During the year 2007 when this thesis was completed the European Union could look back at fifty years of collaboration, which began with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and which has developed from being mainly economic in character to incorporating a political as well as a social dimension at the European level. In 2007 the European Union also commemorated the twentieth anniversary of Erasmus, its higher education mobility programme. It is this relatively new political dimension which I have been interested in investigating in this thesis. More precisely, it is the political construction of a common European identity which is analysed using a critical discourse analysis approach. The major aim of this thesis has been two-fold. The first aim has been to investigate how the European is constructed in the discourse contained within the official European Union documents. I have been interested in analysing the various structures, in the form of ideas and norms which are used to construct 'the European'. The second aim has been to explore whether the role of higher educated, as constructed in the official European Union discourse, is given a similar identity-making role as education is argued to have in the nation-state according to the theory on national identity. I argue that there are three versions of European identity construction, i.e. cultural, civic, and neo-liberal, with their own relationship to higher education, present in the empirical material analysed, consisting of official European Union documents. Further, this thesis is also a study of the power of modern government. I argue that there is an increase in normative soft power where 'the Good European' is not something 'you' are but something 'you' become by being a responsible active citizen. Through the use of critical discourse analysis I illuminate the power which resides in the language in the discourse analysed. Thus, I have been interested in investigating how the discourse analysed works to both include and exclude individuals. / Under 2007 då denna avhandling färdigställdes kunde den Europeiska Unionen se tillbaka på femtio år av samarbete som började med Romfördraget 1957 och som har utvecklats från att vara framförallt ekonomiskt till att även behandla politiska och sociala frågor på den europeiska nivån. År 2007 firade den Europeiska Unionen även tjugoårsjubileet för Erasmus, sitt program för rörlighet inom högre utbildning. Det är denna relativt nya politiska dimension som jag har varit intresserad av att undersöka i avhandlingen. Närmare bestämt, det är den politiska konstruktionen av en gemensam europeisk identitet som analyseras med hjälp av kritisk diskurs analys. Syftet med avhandlingen har varit tvådelat. Det första syftet har varit att undersöka hur europén skapas i diskursen som finns att finna i officiella EU policy dokument. Jag har varit intresserad av att analysera de olika strukturer, i form av idéer och normer som används för att konstruera 'europén'. Det andra syftet har varit att undersöka om högre utbildning, som den konstrueras i den officiella EU diskursen, har samma identitetsskapande roll som utbildning sägs ha i nationalstaten enligt nationell identitetsteori. Jag påstår att det finns tre versioner av europeisk identitet, i.e. kulturell, politisk och neoliberal, var och en med sin egen relation till högre utbildning, i det empiriska materialet, bestående av officiella EU dokument, som har undersökts. Dessutom, avhandlingen är en studie av den makt som är del av modernt styrande. Jag påstår att det har varit en ökning då det gäller 'mjuk. makt där en 'God Europé' inte är något 'du' är utan något 'du' blir genom att vara en ansvarstagande aktiv medborgare. Genom kritisk diskursanalys belyser jag uttrycken av makt som finns att finnas i den diskurs jag analyserar. Med andra ord, jag har varit intresserad av att undersöka hur den analyserade diskursen både inkluderar och exkluderar individer.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of identity when it comes to European integration. Specifically, the citizen of the European Union’s identity as exclusive national or as transnational. What does the social constructivist theory say when it comes to the role of EU-citizens identity and European integration? I also want to contribute to strengthen the social constructivist theory in political science and international politics. I will examine this through a discourse analysis on four different selected materials. A campaign webpage from the Vote Leave group who ran a campaign to make the Great Britain leave the European Union, an interview the German newspaper der SPIEGEL did with Marine Le Pen who is the party leader of the French right-winged party Rassemblent National, a debate article written by the French president Emmanuel Macron and the Swedish party Liberalernas webpage campaign for the European Parliament elections 2019. I analyse how the discourse these four examples shape and creates the feeling of national or transnational identity and what the message connected to that identity-making says about European integration. With my discourse analysis and the theories of Thomas Risse and Catherine E. De Vries on social constructivism, identity and European integration I analyse and see that those who identify exclusively with a national identity are less keen on solidarity between nations, common policies and have a xenophobic view as oppose to those who have a transnational identity who are positive towards solidarity between nations, want a closer European integration and are not hostile towards migrants. I come to the conclusion that the identity of the EU-citizens is a major factor in human action, political mobilization, political action as in choosing and voting for a party, the EU-institutions way of negotiating on common political issues, public opinion and election outcomes. This means that feeling of an exclusive national or transnational identity is an important factor of European integration.

