'Losing Control combines a glimpse behind the security screens with sharp analysis of the real global insecurities - growing inequality and unsustainability.' The New Internationalist The attacks in New York and Washington on 11th September 2001 took most of the world by surprise. It showed that, for those living in the West, the threat of terrorist attack is now very real. Maintaining control of global security has become a matter of paramount importance to all Western governments. As the war against 'terrorism' widens into a war against particular states who may have played little part in the disaster, the idea that we can maintain global security by desperately clinging to our current security paradigm becomes increasingly improbable. In Losing Control, Paul Rogers calls for a radical re-thinking of western perceptions of security that embraces a willingness to address the core issues of global insecurity. This acclaimed book has already become an essential guide for anyone who wishes to understand the current crisis, and this updated edition contains a new preface and a new chapter which address the specific problems that have arisen since the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Drawing on examples from around the world, Rogers analyses the legacy of the Cold War's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the impact of human activity on the global ecosystem; the growth of hypercapitalism and resulting poverty and insecurity; the competition for energy resources and strategic minerals; biological warfare programmes; and paramilitary actions against centres of power. The new edition brings the whole analysis right up to date, arguing persuasively that the world's elite cannot maintain control and that a far more emancipatory and sustainable approach to global security has to be developed. / Also published in Japanese

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La notion d'« armes de destruction massive » (ADM) est insaisissable : au lieu d'avoir pour but de mieux définir un type d'arme, elle agit à l'inverse, en créant une confusion entre l'arme et les conséquences de son emploi. Cette nature inconsistante se poursuit au niveau juridique. En effet, bien que l'expression fasse très tôt son entrée au sein des Nations unies, aucun traité ni organe officiel n'a, jusqu'alors, réussi à en donner une définition probante. À défaut de définition incontestable, et en l'absence d'un critère vérifiable d'identification de ce qu'est une « arme de destruction massive », cette notion s'est avérée préjudiciable. L'écart entre la réalité de la menace existante en matière d'« armes de destruction massive » et la façon dont elle fut perçue, puis gérée par la communauté internationale, c'est-à-dire à la fois par les États de façon individuelle et par les organisations internationales et les traités de façon collective, a conduit à de multiples dérives. Par conséquent, s'agissant là d'une notion plus politique que juridique, il apparaît nécessaire qu'elle soit précisée ou abandonnée / The term « weapons of mass destruction » (WMD) is ambiguous: instead of aiming to clearly define a certain type of weapon, it does the opposite by creating confusion between the weapon itself and the consequences of its use. This confusion is also reflected at in the legal definition. Indeed, even though the term has been used by the United Nations from an early stage, no treaty or official entity has succeeded in providing a clear definition to this day. The lack of a clear definition, and the absence of defined criteria to determine what constitutes a « weapon of mass destruction », has turned out to be damaging. The dichotomy between the existing threat from « weapons of mass destruction » and the way it is perceived and handled by the international community, including individual states, international organisations, as well as collective treaties, has resulted in several instances of inappropriate use. As a consequence, the term has become a political rather than legal notion. A clearer legal definition is needed, or otherwise the term should be abandoned

Even though terrorism has been on the political agenda for several years there is no general accepted definition of the phenomena of terrorism. Several scientist do also apply that terrorism have changed after the 9/11-attacks. The purpose with this thesis was to analyze and compare the image of terrorism represented by the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and Norway, in an attempt to draw conclusions about similarities and differentials. The material that was used was these four nations individual counter terrorism strategy. This was made by using idea analysis and self constructed dimensions based on earlier science about security, terrorism and international law. A result of this study showed that there is a consensus about terrorism as a high existential threat because of the religious extremism that is related to Al Qaeda and justifies mass murder and have showed attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. On this adoption the nations in this study justifies extraordinary actions in cooperation against global terrorism. It is however some differentials about the means to counter this threat. The United States, United Kingdom and Norway describes in their strategy that the threat of Al Qaeda and its allies should be met by military force. United Kingdom describes that the military action is to consider as an exception based on the extraordinary threat that Al Qaeda poses. Sweden on the other hand shows a description of terrorism as a criminal act that should be met by national measures.

