Orientador: David Dequech Filho / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T22:45:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Angeli_Eduardo_D.pdf: 1870969 bytes, checksum: 2e7fd01a02cca6a4c31d8db49941dc79 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: O objetivo da tese, constituída de quatro ensaios, é, por um lado, aprofundar o conhecimento acerca da mainline economics, e, por outro, aproximá-la de alguns debates contemporâneos da ciência econômica. Para isso, apresenta e qualifica como heterodoxa e robusta a mainline economics, uma linha de pesquisa existente ao longo da evolução do pensamento econômico que abre mão de um conceito central à ortodoxia, o de equilíbrio, substituindo-o pela análise institucional sob uma perspectiva liberal. Procura argumentar também que a crítica heterodoxa da teoria econômica convencional não deve ser confundida com a crítica do próprio sistema capitalista. Uma vez que os autores associados à mainline economics, em geral, encontram-se no passado da disciplina e à margem de sua corrente ortodoxa, a tese busca, a seguir, justificar a importância do estudo da história do pensamento econômico e da existência do pluralismo de metodologias em economia. Para isso, levanta dois argumentos associados à escola austríaca, um grupo particular dentro da mainline economics: a abordagem de Israel Kirzner para a descoberta de oportunidades no processo de mercado como analogia ao que acontece na relação entre teoria econômica e história do pensamento econômico, e a defesa da liberdade por F. A. Hayek como incentivo à chance de variação e fuga do modo convencional de se fazer ciência econômica. Tendo argumentado a favor da valorização de autores pregressos em economia e pela liberdade de se adotar metodologias distintas da convencional para se avançar em teoria econômica, a tese busca envolver o pensamento de dois autores associados à mainline economics com debates contemporâneos em economia. Assim, procura apreender o papel do individualismo no pensamento econômico e apresentar ao menos uma interpretação distinta da mainstream economics, mas que busca resgatar o pensamento de alguns dos clássicos da disciplina, qual seja, a de James Buchanan. Por fim, propõe-se avaliar o pensamento institucional de Hayek e sua compreensão de conceitos como instituições, regras, cultura e outros correlatos, bem como as relações entre eles, o comportamento humano e o desempenho do grupo social. Avalia também de que maneira se pode entender o liberalismo de Hayek como resultado de suas posições em economia institucional / Abstract: This dissertation is composed by four essays. Its purpose is to improve the comprehension about the mainline economics and to make it closer to some current discussions in economics. In order to achieve such goals, this dissertation presents the mainline economics, an intellectual project that can be found through the history of economic thought. Usually, the mainline economics does not use the conceptualization of equilibrium, at least not in the same sense of conventional economic theory. In this dissertation, there is an explanation of the reason for mainline economics can be heterodox and robust. It is also argued that a critique of orthodox economics should not be taken as a necessary critique of capitalism nor liberalism. Since economists who can be associated to the mainline economics are usually in the history of economics and they are not associated with economic orthodoxy, it is argued that both the history of economic thought and methodological pluralism in economics can be useful for the economic scientific community. In this context, two arguments related to the Austrian School of Economics are here developed: the place of entrepreneur in Kirzner's approach to the market process as an analogy to what is seen in the history of economic thought, and Hayek's arguments for liberty as a defense of freedom of research and the existence of methodological pluralism. It is argued that, under the Austrian point of view, history of economic thought and methodological pluralism might be more appreciated by economists. Afterwards, two connections between mainline economics and current discussions in Economics are proposed. Firstly, the role played by individualism in the economic thought is introduced and an interpretation that is different from the one held by orthodox economics. This reading is introduced by J. M. Buchanan's perspective. He is a mainline economist who has interesting explanations for the role of individualism in Economics. Secondly, Hayek's institutional thought is presented, in order to be compared to some institutional approaches that have been spreading through the social sciences in the last decades. The relation between Hayek's institutionalism, his liberalism and his interpretation of the role played by institutions over individual behavior and social performance is discussed as well / Doutorado / Teoria Economica / Doutor em Ciências Econômicas

