Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenska aktiemarknaden sker främst med kontantvederlag, ofta förenat med aktievederlag. Som alternativ till sådant vederlag kan budgivaren erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare ”stub equity” med vilket avses det fall budgivaren erbjuder målbolagets aktieägare en begränsad mängd aktier i ett särskilt onoterat holding- eller budbolag, vilket i sin tur efter det offentliga uppköpserbjudandet innehar samtliga aktier i målbolaget. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur ett sådant erbjudande måste utformas för att vara förenligt med Takeover-reglerna, då i synnerhet den aktiemarknadsrättsliga likabehandlingsprincipen. Det föreligger inga direkt aktiemarknadsrättsliga hinder för stub equity vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, förfarandets förenlighet med regleringen är helt beroende av hur erbjudandet utformas och vilka syften erbjudandet avser uppnå. Möjligheterna att särbehandla målbolagets aktieägare är till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen i regel mycket små. Ett erbjudande med stub equity torde kunna utformas så att mindre aktieägare erbjuds ett kontantvederlag alternativt ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget medan de större aktieägarna enbart erhåller ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget, då mot bakgrund av de praktiska skäl som finns till stöd för en sådan utformning. Budgivaren har därutöver vid ett erbjudande med stub equity möjligheten att erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare A-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot A-aktier i målbolaget, B-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot B-aktier i målbolaget samt en premie för aktier med olika ekonomiska rättigheter. Ett stub equity-erbjudande ställer därutöver krav på erbjudandehandlingens utformning, innefattande att ett värderingsutlåtande avseende värderingen av aktievederlaget bör inhämtas och bifogas samt att målbolagets aktieägare bör informeras om upplägget i erbjudandehandlingen på ett tydligt och lättbegripligt sätt. Vidare torde villkor om viss anslutandegrad för stub equity-delen av vederlaget, villkor om att aktievederlaget med stub equity begränsas samt villkor om att vissa aktieägare ska acceptera erbjudandet vara förenligt med likabehandlingsprincipen. Gällande reglering torde slutligen innebära ett erforderligt skydd för okvalificerade investerare vid erbjudanden om stub equity, detta då möjligheterna att särbehandla aktieägare till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen är mycket begränsade och skyldigheterna att informera okvalificerade investerare om innebörden av ett erbjudande med stub equity betydande. / Public takeover bids on the Swedish stock market are mainly made with cash considerations, frequently combined with share considerations. As an alternative to such public offerings, the bidder may offer the company's shareholders “stub equity”, in which case the bidder offers the target company's shareholders a limited number of shares in a special unlisted holding or bidding company, which in turn after the public takeover bid holds all shares in the target company. This thesis seeks to discuss how such an offer needs to be designed in order to be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation, in particular the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. There are no direct restrictions to stub equity in public takeover bids in the Swedish takeover regulation, the procedure's compatibility with the regulation is entirely dependent on how the offer is designed and what purposes the offer is intended to achieve. The opportunity to treat the target company's shareholders differently are generally very limited due to the principle of equal treatment. An offer with stub equity ought to be able to be designed so that smaller shareholders are offered a cash consideration or a share consideration in the holding or bidding company, whilst the larger shareholders only receive a share consideration in the holding or bidding company. This in accordance with the exception for practical reasons the Swedish takeover regulation permits in these cases. In addition to this, in an offer with stub equity, the bidder has the opportunity to offer the target company's shareholders A-shares in in the holding- or bid company in exchange for A-shares in the target company, B-shares in the holding- or bid company in exchange for B-shares in the target company as well as a premium for shares with different financial rights. Furthermore, an offer with stub equity places high demands on the design and content of the offer document, including obtaining a valuation statement regarding the valuation of the share consideration and informing the target company's shareholders about the structure of the offer document in a clear and easy to understand manner. Conditions regarding certain degree of accession to the stub equity part of the offer, conditions that the share consideration with stub equity is limited and conditions that certain shareholders must accept the offer ought to also be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation. Lastly, the existing regulation ought to entail the necessary protection for unqualified investors when offering stub equity, as the opportunity to treat shareholders differently due to the principle of equal treatment is very limited and the obligations to inform unqualified investors about the meaning of an offer with stub equity are significant.