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Le différend entre la France et les Etats-Unis sur le règlement de la question irakienne a provoqué une crise diplomatique majeure entre les deux pays, jugée par certains comme la plus sérieuse dans l’histoire des relations bilatérales. Le dossier irakien a cristallisé les positions diplomatiques des deux alliés et mis en lumière deux lectures d’une grande question internationale. Pour la France, il a été l’occasion de défendre des principes, de faire entendre sa voix et de partager sa vision d’un monde multipolaire fondé sur la quête d’un règlement pacifique des différends. Pour les Etats-Unis, cette question relevait d’un enjeu de sécurité nationale, dans une Amérique profondément traumatisée par les attentats de septembre 2001. La rupture franco-américaine a résulté de facteurs structurels anciens : la concurrence entre deux modèles politiques et diplomatiques qui se veulent universels et le déséquilibre entre une puissance française, déclinante, qui aspire à préserver ses sphères d’influence sur la scène internationale, et une puissance américaine, ascendante, devenue, depuis l’effondrement du bloc soviétique, l’unique superpuissance à la tête d’un monde unipolaire. L’affrontement bilatéral du printemps 2003 a ainsi révélé les caractères intrinsèques qui opposent la diplomatie française et la diplomatie américaine et dévoilé leur conception très éloignée qu’elles se faisaient du nouvel ordre mondial et de la place qu’elles aspirent à occuper sur l’échiquier international / The disagreement between France and the US over the Iraqi issue led to a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries, considered by many analysts as the most serious one in the history of bilateral relations. The Iraqi case crystallized the diplomatic positions of both allies and revealed two different reads of this major international issue. For France, this case was the opportunity to defend its principles, to get itself heard by the rest of the world and to share its vision of a multipolar world, where disputes would be peacefully settled through international organizations. For the US, that issue fell under a matter of national security, in a country deeply traumatized by ‘9/11’. The split between thetwo countries resulted from historical structural causes : (i) the competition between two political and diplomatic models that present themselves as universal, and (ii) the imbalance between France’s declining power aspiring to preserve its spheres of influence over the world and America’s ascending power that has become, since the end of the Cold War, the only superpower. The bilateral confrontation of 2003 revealed the distinctive patterns of both French and American foreign policies and exposed their different views and models of the new world order, as well as their ambitions on the international scene

Les inventions biotechnologiques ont un double visage, une face bienveillante et une face terrifiante, chacune source potentielle de risques majeurs. Comment les contrôler et les réguler ? La recrudescence des catastrophes majeures (crises sanitaires) liées à l’usage de produits biotechnologiques, d’une part, puis l’échec à l’adoption d’un protocole de vérification à la Convention d’interdiction des armes biologiques suivi de l’émergence de nombreuses publications à risques dans le domaine des biotechnologies, d’autre part, démontrent l’omniprésence et la transversalité de cette problématique. Par leur essence duale, les biotechnologies appellent des solutions globales. La voie d’une gestion cohérente semble s’ouvrir au travers d’un corps de règle prenant tous ces paramètres en considération, les risques majeurs. L’avantage de cette législation, si elle admet une modification préalable de la nomenclature des risques majeurs en y intégrant les risques liés aux conflits, reposera sur sa globalité et sur la responsabilisation de tous. Face à une menace biotechnologique qui est perçue comme dominante dans les années à venir, l’émerge d’un ordre public mondial favorable à un accroissement de la responsabilité des Etats à l’égard de la sécurité humaine serait souhaitable. Le but de toute institution étatique étant de garantir à ses ressortissants leur sécurité et leur sûreté quelles que soient les circonstances, cet ordre public pourrait trouver ses bases au sein des réglementations relatives aux droits de l’homme et au droit de l’environnement ; réglementations déjà émancipées de la distinction entre situations de paix, de crises ou de conflits / The biotechnological inventions have a double face, a kindly face and a terrifying face, each potential source of major risks. How to control them and to regulate them? The outbreak of the major disasters (sanitary crisis) bound to biotechnological products, on one hand, the failure to the adoption of a Protocol to the Biological Weapon Convention, followed by the emergence of numerous publications at risks in the field of biotechnology, on the other hand, demonstrate the omnipresence and the transverse character of this problem. By their duality, biotechnologies need global solutions. The way of a coherent management seems to open through a body of rule considering all these parameters, the major risks. The advantage of this legislation, if it admits a preliminary modification of the list of the major risks by integrating the risks connected to the conflicts, will be based on its global aspect and everyone’s responsibility. In front of biotechnological threat, which is perceived as dominant in the years to come, an emergent world law and order favourable to an increase of the responsibility of States towards the human safety would be desirable. The purpose of any state institution is the guarantee of Nationals safety, whatever circumstances are, this law and order could find its bases within the regulations relative to human rights and to environmental law; these regulations are already indifferent to the distinction between situations of peace, crisis or conflicts