This thesis analyses four European writers, whose common denominator is that they have moved to Sweden from other European countries and chosen to write in Swedish: Caterina Pascual Söderbaum, Theodor Kallifatides, Gabriela Melinescu and Sigrid Combüchen. Focus lies on novels published by the authors in the 21st century. The thesis builds upon theories on memory by Pierre Nora and on imagined communities by Benedict Anderson, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand. In Imagined Communities, Anderson shows the effects of the emerging nation states on the modern novel in the 19th century. The hypothesis of this study is that the emergence of the European Union and the resulting European movement will affect narratives in a similar way, but on a European rather than national level. The main finding seems to confirm this, showing that an imagined European community takes shape in the studied novels, surpassing that of the nation state’s borders.  All writers focus on memories, but in two different ways: Kallifatides and Melinescu depict long memories, starting in ancient times and with a positive view on remembrance as a focus on what is in common for Europeans. Pascual Söderbaum and Combüchen, on the other hand, depict memories from the dark 20th century and the importance of forgetting and moving on in order to give future generations freedom. In most novels, however, there are examples of lieux de mémoire (sites of memory), with Nora’s terminology, expanding towards a common European identity, in spite of the plethora of myths and languages. / Den här uppsatsen analyserar fyra europeiska författare vars gemensamma nämnare är att de har flyttat till Sverige från andra europeiska länder och valt att skriva på svenska: Caterina Pascual Söderbaum, Theodor Kallifatides, Gabriela Melinescu och Sigrid Combüchen. I fokus är romaner som givits ut av författarna under 2000-talet. Uppsatsen bygger på teorier om minne av Pierre Nora och föreställda gemenskaper av Benedict Anderson, Chiara Bottici och Benoît Challand. I Imagined Communities visar Anderson vilken påverkan de framväxande nationalstaterna hade på den moderna romanen under artonhundratalet. Den här uppsatsens hypotes är att framväxten av EU och den europeiska rörlighet som EU resulterat i påverkar narrativen på ett liknande sätt, men på en europeisk snarare än nationell nivå. De viktigaste resultaten tycks i huvudsak bekräfta denna hypotes, och visar på hur en föreställd europeisk gemenskap tar form i de studerade romanerna, en gemenskap som överskrider nationalstatens gränser. Samtliga författare fokuserar på minnen, men på två vitt skilda sätt: Kallifatides och Melinescu skildrar långa minnen med början i antiken och en positiv syn på hågkomst som det som förenar européer. Pascual Söderbaum och Combüchen, å andra sidan, skildrar minnen av det mörka nittonhundratalet och vikten av att glömma bort och gå vidare för att ge framtida generationer frihet. I de flesta romaner finns det dock exempel på lieux de mémoire (minnesplatser), med Noras terminologi, som vidgar sig mot en gemensam europeisk identitet, trots den stora mångfalden av myter och språk.

<p>European cities of today are under the challenge to find ways to stay competitive and flourish in a rapidly changing world, where the old patterns of centrality and periphery not necessarily holds true. New and improved communication networks, a changed political geography in Europe, and the globalisation of not only the financial and industrial markets but also to a certain extent the globalisation of people, have all led to great challenges for cities and regions.</p><p>In a changed spatial reality the classic monocentric models are challenged by newer models of urbanisation. The polycentric urban region is one such model which has been used to describe urban regions like the Randstad in the Netherlands and the Rhein-Ruhr region in Germany. Regions which lack the single dominant central city of the monocentric models of old, and instead shows a high degree of more equal-sized and sometimes more specialised cities in regional cooperation. The polycentric urban region is in that aspect a possible model for how other urbanised regions in Europe may act to be able to position themselves as attractive urban regions and regional hubs in the European urban network.</p><p>Polycentric urban regions are not a universal solution, though. For such regions to work there are a number of prerequisites to be filled, something that makes it a possible future for regions like Haute-Normandie in France, where the two cities of Le Havre and Rouen have the possibility to form one urban region and already show signs of heading in that direction, while a region like Dolnośląskie in Poland – where the city of Wrocław is the dominant city in what makes for a more classic monocentric region – has much less opportunity to use a polycentric strategy on the regional level to become competitive. On the other hand such a city and region can instead benefit from the fact that Poland is to a high degree a polycentric nation, and as one of the larger cities in such an environment, Wrocław has the opportunity to position itself as a hub in the European urban network in a way that Le Havre and Rouen cannot, due to their physical location close to the giant European urban region of Paris.