Corporate Governance (CG) nowadays is on the agenda of most developed and developing countries, including Jordan, and is receiving considerable attention in the business world as well as in the area of academic research, which is an indication of its importance for business development and society as a whole. The knowledge base about CG in developing countries appears to be limited, but it is growing in size and importance. This study therefore aims to investigate current CG practices and barriers to the development of good CG practices in firms. In order to accomplish the research objectives, a mixed research methodology was adopted. The findings of the study contribute to knowledge by providing empirical data to test and extend the theory of CG. The results suggest that most big and old firms are applying best practice of good CG. Regarding factors inhibiting the practice of effective CG, the results indicate that weakness of the legal environment for firms and lack of knowledge of BODs about CG principles are the most important factors. The empirical results find that constitution, compliance and conscience will affect firm’s performance positively. Separation between the position of CEO and Chairman, the existence of independent NEDs, the use of board subcommittees and a strong disclosure regime also help firms to improve performance. On the basis of the empirical results, the study recommends that the government needs to reform the relevant legislation. These suggestions may strengthen the internal governance of firms, thereby increasing performance and maximise shareholders’ wealth.

在資本主義盛行之今日，「公司治理」已成為舉世矚目之焦點。自從1997年亞洲爆發金融危機後，許多國際組織、非政府組織及亞洲經濟體投入大量的資源與時間研究此一議題，認為完善的公司治理是提昇企業策略能力及國際競爭力的最佳良方。在台灣，隨著資本主義盛行的浪潮，近二十年來產業轉型、高科技事業蓬勃發展的幕後功臣，除了政府主導科技研發計劃與租稅優惠及專案補助措施外，首推「創業投資業」；創業投資業之所以成為台灣高科技產業之推手，主要在於其「投資後管理」之積極性、策略性功能。根據經濟合作暨發展組織（OECD）於2002年所發表之研究報告顯示，創業投資業投資額佔GDP比率與該國公司治理績效之評比成正相關，由此可見創業投資業對提昇公司治理的貢獻。 本研究之目的在探討創業投資業於各投資階段，增進轉投資事業公司治理之最佳實務作法，期能提供我國創業投資業者參酌、運用，以發揮其對被投資公司積極、正面之監督控管功能，並符合公司治理的四個基本原則：公平性（Fairness）、透明性（Transparency）、課責性（Accountability）、責任性（Responsibility），建立二者間良性、穩定的溝通模式及信賴關係，讓創業投資業繼續為台灣產業競爭力加分。 「創業投資」（Venture Capital）又稱「風險投資」，而專為投資於高科技、高風險、具發展潛力且成長快速之事業所募集之資金，則為「創業投資基金」（Venture Capital Fund）。創業投資的投資模式是在高風險、高報酬的前提下，對具成長潛力的被投資公司提供中、長期資本及經營、資源、網絡的加值服務，協助投資標的快速成長，克服各項經營問題，申請上市櫃，以實現其高額之資本利得；因此，創業投資業與被投資公司間之投資關係，是建立在相互合作之互信基礎，互謀長期最大利益，而創業投資業最重視的則是，投資資金是否能順利回收及獲利，被投資公司的獲利是否有如預期、體制運作是否健全，進而進入資本市場，讓其所投入之資金有退出機制。 公司治理 (Corporate Governance) 這個議題是從美國發展出來的，當初國內學者對該名詞的翻譯不盡相同，有譯為「公司管理」、「公司治理」者；亦有譯為「公司監控」、「公司管控」者；在台灣統稱為「公司治理」，以兼顧管理、監控及自治、自律之功能。依據中華公司治理協會之定義：「公司治理是一種指導與管理的機制，以落實公司經營者責任為目的，在兼顧其他利害關係人利益下，藉由加強公司績效，保障股東權益」。 良好的公司治理必須符合四個原則，分別是公平性 (Fairness)、透明性 (Transparency)、課責性 (Accountability)以及責任性 (Responsibility)。公平性指的是對公司各投資人以及利益相關者予以公平合理的對待；透明性指公司財務以及其他相關資訊，必須適時適當地揭露；課責性指公司董事以及高階主管的角色與責任應該明確劃分；責任性則指公司應遵守法律以及社會期待的價值規範。 依據OECD公司治理原則之說明，良好的公司治理具有：提高經濟效率、降低資金成本、健全財務結構之基礎等功能。 在台灣，上市公司與大多數國家一樣，公司的所有權結構大都傾向於具有控制股東，而控制股東會透過金字塔結構、交叉持股與互為董事等方式而達到控制公司的目的，在此情況下，控制股東極可能透過利益輸送和掏空公司資產等方式，剝奪奪小股東的財富，並衍生道德危機與逆選擇的相關代理成本，而引發核心代理問題。 本研究發現創業投資業推動公司治理之誘因如下列： 一、期藉由灌輸經營團隊公司治理--「課責性」及「責任性」之基本原則，塑造正確之價值觀，建立企業長治久安之基礎。 二、強調公司治理--「公平性」之基本原則，保障少數股東之權益，維護創業投資業持有股權之股東權益及價值。 三、確信良好之公司治理會提昇轉投資事業之獲利能力及市場價值，同時增加創業投資業退出時所獲之資本利得。 本研究發現創業投資業評估轉投資事業公司治理之重點如下列： 一、轉投資事業之財會數據之正確性、可信賴度及資訊透明度、詳細度。 二、轉投資事業股東成員、股權結構及背景，及具實質影響力之股東特性。 三、轉投資事業董事會運作之情形，如：董事會成員、董事選任方式、董事會議題及會議進行模式。 四、轉投資事業經營團隊之商譽及誠信度，各項法令之遵循程度，公司章程之適法性及可執行程度。 五、董事會、董事長、總經理之權責劃分是否適當及課責性是否落實。 六、轉投資事業之會計制度是否建立且落實執行，以避免轉投資事業做假帳，並確保能按時提供財務報表。 本研究針對創業投資業推動創建期事業公司治理之方法建議如下： 一、建立企業主正規之「公司法制」觀念。 二、正視「公司章程」之法律地位及重要性。 三、導入「股份有限公司」之運作機制，建立「股東會」、「董事會」及「監察人」之基本功能及符合法令規定之決策模式。 四、建制符合「內部控制機制」之作業系統及程序。 本研究針對創業投資業推動擴充期事業公司治理之方法建議如下： 一、善用「公司章程」及「法令規章」解決「核心代理問題」。 二、強化「董事會」、「監察人」職能，推動「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」。 本研究針對創業投資業推動成熟期事業公司治理之方法則建議由實踐股東行動主義著手；包括： 一、創投業於投資前，應確信公司治理之重要性，將投資標的推動公司治理之績效，納入投資組合考量。 