The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (the Tribunal) is the only judicial organ of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC). Its mandate includes ensuring “adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Southern African Development Community Treaty” (the Treaty). The decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding in the territories of member states party to a dispute before it. The responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced lies with the Southern African Development Community Summit (the Summit). The Summit is the supreme policy-making body of the SADC. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of all SADC member states. The decisions of the Summit are binding on all member states and, upon referral from the Tribunal, it has the power to take appropriate action against a member state who refuses to honour a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was established primarily to deal with disputes emanating from the SADC’s economic and political units and not with human rights. A dispute concerning allegations of human rights violations in Zimbabwe was brought before the Tribunal by farmers affected by the country’s land-reform policy. The Tribunal, through reliance on the doctrine of implied powers, and the principles and objectives of the SADC as contained in the Treaty, extended its jurisdiction. In particular, the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear cases involving human rights violations and that there had indeed been human rights violations in the case before it. It consequently ruled against Zimbabwe. This decision has been welcomed by many within the SADC region as showing the Tribunal’s commitment to interpreting the Treaty in a way that does not run counter the rights of SADC citizens. However, the Tribunal’s decision has met with resistance from Zimbabwe and has not been implemented on the ground, inter alia, that the Tribunal acted beyond its mandate. The Tribunal has on several occasions referred cases of non-compliance to the Summit for appropriate action against Zimbabwe. The Summit, however, has done nothing concrete to ensure that the Tribunal’s decisions are enforced in Zimbabwe. Instead, in an unexpected move that sent shockwaves through the SADC region and beyond, the Summit suspended the Tribunal and resolved that it should neither receive nor adjudicate any cases. During the SADC summit in August 2014, a Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community was adopted and signed (the 2014 Protocol). In terms of this Protocol the iii jurisdiction of the (new) Tribunal will be limited to inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, it also does not provide any transitional measures to address issues such as the manner to deal with pending cases and the enforcement of judgments. When it comes to the execution and enforcement of judgments, it can be argued that the 2014 Protocol is largely a replica of the original 2000 Tribunal Protocol. The reason for this is that the envisaged mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the new Tribunal is to a large extent similar to the previous one. Unsatisfied over the non-compliance with the decision by Zimbabwe, the litigants approached the South African courts to enforce the Tribunal’s decision in South Africa.1 The South African courts found that South Africa is obliged under the SADC Treaty to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the decisions of the Tribunal are enforced, and ruled against Zimbabwe. However, the decision is yet to be enforced. The non-compliance with the judgments and a lack of mechanisms to enforce the decisions of the Tribunal, are crucial issues as they undermine the authority of the Tribunal. This thesis explores whether the Tribunal acted within its mandate in receiving and hearing a human rights case. It further considers whether, in the absence of a human rights mandate, the Tribunal enjoys implied powers under international law to invoke the powers necessary for the fulfilment of the objectives set out in the Treaty. It also reviews the concept of state sovereignty and the extent to which it has been affected by human rights norms post-World War II; regionalism; and globalisation. An important aspect examined, is the relationship between SADC Community law and the national law of member states. The relationship between national courts and the Tribunal also receives attention. Ultimately, the discourse addresses compliance and enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions in the context of international law. To the extent relevant, I draw on other regional (the European Court of Justice) and sub-regional (the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the East African Court of Justice) courts to establish how they have dealt with human rights jurisdiction and the enforcement of their judgments. / Jurisprudence / LL. D.

