This is a Master´s Degree Dissertation that examines how neoconstitutionalism and post-positivism serve as theoretical frameworks in the grounds of judicial review of public policies related to health treatment. It is noteworthy, too, the normative force of the Constitution and the principle of human dignity as an argument in the realization of social rights. Citing case law and reference to different doctrinal positions, this study further explores how the programmatic standards may provide legal support for the realization of fundamental social rights of individual or collective nature, allowing it to recognize any omissions state that deviate from commitments constitutional assumed by Constituent Power Sourced. It also analyzes the main arguments presented by the Treasury in this kind of control: the violation of the principle of separation of powers and the reserve as possible. In light of the precedents of the Superior Courts, will be presented the understanding that, in the case of health services directed to ensure life, judicial control of public policy is different, and the reserve can only be an obstacle when the situation pled escape of proportionality, which should not be confused with the issue of resources to be spent and its scarcity. Finally, we will argue that judicial review may interfere with the pursuit of an efficient budget planning towards the achievement of public policies for the realization of the Health. / A Dissertação de Mestrado examina como o neoconstitucionalismo e o pós-positivismo servem de marcos teóricos na fundamentação do controle judicial de políticas públicas relacionadas com a saúde terapêutica. Destaca-se, também, a força normativa da Constituição e o princípio da dignidade humana como argumento na efetivação do aludido direito social. Citando jurisprudência e diferentes posições doutrinárias, o presente estudo aprecia ainda como as normas programáticas podem servir de amparo jurídico para a concretização de direitos fundamentais sociais de natureza individual ou coletiva, autorizando a que se reconheçam as eventuais omissões estatais que se afastam dos compromissos constitucionais assumidos pelo Poder Constituinte Originário. Analisa também os principais argumentos apresentados pela Fazenda Pública nessa espécie de controle: a violação do princípio da separação de poderes e da reserva do possível. À luz dos precedentes dos Tribunais Superiores, será apresentado o entendimento de que, no caso de prestações de saúde direcionadas para assegurar a vida, o controle judicial das políticas públicas é diferenciado, sendo que a reserva do possível só será um obstáculo quando a situação pleiteada fugir da proporcionalidade, o que não se confunde com as questões relativas aos recursos a serem gastos e à sua escassez. Por fim, sustentará que o controle judicial poderá interferir na busca de um planejamento orçamentário eficiente em prol da concretização de políticas públicas voltadas para a realização dos direitos à Saúde.

Função política do Estado é a atividade que órgãos instituídos pela Constituição exercem no âmbito de sua competência, tendo por objetivo preservar a sociedade política e promover o bem comum, e que consiste em determinar, mediante a livre interpretação de normas constitucionais, o que é o interesse público e quais são os meios necessários à sua implementação. A função política é desempenhada por diversos órgãos e poderes, inclusive pelos tribunais constitucionais. Os tribunais constitucionais exercem função política, basicamente, em relação a quatro grandes temas: separação de poderes, federalismo, direitos fundamentais e funcionamento das instituições democráticas. O exercício da função política pelos tribunais constitucionais possui características específicas. Os tribunais constitucionais têm legitimidade para exercer função política, apesar de seus integrantes normalmente não serem escolhidos pelo voto popular. No desempenho de função política, os tribunais constitucionais devem observar limites. No Brasil, o órgão que exerce o papel de tribunal constitucional é o Supremo Tribunal Federal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal, ao longo de sua história, desde sua instalação, em 1891, até os dias atuais, contribuiu para a definição do que é o interesse público, bem como para a definição dos meios necessários para sua implementação. Portanto, exerceu função política. Foram identificadas sete fases na história do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Em algumas delas, o Supremo Tribunal Federal exerceu função política mais ativamente. Em outras fases, limitou-se a confirmar decisões adotadas por outros órgãos de soberania. O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem legitimidade para