二、執行投資後，創投業應經常與公司重要股東與經營階層充份溝通及於董事會、股東會中充份表達意見，以促使公司控制股東及經營階層重視少數股東之權益。 關鍵字：創業投資業、創建期、擴充期、成熟期、公司治理、核心代理問題、控制股東、公司章程、股東會、董事會、監察人 / According to the OECD research report released in 2002 that existed a positive relevant between the investment amount of venture capitalist to the GDP and the corporate governance performance in the most countries worldwide. The contribution of venture capitalist for the corporate governance is obviously numerous. The objectives of this thesis is intend to research venture capitalist how to enhance the investee corporate governance in the investees’ start-up, development, maturing stages practicably. Basing on this study, both of the venture capitalist and the investee can conduct a beneficial and stable communication manners and relationship. In Taiwan, most of the listing companies are same as the developed countries; the majority shareholders almost constitute the whole shareholders’ structure and possess the great majority voting rights. Under this circumstance, the majority shareholders instinctively intend to create the arms-in-length transactions to deprive the minority the shareholders’ benefits and wealth, and cause the core agent problems. The study was conducted by analysis, induction, and case study methodology covering three samples of venture capitalist. The results of this study are follows: 1.At the investees’ start-up stage, the measures of venture capitalist enhances corporate governance are listed as below: 1)Educating the business owner to establish the corporate legal concept. 2)Paying much attention about the article to follow the company law. 3)Introducing and following the company law’s operating structure, and establish the “shareholders”, “board of directors” and “supervisors” basic functions and decision model. 4)Establish the internal control system and procedures. 2. At the investees’ development stage, the measures of venture capitalist enhances corporate governance are listed as below: 1)Practicing the article and regulation to overcome the core agent problems. 2)Empowering the board of directors and supervisors function, and progressing the “Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies” in the investees business running. 3. At the investees’ maturing stage, the venture capitalist suggested to practice the shareholders activism; for example: taking the corporate governance performance into the investment evaluation. Key Words: venture capitalist, start-up stage, development stage, maturing stage, corporate governance, core agent problem, majority shareholders, article, shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors supervisor

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

Este trabalho propôs-se a estudar, mediante abordagem crítica e multidisciplinar, questões processuais que surgem na impugnação de deliberações de assembleias de sociedades por ações, procurando não só comprovar a ideia de que o direito processual civil deve responder a especificidades vindas do direito material, mas tecer conclusões a respeito de qual maneira o processo civil, neste âmbito específico do direito material, atende a essas peculiaridades. Por entendermos que existe um fio condutor lógico que une conteúdo do provimento, objeto do provimento e limites objetivos e subjetivos da coisa julgada, foram eleitas algumas questões processuais como objeto principal da pesquisa, sintetizadas nas seguintes indagações: (i) qual o conteúdo do provimento jurisdicional que desconstitui deliberações de assembleias gerais de sociedades por ações?; (ii) quais os limites objetivos desse provimento e da coisa julgada que sobre ele incide?; e (iii) quais os limites subjetivos desse mesmo provimento e da coisa julgada que o acoberta? O escopo principal desta dissertação, assim, foi responder a