Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-23T18:16:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Sandra Cristina Porsche.pdf: 1320789 bytes, checksum: 9160b2f13a735e411a2c7705e5968c9c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-23T18:16:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sandra Cristina Porsche.pdf: 1320789 bytes, checksum: 9160b2f13a735e411a2c7705e5968c9c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-23 / Milton Valente / O conceito saussuriano de arbitrariedade do signo já foi objeto de um extenso número de trabalhos. Saussure colocou o princípio na base de toda sua teorização, mas não tardou para surgirem grandes dificuldades em compreender como ele se enquadra no conjunto da teoria, apresentando-se como extremamente paradoxal e sendo submetido a escrutínio por uma série de intérpretes. A obra de Saussure é fundamentalmente cercada de controvérsias, em vista do Curso de Linguística Geral (CLG), obra que não foi escrita por ele, e em virtude de uma quantidade ímpar de manuscritos surgidos após os anos 50 e, mais recentemente, em 1996. Com as novas contribuições, hoje retoma-se a teoria para elucidar novos fatos. Assim, esta tese discute o conceito de arbitrariedade do signo, procurando encontrar o lugar que lhe cabe. Partimos do exame do CLG, do Escritos de Linguística Geral (ELG), com apoio nos cadernos de alunos, e de leituras de intérpretes saussurianos, para apresentar uma proposta sobre o lugar do conceito na teoria. Há quatro problemas principais para a compreensão do arbitrário: 1) um aparente paradoxo: Saussure combate a visão nomenclaturista, mas apresenta provas que fazem supor a existência de um significado existente a priori, universal, antes da conjugação do fato linguístico, o que contradiz a teoria. Surge, então, o problema de saber como, no conjunto da obra, Saussure responde à complexa questão da relação da língua com a realidade; 2) com a afirmação de que todo signo é motivado no sistema e com o conceito de arbitrário relativo, é difícil ver um lugar para o arbitrário absoluto na língua; 3) o conceito clássico de convencionalidade é reformulado por Saussure, sem que ele teorize suficientemente essa mudança, gerando o problema de saber em que consiste a diferença e 4) também não há teorização suficiente de Saussure sobre a relação entre semiologia e linguística. Concluimos, a partir do exame desses problemas, que o arbitrário é entre significante e materialidade da língua, o que nem sempre é visto com clareza. Entre eles a relação é arbitrária e, considerando o postulado da transmissão da língua, visto que ela se materializa na fala e por ela se transmite, o arbitrário é princípio semiológico de base, sempre presente na transmissão (diacrônico), causando efeitos no plano sincrônico. Pela reformulação do conceito de convencionalidade, Saussure se desloca para o plano da língua, tomada pela sua matéria sonora, deixando o plano do significado (sem significante) a outro campo de estudos. Concluimos que o arbitrário do signo na linguística refere-se à relação entre significante e materialidade da língua. / Saussure ́s arbitrariness of the sign concept has been the focus of great debate. For him, it was a key concept, but many difficulties in understanding its place in the theory have soon arisen. The concept was considered extremely paradoxical, leading to much scrutiny by many authors. Saussure ́s work is fundamentally involved in controversies due to the Course in General Linguistics (CLG), which was not written by himself, and also because of a great amount of his manuscripts which appeared after the 1950 ́s, and more recently, in 1996. Due to these additional contributions, there are current efforts to unveil new facts. Based on this panorama, this thesis discusses the arbitrariness of the sign with the intention of showing how the concept fits into the theory. This work is fundamentally based on the CLG and the Writings in General Linguistics (WGL), also taking some students ́ notebooks in order to present a plan about the place of the concept in the theory. There are four main problems for understanding the arbitrariness of the sign: 1) an apparent paradox: Saussure condemns a nomenclaturist view of language, but presents examples that make believe there is a universal, a priori meaning before any linguistic fact, which is in contradiction with his theory. Therefore, there is the problem of knowing how Saussure understands the relationship between language and reality in his work; 2) by saying that all signs are motivated in the system, and with the concept of relative arbitrariness, it is difficult to see a place for absolute arbitrariness; 3) the classical philosophical concept of conventionalism is redefined by Saussure, but without him sufficiently theorizing about it, which caused the problem of knowing where the difference lies, and 4) there is also insufficient theorization by Saussure about the relationship of semiology and linguistics. By examining these issues, the conclusion is that the arbitrariness of the sign was thought by Saussure considering the signifying in its relationship with language sound (its materiality), and this has not always been clearly seen. The relationship between them is arbitrary and, considering that language is materially transmitted through speech, the arbitrariness of the sign is a semiological principle underlying language, always present through transmission (diachronically), causing effects on the synchronic plan. By redefining the concept of conventionality, Saussure places himself on the language side, from the point of view of the sound, leaving the signified (without signifying) to another field of study. Our conclusion is that, in linguistics, the arbitrariness of the sign refers to the connection between the signifying and the materiality of language.