Friedrich August von Hayek hat meines Erachtens die elaborierteste Neufassung der liberalen Theorie im 20. Jahrhundert formuliert. Hayek selbst sah die Gefahr für eine liberale Großgesellschaft in der Überschätzung der menschlichen Erkenntnisfähigkeit, die Menschen dazu veranlasst, Gesellschaften zu planen. Die Konsequenz dieses falschen Anspruchs sah er in der Zerstörung der sozialen Strukturen, welche die Menschen kognitiv zur Planung erst befähigen. In dieser Arbeit zeige ich, dass es davon abweichend eine zweite Form des Scheiterns des liberalen Projekts gibt, welche aber selbst als Resultat der konsequenten Umsetzung desselben verstanden werden muss. Die liberale Großgesellschaft beruht auf einer bestimmten Geltung von Werten, welche die Individuen anerkennen. Meine These ist, dass einige dieser starken Werte selbst durch Marktkräfte selektiert werden und die Individuen im falschen Bewusstsein, dass diese Werte für die Marktgesellschaft konstituierend sind, das politische System zu einer antiliberalen Gesetzgebung animieren. Um dies zu plausibilisieren, soll der methodologische Individualismus konsequent angewendet werden. Dann muss aber der Darstellung der sozialen Ordnung ein Diskurs vorgelagert werden, der sich mit der Erkenntnisfähigkeit des Individuums beschäftigt. Die Art und Weise, wie es erkennt und was es über die Welt überhaupt wissen kann, ist grundlegend für die Art sozialer Ordnungen, die es realisiert. Die Soziologie von Hayek kann meines Erachtens nur aus der Perspektive seiner theoretischen Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie angemessen interpretiert werden. Hier kommt der Referenz auf Hermann von Helmholtz Theorie des unbewussten Schlusses eine überragende Bedeutung zu. Mit diesem Ansatz gelingt der Anschluss der Überlegungen Hayeks an die neueste Interpretation des Gehirns als prediction machine durch Karl Friston. Dies führt zu der Ansicht, dass eine Herrschaft der in der Vergangenheit aufgebauten neuronalen Strukturen über den neu einlaufenden sensorischen Input behauptet werden kann. Das Gehirn ist eine statistische Maschine, die auf Basis eines registrierten Ereignisses die Folgeereignisse prognostiziert. Dies hat zufolge, dass die Wahrnehmung der Gegenwart immer eine Simulation einer möglichen Zukunft darstellt. Wir nehmen die Welt wahr, bevor sie sich gezeigt hat. Dadurch, dass Hayek zugleich eine Variante des Funktionalismus eine Dekade vor Hilary Putnam entworfen hat, und die epistemische Funktion des Marktes hervorhebt, kann der Markt im Sinne der von Clark und Chalmers formulierten These als aktiver Externalismus verstanden werden. Er ist somit als soziales System rekonstruierbar, dass die Wissensgrenze jedes Individuums dadurch erweitert, dass die ihn konstituierenden Prozesse der Außenwelt als notwendiger Teil der intern laufenden kognitiven Prozesse der Individuen verstanden werden. Möglich werden Marktgesellschaften dann, wenn Individuen über ganz bestimmte neuronale Repräsentationen verfügen, die sie zu einem ganz bestimmten Handeln und Urteilen bewegen. / In my opinion, Friedrich August von Hayek formulated the most elaborate rewriting of liberal theory in the 20th century. Hayek himself saw the danger to a liberal grand society in the overestimation of human cognition that prompts people to plan societies. He saw the consequence of this false claim in the destruction of the social structures that cognitively empower People to Plan. In this work I show that there is a different form of failure of the liberal project, which itself has to be regarded as a result of the consistent implementation of it. The liberal great society is based on a certain validity of values that individuals recognize. My thesis is that some of these strong Values are self-selected by market forces, and individuals, in the mistaken awareness that these Values are constituent for market society, animate the political system into anti-liberal legislation. In my opinion, Hayek's sociology can only be interpreted appropriately from the perspective of his theoretical psychology and epistemology. In this context, the reference to Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of unconscious inference is of paramount importance. This approach allows the connection of Hayek's reflections to the latest interpretation of the brain as a prediction machine by Karl Friston. This leads to the view that a domination of neural structures built up in the past can be predicated over the newly incoming sensory input. The brain is a statistical Machine that predicts follow-up events based on a registered event. According to this, the perception of the presence is always a simulation of a possible Future. We perceive the world before it has shown itself. By designing a variant of functionalism a decade before Hilary Putnam, highlighting the epistemic function of the market, according to Hayek, the market can be understood as active externalism in the Sense of the thesis formulated by Clark and Chalmers. It can therefore be reconstructed as a social system that expands the knowledge limit of each individual by understanding the processes of the outside world that constitutes it as a necessary part of the internal cognitive processes of Individuals. Market societies become possible when individuals have very specific neural representations that induce them to act and judge in a very specific way. These representations are located on such a high level within Hayek's neural architecture that they decide upon perceptual content. Traditionally, they can be described as norms or values. One of their essential characteristics is their consistency in time. In my opinion, therefore, there is a stage of development within the evolution of the market society, in which the values and normative attitudes that have historically led to the application of the market as a social system must now be abandoned in order to ensure the evolution of the market society. If the adaption time is too small, an interruption of the evolution of the market society may occur. This leads to the paradoxical situation that individuals nevertheless believe that they are realizing a liberal society, which, by the standards of the position developed by Hayek, can only be described as socialist. I will describe this as the self-annulment process of liberal society. In this scenario, the market society does not fail economically, but morally.