exercer função política. Sua jurisprudência demonstra também que, no exercício da função política, o Supremo Tribunal Federal observou limites. / Political function of the State is the work performed by constitutional bodies, within the scope of their respective competencies, to preserve political society and promote public welfare. It consists in determining, through free interpretation of constitutional rules, what may be considered of public welfare and what are the necessary mechanisms for its implementation. Political function is performed by various powers and bodies including the constitutional courts. Basically, constitutional courts exercise political function in relation to four major subjects: segregation of power, federalism, basic rights and the functioning of democratic institutions. Constitutional courts bear specific characteristics when it comes to exercising their political function. A constitutional court has the legitimacy to exercise political functions even though its constituents are not elected through popular suffrage. In the exercise of their political function, constitutional courts must beware of some limits. In Brazil, the body that plays the role of constitutional court is the Federal Supreme Court. Throughout its history, that is, since its establishment in 1891 until the present, the Federal Supreme Court has contributed to define what public welfare is, as well as to its implemen-tation. Therefore, it has exercised its political function. Considering its jurisprudence, it is possible to identify seven stages in the Federal Supreme Court history. In some of these stages the Supreme Court exercises its political function actively. In other stages, simply confirmed decisions taken by other bodies. The Federal Supreme Court has legitimacy to exercise its political function. Its jurisprudence also shows that, in the exercise of its political function, the Federal Supreme Court has known some limits.

Só é possível estudar o tema O controle das contas municipais em um Estado que apresente, em sua Constituição, o princípio da separação de Poderes como uma de suas pedras angulares. Além de competir a cada órgão do Poder uma função típica, também reflexo da teoria da separação de Poderes de Montesquieu é o sistema de checks and balances pelo qual um Poder controla o outro evitando a prática dos abusos. Em matéria de contas públicas, este controle recíproco se apresenta com o dever que o Chefe do Poder Executivo tem de prestar contas ao Poder Legislativo do uso que conferiu ao dinheiro público que, na verdade, pertence ao povo. Fala-se, portanto, na função de controle externo que o Legislativo realiza sobre as contas prestadas pelo Executivo. Em âmbito municipal, o controle externo é exercido pela Câmara Municipal com o auxílio do Tribunal de Contas, ao qual compete o dever de elaborar um parecer prévio sobre as contas de governo anualmente prestadas pelo Prefeito e encaminhá-lo ao julgamento político da Câmara Municipal. À Corte de Contas compete, pois, o controle técnico das contas, através das fiscalizações contábil, financeira, orçamentária, operacional e patrimonial e à Câmara dos Vereadores, o controle político de tais contas. / To study The control over municipal accounts it is mandatory that a State has the principle of separation of powers as a cornerstone of its Constitution. Besides that each branch of Government has specific responsibilities, another reflection of Montesquieus theory of separation of Powers is the system of checks and balances, under which each branch of government controls the other to prevent abuse of power. In terms of public accounts, this reciprocated control is represented by the duty the Head of the Executive has to account for the destination of the public money, which belongs to the people, to the Legislative; i.e., the external control carried out by the Legislative Branch over the accounts of the Executive Branch. At municipal level, external control is carried out by the City Council and the Court of Auditors, which has to prepare a previous opinion on the government accounts annually presented by the Mayor and send it for the political judgment of the City Council. Thus, the Court of Auditors is responsible for the technical control of the accounts, running accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and equity audits, while the City Council is responsible for the political control thereof.