</p> / <p>Dagens europeiska städer står inför en utmaning att finna sätt att förbli konkurrenskraftiga och framgångsrika i en snabbt föränderlig värld, där de gamla mönstren vad gäller centralitet och periferi inte längre nödvändigtvis gäller. Nya och förbättrade kommunikationsnätverk, en förändrad politisk geografi i Europa, globaliseringen av inte bara de finansiella och industriella systemen, utan även till viss del en globalisering av människorna, har alla lett till stora utmaningar för städer och regioner.</p><p>I en förändrad rumsgeografisk verklighet utmanas de klassiska monocentriska modellerna av nyare urbaniseringsmodeller. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är en sådan modell som har använts för att beskriva urbana regioner som Randstad i Nederländerna och Rhein-Ruhrregionen i Tyskland. Regioner som saknar den ensamt dominierande centrala staden från de klassiska monocentriska modellerna, och istället uppvisar en hög grad av mer jämnstora och ibland mer specialiserade städer i regionalt samarbete. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är mot den bakgrunden en möjlig modell för hur andra urbaniserade regioner i Europa kan agera för att positionera sig själva som attraktiva urbana regioner och regionala nav i det Europeiska urbana nätverket.</p><p>Polycentriska urbana regioner är däremot inte någon universallösning. För att sådana regioner ska fungera krävs att ett antal punkter är uppfyllda, något som gör det till en möjlig framtid för regioner som exempelvis Haute-Normandie i Frankrike, där de två städerna Le Havre och Rouen tillsammans kan bilda en urban region och redan visar tecken på att gå i den riktningen, medan en region som Dolnośląskie i Polen – där staden Wrocław är den dominerande staden i vad som utgör en mer traditionell monocentrisk region – har betydligt mindre möjlighet att använda sig av en polycentrisk strategi på det regionala planet för att bli konkurrenskraftig. Å andra sidan kan en sådan stad och region istället utnyttja det faktum att Polen är en ovanligt polycentrisk stat, och som en av de större städerna i en sådan miljö har Wrocław möjligheten att positionera sig själv som ett nav i det europeiska urbana nätverket på ett sätt som Le Havre och Rouen inte kan, till följd av deras fysiska lokalisering nära den gigantiska europeiska urbaniserade regionen Paris.</p>

European cities of today are under the challenge to find ways to stay competitive and flourish in a rapidly changing world, where the old patterns of centrality and periphery not necessarily holds true. New and improved communication networks, a changed political geography in Europe, and the globalisation of not only the financial and industrial markets but also to a certain extent the globalisation of people, have all led to great challenges for cities and regions. In a changed spatial reality the classic monocentric models are challenged by newer models of urbanisation. The polycentric urban region is one such model which has been used to describe urban regions like the Randstad in the Netherlands and the Rhein-Ruhr region in Germany. Regions which lack the single dominant central city of the monocentric models of old, and instead shows a high degree of more equal-sized and sometimes more specialised cities in regional cooperation. The polycentric urban region is in that aspect a possible model for how other urbanised regions in Europe may act to be able to position themselves as attractive urban regions and regional hubs in the European urban network. Polycentric urban regions are not a universal solution, though. For such regions to work there are a number of prerequisites to be filled, something that makes it a possible future for regions like Haute-Normandie in France, where the two cities of Le Havre and Rouen have the possibility to form one urban region and already show signs of heading in that direction, while a region like Dolnośląskie in Poland – where the city of Wrocław is the dominant city in what makes for a more classic monocentric region – has much less opportunity to use a polycentric strategy on the regional level to become competitive. On the other hand such a city and region can instead benefit from the fact that Poland is to a high degree a polycentric nation, and as one of the larger cities in such an environment, Wrocław has the opportunity to position itself as a hub in the European urban network in a way that Le Havre and Rouen cannot, due to their physical location close to the giant European urban region of Paris. / Dagens europeiska städer står inför en utmaning att finna sätt att förbli konkurrenskraftiga och framgångsrika i en snabbt föränderlig värld, där de gamla mönstren vad gäller centralitet och periferi inte längre nödvändigtvis gäller. Nya och förbättrade kommunikationsnätverk, en förändrad politisk geografi i Europa, globaliseringen av inte bara de finansiella och industriella systemen, utan även till viss del en globalisering av människorna, har alla lett till stora utmaningar för städer och regioner. I en förändrad rumsgeografisk verklighet utmanas de klassiska monocentriska modellerna av nyare urbaniseringsmodeller. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är en sådan modell som har använts för att beskriva urbana regioner som Randstad i Nederländerna och Rhein-Ruhrregionen i Tyskland. Regioner som saknar den ensamt dominierande centrala staden från de klassiska monocentriska modellerna, och istället uppvisar en hög grad av mer jämnstora och ibland mer specialiserade städer i regionalt samarbete. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är mot den bakgrunden en möjlig modell för hur andra urbaniserade regioner i Europa kan agera för att positionera sig själva som attraktiva urbana regioner och regionala nav i det Europeiska urbana nätverket. Polycentriska urbana regioner är däremot inte någon universallösning. För att sådana regioner ska fungera krävs att ett antal punkter är uppfyllda, något som gör det till en möjlig framtid för regioner som exempelvis Haute-Normandie i Frankrike, där de två städerna Le Havre och Rouen tillsammans kan bilda en urban region och redan visar tecken på att gå i den riktningen, medan en region som Dolnośląskie i Polen – där staden Wrocław är den dominerande staden i vad som utgör en mer traditionell monocentrisk region – har betydligt mindre möjlighet att använda sig av en polycentrisk strategi på det regionala planet för att bli konkurrenskraftig. Å andra sidan kan en sådan stad och region istället utnyttja det faktum att Polen är en ovanligt polycentrisk stat, och som en av de större städerna i en sådan miljö har Wrocław möjligheten att positionera sig själv som ett nav i det europeiska urbana nätverket på ett sätt som Le Havre och Rouen inte kan, till följd av deras fysiska lokalisering nära den gigantiska europeiska urbaniserade regionen Paris.

What is the European Union (EU) and which countries should be part of it in the future? These questions became topical during the first part of the 21st century when political and geographical changes hasten the need to decide the nature of the European cooperation. In the European Constitution, that never come into force, the European values that a key role but was taken away in the succeeding Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless EU continues to expand, recently to the East and non-European countries asTurkey are now on the “waiting-list”. What is then the European Identity in the changedEurope of today?   The President of the Commission has during the years had great influence on EU's view upon the European identity. For example, Jacques Delors was prominent in urging for European togetherness over national borders. Still, the current president, José Manuel Barroso, has new political and geographical situations to consider. That raises the question whether this new era might have an impact upon the president’s view of the European identity.   How to relate to the European identity is something that the sociologist Gerard Delanty investigates. Foremost is his focus upon the historical rise of “Europe” and in addition the European identity effect European immigrants. Delanty has also created four models for European identity of “thick” and “thin” categories. The models systematize different views upon the European identity.   This essay investigates how these models can be used as an instrument to categorize the different views upon the European identity that has been used by official sources within EU in the past, and compare these to the view which is expressed by Barroso today. The result is that Barroso’s view upon the European identity correlates to a great extent with the view of the 1950’s and 1960’s. That is, that the European identity should be based upon moral values as democracy and human rights. In contrast, the view in the 1980’s and beginning and 1990’s was a greater focus upon similarities in ancient history and multi-cultureEurope. In this way, Barroso’s view is similar to the early EU, however, not to the more recent opinions about European culture.

This Bachelor thesis deals with the act of the British Labour Party when they recalled a referendum promised by former Prime Minister Tony Blair. Tony Blair promised a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, but his successor Gordon Brown later recalled it when the Lisbon Treaty succeeded the Constitutional Treaty as the legal foundation of the European Union. The main purpose of this thesis was to with help from various theorethical frameworks explain why the Labour Party decided to do this, even if this decision gave the main opposition party, the Conservative and Unionist Party (the Tories), the chance to heavily critisize the Labour Party, and picture them as traitors. The research questions were: • What are the reasons that the Labour Party went from being a Eurosceptical party, to become more pro-European? • Why did the Labour Party cancel the promised referendum on the new treaty of the European Union? Various answers were found for the first research question. Among the most important was that it was a part of the over all transition which led to the launch of New Labour. The second research question was answered with three explanatory models based on actions of the Labour Party on three arenas; the electoral arena (based on power, this model claims that the Labour Party act as they do because the know the Tories would not act differently if they were in office), the parliamentary arena (based on ideology, this model claims that Labour want the Lisbon Treaty because it has a stronger social dimension than earlier treaties) and the internal arena (based on the problem of identification, this model claims that the Labour Party identifies itself with the British government, and not just the voters, and are afraid of damaging Britain’s influence in the EU and international politics if Britain says ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty).