Toute économie ainsi que toute science a pour mission d’atteindre un certain progrès dans son domaine. Or si nous pouvons tous être d’accord sur ce point, nous ne partageons pas forcément la même définition du progrès. Pour élucider cette divergence de compréhension, nous avons pris le parti d’adhérer à une distinction entre éthique et morale : là où tout ordre moral consiste à ordonner les éléments d’un cadre déterminé pour une fin donnée, une posture éthique consiste à adopter et à adapter un principe faisant autorité pour découvrir un environnement alors inconnu. Nous avançons alors que le domaine de l’économie ainsi que toute idée de progrès ne peuvent être rattachés qu’à un ordre moral et non à une posture éthique. Pour illustrer ces propos, nous menons une réflexion sur la question de l’identité, notion certes vide et idéologique mais qui permet tout de même, couplée avec la distinction entre éthique et morale, de nous concentrer notamment sur les notions d’Etat, de personne ou encore de pouvoir. Ces réflexions nous éclairent sur certains fondements de l’économie et sur la philosophie utilitariste, philosophie avant tout liée au langage et de ce fait à la notion d’identité une fois encore ; utilitarisme et économie seraient en un sens déterministes, nous permettant d’accéder à un bonheur identifiable et vers lequel nous pourrions progresser. Ainsi nous avançons que le progrès ne peut qu’être conçu à partir d’un ordre moral et qu’il faille plutôt rechercher un certain équilibre pour que la dimension éthique puisse être elle aussi cultivée, au même titre que la catallaxie puisse être encouragée au côté de l’économie. / Every economics or science has to reach some progress in its field. But, if we can agree on this point, we do not necessarily share the same definition of progress. To clarify this divergence of understanding, we have chosen to distinguish between ethics and morals: if a moral order permits to order elements in a determined frame for a specific goal, an ethical posture means to adopt and to adapt an authoritative principle for the discovery of an unknown environment. We advance that the economic field and the idea of progress can only be associated with a moral order and not with an ethical posture. To illustrate that, we conduct a reflection about identity, which is an empty and ideological notion but which allows us, along the distinction between ethics and morals, to focus especially on notions like State, person or power. These reflections can enlighten us about some foundations of economics and utilitarianism which is a philosophy deeply related to language and then with the notion of identity once again; utilitarianism and economics are in a certain way playing a defining role, allowing us to reach a well-being which we can identify and to which we can progress. Thereby, we are advancing that the progress can only be conceived from a moral order and that we should search a kind of equilibrium to let the ethical dimension be cultivated, as well as to encourage catallaxy outre economics.

Politics and social life are essentially about decision making, but great parts of that which politics aims to govern, that which social life revolves around and that which is studied in political science is not necessarily the result of conscious decisions. This some philosophers and political theorists would attribute to spontaneous order, arguing that certain norms, customs and institutions have evolved as the result of human action without, for that matter, being the result of human design. The theory of spontaneous order was primarily developed by the Austrian-British philosopher and economist Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). To him, spontaneous order was a way of solving problems with information deficits in society as well as an important part of his economic, political and institutional theory. However, Hayek’s social theory, which is largely based on the idea of spontaneous order, gives rise to a number of questions. The purpose of this essay is to examine the relationship between individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order in Friedrich Hayek’s social theory, and to critically evaluate this relationship in the light of that same theory. The purpose is achieved through critical analysis and by answering the following three questions: How does individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order relate to each other according to Hayek? Is Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order? Are there institutions, according to Hayek, that limit individual freedom, but are legitimate nevertheless by virtue of having developed spontaneously? The general conclusion of the essay is that Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design is logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order, and that the principles of individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order are related to each other in a logically valid manner, but that the other institutions that Hayek proposes give rise to contradictions and indeterminacy vis-à-vis the fundamental principles of his theory.