Bakgrund: Redovisning syftar till att ge en historisk bild av en organisation – ett företag eller en koncern. Skillnaden mellan den bild som baserar sig på redovisningsprinciper (och regler) och en bild, vilken som helst, är jämförbarheten. Goodwillned-skrivningar skapar problem med just jämförbarheten. Det skäl som anges baserar sig på regler stipulerade i IFRS. Skälen som koncerner anger är i sin tur naturligtvis motiverade mer eller mindre väl med utgångspunkt i IFRS men dessa regler innehåller en betydande rymlighet som kan beskrivas i termer av godtycke. Den här uppsatsen undersöker denna rymlighet i termer av regleringen och skälen för nedskrivning som ingen undersökning hittills orienterat sig mot. Syfte: Den här undersökningen syftar till att förtydliga strukturer i skälen till goodwill-nedskivningar som ett exempel på strukturer mellan explicita skäl och regler och underliggande (implicita) tillämpningar och normer. Metod: Metoden som användes var facktextanalys. Företagen i studien är valda utifrån kriterier som är energi- och råvaruföretag, börsnoterade på stockholmsbörsen (NASDAQ OMX Nordic). Resultat: Resultaten redovisas i en tabell där man kan se tendenser. En tendens är att företagen har ett behov av att förklara och försvara sitt agerande. En annan är på normnivån, att man gärna vill vara rationell och ärlig. Det som vidare framträder är ett möjligt samband mellan den explicit formulerade regeln (IFRS) och de skäl som anges. Men detta samband är inte entydigt. Slutsats: Goodwillnedskrivningar förefaller vara svagt institutionaliserat. Godtycket (öppenheten) tycks vara det centrala som bäst förklarar det empirin visat. De skäl som koncernerna ger kopplar inte entydigt till reglerna, istället tycks det som om det finns ett betydande utrymme (godtycke) att utforma en praktisk redovisningsmodell när det gäller nedskrivningarna. / Background: The aim of accounting is to provide a historical view of an organization – a company or concern. The difference between the view that is based on accounting principles (and rules) and a view, any view, is comparability. Goodwill impairment causes a problem with precisely this comparability. The reasons given are based on rules stipulated in IFRS. The reasons that a concerns use are, in turn, motivated more or less well on the basis of IFRS but these rules contain a considerable spaciousness thus the use is arbitrary. This thesis examines the spaciousness in terms of regulation and the reasons for impairment as no study so far has studied this. Aim: This study aims to clarify the structures in the reasons for goodwill impairment as an example of the structures of explicit reasons and rules and implicit applications of standards Method: The method used was specialized text analysis. Concerns in the study are selected based on specific criteria. These concerns are selected based on the commodity and energy industries. The stocks of the concerns are listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (NASDAQ OMX). Results: The results are presented in a table where one can see tendencies: one such tendency is that concerns have a need to explain and defend their impairments. Another tendency is on the normative level, that one wants to be rational and honest. What also emerges is a possible connection between the explicitly formulated rule (IFRS) and the reasons given. But this relationship is not unambiguous. Conclusion: Goodwill impairment appears to be only slightly institutionalized. The arbitrariness (spaciousness) appears to be the key element that explains what our empirical data has shown. The reasons that concerns provide does not clearly link to the regulations, instead it appears that there is a considerable spaciousness (arbitrariness) to the design of a practical accounting model in terms of impairment.

