The results show that political connection has positive relation with ROE, but negative with ROA which means businessmen seek rent by from government and meanwhile, politicians extract rents from companies they manage. If members of Committee of the Chinese¡¦s People¡¦s Political Consultative Conference and firms¡¦ Community Party also serving on the board have great influence on firms¡¦ performance and resource. Besides, poor performance does not lead firms to gain political connection. Most import, power transition does not influence firms¡¦ value, especially those with old political connection.

Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / The regional great power competition between the United States and China is escalating in various dimensions such as economic, political, and security realms. Who instigates such tension and how? To answer these questions, this paper inquires whether it is the declining power, the United States, or the rising power, China, that causes regional tension to heighten. Applying the theories on power transition and power transition war to the three case studies on South Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea dispute in Vietnam, how the United States is provoking China to adopt policies that increase tension will be examined. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Which grand strategies do Great Powers adopt towards rising challengers? When do Great Powers conciliate their potential rivals, and when do they opt for strategies of containment? In this master’s report, I outline an argument to answer these and related questions. I add to the existing literatures on grand strategy and power transitions in several key respects. First, I model power shifts between Great Powers as contests over access to externally located benefits rather than as contests over power for its own sake. Second, I emphasize the weight of domestic politics in shaping states’ preferences over the apportionment of these benefits. Third, I highlight the role of diplomacy in determining whether established Great Powers choose to conciliate or else contain potential rivals. Empirically, I provide four vignettes of Great Power responses to rising states: the United States’ strategy towards Japan during the Cold War; Britain’s appeasement of the United States, 1890-1914; the United States’ containment of the Soviet Union under Ronald Reagan; and Britain’s containment of Wilhelmine Germany. / text

This case study traced the American reaction to Chinese activities in Africa from the year 2000 to the present. Two keys to understanding how this reaction might unfold were power-transition theory, which predicts that rising states will challenge the hegemon in an international system in order to revise the rules, and status-based competition theories. The U.S. appeared delayed in reacting to competition in Africa from its rising challenger there, China, until it understood that competition to be status-based. A clear, progressive reaction on the part of American leaders was traced. First, there was a split between the reactions of members of Congress and diplomats on-the-ground, who were concerned about China in Africa around the year 2005, and leaders in the White House and State Department, who publicly denied there was any kind of problem. White House and State Department leaders’ reaction then grew somewhat as relative gains concerns were activated by economic and power losses in Africa. These leaders then engaged in quiet diplomacy with China and Africa, perhaps to try to socialize China and to moderate its less favorable activities. The U.S. at this time did not seem to be fully aware of the status threat China was presenting. However, in about 2011, the U.S. appears to have begun to perceive the status losses it had sustained in Africa. Through policy changes, discourse, summitry and public diplomacy, including social media, leaders launched what appeared to be a public campaign, designed to position the U.S. as opposed to the values of China, and as a better partner for Africans. This can be seen as status competition because the U.S. had little to gain economically in Africa and its domestic public remained unconcerned with Africa. Loss of status appears to have motivated the U.S. to take action when nothing else had, inspiring policy changes vis-a-vis Africa, the first-ever U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, two presidential trips to Africa, and a public diplomacy campaign designed to showcase American strengths.

本研究主要探討中國如何介入中東地區，並且檢視其多重戰略操作現況，其中包括了安全議題、能源議題、以及經貿議題。透過中國藉由上述議題介入中東事務的發展，本研究期望能呈現中國的中東外交政策及其未來發展趨勢。本研究以中國與美國兩強是否會在中東地區發生權力轉移的可能作為研究問題，有鑑於此，本研究以AFK Organski的權力轉移理論作為全文的概念化基礎，並且重新檢視權力轉移理論在近年來的發展與實踐。就此，本研究將回應下列幾個問題:中國的中東外交政策之主要戰略目的為何?此一政策在中國全方位外交政策中的權重與定位為何?中國與中東國家的交往及雙邊關係中，所具備的優勢與劣勢為何?從結構層次來說，中國與美國在中東是否將達到權力平衡的局面?最後，中國是否滿意現階段自身在中東的地位以及中東地緣政治本身的現況?又或者中國傾向改變中東現狀，並且有意取代美國。本研究透過對上述問題的重新檢視，發現如果中國在中東所介入的勢力與議題越廣泛，並且以挑戰美國霸權為前提全力推進中國的中東介入政策，這意味著中東的現狀與規則將會被調整與改變，進而產生權力轉移的情況。不過，中國現階段並未有意、有能力挑戰美國在中東的戰略地位，因為這將使得中國與美國的結構性矛盾導向衝突。 / This study aims at examining the different aspects of China’s involvement in the Middle East: security, energy and economy, in the context of its evolving foreign policy and changing international status. The main question of the research is whether a power transition between the US and China is possible in the region of the Middle East. Hence. The power transition theory developed by AFK Organski in the 1950s is the basis of this research. The main question is answered by several secondary questions: What is China's foreign policy in the Middle East, and how does it combine into its overall foreign policy; What are the strong points as opposed to the weak points of China's relations with Middle Eastern countries; Is China on the course of achieving parity with the US in the region of Middle East? And the last one, is China satisfied with its current role in the Middle East and the regional existing order, or it would like to alter it in order for it to be able to replace the US as the hegemonic power in the area. If China is indeed becoming more powerful in the area and is challenging the American hegemony, the transformation of the current order and accepted rules of the games in the region could be changed to accommodate China’s needs, and this might lead to tension between China and the US or even conflicts.