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Fabiani Capano.pdf: 849796 bytes, checksum: 890e5b2afe86af98005c7ef8394adc71 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-30 / Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie / The present work intends to study, in the context of the constitutionalism, which was and which is the paper of the Judicial Power in the historical consolidation of the basic rights of the human being. It still intends to investigate great part of the most important doctrinal production concerning the doctrine of the separation of powers, giving ballast to the quarrel concerning the birth, growth and consolidation of the paper of Constitutional Justice as warranting force of the values sculptured in the Constitutions of the countries with democratic experience. In this line of reasoning, this work adopts as starting point the phenomenon of the legalization of the politics or the politicalization of the law, understood here as a social phenomenon, which demonstrate the new role assumed by the Judiciary Power in the current days. In the next chapter, this work reconstructs the historical line of the formation of the State, starting with the Liberal State and the rights of freedom, going trough the Social State and the consolidation of the social rights, finishing with the formation of the Constitutional State and the sprouting supply-individual right, also involving the sphere of solidarity and fraternity rights. In the third chapter, the concern is the doctrine of the separation of powers, passing for its conception and evolution, in the attempt to point out the work of the jurisdictional function as counterpoint of the other instituted powers. During the fourth chapter, this work demonstrates the movement of the constitutionalism, considering the center role that the Constitution acquired modernly, and the concepcion of Justice Constitutional in diverse countries. The third chapter also brings the problem of the neoconstitutionalism as new Law theory, demonstrating the methods of interpretation of the Constitutional Law, intending to give handle of the mission that constitutional principles have, in the modern Constitutions, by becoming effective, using the direct application of values, as well as the problem of the judicial ativism that, in many times, exceeds the tenuous line between the legitimacy of the proper judicial function and the usurpation of the political decisions conceived in legitimate process in other democratic spheres. Finally, study perceives the necessity of the balance between the diverse state functions, to maintenance a healthy democratic system. / O presente trabalho pretende aferir, no contexto do movimento do constitucionalismo, qual foi e qual é o papel do Poder Judicial na consolidação histórica dos direitos fundamentais do ser humano. Pretende, ainda, investigar grande parte da mais importante produção doutrinária acerca da separação de poderes, dando lastro à discussão sobre nascimento, crescimento e consolidação do papel da Justiça Constitucional como força garantidora dos valores esculpidos nas Constituições dos países com prática democrática. Nessa linha de raciocínio, esta dissertação adota como ponto de partida o fenômeno da jurisdicionalização da política ou a politização do direito, entendido aqui como fenômeno social apto a demonstrar o novo papel assumido pelo Poder Judiciário nos dias atuais. Em seguida, o trabalho reconstrói a linha histórica da formação do ente estatal, passa pelo Estado Liberal e pelos direitos fundamentais de liberdade, caminha pelo Estado Social e pela consolidação dos direitos de prestação e termina na formação do Estado Constitucional de Direito e no surgimento dos direitos supraindividuais, envolvendo a esfera da solidariedade e fraternidade dos povos como destinatária de tais direitos. No terceiro capítulo, a preocupação se dá com a doutrina da separação de poderes, passando por sua concepção e posterior evolução, na tentativa de situar o trabalho da função jurisdicional como contraponto dos demais poderes instituídos. Durante o quarto capítulo, demonstra-se conceitualmente o movimento do constitucionalismo e o surgimento e a operacionalização histórica, ante a centralidade que a Constituição adquiriu modernamente, das Justiças Constitucionais em diversos países. Outrossim, o terceiro capítulo traz a problematização do neoconstitucionalismo como nova teoria do Direito, a demonstrar ainda os métodos de interpretação da Lei Maior que pretendem dar cabo da missão de tornar efetiva, pela aplicação direta de valores, dos princípios havidos nas Constituições modernas, bem como o problema do chamado ativismo judicial que, por vezes, ultrapassa a tênue linha demarcatória havida entre a legitimidade da função judicante própria e a usurpação das decisões políticas concebidas em processo legítimo em outras esferas democráticas. Finalmente, à guisa de conclusão, percebe-se a necessidade do equilíbrio entre as diversas funções estatais, salutar para a manutenção coesa do sistema democrático.