Cette thèse jette un œil sceptique sur plusieurs théories courantes de l’état d’urgence. La plupart de ces théories de l’état d’urgence présupposent que la notion d'une « urgence » est claire, conceptuellement et pratiquement. J'argue que ceci n'est pas le cas et que cette certitude mal placée produit des problèmes pratiques et conceptuels avec ses théories. De plus, cette thèse démontre que cette certitude mal placée dans la clarté du concept de l'urgence mène les autorités gouvernementales à agir arbitrairement plutôt que selon des principes libéraux et démocratiques pendant des états d’urgence. Contre cette certitude mal placée et contre plusieurs théories contemporaines influentes des états d'urgence, j'offre une théorie rigoureuse et analytique du concept de l’« urgence. » Une fois que le concept de l'urgence est défini, et que cette conception est défendue, la thèse démontre les diverses manières dont les malentendus du concept, mènent aux utilisations arbitraires (de la puissance monopole de l'état) en situation d’urgence. En considérant les états d’urgences, comme événements rares, la thèse évite la tentation de les considérer comme événements exceptionnels capable de fragmenter l'ordre politique établi (comme d’autres théories le font). La thèse argue que les mesures prises par le gouvernent pendant l’état d’urgence devraient être compatibles plus généralement avec les valeurs démocratiques et libérales. En rejetant l'idée que les états d'urgence sont des événements exceptionnels, la thèse crée un espace conceptuel dans lequel des propositions plus constructives concernant la gestion des états d'urgence peuvent être entendues. De plus, en analysant les diverses manières dont les autorités gouvernementales utilisent leur forces de façon arbitraire pendant les états d’urgence, la thèse argue clairement pour la supervision institutionnelle accrue en ce qui concerne les procédures d’urgence et leur déploiement pendant des états d'urgence. En conclusion, la thèse argue que les démocraties libérales n'ont pas besoin de craindre les états d’urgences tandis que les démocraties libérales ont déjà les ressources requise pour administrer les états d’urgence. Contrairement à ce que d’autres théories l’état d'urgence recommandent, les démocraties libérales ont déjà les ressources institutionnelles et conceptuelles pour administrer les états d’urgences. / This dissertation casts a skeptical eye on theories of emergency government. It argues that far from being self-evident, most accounts of emergency government assume that the notion of an “emergency” is clear, both conceptually and practically. I argue that this is not the case and that this misplaced certainty generates both practical and conceptual problems. Further, this dissertation shows that this misplaced certainty in the clarity of the concept of emergency leads authorities to act arbitrarily rather than on principle in times of emergency. Against this misplaced certainty and against many influential contemporary accounts of states of emergency I offer a more perspicuous account of the concept of “emergency.” Once the concept of emergency is defined and defended, the dissertation proceeds to show the various ways in which misunderstandings of the concept lead to arbitrary uses of state power in emergencies. By closely examining the work of competing theories of emergency, the dissertation is able to reveal where these other theories go wrong. By viewing emergencies as rare events, the dissertation avoids the temptation to view them as exceptional events that sunder the established political order. Arguing that emergency measures should be compatible with liberal democratic values more generally, the dissertation makes the case for treating emergencies from within the ambit or existing liberal democratic institutional mechanisms as opposed to jettisoning these mechanisms as some other theorist recommend. In undermining the idea that states of emergency are exceptional events, the dissertation creates a conceptual space within which more constructive proposals pertaining to emergency management can be heard. Further, by unearthing the various ways in which state authorities arbitrarily employ power in emergencies, the dissertation makes clear the need for increased institutional oversight as concerns emergency powers and their deployment in emergencies. In conclusion, the dissertation advances that liberal democracies need not fear emergencies as much as they do and argues for the view that democracies already have the required resources for dealing with emergencies in an institutional manner that is both politically liberal and institutionally democratic. Against those skeptical of these resources, the dissertation offers comprehensive philosophical reasons for abandoning said skepticism.

