La présente thèse a pour objet l’étude de la relation entre la preuve et la responsabilité pénale des supérieurs hiérarchiques devant les juridictions pénales internationales. Ces juridictions sont chargées de juger les responsables des crimes de masse. La question est donc de savoir comment elles procèdent, sur quelles preuves elles se basent et quel mode de participation est le plus adapté pour juger ces responsables. / This thesis deals with the study of the relationship between evidence and criminal responsibility of high ranking officers before international criminal courts. These courts judge the persons responsible for having committed mass crimes. The question is how they proceed, on which evidence they rely and which mode of participation is the most adequate to do so.

Vingt et un an après la création du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda et dix-sept ans après la signature du traité de Rome donnant naissance à la Cour pénale international, la fièvre dénonciatrice que connait cette institution n’est toujours pas apaisée. La CPI est-elle otage des idéaux qui justifient sa création et des forces politiques antagonistes auxquelles elle reste malgré tout liée ? Les africains commettraient-ils davantage de crime passibles de poursuites devant la Cour que les ressortissant d’autres continents ? Si l’étude des procédures judiciaires nées des crimes commis dans des conflits se déroulant sur le continent africain et l’analyse des procédures de mise en cause de certains Chefs d’Etats africains soulignent le très important travail de lutte contre l’impunité que réalise la Cour pénale internationale, le bilan de ce travail met toutefois en évidence la collision des procédures judiciaires avec des impératifs politiques internationaux. Ce travail de recherche montre que si la CPI se veut un prolongement de la sécurité collective, l’efficacité de son action et son universalisme sont aujourd’hui mise en doute, au point de cristalliser les rapports de l’organisme judiciaire international avec le continent africain. / Twenty-one year after the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and seventeen years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome giving rise to the International Criminal Court, the whistleblower fever that knows this institution is still not appeased. Is the ICC hostage ideals that justified its creation and antagonistic political forces which it nevertheless remains bound? African they commit more crime prosecuted before the Court that the national of other continents? If the study of legal proceedings arising from crimes committed in conflicts taking place on the African continent and in the analysis of the party proceedings of some African Heads of States stress the very important work to fight against impunity that makes the International Criminal Court, the outcome of this work, however, shows the collision of legal proceedings with international political imperatives. This research shows that if the ICC is an expansion of collective security, the effectiveness of its action and universalism are now in doubt, as to crystallize the reports of the international judicial body with the mainland African.

Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ? / The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?