This thesis examines Augustine and Friedrich Hayek’s notion of subjectivity in the context of cultural translation theory, following Talal Asad. Previous researchers have related Hayek to political theology and economic theology by observing the notion of market’s divinizing implications and tendencies, often through generalized methods of analysis and allegorical comparison. Research treating neoliberal subjectivity seldom considers it building on Christian theological notions. Given the lack of research on the given topic, more specific the relationship between theological and neoliberal understandings of subjectivity, it is pertinent to examine neoliberal subjectivity as expressed by Hayek, by comparing to saint Augustine. By a close reading of one of western societies most important theologians, Augustine, and comparing to Hayek’s economic vision of society, this study examines how Augustine and Hayek interact by using cultural translation as a methodological framework. Augustine’s notion of God, and Hayek’s notion of the market, is analyzed as explicitly proposing, or implicitly presupposing, notions of subjectivity. Translatability and untranslatability are used as methodological concepts for discussing where Augustine and Hayek’s notions overlap and where they differ. This study demonstrates that Hayek’s understanding of subjectivity in relation to the market has comparable aspects with Augustine’s understanding of human subjectivity in relation to God. Though some aspects where the authors differ, such as the understanding of knowledge, might be described as untranslatable. Use of cultural translation theory, allows for important nuances in the relationship between theology and economic understandings of subjectivity to transpire in analysis.

Hayek's interpretation of Smith's invisible hand as a metaphor for the theory of spontaneous order still holds as the only authentic interpretation of that famous phrase, despite all criticism. Although not many authors noticed it, Hegel was a theorist of spontaneous order, namely also a theorist of the spontaneous order of market economy. There is evidence that Hegel followed here Adam Smith's teachings about the invisible hand. The invisible hand is present in Hegel's writings as an element, from what sprang his theory of spirit. That means that his theory of spirit is a general theory of spontaneous order, although written in metaphysical manner. However, being a theorist of spontaneous order didn't prevent him from being an interventionist. He was led to interventionism by his synoptic fallacy of mind. He never tried to apply this fallacy on the studies of the market economy. Marxists did that. Some of recent scholars (Sciabarra, Johnson, and Cristi) identified Hegel's theory of spontaneous order, but their interpretation wasn't perfectly in accordance with Hegel's texts. How these authors denied Popper's and Hayek's incorrect opinion that Hegel was a totalitarian, thus it is needed to enrich studies of mentioned current scholars. Here it is taken into account only what Hegel wrote, not later authors about him. This thesis is also an attempt to evaluate the history of economic thought from the standpoint of Smith's and Hegel's methodology.

