Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 outlines the scope of judicial authority as encompassing the resolution of any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law. The courts in South Africa have developed several justiciability canons that restrain when courts may adjudicate disputes, such as standing, mootness, ripeness, and the prevention of advisory opinions. These justiciability canons emanate from constitutional considerations such as respect for separation of powers and the proper role and scope of judicial review in a constitutional democracy. This study focuses on another justiciability canon - the political question doctrine. This doctrine arises from the principle of separation of powers and, in the main, provides that certain questions of constitutional law are allocated to the discretion of the elected branches of government for resolution. As a result, such questions are non-justiciable and require the judiciary to abstain from deciding them because not doing so intrudes into the functions of the elected branches of government. The underlying theme is that such questions must find resolution in the political process. Through a comparative lens, the study examines the origins and current application of the political question doctrine in selected countries with a view to obtain lessons therefrom. It examines the origins of the doctrine, by placing particular emphasis on the early application of the doctrine by the US Supreme Court. The study also examines the modern application of the doctrine in the constitutional jurisprudence of several countries, including Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria. It advances the view that while the doctrine exists in the South African jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court should articulate and develop it into a clear doctrine taking into account lessons from those countries. The study offers some recommendations in this regard. The study submits that the political question doctrine is an appropriate legal mechanism through which the South African judiciary can address the recent problem of the proliferation of cases brought to the courts that raise non-justiciable political questions and threaten to delegitimize the role of the courts in a democracy. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D.

The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable. The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)

台灣司法院大法官早在1948年就開始進行違憲審查，迄今已釋憲超過65餘載，共作成730餘則大法官解釋，違憲宣告的比例大約30%至40%之間，其中與社會權相關的案件約20餘件，面對社會權應如何司法性的提問，我國學者多認為大法官對於社會權案件之釋憲立場過於難以捉摸，時而寬鬆時而嚴謹，大法官於社會權案件之審查上，並未創造出一套如同自由權般穩定且具有預測可能性的審查標準。 對於我國大法官於社會權案件中的釋憲難題，若僅著墨於方法論上的研究，忽略國家整體社會發展的歷史脈絡，將有見樹不見林之遺憾，而此種將社會發展歷史脈絡融入大法官釋憲過程中，最受國際推崇者莫過於南非憲法法院。南非在歷經長達數百年的種族隔離後，終於揮別威權擁抱民主，並擁有一部為世人所稱羨的新憲法，然而新民主南非所面臨來自於經濟、社會、政治與轉型正義等各方面之挑戰，並未因新憲法的制定而全盤迎刃而解。相反的，民主化後的新政府因財政短缺，導致無法實踐南非憲法中所保障之社會權，求助無門的民眾最終只能向憲法法院訴請權利保障。南非憲法法院面對困擾全球各地憲法法院之亙古難題「社會權如何司法性」時，並不懼怕挑戰，展現出以人為本之人權保障與弱勢保障之高度，做出許多為世人所稱羨之社會權憲法判決。 反思我國之社會權釋憲案件，多數均非由經濟弱勢者所提出，甚或有些與弱勢生存保障密切相關之釋憲案，最終這些弱勢群體之弱勢成因、社會處境現狀並未在釋憲場域中被凸顯、被衡量，導致憲法權利保障所連結之個人或群體從事現場域中消失了。對此，人民權利保障與權力分立原則同為憲法之兩大基石，二者間並無孰輕孰重之差別，故在社會權案件中，雖需考量資源有限性等權力分立之問題，然而過度尊重立法者之形成自由忽略人民權利保障之作法，仍有進一步改善之空間。