歷經第二次伊拉克戰爭與經濟危機，冷戰後主導世界秩序的支配強權－美國國力遭受打擊，進而出現美國衰落的論述；同一時期，太平洋另一端新興大國—中國藉由快速的經濟發展在世界舞台展露頭角。因應此國際情勢而生的「權力轉移理論」便是探討既存支配強權與新興崛起挑戰者間權力轉移過程的理論。權力轉移論者認為，當新興挑戰國的能力增強至足以與既存支配強權匹配時，若同時其對現狀滿意度越來越低，便可能觸發戰爭。然而，國際政治受各區域國家所牽動，兩強間分庭抗禮且須考量區域中舉足輕重的領導國家。傳統上拉丁美洲被視為美國後院，而中國對該區域各國互動密切，更有論者提出中國直搗美國後院一說。綜觀拉美各國，其中擁有豐富天然資源、作為美洲第二大經濟體的巴西，是首屈一指的區域領導國家。是而本研究以巴西為舞台，從美國－巴西互動、中國－巴西互動，討論新興大國中國與既存支配強權美國間權力轉移的過程，從三方來往間探討權力轉移的跡象並驗證權力轉移論者的主張與假設，另外，本研究嘗試補充權力轉移論者中較少著墨的第三國－區域領導國家，在既存、新興兩強發生權力轉移時所扮演的角色與考量。 / After 2003 Iraq War and financial crisis, the power of dominator, United States is on the way fading. Meanwhile, on the other side of the pacific comes an emerging challenger -China. U.S. decline and China rise complete power transition theory as to illustrate the process of dynamic power change between dominated country and potential challenger. Power transition theory discusses that the war along with power shifting from dominanted state to potential challenger may explore while fulfilling two variables, power parity as the opportunity and negative evaluations of the status quo as the willingness. However, the world politics is well effected by regional countries even on the interactions between two major agents in power transition. Latin America is traditionally regarded as “backyard” of the U.S. but with increased cooperation from China, this claim has been slack. Among all countries in Latin America, Brazil devotees in leading the region due to its rich natural resources and political-economic influence. This article focuses on Brazil and imply competitions between the U.S. and China on the interactions with Brazil so to discuss the power transition phenomena and relevant hypothesis verifications. Furthermore, it tends to develop the autonomy and active position of third state while participating in power transition.

This study uses defensive realism, offensive realism and power transition theory (PTT) in order to examine the great powers’ grand strategies in the Arctic region, aiming to recontextualise the security theatre in the Arctic as a reflection of the return of great power politics and the end of Arctic exceptionalism, and to examine the explanatory power of the different strands of realism on the great power behaviour identified in their Arctic strategies. The study is conducted using qualitative content analysis and utilises Jacob Westberg’s theorisation of grand strategies through the categories of context, ends, means and ways as analytical framework, to which the theoretical framework is applied. The result shows that realism is a suitable theory for predicting great power behaviour in the Arctic, where PTT provides the strongest explanatory power; that the dichotomy between hard and soft security is eroding; and that the strategies were highly context-dependent, thus rendering generalisable results difficult to discern.

