O presente estudo tem como escopo examinar os limites constitucionais da influência da tributação nas atividades econômicas dos Contribuintes, à luz dos princípios e postulados da livre iniciativa, da livre concorrência, da igualdade, da proporcionalidade e da proibição do excesso. A indagação geral que impulsionará a pesquisa é a seguinte: pode a tributação, de forma indistinta, determinar como os Contribuintes devem agir ao plasmar suas atividades econômicas, ou há algum limite a partir do qual a influência da tributação sobre as livres escolhas dos Contribuintes não pode mais avançar? Quais as normas resultantes das interações entre direito tributário e direito econômico? Quais limites a igualdade impõe ao uso de medidas extrafiscais? De quais ferramentas dispõe o aplicador para realizar a liberdade econômica e a igualdade? Como a tese do legislador negativo representa um entrave para a realização dos princípios e postulados em questão? Quais paradigmas estão por trás de tal tese? Mais especificamente, examinaremos alguns casos concretos que ilustrem os problemas em questão e permitam um aprofundamento dos pontos discutidos na pesquisa. O primeiro caso será o das empresas excluídas do SIMPLES cuja exclusão esteja motivada pelo simples exercício de determinada atividade econômica, buscando elucidar se tal discriminação encontra suporte no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, considerando o seguinte: existindo um critério objetivo para definir quais empresas podem gozar dos benefícios do SIMPLES, qual seja, a receita bruta anual da empresa, pode o Poder Legislativo adotar critério distintivo diverso (a atividade econômica desenvolvida pela empresa) para fins de enquadramento no referido regime tributário? Tal discriminação em função da atividade econômica do Contribuinte encontra respaldo na Constituição Federal? Se a liberdade econômica é um limite à tal discriminação, quais são seus elementos e eficácia jurídica? O segundo caso, que impõe questionamentos semelhantes, é o da exclusão da possibilidade de creditamento da mão-de-obra de pessoas físicas utilizada como insumo por Contribuintes do PIS e da COFINS não-cumulativos. / This paper aims to verify which are the constitutional limitations to the influence of taxation over taxpayers’ economic activities, in the light of the principles and postulates of freedom of enterprise, free competition, equality, proportionality and the prohibition of excessive influence. The general enquiry that will guide this research is the following: can taxation, indistinctly, determine how taxpayers shall act when choosing and directing their economic activities, or are there some limitations that compel the government to not influence taxpayers' economic choices? What are the norms resulting from interactions between tax law and economic law? What limits does equality imposes to the use of behavior influent taxation? Which are the tools available to the judges to promote economic freedom and equality? How does the thesis of negative legislative power represents an obstacle to the achievement of such principles and postulates by the courts? What are the paradigms behind such thesis? More specifically, we are going to examine some cases that illustrate the problems abovementioned and allow us to go deeper in points discussed in this research. The first case is the exclusion of companies from tax benefit program called SIMPLES (for small business), whose exclusion is determined by the simple fact of exercise of a specific economic activity. We are going to exam it in order to elucidate if Brazilian law sustains such discrimination, considering the following: if the law choses one criteria to grant the tax benefits of SIMPLES (company's economic size measured by gross income), can the legislator choose another criteria (company's economic activity) to exclude it from the tax benefit program? Is it grounded in Brazilian Constitution the discrimination based upon the simple adoption of an economic activity? If freedom of enterprise is a limitation to such discrimination, which are its elements and legal effectiveness? The second case, which implies similar questions, is the exclusion of the possibility of crediting the labor of natural persons used as an input for taxpayers of non-cumulative PIS and COFINS (social contributions over gross income - VAT).