This study on "The road to constitutionalism and democracy in post-colonial Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo" revolves around a major research problem: What has been the road to constitutionalism and democracy in Africa since independence and how can constitutionalism and democracy be established and consolidated on the African continent? The importance of the problem and its implications for the life of millions of African people and the state of the literature still dominated by persons foreign to Africa make constitutionalism and democracy one of the most fascinating and challenging intellectual projects, particularly among African scholars. This work is a contribution to the development of knowledge and to the building and consolidation of constitutionalism and democracy in Africa. It revisits and critically examines the concepts and the various discourses and voices we have heard form both inside and mostly outside the continent. It highlights the African struggle, explores the major trends, and stresses the challenges and prospects for constitutionalism and democracy in Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a case study. The research deals with the unfinished struggle of the people of the Congo and explains why the Congo has gone from DRC to DRC via Zaire, from one crisis of the Congo in the 1960s to another crisis of the Congo since the early 1990s and why the DRC history has been rehearsing in a vicious circle of coups and countercoups, rebellions, unsuccessful national conferences, authoritarian and unconstitutional regimes. Central to the crisis in many African states, including the DRC, is the crisis of constitutionalism and democracy and the failure of the post-colonial state. The study ends with the conclusion that constitutionalism and democracy also belong to Africa and constitute a prerequisite for African survival and renaissance. / Constitutional and Public International Law / LL.D.

Le présent texte porte sur l’état de la démocratie au Sénégal depuis l’alternance politique survenue en 2000. Adoptant une définition minimale de la démocratie – respect des libertés civiles et politiques, et tenue d’élections libres et justes – à laquelle il ajoute le principe de séparation des pouvoirs, son principal objectif est de répondre à la question suivante : pourquoi le fonctionnement de la démocratie est-il entravé au Sénégal? L’hypothèse avancée pour répondre à cette interrogation est la présence du néo-patrimonialisme. Celui-ci, par l’intermédiaire de la personnalisation du pouvoir et le clientélisme, sape le respect des règles démocratiques dans ce pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest. Pour analyser l’impact du néo-patrimonialisme sur la démocratie au Sénégal, ce mémoire privilégie le néo-institutionnalisme sociologique comme cadre théorique. Cette approche définit les institutions de façon large : celles-ci peuvent englober non seulement des normes formelles mais également des règles informelles. En vertu de cette approche, le néo-patrimonialisme et la démocratie représentent des institutions puisque le premier englobe un ensemble de règles informelles et le second un ensemble de normes et procédures formelles. Ces deux institutions structurent et façonnent le comportement des individus. Dans cette confrontation institutionnelle, les règles néo-patrimoniales influencent davantage l’action des élites politiques sénégalaises – notamment le chef de l’État – que les normes démocratiques. La vérification de l’hypothèse s’appuie sur des études sur la démocratie et le néo-patrimonialisme aussi bien au Sénégal qu’en Afrique. Elle se base également sur l’actualité et les faits politiques saillants depuis l’alternance. L’analyse est essentiellement qualitative et se divise en deux chapitres empiriques. Le premier de ceux-ci (chapitre II dans le texte) concerne la séparation des pouvoirs. Le but de ce chapitre est d’observer la manière dont l’actuel président de la République, Abdoulaye Wade, contrôle le parlement et la justice. Le second chapitre empirique (chapitre III dans le texte) se divise en deux sections. La première s’intéresse aux libertés civiles et politiques qui subissent des restrictions dues au penchant autoritaire de Wade. La seconde section porte sur les élections dont le déroulement est entaché par de nombreuses irrégularités : violence électorale, manque de ressources de l’autorité électorale, instabilité du calendrier électoral, partialité de la justice. L’étude confirme l’hypothèse, ce qui est très problématique pour la plupart des États africains. En effet, le néo-patrimonialisme est une caractéristique fondamentale de la gouvernance en Afrique. Ainsi, beaucoup de régimes du continent noir qui enclenchent ou enclencheront un processus de démocratisation comme le Sénégal, risquent de connaître les mêmes difficultés liées à la persistance des pratiques néo-patrimoniales. / This text is about state of democracy in Senegal since the political changeover in 2000. Using a minimal definition of democracy – respect of political and civil liberties, free and fair elections – completed by the separation of state powers, it aims to answer to the following question : why is the functioning of democracy hampered in Senegal? The hypothesis is that neopatrimonialism, through personalization of power and clientelism, hinders the respect of democratic rules in this West African country. To analyze the impact of neopatrimonialism on democracy in Senegal, this text draws from the sociological institutionalism as theory. This approach provides a broad definition of institutions which includes formal norms as well as informal rules. In this perspective, neopatrimonialism and democracy embody institutions because the former has a set of informal rules and the later a set of formal norms and procedures. These two institutions structure and shape the individual behaviour. In this institutional confrontation, the neopatrimonial rules have a deeper impact on the action of Senegalese elites, particularly the president. To verify the hypothesis, one refers to studies that analyze the link between democracy and neopatrimonialism in Senegal and in Africa. This text also takes into account current events and striking political facts since 2000. The analysis is essentially qualitative and divided in two empirical chapters. The first one (chapter II in the text) studies the separation of powers and how the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, control the parliement and courts. The second empirical chapter (chapter III in the text) is subdivided in two sections. The first section examines how civil and political liberties are restricted by Wade’s inclination to authoritarianism. The second section analyses the numerous irregular situations that characterize senegalese elections : violence, lack of ressources for the electoral authority, frequent change of electoral timetable, partiality of the justice. On the whole, the hypothesis is confirmed, which is problematic to most of subsaharian African states. Neopatrimonialism is a fundamental feature of African politics. Its persistence could constitute a source of difficulty for African regimes that begin or will begin democratization like Senegal did.