Cette thèse s’intitule Les racines philosophiques et anthropologiques du destin de l’ordre catallactique chez Friedrich August von Hayek. Von Hayek fut économiste, psychologue théorique, juriste et historien. Mais l’étude de son œuvre montre aussi qu’il fut philosophe et anthropologue. Et, dans une certaine mesure, même s’il ne respectait pas toujours les politiciens, il fit, à sa manière, de la politique, dans son acception non politicienne, puisqu’il eut une réelle compréhension et un très grand respect pour la démocratie. Il tenta plutôt d’influencer, à l’université, lors de conférences internationales, dans ses ouvrages, les intellectuels, spécialement les rationalistes constructivistes, les hommes d’État ou de gouvernement, particulièrement les socialistes et les conservateurs, et, surtout, l’homme de la rue, finalement sur qui portait tout le poids de l’avenir de la civilisation occidentale. À ce sujet précis, il eut tellement de choses à dire. Et ces choses furent le prétexte à l’écriture d’un ouvrage philosophique. En effet, 1943 fut une date importante, pour lui. Il fit paraître La Route de la servitude. Déjà le titre était annonciateur. Dans cet ouvrage, von Hayek voulait alerter le monde des intellectuels, des hommes politiques et administratifs et de l’opinion publique au sujet de la prison vers laquelle tout ce monde, nonchalamment, volontairement, se dirigeait. Et en s’asservissant ainsi, l’homme du XXe siècle menaçait de mort ou d’appauvrissement, à terme, insidieusement, l’Occident. La mort ou l’appauvrissement de la civilisation occidentale, pour von Hayek, serait cataclysmique. Des milliards de personnes, au XXe siècle, survivaient justement grâce à ce qui avait permis à cette grande civilisation de la liberté de l’homme d’apparaître, de se développer et de se maintenir : il s’agissait de l’ordre catallactique. Mais qu’arrivait-il, au XXe siècle, à cet ordre catallactique riche de vies humaines? En fait, ce questionnement portait justement sur cet ordre et surtout sur son destin de plus en plus incertain. L’ordre catallactique, qui apparut, se développa et se maintint, s’affaiblissait ou disparaissait de plus en plus au XXe siècle et ce, malgré le fait qu’il favorisa, il y a des millénaires de cela, la vie à travers un mode différent et nouveau de survie. C’est pourquoi la déchéance de cet ordre, au XXe siècle, le préoccupa et le fit penser et écrire. L’objet de ses réflexions à l’égard du destin incertain de l’ordre catallactique est précisément ce que vise cette thèse : élucider et exposer, dans une perspective exégétique, les racines philosophiques et anthropologiques qui, dans la pensée de von Hayek, ont favorisé l’apparition, le développement et le maintien de l’ordre catallactique et de son déclin. Ainsi, nous avons eu besoin de nous appuyer sur quatre parties, qui sont, elles-mêmes, distribuées en sept chapitres. Première partie et ses deux chapitres. D’abord, nous avons tracé le profil biographique de Friedrich August von Hayek et enfin nous avons présenté une thématique intégratrice autour de laquelle gravite sa réflexion à l’égard du destin de l’ordre catallactique : il s’agit de la vie qui est essentiellement comprise comme une survie. Deuxième partie et son seul chapitre. Nous avons présenté la théorie de la connaissance de von Hayek, qui pourrait se ramener à l’idée suivante : l’homme ou l’intellectuel, du reste, reste un être de limites et d’ignorance. Cette conception, qui peut sembler étrange, possédait le mérite, selon von Hayek, de pouvoir voir au-delà de ce que les sens offrent à l’observation : l’invisible, l’inobservable et l’intangible qui caractérisent les pratiques économiques et les règles juridiques catallactiques qui apparurent, se développèrent et se maintinrent de façon spontanée, abstraite et complexe. Troisième partie et ses trois chapitres. En fait, ils viendront élucider et exposer les racines philosophiques et anthropologiques du destin incertain de l’ordre catallactique. D’abord, nous présenterons les concepts économiques et juridiques d’ordre et de catallaxie, qui sont à la base de l’ordre catallactique. Ensuite, nous tracerons le profil psychologique et anthropologique de l’homme : l’homme sensoriel ou phénoménal, l’homme biologique et l’homme culturel, qui furent à la base de la naissance de l’ordre catallactique et de son déclin. Enfin, nous avons repéré cette biologie immémoriale et psychophysiologique, et cette culture récente et lente au sein de l’histoire de l’évolution humaine afin d’y détecter des mouvements d’évolution – de la biologie à la culture – et d’autres de retour en arrière – de la culture vers la biologie. Quatrième partie et son chapitre. Nous avons présenté la problématique morale ou éthique que le destin de l’ordre catallactique, incertain au XXe siècle, portait en lui. En effet, pour certaines raisons, le système moral ou éthique catallactique n’arrivait plus, au XXe siècle, à concurrencer le système moral ou éthique socialiste ou socialisant issu de la pensée rationaliste constructiviste.