Etant membre de la communauté internationale, l'Etat ne peut pas être irresponsable pour ses actions. De même la spécificité principale de la responsabilité internationale est liée aux particularités du droit international et de ses sujets principaux- Etats souverains. La compréhension du mécanisme de la mise en œuvre de la responsabilité internationale des Etats et de son rapport avec la souveraineté montre la validité et l'efficacité du droit international. La réalisation de la responsabilité en tant que processus est examinée en thèse en tenant compte des différents critères : comme la réalisation des éléments de la responsabilité (application de mesures de contrainte), le processus de l’attribution de la responsabilité (le procès de l’attribution à l'Etat des faits des autres sujets du droit international) et la réalisation des phases de la responsabilité (les questions liées à la procédure judiciaire et à l’exécution des décisions internationales).La corrélation de ces deux notions est conçu en thèse sous deux aspects: à savoir, si l'Etat souverain peut en se couvrant sous la souveraineté tenter d'éviter la responsabilité et quels sont les mécanismes pour l’en empêcher et à contrario, comment la réalisation de la responsabilité peut toucher ou même violer la souveraineté des Etats. / Being a member of the international society, the State can not be irresponsible for its actions. At the same time the peculiarity of international responsibility is joined to the peculiarities of the international law and its subjects-sovereign states.The understanding of the mechanism of application of State’s international responsibility and its relation with sovereignty shows the validity and the efficiency of the international law.The realization of the responsibility is regarded in this research as a process taking into account different criterions: as the realization of elements of responsibility (application of coercive measures), as a process of attribution of responsibility (a process of attribution to a State the acts of other subjects of the international law) and as a realization of phases of the responsibility (questions related to the court procedures and to the execution of the international awards).This research considers the correlation of these two legal concepts in two aspects: on the one hand, if the Sovereign state by using the principle of sovereignty can escape the responsibility and what are the mechanisms to prevent it, and, on the other hand, how the realization of responsibility could touch or even violate the sovereignty of the states.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

Subjektlücken in Koordinationsstrukturen sind nicht leicht zu analysieren, insbesondere Subjektlücken in Asymmetrischen Koordinationen wie die SLF-Koordination (Subjektlücken in finit-frontalen Strukturen). Die Dissertation gibt eine umfassende Übersicht über verschiedene linguistische Analysen solcher Strukturen. Desweiteren präsentiert die Arbeit empirische Daten zur SLF-Koordination, zur Asymmetrischen sowie auch zur Symmetrischen Koordination. Es konnte eine breite empirische Datengrundlage geschaffen werden, indem Akzeptabilitätsurteile über Online-Fragebogen gesammelt wurden, wobei die psycholinguistische Methode Magnitude Estimation Anwendung fand. Die Dissertation ist relevant für die deskriptive Grammatik, für psycholinguistische Fragestellungen und linguistische Analysen zu Subjektlücken in Koordinationsstrukturen.

Previous research on human judgment and decision making has demonstrated systematic and predictable biases of judgment in experimental settings. One example of this is the tendency to intuitively violate the conjunction rule - a simple rule of probability. This was well illustrated in the famous Linda-problem. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). According to the dual-process theory of reasoning, (Kahneman, 2011) reasoning fallacies such as the conjunction fallacy occurs when people fail to use analytic reasoning and instead overly rely on their intuition. The dual process theory proposes that cognitive processes underlying our intuitive impulses and our conscious reasoning constitutes two different modes in the mind –system 1 and system 2- and that the intuitive system 1 are not able to compute probabilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that processes that are labeled system 1 are fast whereas system 2 are thought to be slow. We tested these time course assumptions of dual process theory in a within-subject design by comparing response time latencies between conjunction fallacy judgments and accurate probability judgments. The results showed that inducing accurate responding did not result in delayed response latency. This indicates that making accurate probability judgments does not require more processing time which goes against what would be expected by the dual-process framework. / Tidigare forskning om mänskligt beslutsfattande och bedömningar har i experiment påvisat systematiska och förutsägbara bias. Ett exempel på detta är tendensen att intuitivt gå emot konjuktionsregeln- en enkel regel gällande sannolikhet. Detta illustrerades väl i det berömda Linda- problemet (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Enligt två-systemsteorin (Kahneman, 2011) om problemlösning, uppstår bedömningsfel såsom konjuktionsfelet när människor inte använder sig av analytiskt tänkande och istället förlitar sig för mycket på sin intuition. Två-systemsteorin menar att de kognitiva processer som ligger till grund för våra intuitiva impulser och vårt medvetna resonerande utgör två olika aktörer i vårt tänkande- system 1 och system 2- och att det intuitiva system 1 inte kan beräkna sannolikheter. Processer som betecknas som tillhörande system 1 är enligt två-systemsteorin snabba medan system 2 föreställs vara ett långsamt system. I denna studie testades antagandet om tidsåtgång för de två systemen i en inomgruppsdesign genom att jämföra responstider mellan bedömningar där konjunktionsfelet begåtts och bedömningar där det inte begåtts. Resultaten visar att korrekta sannolikhetsbedömningar inte resulterar i långsammare responstider. Detta indikerar att det inte tycks vara mer tidskrävande att göra riktiga sannolikhetsbedömningar, vilket motsäger två-systemsteorins antagande om snabbt och långsamt processande.