La notion d’identité constitutionnelle permet de qualifier le positionnement respectif des ordres juridiques irlandais et français face à la primauté du droit de l’Union européenne. Comparé à la jurisprudence européenne, leurs régimes constitutionnels relatifs à ce droit externe n’offrent qu’une immunité et affirme in fine la suprématie de la Constitution en tant qu’expression de la souveraineté nationale. Pourtant, les juridictions des deux pays montrent une attitude conciliante fondée sur une relation de contenu entre normes constitutionnelles et européennes. Plutôt qu’un essentialisme, la notion d’identité constitutionnelle représente un discours portant sur la Constitution suivant lequel une qualité identitaire est reconnue aux normes constitutionnelles susceptibles de mettre en échec les dispositions dédiées à la primauté des normes européennes au terme d’une interprétation les mettant en balance.Malgré des affirmations différentes de leur souveraineté nationale, l’accroissement du contrôle de l’application du droit européen est un objectif commun dans la jurisprudence des deux pays. La dynamique institutionnelle qui caractérise le processus interprétatif qu’implique la notion d’identité constitutionnelle privilégie les juridictions et mène à une forme singulière de dialogue avec la Cour européenne de justice conciliant primauté du droit européen et suprématie de la Constitution. Les monologues menant à une exclusion de l’application du droit européen au nom de l’identité constitutionnelle sont une invitation faite à la juridiction européenne pour établir une coexistence pacifique entre les ordres juridiques définie par une union de mots dans une diversité de sens. / Comparing the Irish and French legal orders leads to describe the appraisal of the primacy of European Union law by the notion constitutional identity. In contrast to the claims of the European Court of Justice, the constitutional regime regarding European rules, both in Irish and French law, only provides for immunity and ultimately affirms the supremacy of the Constitution as the norm expressing national sovereignty. Still, Irish and French courts display a conciliatory attitude focused on aligning the material content of domestic and European norms. Rather than essentialism, the notion of constitutional identity represents a discourse on the Constitution whereby the identity status qualifies those constitutional norms which can defeat constitutional provisions dedicated to the prevalence of European rules as a result of an interpretative balancing process.While manifesting different affirmations of national sovereignty, the common objective of Irish and French courts is attaining increased control of the application of European Union rules. The institutional dynamics distinguishing the notion of constitutional identity as an interpretative process involve both an empowerment of the judiciary and a specific form of dialogue with the European Court of Justice regarding the conciliation between the primacy of European Union law and the supremacy of the Constitution. Judicial monologues protecting constitutional identity mean possible exclusions of the domestic application of European law and constitute an invitation to the European Court of Justice to agree to a peaceful co-existence of the two legal orders defined as a unity of words with a diversity of meanings.