The dissertation begins with an introduction about Renaissance, because Thaddaeus Hagecius lived and worked in this age. Renaissance was both an age of faith in hermetic sciences and an age of important scientific discoveries which fundamentally influenced the transformation of cosmology. My intention is to explain the characteristics of this period in the beginning of the dissertation. The next chapter is mainly focused on Hagecius's biography and an overview of his main writings. At first, I dealt with Hagecius's youth and his studies in Bohemia and foreign countries. Afterwards, I mentioned the areas that Hagecius had developed and the writings that he had published about them. I have more thoroughly expanded Hagecius's activity in medicine and astronomy because they were the main areas of his research. In another part of the chapter, I have outlined the friendship between Hagecius and Brahe. I have closed the chapter with an explanation of Hagecius's reference to alchemy. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I have introduced Hagecius's scientific efforts in four areas. These are as follow-astronomy, medicine, botany and brewing, because Hagecius contributed to these four areas with an interesting manner. These areas also show the huge diversity of Hagecius's interests.

O presente trabalho analisa como o economista austríaco Friedrich August von Hayek estrutura sua teoria da justiça, identificando a realização do ideal de justiça numa sociedade livre com a vigência do Estado de Direito, ou seja, do governo das normas gerais de conduta justa, que deverão ser aplicadas sempre visando a igualdade formal (isonomia). Ainda, discute os motivos pelos quais o autor considera que a liberdade individual só poderá efetivamente florescer em uma ordem espontânea, que funciona baseada na concorrência, a qual só poderá se manter onde vigore o Estado de Direito e, portanto, haja justiça formal. / The present paper analyzes how the economist Friedrich August von Hayek structures his theory of justice, identifying the accomplishment of the ideal of justice in a free society with the Rule of Law, that is to say, in the government of rules of just conduct, which must be applied always aiming at the equality before the law (isonomia). Besides, this paper discusses the reasons why the author considers that liberty can effectively flourish only in a spontaneous order that performs based on competition, which will be maintained where the Rule of Law stands and, therefore, the formal justice is present.

Entre avril et juin 2008, le prix des commodités (blé, maïs, riz) a atteint un niveau impressionnant, mais pas exceptionnel. Les populations de 48 pays ont été affectées par une sévère sous-alimentation. La plupart d’entre eux avait déjà été affaiblie par des conflits et des catastrophes naturelles inhabituelles et dramatiques. Ces facteurs ont souvent interagi pour aggraver la situation. Pourtant, si la crise de 2007-2008 a été un «problème extraordinaire», c’est aussi parce que la connaissance scientifique «normale» a échoué face à la complexité de la «poly-crises» alimentaire (Morin, 2011). En réponse, nous avons conçu un cadre épistémologique, méthodologique, et technique, à partir de deux approches face à la complexité, celles de Hayek (1899-1992) et de Simon (1916-2001), avec un objectif, satisfaire au critère de cumulativité, un reproche traditionnellement adressé à ce type d’approche. Ce travail a produit deux enseignements. Premièrement, les fondements épistémologiques de la production de la connaissance en économie doivent être révisés en environnement complexe et incertain: 1) du certain/de l’objectif vers l’incertain/le subjectif; 2) de la prédiction exacte vers la conception; 3) de la causalité linéaire inappropriée, ou pire, menaçant la liberté individuelle, vers une causalité complexe. Deuxièmement, dans le processus d’adaptation, le rôle de la production et du partage de la connaissance «tacite» est central. Pour cette raison, le problème économique n’est plus un problème d’allocation des ressources. Il est de savoir comment des êtres humains aux capacités cognitives «limitées» computent et socialisent (Nonaka et alii, 1994, 2001) la connaissance et l’information disponibles, mais dispersées, pour la convertir en heuristiques ou patterns favorisant l’adaptation. Deux autres hypothèses les renforcent : 1) les dynamiques du changement s’enracinent «dans la pensée et la créativité des gens impliqués dans des situations complexes et dans leur capacité à restructurer leurs propres modèles d’interactions», (Ostrom, 2011) ; 2) l’altruisme réciproque (Simon, 1992, 1993) est un comportement rationnel qui peut être plus efficient dans les interactions sociales en environnement complexe que le comportement maximisateur ou égoïste. Ces résultats ont été synthétisés dans une interface que nous avons créée et qui a pris la forme d’une boucle de la connaissance à deux allèles, une pour la connaissance générique, l’autre, pour la tacite, qui, par récursion, produisent une méta-connaissance. Cette interface est à la fois ouverte et fermée et reflète ainsi la