essas perguntas, embora, para que se atingisse esse intuito, outras indagações também tenham sido respondidas. / This work aims at studying, through a critical and multidisciplinary approach, procedural matters arising out of claims that request the annulment of shareholder meetings resolutions, seeking not only to evidence the idea that the civil procedural law should correspond to specific issues of the substantive law, but also draw conclusions on how the civil procedure, within the specific ambit of the substantive law, answers to these peculiarities. Since we understand there is a logical guiding thread that links the judgment, its subject matter and the objective and subjective limits of the judgement and of the res judicata, we have chosen a few procedural issues as main object of our research, summarized in the following questions: (i) what is the content of the judgement that annuls the shareholder meetings deliberations?; (ii) what are the objective limits of this judgement and of the res judicata, which affect such deliberations?; and (iii) what are the subjective limits of this same judgement and of the res judicata, which restrict their interference in said deliberations? The main scope of this dissertation was, therefore, to answer these questions, although, in doing so, other questions have ended being answered.

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

Este trabalho propôs-se a estudar, mediante abordagem crítica e multidisciplinar, questões processuais que surgem na impugnação de deliberações de assembleias de sociedades por ações, procurando não só comprovar a ideia de que o direito processual civil deve responder a especificidades vindas do direito material, mas tecer conclusões a respeito de qual maneira o processo civil, neste âmbito específico do direito material, atende a essas peculiaridades. Por entendermos que existe um fio condutor lógico que une conteúdo do provimento, objeto do provimento e limites objetivos e subjetivos da coisa julgada, foram eleitas algumas questões processuais como objeto principal da pesquisa, sintetizadas nas seguintes indagações: (i) qual o conteúdo do provimento jurisdicional que desconstitui deliberações de assembleias gerais de sociedades por ações?; (ii) quais os limites objetivos desse provimento e da coisa julgada que sobre ele incide?; e (iii) quais os limites subjetivos desse mesmo provimento e da coisa julgada que o acoberta? O escopo principal desta dissertação, assim, foi responder a essas perguntas, embora, para que se atingisse esse intuito, outras indagações também tenham sido respondidas. / This work aims at studying, through a critical and multidisciplinary approach, procedural matters arising out of claims that request the annulment of shareholder meetings resolutions, seeking not only to evidence the idea that the civil procedural law should correspond to specific issues of the substantive law, but also draw conclusions on how the civil procedure, within the specific ambit of the substantive law, answers to these peculiarities. Since we understand there is a logical guiding thread that links the judgment, its subject matter and the objective and subjective limits of the judgement and of the res judicata, we have chosen a few procedural issues as main object of our research, summarized in the following questions: (i) what is the content of the judgement that annuls the shareholder meetings deliberations?; (ii) what are the objective limits of this judgement and of the res judicata, which affect such deliberations?; and (iii) what are the subjective limits of this same judgement and of the res judicata, which restrict their interference in said deliberations? The main scope of this dissertation was, therefore, to answer these questions, although, in doing so, other questions have ended being answered.