[pt] A Revolução Americana registrou uma intensa participação política popular nos Estados da Confederação. Este período marcou a preferência pela doutrina da separação absoluta de Poderes, uma vez que o sistema de governo balanceado inglês permitiu que o clientelismo real corrompesse a independência do Parlamento, órgão supostamente responsável pela defesa das liberdades civis nas colônias. Porém, o engajamento do povo foi condenado pela elite norteamericana, que liderou um movimento de centralização do poder capaz de controlar o excesso de democracia local, identificado com a supremacia que as assembléias possuíam no âmbito estadual. Neste contexto surge a Constituição de 1787, que funda suas bases na teoria dos freios e contrapesos como um método de fiscalização recíproca dos Poderes, mas, com especial destaque, para o controle do Legislativo. O evento constitucional enfraqueceu a virtude dos cidadãos, que se restringiu à atividade de expansão rumo à fronteira e criou um mecanismo de governo autônomo, que concentrou a política na ação de uma elite dirigente e na relação entre os diferentes órgãos intra-estatais. O estudo da concepção de separação de Poderes em Jefferson, Madison e Hamilton ajuda a esclarecer o modo com que o projeto constitucional de 1787 rompeu com a ideologia a essência revolucionária. / [en] The American Revolution presented a high level of popular politics participation under the Confederation years. This moment marked the option for the absolute doctrine of the separation of powers as a response against the failure of the balanced constitution theory and the incapacity of the British Parliament to protect the colonies civil liberties. However, the fear of popular engagement made the American elites lead a centralization of power that could be able to control the popular local democracy. The Constitution of the United States and its checks and balances system were born as a result of that conservative process. The constitutional structure protected the government of the people direct action and influence, creating a separated dimension to the politics forces game. The study of the concepts of this era and the meanings they were used, particularly, the Jefferson s, Madison s and Hamilton s conception concerning of the separation of powers doctrine helps to understand how the Constitution ruptured the spirit of the American Revolution, based on the active citizenship.

Esta tese pretende ampliar o objeto de análise da judicialização da saúde, ao situar a questão dentro do Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS). A partir do estudo sobre a integralidade da atenção e a universalidade de acesso, que tomamos como regras do sistema, procuramos identificar o mínimo existencial do direito à saúde, tanto no SUS como no caso concreto. Defendemos a tese de que a identificação do mínimo existencial do caso concreto e do sistema de saúde pode ser realizada por várias pessoas: pelo legislador, pelo administrador, pelos membros do Conselho de Saúde e da Conferência de Saúde, pelo médico que assiste o paciente. Vimos também que a discricionariedade do administrador quanto à escolha das prestações mínimas a serem implementadas é reduzida no que diz respeito à saúde. Uma vez identificado o mínimo existencial da saúde, esse direito deve ser satisfeito, não se admitindo qualquer restrição, pois essa é uma exigência do ordenamento jurídico, que tem como valor fonte a pessoa humana. Defendemos também a posição de que, diante da omissão do Legislativo e do Executivo na implementação do direito ao mínimo existencial, caberá ao Poder Executivo atuar para que sejam cumpridas as políticas públicas e atingidos os objetivos do Estado Democrático de Direito. / The objective of this thesis is to expand the analysis of the judicialization (or judicial control) of health by placing the issue within the scope of the Brazilian Universal Healthcare Program (SUS). From the study on comprehensive care and universal access, which we accept as being the general rule in health system, we try to identify the existential minimum of the right to health both in the Brazilian Universal Healthcare Program SUS and in the concrete cases. We defend that the identification of the existential minimum in concrete cases and in the health system can be done by several people: the lawmaker, the administrator, the members of Health Councils and Health Conferences, and the physician attending the patient. We also saw that the administrators discretion towards choosing the minimum services to be implemented is reduced when referring to health. Once the existential minimum for health is identified, this right must be fulfilled, with no restrictions, since this is demanded by the legal system, whose basic value is the individual person. We also defend the position that, in view of the omission of the Legislative and Executive branches in implementing the existential minimum, it will be responsibility of the Judicial branch to act so that public policies are met and objectives of the Democratic State ruled by the law are complied with.