O presente estudo tem como escopo examinar os limites constitucionais da influência da tributação nas atividades econômicas dos Contribuintes, à luz dos princípios e postulados da livre iniciativa, da livre concorrência, da igualdade, da proporcionalidade e da proibição do excesso. A indagação geral que impulsionará a pesquisa é a seguinte: pode a tributação, de forma indistinta, determinar como os Contribuintes devem agir ao plasmar suas atividades econômicas, ou há algum limite a partir do qual a influência da tributação sobre as livres escolhas dos Contribuintes não pode mais avançar? Quais as normas resultantes das interações entre direito tributário e direito econômico? Quais limites a igualdade impõe ao uso de medidas extrafiscais? De quais ferramentas dispõe o aplicador para realizar a liberdade econômica e a igualdade? Como a tese do legislador negativo representa um entrave para a realização dos princípios e postulados em questão? Quais paradigmas estão por trás de tal tese? Mais especificamente, examinaremos alguns casos concretos que ilustrem os problemas em questão e permitam um aprofundamento dos pontos discutidos na pesquisa. O primeiro caso será o das empresas excluídas do SIMPLES cuja exclusão esteja motivada pelo simples exercício de determinada atividade econômica, buscando elucidar se tal discriminação encontra suporte no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, considerando o seguinte: existindo um critério objetivo para definir quais empresas podem gozar dos benefícios do SIMPLES, qual seja, a receita bruta anual da empresa, pode o Poder Legislativo adotar critério distintivo diverso (a atividade econômica desenvolvida pela empresa) para fins de enquadramento no referido regime tributário? Tal discriminação em função da atividade econômica do Contribuinte encontra respaldo na Constituição Federal? Se a liberdade econômica é um limite à tal discriminação, quais são seus elementos e eficácia jurídica? O segundo caso, que impõe questionamentos semelhantes, é o da exclusão da possibilidade de creditamento da mão-de-obra de pessoas físicas utilizada como insumo por Contribuintes do PIS e da COFINS não-cumulativos. / This paper aims to verify which are the constitutional limitations to the influence of taxation over taxpayers’ economic activities, in the light of the principles and postulates of freedom of enterprise, free competition, equality, proportionality and the prohibition of excessive influence. The general enquiry that will guide this research is the following: can taxation, indistinctly, determine how taxpayers shall act when choosing and directing their economic activities, or are there some limitations that compel the government to not influence taxpayers' economic choices? What are the norms resulting from interactions between tax law and economic law? What limits does equality imposes to the use of behavior influent taxation? Which are the tools available to the judges to promote economic freedom and equality? How does the thesis of negative legislative power represents an obstacle to the achievement of such principles and postulates by the courts? What are the paradigms behind such thesis? More specifically, we are going to examine some cases that illustrate the problems abovementioned and allow us to go deeper in points discussed in this research. The first case is the exclusion of companies from tax benefit program called SIMPLES (for small business), whose exclusion is determined by the simple fact of exercise of a specific economic activity. We are going to exam it in order to elucidate if Brazilian law sustains such discrimination, considering the following: if the law choses one criteria to grant the tax benefits of SIMPLES (company's economic size measured by gross income), can the legislator choose another criteria (company's economic activity) to exclude it from the tax benefit program? Is it grounded in Brazilian Constitution the discrimination based upon the simple adoption of an economic activity? If freedom of enterprise is a limitation to such discrimination, which are its elements and legal effectiveness? The second case, which implies similar questions, is the exclusion of the possibility of crediting the labor of natural persons used as an input for taxpayers of non-cumulative PIS and COFINS (social contributions over gross income - VAT).

The production of knowledge and the information were imposed, since the beginning, as necessary to human existence, implying in processes of social memory and transmission, as well, recognition of rights. Throughout history, restrictions on access to information were common, putting themselves at opposite ends those who possessed the copyright, or those to whom they were related, and those who would fit the right of information, which is a cornerstone of social inclusion and citizenship. In fact, there is a causal correlation between intellectual production and dissemination, as the search for knowledge is closely linked to the need for their disclosure and use for the benefit of man himself. In this sense, an intellectual or scientific discovery has meaning only when it fulfills its social function. The scope of this study is to examine, from the perspective of constitutional and contemporary conception of human rights, the counterpoint between the protection of copyright and its social function. Therefore, initially it is presented a retrospective of the assertion of human rights in history and their generations, highlighting the current characteristics of universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights. Then it was performed a review about the positiveness of the rights inherent to the human person in the legal-constitutional states, including Brazil, distinguished human rights from fundamental rights. Marks of the law constitutionalization in Brazil were also investigated, with emphasis on the ideology of post-positivism, the normative force of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation. The copyright and its social function were also addressed, from the international point of view and from the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, with the presentation of the two strands of current protection of the rights of intellectual creators, the Anglo-American and the French. After, there was a study of