Aujourd’hui, l’Afrique est sans aucun doute la partie du monde la plus affectée par la commission des crimes internationaux les plus graves. Pourtant, depuis des décennies, il existe des mécanismes juridiques visant à sanctionner les responsables des crimes qui heurtent la conscience humaine. Seulement, l’échec relatif de ces mécanismes peut pousser l’observateur à se demander s’il est possible de garantir la diffusion du droit international pénal sur le continent africain. Cette interrogation est loin d’être incongrue, car même si un nombre important d’états africains ont ratifié le Statut de Rome qui organise la répression du génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité, des crimes de guerre et même du crime d’agression, il n’en demeure pas moins que l’application de ce Statut dans les différents ordres juridiques concernés est très souvent compromise. La principale raison à cela c'est que, le droit international pénal ne tient pas forcément compte des particularismes juridiques des états qui ont pourtant la primauté de compétence, en vertu du principe de subsidiarité, pour sanctionner la commission des crimes internationaux selon les règles classiques de dévolution des compétences. De plus, il faut préciser que l’Afrique est le terrain de prédilection du pluralisme juridique qui favorise la juxtaposition de l’ordre juridique moderne et de l’ordre juridique traditionnel. Si le premier est en principe réceptif aux normes internationales pénales, le second qu’il soit musulman ou coutumier avec l’exemple des Gacaca rwandais, repose sur une philosophie juridique différente de celle du droit international pénal. Dans tous les cas, l’articulation du droit international pénal avec les ordres juridiques africains est une des conditions de sa diffusion. Cette articulation pourrait d’ailleurs être favorisée par le dialogue entre les juges nationaux et internationaux qui doivent travailler en bonne intelligence pour édifier un système international pénal ; d’où l’intérêt pour les états africains de favoriser une coopération effective avec les juridictions pénales internationales. Il va sans dire que, tout ceci ne sera possible qu’au sein des régimes politiques démocratiques capables de renoncer aux règles et pratiques juridiques anachroniques pour s’appuyer sur une politique criminelle pouvant favoriser, dans un avenir plus ou moins lointain, un véritable universalisme du droit international pénal. / Today, Africa is undoubtedly part of the world most affected by the commission of the most serious international crimes. Yet for decades, there are legal mechanisms to punish those responsible for crimes that shock the conscience of humanity. But the relative failure of these mechanisms can push the viewer to wonder if it is possible to ensure the dissemination of international criminal law on the African continent. This question is far from being incongruous, because even if a significant number of African states have ratified the Rome Statute that governs the fight against genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression even, the fact remains that the application of the Statute in the different legal systems involved is often compromised. The main reason for this is that international criminal law does not necessarily take into account the legal peculiarities of the states that have yet the primacy of jurisdiction under the subsidiarity principle, to sanction the commission of international crimes by the conventional rules devolution of powers. In addition, it should be noted that Africa is the stomping ground of legal pluralism that promotes juxtaposition of the modern legal system and traditional law. If the first is normally receptive to criminal international standards, the second whether Muslim or customary with the example of the Rwandan Gacaca is based on a different legal philosophy from that of international criminal law. In all cases, the articulation of international criminal law with African legal systems is one of the conditions of release. This link could also be encouraged by the dialogue between national and international judges who must work in harmony to build an international criminal system; hence the need for African states to promote effective cooperation with international criminal courts. It goes without saying that all this will be possible only in democratic political systems which can waive the rules and legal practices anachronistic to press a criminal policy that can promote in a more or less distant future, a true universalism of international criminal law.

Les crimes internationaux constituent des infractions dont les conséquences dramatiques affectent la communauté internationale dans son ensemble. Cette dernière s'est engagée dans la poursuite d'auteurs présumés de ces crimes à travers les différents mécanismes juridiques mis en place par la justice pénale internationale. Il incombe essentiellement aux États d'assurer l'effectivité de cette justice. Ainsi, quand des auteurs présumés de crimes internationaux se trouvent sur le territoire ou dans la juridiction d'un État, ce dernier est tenu de les poursuivre ou de les extrader vers d'autres États ou juridictions pénales internationales lorsque cela est nécessaire. Depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, certains États mettent en application ces obligations en engageant des poursuites à l'encontre de criminels internationaux. La répression nationale des crimes internationaux se heurte à de nombreuses difficultés afférentes, le plus souvent, au manque de moyens ou de volonté, à l'inadéquation de certains systèmes juridiques nationaux, à la realpolitik (de l'allemand politique réaliste), à la nécessité de préserver les relations interétatiques, etc. Par ailleurs, il n'existe pas encore d'instance supranationale capable de contraindre les États à respecter leurs obligations internationales de répression des crimes internationaux. Par conséquent, l'idée de l'implication des cours régionales des droits de l'Homme dans la répression nationale des crimes internationaux s'impose davantage eu égard aux exigences internationales de répression des crimes internationaux qu'elles rappellent constamment aux États / International crimes constitute offences whose dramatic consequences affect the international community as a whole. This international community has committed itself to prosecute alleged perpetrators of these crimes through various legal mechanisms created by international criminal justice. The States are primarily responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of international criminal law. Consequently, when alleged perpetrators of international crimes are on the territory or under the jurisdiction of a given State, national authorities must prosecute them in their own national courts or extradite them to others States or international criminal courts when necessary. Since the Second World War, some States implement these international obligations by prosecuting international criminals. The national prosecution of international crimes faces many barriers related most of the time to a lack of financial resources or political will. This can also result from the inadequacy of some national legal systems, realpolitik, the need to safeguard inter-state relations... In addition to this, a supranational body compelling States to respect their international obligations to prosecute international crimes has not yet been created. Therefore, the legal involvement of regional human rights courts in the implementation of national prosecution of international crimes is necessary. This is the consequence of international requirements related to the pursuit of international criminals reminding the States of their legal duties

Thesis (doctoral)-Freie Universität, Berlin, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 350-399) and index.