L’émergence de la Chine dans le système international post-guerre froide pose un défi pour la position hégémonique des États-Unis et l’ordre mondial libéral. Lorsqu’ils tentent d’expliquer ce défi, les spécialistes tendent à se concentrer uniquement soit sur le hard power chinois (en particulier, sa puissance militaire) soit sur son soft power (l’attrait de sa culture et idéologie). Cette thèse développe un cadre d’analyse alternatif inspiré de la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu, articulé autour de la notion de pouvoir symbolique. Elle conçoit la politique internationale en termes d’une lutte symbolique (entre, par exemple, une orthodoxie et une hétérodoxie) dont l’issue est déterminée par au moins trois facteurs cruciaux : contexte, capital et lieux communs. Ce cadre est appliqué à l’analyse du nouveau rôle de la Chine dans le monde depuis la fin de la guerre froide, lequel est indiscutablement l’un des développements les plus remarquables des relations internationales des temps modernes. La thèse démontre que la Chine ne défie pas l’hégémonie des États-Unis et l’ordre mondial libéral au sens conventionnel de la puissance matérielle ou de l’idéologie, mais plutôt au niveau symbolique. La thèse soutient que la conjonction des trois facteurs susmentionnés a été nécessaire à l’influence mondiale de la Chine : (1) la crise de légitimation des États-Unis (sur les plan économique, politique et idéologique), couplée à l’extraordinaire ascension de nouvelles puissances dans le système international comme la Chine, ont créé un contexte historique favorable ou « condition de possibilité »; (2) l’énorme capital symbolique accumulé par la Chine, en raison non seulement de son nouveau statut de grande puissance, mais aussi de son approche pragmatique des questions nationales et internationales, en a fait une source d’inspiration convoitée mondialement ; (3) la mobilisation stratégique par la Chine de son capital symbolique, sous la forme d’un ensemble de lieux communs ‘rhétoriques’, a grandement contribué à légitimer sa puissance, en particulier aux yeux des élites dirigeantes dans le monde en développement, dissimulant ainsi le caractère asymétrique et arbitraire de ses relations. Ensemble, ces trois éléments –contexte, capital, lieux communs– expliquent le pouvoir symbolique de la Chine, c’est-à-dire la perception selon laquelle, contrairement aux États-Unis, elle propose des réponses pertinentes et cohérentes aux problèmes d’organisation sociale, économique et politique de ce monde. L’ascension de la Chine remet ainsi en question le « méta-capital » des États-Unis, c’est-à-dire son monopole sur la production du capital économique, social, culturel et symbolique. L’accent mis sur cette dimension symbolique de la lutte pour définir et imposer la « vision légitime du monde social et ses divisions » révèle une rupture avec la pratique conventionnelle de la politique des grandes puissances, au profit d’une transformation pacifique du système international et d’une diplomatie symbolique. Cet accent sur le pouvoir symbolique ouvre des avenues prometteuses pour l’étude du changement et des sources d’autorité sur la scène politique mondiale, traditionnellement définie comme « anarchique ». / China’s rise within the international system in the post-Cold War era challenges the hegemonic position of the United States and the Western liberal order. In trying to explain this challenge, scholars tend to either focus on Chinese hard power (in particular, its military power) or on its soft power (the attractiveness of its culture and ideology). This thesis develops an alternative Bourdieu-inspired framework addressing symbolic power. It conceptualizes international politics in terms of a symbolic struggle (such as that between orthodoxy and heterodoxy) whose outcome is determined by at least three crucial factors: context, capital and commonplaces. The framework is applied to the analysis of China’s new world role, which is arguably one of the most remarkable developments in modern international relations. The thesis shows that China does not challenge U.S. hegemonic position and the Western liberal order in the conventional sense of material power or ideology, but rather at the symbolic level. The thesis argues that the combination of the three above-mentioned factors has been necessary to China’s worldwide influence : (1) the legitimation crisis of the United States (economically, politically and ideologically), paired with the extraordinary rise of new illiberal powers on the world scene such as China, created a favourable historical context or “condition of possibility”; (2) the huge amount of symbolic capital accumulated by China, not only because of its new status as a great power, but also because of the success of its pragmatic approach to national and international issues, made it become a source of inspiration for countries across the world; (3) the strategic mobilization by China of its symbolic capital, in the form of ‘rhetorical’ commonplaces, greatly contributed to legitimize its power, especially in the eyes of ruling elites in the developing world, thereby dissimulating the asymmetric and arbitrary nature of the Chinese power and relations. Together, these three components -context, capital, and commonplaces- explain the emergence of China as a symbolic power, i.e. the perception that, unlike the United States, China now has the authority to speak the truth and to define causes of and remedies for certain problems and crises. China’s rise challenges the Unites States’ ‘meta-capital’, that is, its monopoly on the production of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital. The focus on this symbolic dimension as a ‘weapon’ in the struggle to define and impose the “legitimate vision of the social world and its divisions” reveals a rupture in the conventional practice of great powers politics, pointing to a peaceful transformation of the international system and symbolic diplomacy. It shows that a focus on symbolic power opens promising avenues for the study of change and sources of authority in world politics, traditionally defined as “anarchic”.