the constitutionalization of copyright in Brazil, using the proportionality as the criterion to solve the apparent conflict between the rights of the individual author and their social function. Finally, it was performed a constitutional analysis of the law proposal n. 3133, of 2012, which intends to modify the current law that deals with this matter, in particular to analyze its principled structure and the limitations to the author s rights. / A produção do conhecimento e a informação impuseram-se, desde os primórdios, como necessárias à existência do homem, o que implicou processos de memorização social e de transmissão, como, também, reconhecimento de direitos. Em toda a história, foram comuns as restrições ao acesso à informação, colocando-se em extremos opostos quem exercia os direitos de autor, ou os que lhes eram conexos, e aquele a quem caberia o direito da informação, que é um dos fundamentos da inclusão social e da cidadania. Na verdade, existe uma correlação de causalidade entre produção intelectual e sua difusão, pois a busca pelo conhecimento está intimamente ligada à necessidade de sua divulgação e utilização para o benefício do próprio homem. Nesse sentido, uma criação intelectual ou uma descoberta científica só tem significado quando cumpre sua função social. O presente estudo tem por escopo examinar, sob a ótica constitucional e da concepção contemporânea dos direitos humanos, o contraponto existente entre a proteção aos direitos autorais e sua função social. Para tanto, inicialmente, apresentou-se umretrospecto da asserção dos direitos humanos na história e de suas gerações, com o devido destaque as atuais características da universalidade, indivisibilidade, interdependência e interrelação dos direitos humanos. Em seguida, realizou-se uma análise acerca da positivação dos direitos inerentes à pessoa humana na ordem jurídica-constitucional dos Estados, inclusive no Brasil, distinguindo-se os direitos humanos dos direitos fundamentais. Foram, também, objeto de investigação os marcos da constitucionalização do direito no Brasil, com ênfase na ideologia do pós-positivismo, na força normativa da Constituição e na interpretação constitucional. Abordou-se, ainda, os direitos autorais e de sua função social, tanto no âmbito internacional como na Constituição brasileira de 1988, com a apresentação das duas atuais vertentes de proteção aos direitos dos criadores intelectuais, a anglo-americana, do copyright , e a francesa, do direito de autor. Após, realizou-se um estudo da constitucionalização dos direitos autorais no Brasil, utilizando-se da proporcionalidade como critério para solucionar o aparente conflito entre os direitos individuais do autor e a sua função social para, por último, realizar uma leitura constitucional do Projeto de Lei n. 3.133, de 2012, que pretende modificar a atual lei que trata da matéria, em particular analisar a sua estrutura principiológica e as alterações mais relevantes referentes às limitações aos direitos autorais.

A dissertação objetiva defender a possibilidade do princípio da insignificância incidir sobre os atos de improbidade administrativa, à luz da hipótese analisada, na busca de uma interpretação mais humanizante ao viés extremamente sancionatório que a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça aplica à Lei 8.429/92, ao impedir, sequer, cogitar-se do princípio nessa seara. Sem olvidar a relevância da moralidade administrativa, o escopo do trabalho é apenas o de abrir uma fresta para a possibilidade de cabimento do princípio da insignificância, enquanto fundamento de validade principiológica da eventual absolvição de acusados da prática de atos de improbidade administrativa, cuja conduta, na análise do caso concreto, tenha se revelado dotada de ofensividade mínima ao bem jurídico protegido. A relevância normativa dos princípios, bem como das garantias e limites constitucionais contra o poder punitivo do Estado, são decorrência do antropocentrismo que fundamenta a Constituição vigente, levando a Suprema Corte a estabelecer vetores de aplicação do princípio da insignificância, que devem ter a possibilidade de serem estendidos, quando cabíveis, ao julgamento dos atos de improbidade administrativa, seja pelos princípios da proporcionalidade e da razoabilidade, limitadores da discricionariedade, seja por princípios de comum cabimento no direito sancionador, diante do conceito universal de antijuridicidade. Por fim, tendências jurisprudenciais e normativas indicam a possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da insignificância aos atos de improbidade administrativa, para corrigir o entrave criado pelo absolutismo da posição que veda, por completo, a mera cogitação de incidência do princípio. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the likelihood of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance, in view of the hypothesis analyzed, in the search for a more human approach rather than the extremely punitive perspective followed by the Brazilian superior court of justice in relation to Law 8.429/92, by completely disregarding the principle in this sense. Notwithstanding the importance of the administrative morality, the purpose of this paper is to simply look at the possibility of considering the principle of insignificance, as a valid principle of eventual acquittal of those accused of administrative malfeasance, and whose actions might have been perceived as offensive to the assets protected by the law through the analysis of the case. The normative relevance of the principles and the warranties and constitutional limitations against the punitive powers of the State arise from the anthropocentrism that supports the current Constitution, which cause the Brazilian superior court of justice to veto the enforcement of the principle of insignificance, which should be extended, whenever possible, to the judgment of administrative malfeasance, either through principles of proportionality and reasonability, which limit discretion, either through common principles common to the punitive law or to the universal concept of unlawfulness. Finally, case lawrelated and normative trends show the possibility of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance to correct problems caused by the absolutism of the position that vetoes the possibility of the principle.