Les juridictions constitutionnelles ont sans doute de larges compétences interprétatives. Toutefois, l’ampleur de ces compétences varie dans les différents ordres juridiques selon l’aptitude que les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat peuvent adopter devant ces interprétations. Une juridiction constitutionnelle a une suprématie interprétative dans un Etat en particulier si ses interprétations doivent être obligatoirement respectées et appliquées par tous les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat. Si ses interprétations sont seulement obligatoires pour quelques autorités, cette juridiction constitutionnelle a simplement une compétence interprétative supérieure vis-à-vis de ces autorités. Afin d’identifier les plus larges compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles, la démarche comparative est hautement recommandée parce qu’elle permet de distinguer plus facilement les limitations que ces juridictions peuvent rencontrer dans leurs ordres juridiques respectifs. Ainsi, en suivant cette démarche, seront identifiées l’ampleur des compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles française et colombienne et leurs répercussions dans chacun de leurs Etats. / Constitutional jurisdictions should have wide interpretative powers. However, the scope of these competences varies in different legal systems depending on the ability of other authorities to adopt such interpretations. A constitutional court has interpretative supremacy in a particular State, if its interpretations are binding for all other departments of the State. If its interpretations are just binding for some authorities, this constitutional court would simply have a superior interpretative competence toward those authorities. In order to determine the broader interpretative powers of the constitutional courts, the comparative approach is highly recommended because it makes easier to distinguish the limitations that these jurisdictions may encounter in their respective legal systems. In this way, the scope of the interpretative powers of the French and Colombian constitutional courts will be identified as well as their repercussions in each of its states.

The subject of this thesis is the presidential system as one of the distinguished alternatives of existing political systems in the present democratic society. This thesis is divided into three parts. The primary aim of the first part is to produce a brief overview of individual political systems and to outline their mutual differences through the description of their characteristics. The second part describes a specific political system in this world - namely the United States of America which became the source of inspiration for all subsequently established systems of this type. This part focusing on the United States is then divided into three separate chapters where each of them provides a view of particular branches of the government which form a constitutional system of the state together. These chapters offer not only the characteristics of these particular government branches and their central government bodies, but they also explain their mutual relationship and the control mechanism and particularly their relation to the President who is the key character of the entire presidential system, also his office and his powers. The main source of information, from which this part of the thesis proceeds, is the United States Constitution itself which is, as the supreme law of the state, the...

[pt] A Constituição Federal brasileira fixou um desenho estrutural de competências que permite uma ampla atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre a vida social e os ramos de governo. Desde 1988, houve uma evolução gradativa no exercício efetivo deste poder em relação ao Congresso Nacional, principalmente, nos julgados sobre comissões parlamentares de inquérito, sistema político e omissões inconstitucionais, enquanto as temáticas do impeachment presidencial, do processo legislativo e da perda de mandato por quebra de decoro parlamentar apresentaram uma reticência interventiva maior. A experiência do institucionalismo norte-americano e a análise destes seis campos jurisprudenciais por diferentes enfoques da teoria institucional – atitudinal, estratégico, constitutivo e histórico – demonstram que não há um panorama assimétrico entre os departamentos estatais. Na verdade, o jogo entre Poderes pode criar cenários conjunturais que libertam decisões baseadas na preferência individual dos julgadores ou que restringem a autonomia da Corte quando críticas ou retaliações externas ameaçam sua permanência e autoridade. / [en] The Brazilian Federal Constitution established a framework of laws that allow for the Supreme Court to act over the social life and branches of the government. Since 1988 there has been a gradual evolution in the effective enforcing of this power over congress, mainly in judgements on parliamentary inquiry committees, the political system and unconstitutional omissions, while the topics of presidential impeachment, legislative process and removal from office for breach of congressional decorum met with greater reluctance to intervene. The North American experience in institutionalism and analysis of these six jurisprudential fields by different approaches to institutional theory - attitudinal, strategic, constituent and historical - demonstrate that the panorama among state departments is not asymmetric. In fact, the separation of powers game can create groups of scenarios that generate decisions based on the preference of individual judges, or that restrict the autonomy of the court when criticism or external retaliations threaten its authority.