This study examines the European council and its connection to CFSP and the European identity. It will give a perspective of the change in common foreign-security policy from the Maastricht Treaty to the Lissabon treaty. The study will reproduce a perspective through time and describe the main ideas in CFSP and make a connection to how it created a European identity. The empirical material will conclude the European council results. To give more perspective, an idea analysis will be operating to capture the ideas of the various materials describing European identity and the CFSP. Henceforth using the empirical material to conclude a result for the analysis. For the analysis to be complete subjects such as normative power and actorness will have a part in the work in CFSP. Social constructivism as a theory will help to understand the power that European identity has in international cooperation. To conclude this, abstract the study will structure a difference in the work of the CFSP and its strategy to promoted democracy, and peace.

Sedan det officiella bildandet av EU så har idén om en gemensam europeisk identitet funnits. Både EU och Sverige har försökt förverkliga denna idé – det finns däremot forskning som tyder på att det är ett tämligen svårdefinierat koncept. I läroplanen för gymnasieskolan finns en formulering rörande utvecklandet av elevernas europeiska identitet. I och med dess svårdefinierade natur så väcker det frågan kring hur lärare själva konceptualiserar en europeisk identitet, vilket besvarar föreliggande studies syfte. Dessutom är det meningen att synliggöra lärares resonemang kring möjligheter och utmaningar som finns med att undervisa om en europeisk identitet. Således har en kvalitativ intervjustudie genomförts där sju verksamma samhällskunskapslärare intervjuats och analyserats utifrån en social identitetsteori. Resultatet av studien visade att det saknas en samstämmighet bland lärarna gällande vilka aspekter som kan utgöra en del av en europeisk identitet. Sekularism, mångkulturalism och kontinentens historia framstod som de främsta aspekterna, men varenda aspekt ifrågasattes kontinuerligt av samtliga lärare. Det fanns en brist på möjligheter bland de intervjuade lärarna som menade att EU och identitet utgjorde självklara förutsättningar men att det kräver ett visst intresse från läraren själv. Vid talan om utmaningar så fann de intervjuade lärarna bland annat att det är en svårdefinierad fråga, ett obekvämt ämne för vissa lärare och framför allt en brist på förankring i ämnesplanen, vilket gör att det europeiska hamnar i skymundan. Den nationella och globala identiteten ges mer utrymme i ämnesplanen och således är det naturligt att dessa behandlas mer i klassrummet. / Ever since the foundation of the European Union, the idea of a common European identity has existed. Both the EU and Sweden have tried to make this idea come into fruition – however, previous research indicate the difficulty in defining this concept. In the Swedish curriculum for upper-secondary school, there is a formulation regarding developing the students’ European identity. Due to its difficulty to define, it raises the question regarding how teachers themselves conceptualize a European identity, which explains the main purpose of this study. Another objective was to investigate teachers reasoning regarding the potential possibilities and challenges when teaching about a European identity. Therefore, a qualitative interview study was conducted where seven active civics teachers were interviewed and analyzed using a social identity theory. The results of the study pointed to a lack of consensus among the teachers regarding what aspects to include in a European identity. Secularism, multiculturalism and the continent’s history emerged as the most prevalent aspects; however, each aspect was continually disputed by every teacher. There was also a lack of possibilities presented. EU and identity were the most obvious in terms of core content, but it requires a certain interest from the teacher. The interviewed teachers brought up several challenges, including its difficulty to define, its uncomfortable nature and, above all, its absence from the course curriculum. This effectively sidelines the European identity from making any significant appearance. The national and global identity are present in the course curriculum and are therefore given a higher priority.

This paper aims at analyzing and understanding the political conflict between the EU and member states Hungary and Poland that has increased in recent years. Though this paper's focus will be on the different understanding and application of democracy, its meaning and values. By understanding the different approach to democracy, through liberal democracy and illiberal democracy, one may understand the conflict better and its implication for European integration. This paper analyses the democratic development in Hungary and Poland, the theories behind their development and its response from the EU. The importance of understanding the core values of democracy and understanding of it, be it liberal democracy or illiberal democracy, is not to be underestimated. Only by understanding these differences in core values can we understand the conflict of Rule of Law between the EU and its illiberal member states. This paper concludes that the negative democratic development in these states and their governments' public philosophical and political narratives for their reforms are not in coordination with neither reality nor public opinion. It also finds that the development of illiberal democracies within the EU is a threat to future European integration and the normative legitimacy of the EU in internal and foreign matters.