This article point out the progressive enrichment by which fundamental rights concept have gone through, providing to holders—government and individuals— not only rights, liberties, powers and immunity but also the obligation to respect, defend, guarantee and promote all them regardless the conduct displayed by the holder in this field. With this in mind, the author examines arbitration definition and main characteristics, highlighting its constitutional dimension proposing a systematic reading in accordance with fundamental rights. / El artículo toma como punto de partida el enriquecimiento progresivo por el que ha transitado la concepción de derechos fundamentales, que actualmente no solo implican el otorgamiento a sus titulares derechos, libertades, competencias e inmunidades sino que todos —Estado y particulares— estamos obligados a respetarlos, defenderlos, garantizarlos y promoverlos, independientemente de que su titular haya desplegado o no una conducta con ese propósito. A partir de ello, el autor analiza la definición y principales características del arbitraje, destacando su dimensión constitucional y proponiendo una lectura sistemática y en armonía con los derechos fundamentales.

Ten einde arbitrere uitoefening van die diskresionere bevoegdhede waarmee staatsarnptenare beklee word, te voorkom en te beperk, is beheer van sodanige bevoegdhede noodsaaklik. In die verhandeling word die rol wat die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1993 (Wet 200 van 1993) kan vervul in die uitoefening van beheer oor die diskresionere bevoegdhede van staatsarnptenare ontleed. Sodanige ontleding geskied met verwysing na die Handves van Menseregte en instellings en ampte wat hulle gesag en bevoegdhede aan die 1993-Grondwet ontleen. Bykomend hiertoe, word ondersoek ook ingestel na die belang en relevansie van konstitusionalisme binne die konteks van publieke administrasie. / In order to prevent and to limit the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers with which public officials are endowed, it is necessary to control such powers. This dissertation explores the role which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) can fulfil in the exercise of control over the discretionary powers of public officials. Analysis of the role of the 1993-Constitution in this regard, is done with reference to the Bill of Rights and institutions and offices which derive their authority and powers from the Constitution. In addition hereto, the importance and relevance of constitutionalism within the context of public administration is also explored. / Public Administration / M.A.

« [L]e commandement appartiendra, […] l'obéissance sera due, à un ordre qui n'a point de visage, dont on peut attendre, puisqu'il est impersonnel, qu'il interpellera sans passion et sera écouté sans colère »1219. C’est à ces fins que la procédure pénale et la pratique tentent d’évincer du jugement les émotions « passives » paralysant le raisonnement autonome du juge, ou certaines émotions « actives » non fondées sur un raisonnement logique. Mais parmi les émotions pourchassées, seules celles qui peuvent être effectivement contrôlées par leur matérialisation sont susceptibles d’être évitées et d’engager la responsabilité du juge. Au-surplus, il faut compter sur l’autodiscipline du juge en le sensibilisant au moyen de règles déontologiques. Toutefois, malgré la crainte de l’arbitraire que pourraient susciter les émotions, la bonne administration de la justice ne peut se faire nonobstant toute considération émotionnelle : le juge perçoit des émotions telles que les doutes méthodiques nécessaires au jugement et doit composer avec celles des tiers. Ainsi, au sein de l’espace laissé aux émotions, le magistrat tente de réguler celles qui survivent légitimement. Finalement renvoyé à sa condition d’être social, le juge ne peut échapper aux émotions qu’il a intégrées par sa sociabilisation. Il est le représentant des émotions sociales, restant ainsi en phase avec les valeurs qu’elles révèlent. La contribution de ces émotions à la décision est légitimée par leur représentativité. La légitimité se propage enfin aux décisions et à l’action du juge. / «Commandment shall belong […] and one shall obey to a faceless order, which may be expected, given its impersonality, to rule without passion and to be listened to without anger»1220. To reach such an aim, practice and criminal procedure try to erase from judgment «passive» emotions as well as some «active» ones that are not based on any logical thinking, since they paralyse the judge's autonomous reasoning. However, among such hounded emotions, only those which can be genuinely controlled by their materialisation are likely to be avoided and to involve the judge's responsibility. Furthermore, one has to take into account the judge's self-discipline by making him aware of these issues thanks to deontological rules. Nevertheless, and despite the fear of arbitrariness that emotions might trigger, the right administration of justice cannot cast aside every emotional consideration: a judge perceives emotions such as the methodological doubts that are necessary to his judgment; he must also take into account the ones felt by others. As a result, within the space left for emotions, a magistrate tries to regulate those which legitimately survive. A judge is ultimately brought back to his status of social being, he cannot escape the emotions which he has integrated through his socialization. He represents social emotions and stays in tune with the values they reveal. The contribution of these emotions to the final decision is legitimised by their representativeness. This legitimacy finally spreads out to the judge's decisions and actions.

