que se fait la société de l’origine et de la légitimité du droit. Grâce à la méthodologie proposée par la théorie des systèmes, il est possible d’analyser le phénomène de la montée en puissance des juges dans sa dimension scientifique, en substituant une interprétation sociologique à celle, traditionnelle, formulée par la science politique. Grâce à une réappropriation de la justice par la science juridique, la production judiciaire du droit peut être étudiée dans une perspective systémique. Celle-ci démontre la situation névralgique occupée par la fonction de juger dans le système juridique. Par le biais d’un retour aux sources de la fonction de juger, l’auteur identifie les stratégies empruntées par les titulaires de cette fonction pour maintenir et légitimer leur position dans l’organisation du système juridique. La thèse démontre que le discours judiciaire de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la norme d’indépendance judiciaire homologue la théorie de la place centrale du système judiciaire dans le système juridique. La thèse conclut enfin que des conditions sociologiques sont nécessaires pour assurer l’indépendance judiciaire et garantir la primauté du droit. Ces conditions sont la différenciation sociale, une structure de programme juridique conditionnelle et la limitation de la responsabilité des juges pour l’impact de leurs décisions dans le système social. / This thesis examines the function of the judiciary in the legal system in a historical and sociological perspective. Through the lens of history and sociology, the author reviews and considers the changes in the role of the judge in the development of law. The heuristic benefit of this approach borrowed from history and systemic theory, is invaluable. Firstly, it demonstrates that the place reserved for the judicial creation of law in the legal system is tributary to what is considered as the source and legitimacy of law. Secondly, it sets in an evolutionary perspective the significant changes that occurred in the development of law and the judicial function. The characterization of the judicial function evolves from a political science’s viewpoint to a legal perspective. Through this reappropriation by the legal science, the judicial production of law can now be examined in its systemic function. As well, exploration of the sources of the function of justice renders possible and understanding of the rationale used by judges throughout history to legitimize their position in the legal system. The thesis supports the proposition that, along with legal conditions relating to the status of judges, a set of sociological conditions must exist in order for judicial independence to be fully protected and the rule of law upheld. These conditions are social differentiation, a structure of conditional programs for law, and limitation in the social system of the responsibility and accountability of judges following the fulfillment of their judicial function. Finally, in the final stage of her socio-historical research, the author demonstrates how the current judicial interpretation of the conditions for judicial independence enhances the theoretical foundations that situate the judicial function at the centre of the legal system.

<p>Local government is arguably the most significant sphere of government to lay citizens, as it is the point of contact of citizens with their government. Local government enables a direct link between the general public and the basic services that they are entitled to by means of their constitutional and legislatively entrenched rights. It is the only sphere of government that allows and encourages face-to-face engagement between citizens and their governors, providing the necessary platform for interaction, contact and communication. It is imperative therefore that this tier of government operate optimally and competently, as it represents a reflection of the operation of government wholly. Research unfortunately illustrates that public perceptions of local government are negative, with levels of trust in local government being substantially lower than those in provincial and national governments. The responsibility for failure to perform would lie squarely on the shoulders of those individuals leading any institution. The leading incumbents driving a municipality are the political and administrative heads, i.e. executive mayor and municipal manager.</p>

The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial transformation in the new South Africa. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. M. (Human Rights Law)