A internacionalização do terror no Cone Sul, durante as décadas de 70 e 80, consistiu na integração dos esforços de um grupo de países para combater um ―inimigo‖ comum: o comunismo. Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguai e Uruguai – com apoio dos Estados Unidos – associaram suas forças militares e serviços secretos para desenvolver um plano de combate internacional contra a ―subversão comunista‖: a denominada Operação Condor. Através dela internacionalizou-se o terrorismo de Estado instaurado nesses países, disseminando a insegurança, a violência e o desrespeito aos direitos humanos em toda a região sul-americana, dando origem a uma verdadeira ―multinacional do terror‖. O Plano Condor visou evitar que a atuação das organizações guerrilheiras existentes nesses países pudesse levar a uma revolução semelhante à ocorrida em Cuba. A Argentina foi um importante ator dessa rede internacional de terror. Perseguiu, reprimiu e colaborou, de forma sistemática e com requintes de violência, na perseguição e no aniquilamento dos opositores do regime ditatorial argentino, bem como dos países vizinhos. Com o golpe de Estado de março de 1976, instalou-se na Argentina a ditadura civil-militar, denominada Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, banalizando o terrorismo do Estado e gerando um clima de insegurança e medo em toda a sociedade argentina. Nesta fase instaurou-se uma política estatal que cometeu diversos crimes de lesa humanidade, no marco do genocídio para alguns, ou do politicídio de vários militantes de movimentos de oposição, tornando-se esta a tática mais utilizada para combater as ideias ―subversivas‖. Milhares de cidadãos abandonaram o país tomando o rumo do exílio para salvar suas vidas, a de seus familiares e para seguir combatendo, desde o exterior, os usurpadores da liberdade na Argentina e lutando pela volta da democracia ao país. / The internationalization of terror in the Southern Cone, between the 70‘s and the 80‘s, was the integration of efforts of a group of countries to combat a ―common enemy‖: the communism. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay – with support from the United States – connected its military forces and secret services to develop a plan to combat internationally the ―communist subversion‖: the named Operation Condor. It internationalized the State terrorism introduced in those countries, spreading insecurity, violence and disrespecting human rights in the entire South American region, giving rise to a genuine ―multinational of terror‖. The Operation Condor aimed to avoid that those guerrillas organizations, active in its countries, could lead to a revolution similar to which occurred in Cuba. Argentina was an important actor from that international network of terror. It persecuted, repressed and collaborated systematically and with refinements of violence in the harassment and the annihilation of enemies of the Argentinean dictatorial regime, such as from its neighbouring countries. With the coup d‟état of March of 1976 in Argentina it was installed the civil-military dictatorship named Proceso de Reorganización Nacional that trivialized State terrorism and generated an atmosphere of insecurity and fear for the Argentine society as whole. This stage introduced a State policy that committed several crimes against humanity, within the framework of genocide for some, or of the politicide of several militants of the opposition movements, making it the most widely used tactic to combat the ―subversive‖ ideas. Thousands of citizenships abandoned this country taking the road of exile to save their own lives, as well as their families‘ and to keep fighting against, from abroad, the usurpers of freedom in Argentina and struggling for the return of democracy to the country. / La internacionalización del terror en el Cono Sur, durante las décadas del 70 y 80, consistió en la integración de los esfuerzos de un grupo de países para combatir un ―enemigo‖ común: el comunismo. Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay – con el apoyo de los EE.UU. – asociaron sus fuerzas militares y sus servicios secretos para desarrollar un plan de combate internacional contra la ―subversión comunista‖: la denominada Operación Cóndor. Mediante ella se internacionalizó el terrorismo de Estado antes esos países, diseminando la inseguridad, la violencia y el desprecio de los derechos humanos a toda la región sudamericana, originando una verdadera ―multinacional del terror‖. El Operativo Cóndor estuvo destinado a evitar que las acciones de organizaciones guerrilleras existentes en esos países pudieran llevar a una revolución semejante a la que ocurrió en Cuba. La Argentina fue un importante actor de esa red internacional del terror. Persiguió, reprimió y colaboró, sistemática y violentamente, en la persecución y en el aniquilamiento de los opositores del régimen dictatorial argentino, así como lo de los países vecinos. Con el golpe de Estado de marzo de 1976, se estableció en la Argentina la dictadura civil-militar, denominada Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, banalizando el terrorismo de Estado y generando una atmosfera de inseguridad y de miedo a toda la sociedad argentina. En esta fase se introdujo una política estatal que cometió diversos crímenes de lesa humanidad, en el marco del genocidio para algunos, o del politicidio de varios militantes de movimientos de oposición, convirtiéndose esta la táctica más utilizada para combatir las ideas "subversivas". Miles de ciudadanos abandonaron el país tomando el rumbo del exilio para salvar sus vidas, la de sus familiares y para seguir combatiendo, desde afuera, los usurpadores de la libertad en la Argentina y luchando por el regreso de la democracia al país.