Ten einde arbitrere uitoefening van die diskresionere bevoegdhede waarmee staatsarnptenare beklee word, te voorkom en te beperk, is beheer van sodanige bevoegdhede noodsaaklik. In die verhandeling word die rol wat die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1993 (Wet 200 van 1993) kan vervul in die uitoefening van beheer oor die diskresionere bevoegdhede van staatsarnptenare ontleed. Sodanige ontleding geskied met verwysing na die Handves van Menseregte en instellings en ampte wat hulle gesag en bevoegdhede aan die 1993-Grondwet ontleen. Bykomend hiertoe, word ondersoek ook ingestel na die belang en relevansie van konstitusionalisme binne die konteks van publieke administrasie. / In order to prevent and to limit the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers with which public officials are endowed, it is necessary to control such powers. This dissertation explores the role which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) can fulfil in the exercise of control over the discretionary powers of public officials. Analysis of the role of the 1993-Constitution in this regard, is done with reference to the Bill of Rights and institutions and offices which derive their authority and powers from the Constitution. In addition hereto, the importance and relevance of constitutionalism within the context of public administration is also explored. / Public Administration and Management / M.A.

L’onomatopée et l’interjection qui ont été étudiées de manière approfondie dans le domaine français dès le XVIIIe siècle n’ont fait l’objet que de quelques allusions dans la théorie grammaticale arabe traditionnelle. C’est ce vide que la présente thèse se propose de combler. Il s’agit d’une étude lexicale qui s’insère dans les recherches développant la théorie des matrices et des étymons (TME). Elle comprend deux grandes parties. La première se compose de deux chapitres. Le premier est consacré aux interjections (34 cas) et le second aux onomatopées proprement dites (18 cas). Dans ces deux chapitres, on procède à la manière de Guiraud (1967, chapitre III, « Structures onomatopéiques », ex. la racine T. K.). On extrait de l’interjection ou de l’onomatopée les deux consonnes qui les composent et on les considère comme un étymon dont on suit les diverses réalisations dans le lexique, en veillant toujours à la corrélation phono-sémantique. Il ressort de cette première partie que les racines (au sens traditionnel du terme) émanant d’étymons onomatopéiques sont près de neuf cents.Comme nous avons observé la présence du trait [+strident] dans un bon nombre de ces étymons, nous avons consacré la seconde partie à l’étude d’une nouvelle matrice qui se compose des traits [+strident] et [coronal], corrélés l’invariant notionnel « son, voix, bruit » et ses conséquences ,incluant la peur, le mouvement et ses diverses caractérisations. Cette matrice se réalise dans 69 étymons qui sont disposés par ordre alphabétique. Les réalisations de chaque étymon sont disposées en trois colonnes : le radical où l’étymon se réalise, la référence dans le tableau de l’organisation de l’invariant notionnel, le sens (tel qu’il est donné dans le Kazimirski).Il ressort de cette double étude qu’un immense pan du lexique de l’arabe est motivé, pourvu que l’on situe l’analyse au niveau des traits, la corrélation s’établissant entre le bruit et la définition même du trait de stridence, les sons stridents « se caractérisant acoustiquement par une plus grande quantité de bruit que leurs correspondants non-stridents » (Chomsky et Halle, 1968, p. 166). / Although onomatopoeia and interjections in French have been studied in depth since the 18th century, they have only been alluded to in traditional Arabic grammatical theory. This thesis is intended to remedy this situation with a lexical study applying the Theory of Matrices and Etymons (TME). The thesis is divided into two major sections, the first of which comprises two chapters. The first chapter deals with 34 interjections and the second 18 onomatopoeia. The