Este trabalho trata fundamentalmente da admissibilidade dos julgamentos parciais do mérito e de questões de mérito no sistema processual civil brasileiro, considerando especialmente o modelo constitucional de processo civil, bem como no sistema processual prospectivo previsto no Projeto de Novo Código de Processo Civil, que deve entrar vigor em breve. Com este objetivo, será abordado no início da dissertação o dogma da unidade estrutural da sentença, sua origem, fundamentos e aplicabilidade no processo civil brasileiro, já que esse dogma parece ser o principal óbice que se opõe à realização dos julgamentos parciais. Em seguida, procede-se à análise da natureza dos pronunciamentos judiciais em que se realizam os julgamentos parciais, quando admitidos no CPC/73, para defini-los como decisões interlocutórias de mérito (ou de questões de mérito) ou sentenças parciais e intermediárias. Além disso, pretende-se estabelecer os pressupostos autorizadores dos julgamentos parciais, para que, assim, esses julgamentos sejam realizados de forma eficiente e em prol da efetividade da tutela jurisdicional. Trata-se ainda os julgamentos parciais na arbitragem e suas particularidades decorrentes das disposições específicas da Lei de Arbitragem e das características específicas do processo arbitral. Finalmente, nos capítulos finais deste estudo enfrentam-se os obstáculos que geralmente se colocam à realização dos julgamentos parciais relativamente ao âmbito recursal e à formação da coisa julgada. Para esse fim, são abordados a teoria dos capítulos de sentença, os efeitos dos recursos e, especialmente, a formação gradual da coisa julgada à luz da doutrina, da jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores e também do Projeto de Novo Código de Processo Civil. / This paper deals essentially with the possibility of rendering partial judgments on the merits and on issues of merits in the Brazilian Civil Procedure, considering especially the constitutional framework of civil procedure, as well as in the prospective procedural system provided by the New Code of Civil Procedure bill, which shall be in force soon. With this goal, the principle of the indivisibility of the award on merits, its origins, its grounds and its applicability to the Brazilian Civil Procedure are addressed in the beginning of the dissertation, as this principle seems to be the main obstacle against the partial judgments. Following this, the nature of the judicial decisions in wich the partial judgments take place when admitted by the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure of 1973 shall be analysed, in order to characterize them either as interlocutory decisions on the merits (or on issues of merits) or as partial and intermediate awards. In addition, there is a focus on clarifying the conditions in which partial judgments can be rendered, in order to carried out in and efficient fashion, and hence contributing to the effectiveness of the judicial relief. Moreover, the partial judgments in arbitration, as well as their particularities arisen from the specific provisions under the Arbitration Act and singular characteristics of arbitral procedure are analysed. The final chapters of this paper face the obstacles associated with appeals and with claim preclusion that are usually posed against the rendering of partial judgments. For this scope, there shall be addressed the theory of chapters of the award, the effects of the appeals, and specially the gradual claim preclusion in view of the scholars opinions, the case law of the Higher Courts, and also under the New Code of Civil Procedure bill.

Wie schätzen Menschen quantitative Größen wie zum Beispiel den Verkaufspreis eines Autos? Oft benutzen Menschen zur Lösung von Schätzproblemen sogenannte Cues, Informationen, die probabilistisch mit dem zu schätzenden Kriterium verknüpft sind. Um den Verkaufspreis eines Autos zu schätzen, könnte man zum Beispiel Informationen über das Baujahr, die Automarke, oder den Kilometerstand des Autos verwenden. Um menschliche Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben, werden häufig linear additive Modelle herangezogen. In meiner Dissertation schlage ich alternative ein heuristisches Modell zur Schätzung quantitativer Größen vor: das Mapping-Modell. Im ersten Kapitel meiner Dissertation teste ich das Mapping-Modell gegen weitere, in der Literatur etablierte, Schätzmodelle. Es zeigte sich, dass das Mapping-Modell unter unterschiedlichen Bedingungen in der Lage war, die Schätzungen der Untersuchungsteilnehmer akkurat vorherzusagen. Allerdings bestimmte die Struktur der Aufgabe - im Einklang mit dem Ansatz der „adaptiven Werkzeugkiste“ - im großen Maße, welches Modell am besten geeignet war, die Schätzungen zu erfassen. Im zweiten Kapitel meiner Dissertation greife ich diesen Ansatz auf und untersuche, in wie weit die Aufgabenstruktur bestimmt, welches Modell die Schätzprozesse am Besten beschreibt. Meine Ergebnisse zeigten, dass das Mapping-Modell am Besten dazu geeignet war die Schätzungen der Versuchsteilnehmer zu beschreiben, wenn explizites Wissen über die Aufgabe vorhanden war, während ein Exemplar-Modell den Schätzprozess erfasste, wenn die Abstraktion von Wissen schwierig war. Im dritten Kapitel meiner Dissertation, wende ich das Mapping-Modell auf juristische Entscheidungen an. Eine Analyse von Strafakten ergab, dass das Mapping-Modell Strafzumessungsvorschläge von Staatsanwälten besser vorhersagte als eine lineare Regression. Dies zeigt, dass das Mapping-Modell auch außerhalb von Forschungslaboratorien dazu geeignet ist menschliche Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben. / How do people make quantitative estimations, such as estimating a car’s selling price? Often people rely on cues, information that is probabilistically related to the quantity they are estimating. For