Função política do Estado é a atividade que órgãos instituídos pela Constituição exercem no âmbito de sua competência, tendo por objetivo preservar a sociedade política e promover o bem comum, e que consiste em determinar, mediante a livre interpretação de normas constitucionais, o que é o interesse público e quais são os meios necessários à sua implementação. A função política é desempenhada por diversos órgãos e poderes, inclusive pelos tribunais constitucionais. Os tribunais constitucionais exercem função política, basicamente, em relação a quatro grandes temas: separação de poderes, federalismo, direitos fundamentais e funcionamento das instituições democráticas. O exercício da função política pelos tribunais constitucionais possui características específicas. Os tribunais constitucionais têm legitimidade para exercer função política, apesar de seus integrantes normalmente não serem escolhidos pelo voto popular. No desempenho de função política, os tribunais constitucionais devem observar limites. No Brasil, o órgão que exerce o papel de tribunal constitucional é o Supremo Tribunal Federal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal, ao longo de sua história, desde sua instalação, em 1891, até os dias atuais, contribuiu para a definição do que é o interesse público, bem como para a definição dos meios necessários para sua implementação. Portanto, exerceu função política. Foram identificadas sete fases na história do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Em algumas delas, o Supremo Tribunal Federal exerceu função política mais ativamente. Em outras fases, limitou-se a confirmar decisões adotadas por outros órgãos de soberania. O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem legitimidade para exercer função política. Sua jurisprudência demonstra também que, no exercício da função política, o Supremo Tribunal Federal observou limites. / Political function of the State is the work performed by constitutional bodies, within the scope of their respective competencies, to preserve political society and promote public welfare. It consists in determining, through free interpretation of constitutional rules, what may be considered of public welfare and what are the necessary mechanisms for its implementation. Political function is performed by various powers and bodies including the constitutional courts. Basically, constitutional courts exercise political function in relation to four major subjects: segregation of power, federalism, basic rights and the functioning of democratic institutions. Constitutional courts bear specific characteristics when it comes to exercising their political function. A constitutional court has the legitimacy to exercise political functions even though its constituents are not elected through popular suffrage. In the exercise of their political function, constitutional courts must beware of some limits. In Brazil, the body that plays the role of constitutional court is the Federal Supreme Court. Throughout its history, that is, since its establishment in 1891 until the present, the Federal Supreme Court has contributed to define what public welfare is, as well as to its implemen-tation. Therefore, it has exercised its political function. Considering its jurisprudence, it is possible to identify seven stages in the Federal Supreme Court history. In some of these stages the Supreme Court exercises its political function actively. In other stages, simply confirmed decisions taken by other bodies. The Federal Supreme Court has legitimacy to exercise its political function. Its jurisprudence also shows that, in the exercise of its political function, the Federal Supreme Court has known some limits.

Marinha do Brasil / O texto constitucional brasileiro de 1988 sofreu diversas alterações em matéria tributária e financeira. Praticamente todas as emendas constitucionais tiveram sua constitucionalidade questionada em razão de alegadas violações aos limites materiais do poder de reforma constitucional. O presente trabalho procura delinear alguns parâmetros para a construção de contornos mais precisos dos limites do poder de reforma constitucional em matéria tributária e financeira. A delimitação de tais parâmetros de reforma, além de contribuir para o exercício da jurisdição constitucional na análise da constitucionalidade das emendas constitucionais, permite que sejam mais bem delineadas quais as decisões fundamentais que a Constituição adotou na seara financeira e tributária, relacionadas ao federalismo, aos direitos fundamentais e à separação de poderes. / This study aims to analyze the constitutional amendments and to examine the limitations to which they are submitted in tax and public finance law. Constitutional changes are necessary as means of preservation and conservation of the Constitution. Constitutional norms are not to be considered perfect but are yet in a constant state of mutual interaction with reality. The obtained results with the research enables us to evaluate the limitations that are imposed to constitutional amendments, the binding orders of the Constitutional Court, the prohibition of abolition of perpetual clauses, as the prohibition retreating to fundamental rights, federalism and separation of powers.