A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar o uso do método da proporcionalidade para decidir questões acerca de direitos sociais. Nesse sentido, antes relacionada somente à proibição do excesso (Übermaßverbot), a proporcionalidade passa a ter reconhecida sua outra face, denominada proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente (Untermaßverbot). O legislador e o administrador passam a ter suas ações balizadas pela proibição do excesso de intervenção e pela imposição da intervenção para proteção de direitos. O termo pouco usual se refere ao controle judicial das omissões do legislador e administrador, na medida em que orienta a atividade deles quando da conformação e implementação dos direitos sociais. Os escassos estudos na doutrina não permitiram o desenvolvimento do método em relação aos direitos sociais no Brasil, em que pese a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal se utilizar da proporcionalidade como proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente em alguns de seus julgados, especialmente em época recente. Mas se a utilização de tal método na argumentação judicial passa a ser vista de forma recorrente, o Tribunal deve primeiro ter clareza de seus elementos quando pretende invocá-lo em suas decisões e até mesmo firmeza da utilidade de seu uso quanto a esses direitos. Ainda, tem-se que o transplante de métodos de revisão judicial dos direitos de defesa para os direitos sociais merece estudo específico, tanto em relação à concepção desses direitos quanto à possível aplicabilidade da proporcionalidade, pois as diferenças entre eles apontam que nem sempre ambos os direitos comportarão argumentações idênticas para os problemas que enfrentam. / This research aims to analyze the use of the proportionality method for deciding social rights questions. Thus, the proportionality was related before only to prohibition of excessive state actions (Übermaßverbot), begins to have its other face recognized, called prohibition of lacking or insufficient state actions (Untermaßverbot). The legislator and administrator now have their actions bounded by the prohibition of \"excessive intervention\" and by the imposing of \"intervention to protection\" rights. The unusual term refers to the judicial control of the omissions of the legislator and administrator, in so far as guides their activity of conformation and implementation of social rights. The few studies on the doctrine did not allowed the development of the method regarding the social rights in Brazil, notwithstanding the fact that the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court uses proportionality as prohibition of lacking or insufficient state actions in some of its decisions, especially recently. But if the use of such a method in the judicial argumentation starts to be seen recurrently, the Court must first get clear of its elements when intends to invoke it in their decisions and even firmness of utility of its use regarding such rights. Also, the transplantation of judicial review methods of defense rights for social rights deserves a specific study, both in relation to the understanding of these rights and in relation to the possible applicability of proportionality, cause the differences between them suggest that not always both rights shall include arguments identical to the problems they face.