Le contrôle juridictionnel sur les décisions des autorités de concurrence présente une intensité fortement changeante. Cela a engendré un effort de systématisation théorique et a demandé la solution d’une série de questions médianes. La nature technique de la matière économique a en effet justifié un modèle institutionnel spécifique (celui d’autorité administrative indépendante), un certain type de norme (par concepts juridiques indéterminés), une forme particulière de pouvoir discrétionnaire (qu’on peut définir mixte : au même temps pur et technique). Sur la base de tous ces éléments, on a individué l’ampleur idéale du contrôle. Le premier élément, le caractère indépendant des autorités, impose de se questionner sur les limites entre administration en formes contentieuses et juridiction, mais aussi sur les limites entre administration et politique. Le deuxième élément, relatif à la structure de la norme, a engendré une réflexion sur l’exigence que l’administration puisse intégrer la prescription légale, à l’acte de son application, de façon qu’elle participe en quelque sorte à la définition des conditions d’exercice de son propre pouvoir. Le troisième des éléments rappelés, la nature mixte du pouvoir discrétionnaire, a permis de redéfinir les raisons de l’analogie du contrôle juridictionnel sur l’opportunité et de celui sur la pluralité des solutions techniques . L’instrument utilisé pour mener cette analyse est le principe de proportionnalité, instrument d’action de l’administration mais aussi instrument de contrôle du juge, qui a permis de relever l’affinité entre les formes de l’action administrative et forme du contrôle qui sont à l’origine des incertitudes relevées. / Judicial review of antitrust authorities’ decisions shows as extremely variable. This justified an effort of theoretical explanation and demanded the elucidation of several intermediate questions. The technical nature of the economic subject accounts for a specific institutional model (the independent agencies one), a given type of norms (through standards and indeterminate concepts), a peculiar form of discretionary power (defined mixt: both pure an technical). Considering all these elements, we defined the ideal reach of judicial review. The first element, the independent nature of authorities, dictates to wonder on the boundaries between confrontational administration and trial, but also on the boundaries between administration and politics. The second element, related to the structure of the norm, provokes a reflection on the necessity that the administration completes the legal prescription while applying it, somehow participating to the definition of her own power’s legitimacy requirements. The third element recalled, the mixt nature of discretionary power, led to redefine the reasons of the analogy between jurisdictional control on opportunity and on technical administrative evaluations. The instrument used to carry out the described analysis is the principle of proportionality, tool of administrative action but also instrument of judicial review, that permitted to reveal the affinity between administrative and jurisdictional paradigms that founds the observed uncertainties.

In the period from 2009-2020, South Africa has witnessed the rise of "lawfare". Lawfare is understood as the judicialisation of politics - turning to the courts and the use of the law to resolve broadly political matters. This thesis explores the unfolding implications of the judicialisation of politics for judicial legitimacy. In the displacement of the political into the judicial the reach of the courts is expanded and the legitimacy of courts engaging in a "political" role is questioned. Situated in the field of judicial-political dynamics, the interplay between law and politics is observed through the adoption of a historical-institutionalist model. This thesis identifies the causes of the judicialisation of politics and then traces its consequences for broader constitutional stability and the impact on the judicial institution. Guidelines for the Court to navigate lawfare to achieve institutional resilience and maintain judicial legitimacy are then proposed. Judicialisation of politics is caused primarily through the failures of the other branches of government to fulfil their assigned constitutional role. Institutional imbalance in a dominant party democracy means that opposition parties and civil society organisations are left with little recourse but to appeal to the Court to be a constitutional bulwark. The Court is then compelled to step into the breach and fill the accountability vacuum. In identifying the causes of judicialisation, a fuller understanding of Lawfare emerges, expanding current scholarship beyond its traditionally abusive characterisation. It posits a duality to Lawfare in that it can be both an abuse of law and a last line of defence. Through observing the judicial political interactions, a trajectory from the judicialisation of politics to the politicisation of law is mapped. The