Le pacte d’actionnaires se place dans une forme de dépendance unilatérale au contrat de société qui n’est pas sans rappeler le rapport juridique d’accessoire à principal.En effet, s’il est fondamentalement distinct du contrat de société qu’il complète, tout pacte conclu par certains actionnaires, en dehors des statuts, afin d’organiser leurs relations interindividuelles d’actionnaires, trouve nécessairement sa matière et puise sa raison d’être dans le pacte social. Ainsi, la dépendance du pacte au contrat de société se manifeste-t-elle, de la manière la plus évidente, par la caducité qu’entraîne pour le pacte l’arrivée du terme du contrat de société ou la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire d’un partenaire.Dès lors, par analogie avec la règle selon laquelle l’accessoire a vocation à suivre le sort du principal, cette dimension d’accessoire du contrat de société justifie que le pacte subisse l’influence du cadre juridique auquel le contrat de société est lui-même soumis, à savoir le droit des sociétés et, en particulier, l’ordre public sociétaire.Cette dépendance au contrat de société, par essence commune à tous les pactes d’actionnaires en raison de leur objet matériel et de leur cause, est à géométrie variable. Elle repose en effet sur divers facteurs de rattachement au contrat de société que sont l’exercice du droit de vote, la détention des actions ou la qualité d’actionnaire des partenaires, lesquels impriment, selon qu’ils s’immiscent plus ou moins profondément dans le fondement, la structure ou encore le fonctionnement de la société, différents degrés de dépendance dans la relation pacte - contrat de société.Malgré l’hétérogénéité du régime des pactes d’actionnaires, il est alors possible de dégager,à l’aune de cette dimension d’accessoire, une tendance fondamentale qui anime, en droit positif, la jurisprudence relative aux pactes. Cette ligne directrice réside dans la variabilité du degré d’emprise des règles qui encadrent le contrat de société sur le régime des pactes d’actionnaires.La jurisprudence se révèle être, en effet, d’une manière générale et par-delà la casuistique, en cohérence avec cette influence proportionnelle de l’environnement sociétaire à l’intensité du degré de dépendance que présente chaque type de pacte en fonction du facteur qui le rattache au contrat de société. Les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance marquée au contrat de société bénéficient ainsi d’une marge de liberté à la mesure de celle dont bénéficie le contrat de société pour l’aménagement de l’exercice du droit de vote ou de la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire. Au contraire, les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance modérée au contrat de société, qui organisent des cessions ou des acquisitions d’actions,sont plus largement libérés des contraintes auxquelles est soumis le contrat de société au regard du principe de libre négociabilité des actions. Quant à l’influence sur les pactes de certains autres principes d’ordre public sociétaire, tels que la prohibition des clauses léonines ou l’expertise de l’article 1843-4 du Code civil, elle demeure incertaine en droit positif. Toutefois, la jurisprudence tend à reconnaître le particularisme de ces règles et à leur retirer, en conséquence, tout caractère impératif en dehors du cadre des relations entretenues collectivement par les actionnaires avec la société. / Shareholders’ agreement falls into a form of unilateral dependence to the companyagreement that is reminiscent of the legal relationship between the incidental and itsprincipal.Indeed, although it is fundamentally separate from the company agreement, which itsupplements, any agreement concluded by certain shareholders apart from the articles ofassociation, in order to organise their inter-individual shareholders relationships, is,nevertheless, necessarily based on and permitted by the company agreement. Thus, thecontractual dependency of the shareholders’ agreement to the company agreementmanifests itself, in the most obvious way, through the obsoleteness of the shareholders’agreement caused by the termination of the company agreement or by the loss ofshareholder status by a partner.Therefore, by analogy with the rule according to which the incidental is inclined to yield to theprincipal, such kinship to the quality of accessory to the company agreement justifies the factthat the shareholders’ agreement would be under the