2002年元月，美國小布希總統宣稱北韓與伊拉克、伊朗，同屬「邪惡軸心」（Axis of Evil）國家，這些國家均係美國列入防止核武擴散之對象，於是北韓與美國關係旋墜落谷底，北韓之鬥爭策略是先昇溫，復加壓，然後迫使美國讓步；北韓復於2006年10月9日，正式對外宣布成功進行地下核武試驗，此舉無疑對東亞及國際安全均帶來衝擊。台灣基於同為亞太國家成員之一，應該理解北韓核武危機所牽動東北亞安全環境變化，以及美國、日本、中國及俄羅斯等國家多邊體系關係，倘北韓核武危機未能圓滿解決，擁核後之北韓除易成為東北亞潛伏威脅外，將引起日本加速武裝。北韓除製造核武問題外，北韓經濟困頓、民不聊生，朝鮮勞動黨為維繫獨裁政權統治，大肆販售飛彈等軍火牟取利益，甚至遭控訴涉及國際間多起販毒、製造假煙及偽造美鈔事件，而台灣位居東亞海空交通樞紐，台灣海峽為北韓船隻往來必經之路，因而有必要瞭解北韓政軍經現況，深入剖析北韓對於國際間衍生種種安全問題，訂定因應措施，以確保國家安全。 由於台灣外交情勢嚴峻，往往無法參與區域性國際組織，北韓乃伺機對台洽購精密儀器或刺探高科技產業技術，使得台灣容易成為北韓覬覦獲得國際管制性物品漏洞，本論文試圖探究並思索如何防止北韓向台灣採購可供軍事用途之精密儀器等用品，或可供生產提昇國防武器裝備之科技機器流向北韓，並配合國際反恐措施予以列管，這樣不僅符合國際利益，而且可以提昇台灣國際形象與國家地位；況且台灣亦有必要隨時瞭解國際上及美、歐等先進國家之最新出口管制措施，從而監督台灣廠商禁止將進口之高科技戰略性物品與生產之精密工具機，輾轉出口至管制地區（包括：伊朗、伊拉克、利比亞、北韓、中國、古巴、蘇丹等國），並配合國際防止擴散組織，共同防止大規模毀滅性武器擴散，形成全球安全之出口管制制度。 / In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as an “axis of evil”. These countries are regarded as subject to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the U.S. As a result, the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. has deteriorated. North Korea has attempted to gradually increase pressure to force the U.S. to concede; on October 9, 2006, North Korea officially announced the success of its secret nuclear weapon test, which undoubtedly made a tremendous impact on security in East Asia and the world. As a member of the Asia Pacific Region, Taiwan should understand how security in Northeast Asia changes due to the fact that North Korea is now a country with nuclear weapons. Taiwan should also be aware of the multilateral relations between the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. Without a satisfactory solution to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons, Japan may accelerate its military build-up in response to this lurking danger in Northeast Asia. Besides the nuclear weapon issue, North Korea has a poor economy and starving people. The Korean Workers’ Party has been accused of being involved in arms sale (such as missiles), international drug smuggling, counterfeit tobacco products, and counterfeit U.S. banknotes in order to maintain its dictatorship. As Taiwan’s geographic position is vital in the air and sea transport in East Asia, it is imperative for Taiwan to understand North Korea’s politics, armed forces, and economy. Taiwan must analyze and understand international security issues related to North Korea and map out corresponding actions so as to ensure national security. Due to its difficult diplomatic situation, Taiwan is unable to join many regional organizations. Therefore, North Korea takes this opportunity to purchase precision devices or pry into high technology from Taiwan. This makes Taiwan prone to become a legal loophole of which North Korea can take advantage to obtain international control items. This study investigates the ways for Taiwan to prevent North Korea from purchasing precision devices for military use or high-tech machinery that can improve defense weapons. In addition, the study also discusses how Taiwan can have better export control against North Korea by conforming to international anti-terror measures. To follow international principles is not only in line with global interests, but can also improve Taiwan’s international image and status. Therefore, Taiwan must keep itself updated of the latest export control measures implemented by the U.S., Europe, and other advanced countries. By doing so, Taiwan government can also prevent corporations in Taiwan from re-exporting strategic high-tech commodities and related production machinery to controlled territories, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan. With cooperation with international non-proliferation organizations, proliferation of WMDs can be stopped and a comprehensive export control network can be formed to maintain global security.