instance, to estimate the selling price of a car they could use information, such as the car’s manufacturer, age, mileage, or general condition. Traditionally, linear regression type models have been employed to capture the estimation process. In my dissertation, I propose an alternative cognitive theory for quantitative estimation: The mapping model which offers a heuristic approach to quantitative estimations. In the first part of my dissertation l test the mapping model against established alternative models of estimation, namely, linear regression, an exemplar model, and a simple estimation heuristic. The mapping model provided a valid account of people’s estimates outperforming the other models in a variety of conditions. Consistent with the “adaptive toolbox” approach on decision, which model was best in predicting participants’ estimations was a function of the task environment. In the second part of my dissertation, I examined further how different task features affect the performance of the models make. My results indicate that explicit knowledge about the cues is decisive. When knowledge about the cues was available, the mapping model was the best model; however, if knowledge about the task was difficult to abstract, participants’ estimations were best described by the exemplar model. In the third part of my dissertation, I applied the mapping model in the field of legal decision making. In an analysis of fining and incarceration decisions, I showed that the prosecutions’ sentence recommendations were better captured by the mapping model than by legal policy modeled with a linear regression. These results indicated that the mapping model is a valid model which can be applied to model actual estimation processes outside of the laboratory.

La présente recherche se réunit quatre questions générales et cruciales : 1) La place de la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme en droit Géorgien; 2) La conformité de la législation géorgienne avec la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme; 3) Les relations de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Géorgie et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme; 4) L’impact des décisions de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sur la Géorgie. Sur toutes ces questions, contrairement aux Etats de l’Ouest de l’Europe, il existe peu d’information et/ou d’ouvrages sur la Géorgie, ce qui a rendu notre tâche longue et délicate. Il convient en effet de rappeler au lecteur de l’Europe occidental que la Géorgie est un Etat en développement. La Géorgie, située entre la Turquie et la Russie, pendant toute son histoire a été obligée de s’orienter vers une politique de défense. L’histoire de la Géorgie indépendante recommence après la chute de l’URSS en 1991. La Géorgie a adhéré au Conseil de l’Europe en 1999, mais les processus de l’européanisation du droit national commencent à partir 2004. La Convention Européenne des droits de l’Homme est un mécanisme efficace pour la protection des droits de l’Homme et les activités de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme suscitent un vif intérêt en Géorgie. Cependant, dans des relations juridiques, y compris devant le tribunal, l’application des standards européens des droits de l’Homme n’est pas un objectif en soi. Il faut que les juges, avocats, procureurs et les représentants d’autres professions juridiques garantissent, au cours de leurs activités, le respect des standards des droits de l’Homme existants.Dans le cadre de la présent recherche, on examinera l’influence de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sur le Droit Géorgien a partir de la ratification de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme en 1999, jusqu’au 28 février, 2014 en deux directions : 1. Le statut de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme dans le Droit Géorgien (PARTIE I) et 2. La Géorgie face à la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (PARTIE II). / The given research unites four main questions: 1. Place of European Convention on Human Rights in Georgian Law. 2. Conformity of Georgian legislation with the European Convention on Human Rights. 3. Conformity of Constitutional Law judgments with the standards established by the European Court of Human Rights. 4. Judgments of European Court of Human Rights against Georgia.In connection to all these questions there is very little information and work in Georgia, which has made us study them better – on the ground of actuality of the given questions. We’ve considered discussing to the West European reader that Georgia is a developed country. It is located between Turkey and Russia, during its whole history it had to be orientated on the self-defense policy. History of Independent Georgia starts in 1991 by destruction of the Soviet Union. In 1999 Georgia became a member of the European Union, but National Law in Georgia and Europeanization process of State Institutions started in 2004. Human Rights European Convention represents an effective standard of Human Rights, accordingly activities of European Court of Human Rights causes great interest in Georgia. Despite all these in the legal circles, between them use of Human Rights European standards have become obligatory in the courts. It is needed that the judges, advocates, procurators and representatives of other legal professions have to actively use the existed standards of Human Rights Protection. In the framework of the given research we will investigate influence of European Convention on Human Rights with Georgian Law and starting from ratification of European Convention by Georgia – since 1999 – till February 28, 2014 included in two directions: 1. Place of Human Rights European Convention in Georgian Law (part I) and 2. Georgia against European Court of Human Rights (part II).