influence of the legal framework towhich the company’s memorandum and articles of association are submitted, that is to saycorporate law and, in particular, corporate law and order.This dependence to the company agreement, which is in essence common to allshareholders’ agreements due to their material object and cause, turns out to be flexible. Itrests indeed on different connecting factors to the company agreement, such as using thevoting right, shareholding or shareholder status of partners, which imprint, according to howdeep they work into the company foundation, structure or functioning, different degrees ofdependence in the relationship between the shareholders’ agreement and the companyagreement.In spite of the heterogenic regime of the shareholders’ agreements, it is possible to outline, inrespect to this type of accessory status to the company agreement, a crucial tendency thatleads, in positive law, agreements-related case law. This guideline lies in the variability of thehold on shareholders’ agreements regime by the rules that frame the company’smemorandum and articles of association.Indeed, case law proves to be, generally speaking and beyond casuistry, consistentwith this proportional influence of the company environment to the degree of dependenceeach type of shareholders’ agreement is subject to, according to the factor connecting it tothe company agreement. The shareholders’ agreements that show a strong dependence tothe company agreement are given a leeway commensurate with the one the company’smemorandum and articles of association benefit from regarding voting right or loss ofshareholder status arrangements. By contrast, the moderately dependant shareholders’agreements, organising transfer or acquisition of shares, are more widely released from therestrictions that govern the company’s articles of association regarding the principle of freetransferability of shares. Furthermore, the influence on shareholders’ agreements of someother principles of corporate law and order, such as the leonine clause prohibition or theexpertise of Article 1843-4 of the French Civil Code, remain uncertain in positive law.However, case law tends to recognize the distinctive identity of these rules and,consequently, to clear them from any imperative property beyond the frame of therelationships that the shareholders have collectively with the company.

La présente étude a pour objet de montrer que les moyens de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires en droit chinois et en droit français ne sont pas soumis à des critères fondamentalement différents. Dans les sociétés anonymes, les règles juridiques visent à trouver un équilibre des rapports entre les actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires, ainsi qu’entre les actionnaires et la société ou le groupe de sociétés.C’est l’intérêt social et le principe d’égalité qui guident le législateur et le juge de proposer des solutions convenables.Il importe de noter qu’en droit français, les dispositions sur les responsabilités et les moyens de recours pour les minoritaires sont d’applications faciles qu’en droit chinois. D’ailleurs, la recherche de l’acquisition des sociétés cotées chinoises sous l’angle de la protection des minoritaires, tout à fait différent à l’offre publique en droit français, présente les particularités du marché réglementé chinois et mérite que les investisseurs étrangers découvrent davantage. / The dissertation aimed to point out that the methods of the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese law and in French law are not subject to the different criteria. In company limited by shares, the legal provisions intend to find a balance of relation between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and between the shareholders and the company or group of company. It is corporate profits and the principal of equality that direct legislators and judges to suggest applicable solutions.It is important to notify that in French law, legal provisions about the responsibility of majority shareholders or company leaders and the ways of resort of minority shareholders provide reference for improvement of Chinese law. Besides, the study of acquisition of chinese listed companies, looked from the angle of the protection of minority shareholders, very different from tender offer in French law, demonstrate the characteristics of Chinese stock market and deserve foreign investors’ enough attention.