Text in English / While intergenerational transmission of trauma has been widely studied, there is a paucity of literature on intergenerational humiliation. Furthermore, humiliation is regarded as a significant feature of transgenerational transmission of trauma and revenge production. Therefore, the present study aimed to contribute to addressing this paucity and to explore and understand intergenerational humiliation as experienced by 20 children and grandchildren of victims of apartheid-era gross human rights violations. Conceptually, historical trauma theory framed the study. A hermeneutic phenomenological methodology was used to achieve the aims. Through purposive-criterion sampling, data was collected and analysed using interpretive phenomenological analysis. Results show that the consequences of intergenerational humiliation are varied as feelings of hurt and loss perpetuate through the generations. Although positive influences counter these feelings within a generation, they remain alive in memories. This has implications on ethnic and racial inter-group relations as transitional societies such as South Africa seek social cohesion. / Psychology / M.A. (Psychology (Research Consultation))

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)

This thesis investigates both substantive and procedural issues pertaining to allegations of crimes committed by UN peacekeepers in three African countries, Somalia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Under the current UN Model Status-of-Forces Agreements, criminal jurisdiction over peacekeepers rests with their sending States. However, although the UN has no criminal jurisdiction, it has been the Office of Internal Oversight Services that has conducted investigations. It is argued that every Status of Force Agreement and every Memorandum of Understanding should contain specific clauses obligating Troop-Contributing Countries to prosecute and the UN to follow-up. If rape, murder, assault, and any other crimes by UN peacekeepers go unpunished, the message sent to the victims is that peacekeepers are above the law. Rape is the most commonly committed crime by peacekeepers, but is usually considered as an isolated act. The procedural issue of prosecuting peacekeepers is investigated in order to establish whether troops can be caught under the ambits of the criminal law of the Host State to hold UN troops criminally accountable for their acts. The laws relative to the elements of each crime and the possible available defences under the three Host States, and the criminal law of South Africa as a Troop-Contributing Country, are discussed. The apparent lack of prosecution is investigated and existing cases of prosecution discussed. Alternatives to the unwillingness by States with criminal jurisdiction under the Status of Forces Agreement or under the Memorandum of Understanding are considered. Considering the current rules related to crimes committed by peacekeepers, the argument put forward is that crimes by peacekeepers must be dealt with completely and transparently though a Convention aiming at barring Troop-Contributing Countries who do not meet their obligations under international law from participating in future operations of peace. This thesis, furthermore, suggests a tripartite court mechanism to fill the lacunae in the law relating to the prosecution of peacekeepers. It considers the issues of reserving jurisdiction over peacekeepers to the Troop-Contributing Countries which are reluctant to prosecute repatriated alleged perpetrators. The victims’ importance in criminal proceedings and their their right to a remedy are highlighted. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.