Depuis le 1er janvier 2016, un nouveau Code de procédure civile est entré en vigueur pour faire passer la justice civile québécoise au XXIe siècle. Bien plus qu’une simple réforme, c’est une « nouvelle culture judiciaire » qui est encouragée, assurant des solutions adaptées aux besoins des justiciables. Dans cette perspective, il convient désormais, selon la lettre du Code, de «privilégier l’utilisation de tout moyen technologique approprié», c’est-à-dire satisfaisant au principe de proportionnalité. Une telle proposition, anodine de prime abord, est en réalité assez inédite : un principe relativement ancien – la proportionnalité procédurale – vient réguler un objet nouveau – les technologies de l’information. La présente thèse vise en ce sens à identifier toutes les ramifications et implications d’une telle approche, et ce, en deux temps successifs. Dans un premier temps, nous délimiterons la notion juridique de proportionnalité procédurale, qui a été relativement peu étudiée jusqu’à présent. Quant à ses origines, le principe de proportionnalité remonte à des millénaires avant notre ère, et n’a cessé de gagner de l’importance dans de nombreux domaines de droit : c’est donc l’histoire d’un «succès en puissance». Néanmoins, ce n’est qu’au milieu du XXe siècle, dans un contexte de crise de la justice civile et sous l’influence des théories utilitaristes, que la proportionnalité s’est développée en procédure civile (d’abord aux États-Unis, puis en Angleterre, pour ensuite percoler dans plusieurs autres juridictions). Ainsi, au Québec, la proportionnalité est aujourd’hui érigée en principe directeur de la procédure civile, qui porterait un véritable «effet système». Cette réussite n’est toutefois pas unanime puisque d’autres pays civilistes, dont la France au premier plan, relèguent la proportionnalité à l’état de simple concept, à la croisée de nouveaux principes managériaux (qualité, efficacité, célérité, etc.). Dans un deuxième temps, nous dégagerons l’action technologique que peut jouer le principe de proportionnalité procédurale. Selon nous, la nouvelle «procédure technologique», fondée sur la transmission technologique des actes et les technologies audiovisuelles, est insuffisante à elle seule : il s’agit d’un amas de règles techniques, sans cohérence, sans cohésion, trop mécaniques. Le principe de proportionnalité, appliquée aux moyens technologiques, apparaît alors comme une piste intéressante pour unifier et humaniser cette procédure technologique. Concrètement, le tribunal devrait autoriser, refuser ou ordonner le recours aux moyens technologiques selon une appréciation in concreto et in globo des intérêts en jeu. Par exemple, dans le cas d’un litige complexe, un témoignage à distance du témoin principal par Skype qui vivrait à côté du Palais de justice, devrait être refusé, car manifestement disproportionné. On voit alors poindre un sous-principe émergent de «proportionnalité technologique» qui aurait sa propre définition, son propre test, ses propres finalités. Plus avant, le juge devrait désormais assumer un nouvel office par rapport aux technologies de l’information, notamment en faisant des choix technologiques, en assurant une forme de Technology Assessment. Au bout du compte, une telle approche, qui se développe dans le contexte québécois, offre un discours assez inédit sur la technique en procédure civile : la proportionnalité n’est ni reniée (passé, tradition, juridico), les technologies ne sont ni rejetées (avenir, innovation, technico), l’un et l’autre doivent être indissociables. C’est donc un message en trois mots que porte la présente thèse : modernisation en modération. / January 1, 2016 marked the entry into force of the new Code of Civil Procedure, leading Québec’s civil justice system into the 21st century. This new Code is much more than a simple reform; rather, it encourages a wholly “new legal culture” by providing solutions adapted to the needs of its citizens. As such, to quote the Code itself, “appropriate technological means should be used whenever possible”, i.e. conforming to the principle of proportionality. This proposition may appear trivial upon first glance, but actually contains a fairly innovative reality: a well-established principle – that of procedural proportionality – now regulates a new area of activities – being information technologies. This thesis aims to identify all of the ramifications and implications of this application and will do so in two steps. First, we will begin by defining the legal concept of procedural proportionality, which has been relatively little studied until now. As to its origins, the concept of proportionality itself goes back millennia and, throughout time, has gained prominence in several fields of law: it is therefore the story of an ever-growing trend. That being said, it was only in the middle of the 20th century, against a backdrop of civil justice crises and under the influence of utilitarian theory, that proportionality was introduced as a matter of civil procedure (first in the United States, then in England, to finally percolate into other jurisdictions). In Québec, proportionality is today a guiding principle of procedure, which qualification has had a genuinely systemic effect. This gain is however not unanimous, as several other civil jurisdictions, France being the first, relegates proportionality to the rank of mere concept, theoretically located at the intersection of new managerial principles of civil procedure (such as quality, efficiency, celerity, etc.) In a second step, we will examine the practical technological effects of the principle of procedural proportionality. In our opinion, what we call “technological procedure” based on electronic transmission of documents and audiovisual technologies is insufficient in and by itself: it is only a mass of technical rules, without coherence or cohesion, much too mechanical. The principle of proportionality, applied to technologies, is therefore an interesting way to unify and humanise technological procedure. Concretely speaking, this means that a court should authorize, refuse or order the use of technologies according to an in concreto and in globo analysis of the interests at stake. For instance, in the case of a complex litigation, the use of Skype for the remote testimony of a main witness who lives next to the courthouse should be refused, since it is manifestly disproportional. In this manner, we are witnessing the emergence of a new sub-principle, what we call “technological proportionality” herein, which has its own definition, test and finalities. Furthermore, judges will henceforth have to assume a new role with respect to information technologies, notably by making technological choices and performing a form of “technology assessment”. In the end, such an approach, as it develops in Québec, offers a novel discussion on technology in civil procedure: neither proportionality (ancient, traditional, legal) nor technologies (futuristic, innovative, high-tech) are rejected; in fact, one cannot be dissociated from the other. The message of this thesis can therefore be summarised by three simple words: modernization in moderation.