L’arme nucléaire, arme de destruction massive par excellence, est unique en son genre par son potentiel de destruction inédit et par le caractère indiscriminé de ses frappes. Véritable menace pour l’humanité, ce type d’arme se doit d’être encadré par un régime conventionnel international de non-prolifération et de désarmement des armes nucléaires fort et complet. Dans les faits, celui-ci comporte des lacunes. Ce mémoire s’intéresse au mécanisme de retrait de ce régime conventionnel international. Plus particulièrement, nous proposons une analyse de la procédure de dénonciation retrouvée dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires de 1968 (TNP), pièce maîtresse du régime, et dans le Traité New Start de 2010, seul traité en vigueur entre les deux superpuissances nucléaires, les États-Unis et la Russie. L’étude du retrait de la Corée du Nord du TNP en 2003 ainsi que des enseignements du régime général de droit international introduit par la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 viennent approfondir l’examen. On dévoile un mécanisme de retrait somme toute peu contraignant reposant largement sur le pouvoir arbitraire de l’État partie, malgré la menace importante pour la paix et pour la sécurité internationales engendrée par une telle décision. Jumelée à des mesures de suivi quasi inexistantes pour donner suite au retrait d’un État du TNP, cette situation laisse la communauté internationale face à une situation hautement dangereuse. À la lumière du mécanisme de retrait retrouvé dans l’Union européenne et tel qu’illustré par le récent cas du Brexit, ce mémoire propose de possibles pistes de solution pour renforcer le mécanisme de retrait du cadre juridique international de non-prolifération et de désarmement des armes nucléaires. / Nuclear weapons, the apex of weapons of mass destruction, are unique in the facet that they have an unprecedented potential for destruction, as well as in the fact that nuclear strikes are indiscriminate. This type of weapon, which represents a real threat to humanity, must be regulated by a strong and complete international conventional regimen of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, the latter suffers from deficiencies. This master’s thesis focuses on the withdrawal mechanism found in this international legal field. The spotlight is more specifically directed on its cornerstone treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT), and on the New Start Treaty of 2010, the only agreement which regulates the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear superpowers, Russia and the United States of America. The analysis is enhanced by the study of the 2003 North-Korean withdrawal from the NPT and of the principles introduced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. A rather soft withdrawal mechanism, which relies largely on the discretion of the State party, is revealed, despite the threat to international peace and security a decision to withdraw represents. This deficiency, paired with inexistent follow-up measures, leaves the international community facing a highly dangerous situation. The examination of the more substantiated withdrawal mechanism found in the European Union’s body of law, as illustrated by the Brexit, allows us to suggest possible solutions to strengthen the NPT withdrawal mechanism as well as potential follow-up measures to be implemented following the withdrawal of a State party.

The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) is a proposed multilateral treaty for the supply-side elimination of fossil fuels championed by a transnational advocacy network. Comparing fossil fuels to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the FF-NPT co-opts the language of non-proliferation and disarmament in a bid to uncover the moral implications of fossil fuel extraction and shift narratives about climate change. Pushing this analogy a step further, this study investigates how insights from global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts might be applied to the FF-NPT and climate governance more broadly. Thematic analysis of interviews with thirteen non-proliferation and disarmament experts is the focal point of this investigation. Findings feature factors behind success and failure; participation and power asymmetry; innovation and regional approaches; norms versus legally binding instruments; and practical parameters of the FF-NPT.