position défendue par Hayek et Simon pour qui la science économique est une «science frontière». Une part de la recherche est consacrée à la création d’outils, par exemple à un indicateur de perception de la contribution des facteurs au déclenchement et/ou à l’aggravation de la crise, à partir : 1) des allocutions des 138 Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement présents à la Conférence de Haut Niveau sur la Sécurité alimentaire mondiale (3-5 juin 2008) ; 2) des analyses des économistes, 3) des témoignages des gens qui ont subi la sous-nutrition ou la hausse des prix des denrées alimentaires (database IRIN). Nous proposons également une typologie actualisée des policy-mix mis en œuvre par 18 pays divisés en 3 groupes : des pays en développement, pour la plupart importateurs nets, sévèrement touchés par la crise et qui ont connu des «émeutes de la faim» (Égypte, Tunisie, Cameroun, Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal, Mauritanie, Haïti, Bangladesh) ; des pays Membres du groupe de Cairns ayant connu soit des «émeutes de la faim», soit des désordres sociaux (Indonésie, Philippines, Thaïlande, Afrique du Sud) ; enfin, des pays ayant adopté des restrictions et/ou prohibitions aux exportations (Chine, Inde, Indonésie, Égypte, Cambodge, Ukraine, Vietnam) [...]. / Over the April-June 2008 period, prices of the commodities such as wheat, maize, rice and vegetable oils, reached impressive yet not exceptional peaks. By contrast, the populations of 48 countries were stricken by severe under nutrition. Most of them had already been weakened not only by conflicts, social disorders, dramatic and unusual climatic and natural disasters, but also by outbreaks, epizooties, and population displacements. In some cases, all these factors together played a significant role in the worsening situation. However, another important reason could be advanced to explain why the 2008 food crisis was an “extraordinary problem”. This one is that “normal” scientific knowledge was defeated by the complexity of what it appears now as a food “poly-crises” (Morin, 2011). We answered by designing an epistemological, methodological, and technical knowledge base from two very different and alternative economics approaches of facing complexity. The first is the Hayekian approach (1899-1992), and the second, the Simonian approach (1916-2001). The research intends to fulfill cumulativity criteria, traditionally difficult to satisfy with the ones of complexity. From the following analysis we mostly learned two things. First, epistemological grounds of economics needed to be broken in complex environment(s): 1) from certainty/objectivity to uncertainty/subjectivity, 2) from accurate prediction to design, 3) from linear causality deemed inappropriate or, worse, threatening people freedoms, to complex causality. Second, in the adaptation process, the role of “tacit” knowledge production and sharing is central. For that reason, the core of economics problem is not allocation of resources anymore. Now, the main problem for humans whose cognitive capacity are “bounded” is to compute, to “socialize” (Nonaka et alii, 1994, 2001), available but dispersed information and knowledge and to converse them into heuristics or patterns allowing the adaptation to complex and uncertain environment(s). Two others auxiliary hypotheses –E. Ostrom (2011) will endorse them later- can be drawn from that preliminary work: 1) the dynamics of change rooted “in the thinking and in the creativity of people involved in complex situations and their capacity to restructure their own models for interactions”, 2) reciprocal altruism (Simon, 1992, 1993) is a rational behavior which can be more effective in/for the social interactions in complex environment(s) than maximizing or selfish behavior. To present preliminary results in an effective way, we created a very simple interface scheme. It takes the form of a three-dimensional knowledge loop with two strands, “generic” and “tacit” knowledge connected between themselves to produce by recursion a meta-knowledge. We made the choice of the interface because it reflects with the most accuracy the position defended by Hayek and Simon which is that economics is a frontier science. Moreover, the interface has the advantage of being both open and closed. A part of the research is more specifically dedicated to design tools increasing the understanding of the “polyfood” crises. We elaborated a three-level indicator with: 1) perceptions of the contribution of each factor to the outbreak and the worsening of the situation; 2) contributions of actors to the explanation of the food crisis proposed in 2008. It was developed from: 1) a case study comparing and contrasting explanations proposed a) in their statements by 138 Heads of State and Government attended the High Level Conference on World Food Security (3-5 June 2008), b) in their analyses by economists, c) in their testimonies by people hit by under nutrition/rising food prices (database IRIN); 2) a new and more updated typology focused on the responses addressed by 18 countries split into 3 groups [...].