Les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général en droit de l’Union européenne sont des intérêts permettant la justification de restrictions aux différentes libertés de circulation. Ces raisons impérieuses sont donc un mode de justification. Un mode de justification essentiellement prétorien car c’est la Cour de justice qui l’a théorisé. Elle a instauré ces raisons dans l’arrêt Cassis de Dijon, étendu leur application à toutes les libertés de circulation et encadré cette application. Ainsi, ces raisons impérieuses sont soumises à la volonté de la Cour et à ses incertitudes. Par conséquent, si la jurisprudence est incertaine concernant les intérêts qualifiés de raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général voire contradictoire à propos des conditions liées aux raisons impérieuses, les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général sont un mode de justification par essence prétorien. D’ailleurs, si certains textes de droit de l’Union européenne reprennent la théorie élaborée par la Cour de justice, ils restent vraiment fidèles à la jurisprudence. Ces textes, aussi bien de droit primaire que de droit dérivé, reprennent des éléments essentiels de la théorie des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général et notamment les conditions élaborées par la Cour. Ces textes copient aussi les imperfections prétoriennes concernant la théorie des raisons impérieuses. On va même jusqu’à avoir une frontière entre les raisons impérieuses et les autres modes de justification tout aussi floue dans les textes que dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. Ainsi, malgré la reprise de la théorie des raisons impérieuses dans des textes, ce mode de justification reste par essence jurisprudentiel. / The mandatory requirements in the European Union law are reasons who can justify restrictions to the differents freedom of movements. So, those mandatory requirements are a justification method. An essentially jurisprudential justification method because it is the Court of justice who theorized it. It established thoses reasons in the Cassis de Dijon case, extended their application to every free movements and regulated their application. So, those mandatory requirements are also subject to the will of the Court and to its uncertainties. Therefore, if the jurisprudence is uncertain about interests named as mandatory requirements and even conflicting about its conditions, the mandatory requirements are an essentially jurisprudential justification method. Although, if some European Union law texts resume the jurisprudential made theory, they are truly loyal to the jurisprudence. Those texts, both primary and secondary law, pick up essential elements of the theory, in particular the conditions created by the Court. But those texts also copy the Courts imperfections about the theory. They even have a border between mandatory requirements and other justification methods equally blurred in the texts and in the jurisprudence. Thus, despite the retake of the theory of mandatory requirements in texts, this justification method stays essentially jurisprudential.

La survie nette est un indicateur très utilisé en épidémiologie des cancers. Il s'agit de la survie que l'on observerait si la seule cause de mortalité était le cancer ; il est le seul indicateur épidémiologique utilisable à des fins de comparaisons de survie (entre périodes/pays) car il s'affranchit des éventuelles différences de mortalité dues aux autres causes que le cancer. Le premier objectif de notre travail était d'analyser les performances des différentes méthodes d'estimation de la survie nette sur données simulées ainsi que sur données réelles afin que les méthodes non biaisées soient reconnues scientifiquement et soient les seules à être utilisées par la suite. Nous avons ainsi démontré que deux approches étaient capables d'estimer sans biais la survie nette : l'approche non paramétrique de Pohar-Perme et l'approche reposant sur une modélisation multivariée du taux de mortalité en excès dû au cancer. Cette dernière approche impose une stratégie de construction difficile à mettre en place. Le deuxième objectif était de développer une boîte à outils composée de différents tests permettant de vérifier les différentes hypothèses faites lors de la construction d'un modèle de régression du taux de mortalité en excès. Ces hypothèses concernent habituellement la proportionnalité ou non de l'effet des covariables, leur forme fonctionnelle, ainsi que la fonction de lien utilisée. Le troisième objectif était une application épidémiologique qui visait à étudier l'impact des facteurs pronostiques, tel que le stade au diagnostic, sur la survie nette conditionnelle, en d'autres termes sur la dynamique du taux de mortalité en excès, après la survenue d'un cancer du côlon / Net survival is one of the most important indicators in cancer epidemiology. It is defined as the survival that would be observed if cancer were the only cause of death. This is the only one indicator allowing comparisons of cancer impact between countries or time periods