Cette thèse a pour but d’examiner comment les individus utilisent des comparaisons entre des situations actuelles et des situations passées dans des contextes politiques. L’utilisation de telles analogies historiques a longtemps été documentée, en particulier au sein des sciences politiques, en histoire et dans les champs concernés par l’argumentation. Ces littératures ont mis en évidence la fréquence avec laquelle les responsables politiques et autres personnages publics utilisent les analogies dans des buts de délibération et de persuasion. Malgré leur omniprésence supposée, peu d’études en psychologie sociale se sont penchées sur ce processus. Les trois volets de cette thèse ont tenté de combler cette lacune en recourant à diverses méthodologies. Plusieurs études expérimentales nous ont d’abord permis d’investiguer si l’exposition à des analogies historiques influence les prédictions que posent les participants concernant des situations réelles incertaines. Les résultats montrent que l’effet, bien que de faible taille, tend à devenir plus fort à mesure que diminuent les connaissances actuelles des individus. Dans un second volet, au lieu de sélectionner a priori les analogies historiques, nous avons donné la possibilité aux répondant.e.s de générer leurs propres analogies et d’expliquer leurs choix dans des questionnaires récoltés en France, en Belgique et en Allemagne à la suite des deux attaques de 2015 en France. L’analyse des réponses ouvertes montre non seulement une grande diversité dans les manières de mettre en correspondance le présent et le passé – même lorsqu’il s’agit d’analogies avec le « même » événement (e.g. l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001) ;mais les participant.e.s utilisent de plus ces analogies pour formuler des arguments, plus ou moins implicites, par rapport à des débats actuels. Cette dimension argumentative dans l’usage des analogies historiques a été explorée plus avant dans un 3e volet. En analysant les articles du mois de mars 2014 relatifs à la crise de Crimée au sein de quatre journaux belges, nous avons relevé comment les individus s’y prennent pour établir des liens entre le passé et le présent, et comment ils procèdent pour les contester. Ensemble, les trois volets de cette thèse suggèrent que les personnes ordinaires, tout comme leurs homologues plus « experts », ne sont pas passives en utilisant les analogies historiques, mais participent activement, par leur biais, au processus éminemment politique de construction et de contestation des passé(s), présent(s) et futur(s). / Doctorat en Sciences psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette recherche porte sur l'exécution de 138 arrêts condamnatoires rendus par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme contre la Finlande jusqu'à présent. La recherche montre que la procédure finlandaise d'exécution n'est pas bureaucratique et qu'elle fonctionne bien, l'efficacité globale étant donc à un niveau très avancé. Quant au paiement de la satisfaction équitable et la prise des mesures individuelles, la recherche démontre que l'exécution est assez efficace en Finlande, sauf en cas de réouverture des procédures nationales. La recherche montre également que même si la prise des mesures générales est efficace du point de vue temporel et matériel, il y a parfois une réticence de prendre des mesures. Néanmoins, la plupart des mesures générales sont prises d'une manière efficace, l'un des meilleurs exemples étant les affaires ne bis in idem. Par contre, les affaires concernant la durée excessive des procédures judiciaires ne font pas preuve ni d'efficacité temporelle ni matérielle. / This study focuses on the execution of the 138 condemnatory judgments delivered so far against Finland by the European Court of Human Rights. The study showed that the Finnish execution procedure was not bureaucratic and it worked well, the overall procedural effectiveness thus being at a very advanced level. As to the payment of just satisfaction and the taking of individual measures, the study showed that the execution was fairly effective in Finland both in the temporal and material sense, the only exception being reopening of domestic proceedings. The study also revealed that although the taking of general measures in Finland was mostly effective, there was also some reluctance to take execution measures. Still most of the general measures were taken effectively in Finland, one of the best examples being the ne bis in idem cases. On the other hand, the length of proceedings cases represented a group of cases in which the temporal and material effectiveness was at its lowest.