自2001年以來，美國爆發安隆、世界通訊等一連串的弊案後，國際性投資機構法人不斷對財務會計報表是否能真實、允當的表達一家公司經營的面貌產生未有的質疑，其中包括國內實施多年的員工分紅配股制度，在此期間，國內主管機關、產業界及學術界針對此制度所衍伸的問題有相當多的討論與交換意見。 本研究觀察2004~2006年國內員工分紅配股現況；探討員工分紅配股屬盈餘分配情況下，在目前會計處理所衍伸的公司治理及會計原則適用問題；並參考馬秀如教授於會計研究月刊所舉的例子，加以延伸，加入更多參數及假設條件，探討員工分紅配股依面額或依市價計算、股價高或股價低、盈餘是否全數轉增資、除權後是否填權情況下，對股東權益產生何種不同程度的影響；再針對目前產業界，針對員工分紅費用化後，員工產生的實質所得減少，所回應的因應配套措施，探討其各項配套措施對員工權益、股東權益甚至產業界長久以往的影響。 經本研究觀察及探討，有以下發現，提供主管機關、投資人、企業及員工做為參考： 一、2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益仍極嚴重，且2004年至2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益情況並無往改善方向進行。 二、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理，無法真實反應公司盈餘、有違公司治理精神且無法與國際會計準則接軌。 三、在相關的簡化假設條件下，員工分紅配股對股東權益造成下列之影響： 1. 高股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 2. 低股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否仍不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 3.員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘不全數轉增資情況下，不論股價高低、填權與否，均可使期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 4. 高股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 5. 低股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率較高股價高。 四、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理下，大多數的公司選擇員工分紅配股的員工激勵制度。 五、員工分紅費用化後，使股東權益稀釋程度鎖住一固定比率、盈餘真實性提高、公司間可在同一基礎上相互比較、財務透明度提高並與國際接軌。 六、員工分紅費用化後，企業因應的員工激勵制度配套措施將呈現多樣化。 七、員工分紅費用化，對員工實質所得有相當大的影響；對股東為鎖住一固定比率的稀釋程度；對公司而言，可用的員工激勵措施資源減少；對產業，將形成好公司更好，壞公司更壞的循環。 / Following the outbreak of a series of scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, in the U.S. as from 2001, international institutional investors have been suspicious about whether financial statements can truly and adequately represent a company’s operating status, including the employee stock bonus system that had been carried out domestically for many years. As a matter or fact, while applying the system, local competent authorities, industries and academic circles have had a lot of concerns about the resulting problems, which triggers plenty of discussions and opinion exchanges. By observing the domestic employee stock bonus distribution for 2004 through 2006, this study aimed to investigate the issues of corporate governance and accounting principle applicability derived from current accounting process under the circumstance where employee stock bonuses fall in retained earnings. Also, by referring to examples given by Professor Sheree S. Ma in Accounting Research Monthly, the study added more parameters and hypothetic assumptions to explore the degree of the influence of employee stock bonus calculation (according to the face value or market price), the stock price (high or low), earnings recapitalization and price recovery status subsequent to the ex-right date on shareholders’ equity, followed by investigating the influence of the countermeasures taken in the industry to cope with the reduction of employee’s real income caused by treating employee stock bonuses as expenses on shareholders’ equity, employees’ real income, and even the industry for a long run. The following findings of the study hope to serve as a reference for competent authorities, investors, enterprises and employees: 1. Given that the dilution status of shareholders’ equity from 2004 to 2006 had not improved, the distribution of employee stock bonuses in 2006 was still severely diluting shareholders’ equity. 2. The current accounting process of combing employee stock bonuses in retained earnings cannot truly reflect a company’s earnings, which is not only against the spirit of corporate governance, but has also deviated from international accounting standards. 3. Under simplified hypothetical assumptions, the employee stock bonus distribution has generated the following influences on shareholders’ equity: (1). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (2.) Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (3). Under circumstance where employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are not all recapitalized as increased capital, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced no matter how high or low of the stock price, or if the stock price can be recovered subsequent to the ex-right date. (4). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are partially recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced. (5). Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be higher than that with high stock price. 4. Before 2008, the existing employee stock bonuses are processed as retained earnings distribution in accounting, a majority of companies choose employee stock ownership as an incentive to motivate their employees. 5. After employee stock bonuses are being treated as expenses, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity is locked at a fixed ratio. As a result, the veracity of company earnings is higher, so different companies may compare with each other on a same basis, financial transparency can be strengthened, and in the end, these companies operating performance can link up with the world. 6. With employee stock bonuses being treated as expenses, the countermeasures taken by enterprises to motivate their employees show versatility. 7. By treating employee stock bonuses as expenses, employee’s real income will be considerably affected, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity will be locked at a fixed rate, company’s available resources for motivating its employees will be reduced, and the whole industry will fall prey to the cycle that good companies get better while bad companies get worse.