because it is not influenced by death because of other causes. The first objective of this work was to compare the performance of several estimators of the net survival in a simulation study and then on real data in order to promote unbiased methods. Those methods are the non-parametric Pohar-Perme method and the parametric multivariable excess rate model. The latest one needs a model building strategy. The use of diagnostic procedures for model checking is an essential part of the modeling process. The second objective was to develop a tool box composed of diagnostic tools allowing to check hypothesis usually considered when constructing an excess mortality rate model, that is, the proportionality or not of the effect of covariates, their functional form and the link function. The third objective deals with the study of the impact of prognostic variables, such as stage at diagnosis, on conditional net survival, that is, on the dynamic of the excess hazard mortality after the diagnosis of colon cancer

The master's thesis deals with local elections in the Czech Republic from the point of view of electoral engineering. Theoretical part of the thesis is focused on the elections, electoral systems and variables of electoral systems. The main variables are electoral district magnitude, electoral formula, legal threshold and the number and character of tier districting. The thesis then describes issue of gerrymandering and malapportionment from the theoretical perspective. The next part of the thesis deals with legislative framework of the local government elections from 1989 including rules and problematic characteristics of current electoral law for electing members of municipality. Empirical part of the thesis analyses local elections in the Czech Republic and results of the elections between 1994 and 2014. In the last chapter, division of the territory into electoral districts is assessed with an emphasis on principle of equal weight of votes and degree of proportionality. Comparison was carried out by using two indices of proportionality, Loosemore and Hanby index and D'Hondt index.

A garantia da igualdade implica a proibição da discriminação. Algumas normas internacionais criaram exceções à proibição de discriminar com o objetivo de permitir a adoção de medidas especiais ou positivas de caráter transitório para acelerar o desenvolvimento e a representação de grupos e categorias que, por motivos discriminatórios, se encontrem em posição de desvantagem diante dos demais. Cabe ao Estado eleger os grupos beneficiários e as medidas de ação afirmativa adequadas para atingir o fim almejado. A constitucionalidade das medidas de ação afirmativa depende da análise em concreto de cada tipo quanto à compatibilidade com os demais direitos e garantias fundamentais por se tratar de medida de exceção quanto à proibição de discriminar. As políticas públicas que incluam medidas de ação afirmativa devem se pautar pelos princípios da razoabilidade e da proporcionalidade, para que a busca da igualdade material não implique o paradoxo de criar novas desigualdades. A política de reserva de vagas por meio de cotas não é o tipo de ação afirmativa mais adequada ao Brasil. As cotas raciais são incompatíveis com a realidade brasileira, carecendo de proporcionalidade na medida em que não se prestam ao fim colimado no tocante ao combate à discriminação e ao preconceito. A formulação de uma política participativa com incentivos à representatividade de grupos sub-representados por meio de metas e cronogramas sem qualquer viés racial tende a atingir melhores resultados sem que o Estado institucionalize a racialização por meio da discriminação reversa. / The equality safeguard implies a ban on discrimination. Some international standards have created exceptions to the ban on discrimination to enable the adoption of special or positive measures, transient in nature, and speed up the development and representation of groups and segments that, because of discrimination, would be at a disadvantage before others. It falls to the government to choose the beneficiaries as well as the appropriate affirmativeaction measures to achieve the desired outcome. The constitutionality of affirmative-action measures depends on a concrete analysis of the compatibility of each type with the other fundamental rights and safeguards since this is an exception to the ban on discrimination. Any policies that include affirmative-action measures must follow the principles of reasonableness and proportionality so that the search for material equality does not entail an inequality-creating paradox. The racial-quota policy is not the appropriate type of affirmative action for Brazil. Racial quotas are incompatible with the Brazilian reality and lack proportionality as they fail to counter discrimination and bigotry. Devising a participatory policy that encourages the representation of underrepresented groups through goals and timetables without any racial bias tends to achieve better results and the government does not have to institutionalize racialization through reverse discrimination.