politicisation of law sees political power refocused on the courts, exposing them to political aggression and attack by the dominant party. The judicialisation of politics that seeks accountability from recalcitrant political actors asks much of the courts, at a time when ensuring executive oversight is the most dangerous, because of the ease with which a hostile executive in a dominant party democracy can implement measures that may undermine the independence of the judiciary. The Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable ability to navigate this era of Lawfare, remaining resolute under fire. However, the more successful the Court is in holding the line against executive abuse of power, the more the judicial route is identified as a powerful weapon to achieve more abusive political objectives. The relationship between Lawfare and legitimacy is identified as a wicked problem that demands expanding boundaries to observe the courts influence on the political environment, and the political environment's influence on the judicial role and its legitimacy. Through advancing a multi-dimensional paradigm of judicial legitimacy, the dialectics of judicial legitimacy are shown to be aggravated by the judicialisation of politics. In this respect it is argued that where the foundations and assumptions on which legitimacy is predicated shift, legitimacy must be re-examined. It is therefore argued that in a culture marked by an impunified disregard of non-judicial regulatory enforcement and increasing non-compliance with judicial orders, the impulse to preserve legitimacy through a detached, formalist stance will not be sufficient. Judicial legitimacy must be relocated in the ability of the Court to be responsive. Pulled into the role of judicial statesmanship, the Court must adopt a robust approach to assertively uphold the rule of law. In tracking the unfolding consequences of the judicialisation of politics, the Court is asked to resolve matters beyond its institutional capabilities. Absent the normative commitment to the rule of law, the internationalisation of constitutional norms, and the political interest to implement remedial orders, the Court is unable to effect workable relief. In tracing the dangers of the continued trend of Lawfare, the thesis sketches a downward spiral of reputational strength of the Court and a decline in democratic responsibility. This leads to an inability to achieve effective reform that ends in disenchantment, questioning the faith placed in the Constitution. It depicts how the Constitutional Court as 'constitutional saviour' can unravel into constitutional blame. The Constitutional Court has been able to hold the line in this era of Lawfare and repel assaults on its integrity and efforts to undermine its independence. However, without a broader culture of commitment to the rule of law, civil education and a suffusion of constitutional responsibility beyond the judiciary, the Court will not be able to continue to shoulder the weight of what is asked of it. This research depicts a circular model of Lawfare and legitimacy, where Lawfare is predicated on judicial legitimacy, but an overreliance on Lawfare will destroy judicial legitimacy.

Text in Afrikaans / The broad focus of the thesis is an analysis of the meaning and the modern development of the doctrine of the separation of power (trias politica) and the application thereof in the constitutional development in South Africa. The first chapter outlines the historical restrictions that were placed on governmental authority by the trias politica doctrine. In the following chapter the application of the trias politica doctrine in different governmental systems (parliamentary, presidential and semipresidential) are analysed. In the third chapter an analysis is made of the constitutions of the former Boer republics, chronologically followed by an analysis of the 1909, 1961 and 1983 Constitutions, to establish to which extent the trias politica doctrine was incorporated in the respective constitutions. In the subsequent chapters, the focus shifts to the constitutions in the post democratic era, namely the 1993 interim Constitution and the 1996 (final) Constitution. It is evident that the new supreme Constitution and an independent judiciary yielded to a stronger adherence to the separation of power principle. It is also evident that the retainment of the parliamentary system, with a fused legislature and executive authority, inhibited a stronger separation of power. The inclusion of sosioeconomic rights in the Constitution resulted in a more direct involvement in governmental policy. However, the Constitutional Court managed to maintain a fine balance between reviewing policy and the formulation of policy. In the closing chapter a short summary is provided, followed by comments on possible alternatives to the existing system to ensure a stronger separation of powers. / Public, Constitutional and International Law / LL. D. (Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law)