approach adopted in these first two chapters is that of Guiraud (1967, chapter III devoted to onomatopoeic structures, e.g. the T. K. root). The interjections and onomatopoeia are extracted from the consonants which compose them; these consonants are considered as an etymon the various realisations of which are pursued in the lexicon with constant attention to the phono-semantic correlation. This first part shows that there are nearly nine hundred roots (in the traditional meaning of the term) arising out of the onomatopoeic etymons. Given the presence of the [+strident] feature in a large number of these etymons, the second part of this thesis is devoted to a new matrix comprising the correlated [+strident] and [coronal] features, the notional invariant "sound, voice, noise" and its consequences including fear, movement and its various characteristics. This matrix is realised in 69 etymons ordered alphabetically. The realisations of each etymon are given in three columns: the radical in which the etymon is realised; the reference in the organisational table of the notional invariant; the meaning (as given in Kazimirski).This double study reveals that - provided that the analysis is established at the phonetic feature level - an immense area of the Arabic lexicon is motivated, the correlation between the noise and the very definition of the feature of stridence and strident sounds: "Strident sounds are marked acoustically by greater noisiness than their nonstrident counterparts" (Chomsky et Halle, 1968, p. 329).

"Endymion" è il traît d'union tra i juvenilia di Keats ("Poems", 1817) e i suoi lavori più conosciuti ("Lamia, Isabella ... and other Poems"). Per sua natura, è un'opera di transizione e quindi concede allo studioso un punto di vista privilegiato sullo sviluppo della poetica e della lingua di Keats. Inoltre, l'"Endymion" è l'opera keatsiana più aspramente contestata dalla critica romantica. Gli studiosi moderni hanno analizzato il problema alla luce di considerazioni socio-politiche, il mio lavoro mira invece ad un'analisi più strettamente linguistica. Ricostruisco il contesto linguistico del diciottesimo e diciannovesimo secolo al fine di spiegare il disagio dei recensori nei confronti di "Endymion". Sostengo che il prescrittivismo del Settecento nasce da una profonda ansia relativa alla lingua, causata dalle teorie di Locke. L'atteggiamento prescrittivista influenza la critica romantica e i critici di Keats in particolare, più di quanto potessero fare considerazioni di natura politica. Analizzo le peculiarità linguistiche e strutturali di "Endymion" al fine di provare che Keats elabora una 'poetica dell'incontrollabilità', una serie di strategie stilistiche e testuali, che violano le convenzioni linguistiche e narrative e che vengono quindi percepite come destabilizzanti e stranianti. / "Endymion" is the traît d’union between Keats’s juvenilia ("Poems", 1817)and his better known, and, conventionally, ’mature’ works ("Lamia, Is- abella ... and other Poems", 1820). By its nature, it is a transitional work, and thus gives the scholar special insight into the development of Keats’s poetics and idiom. Moreover, "Endymion" is the Keatsian work which most irritated and provoked contemporary critics; the two pieces of venomous invective it received in the periodical press of the time have become the stuff of scholarly legend. Recent scholarly work has analysed the language of "Endymion" in socio-political terms; my work focuses on more strictly linguistic concerns. I reconstruct the linguistic context of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to explain the reviewers’ unease with regard to "Endymion". I maintain that eighteenth-century prescriptivism arose from a deep-seated anxiety regarding language, Lockian in origin, and that the ensuing desire to stabilize and therefore control language informed Romantic criticism in general, and the criticism of Keats’s work in particular, more fundamentally than politics could or did. I analyse the imaginative and linguistic markers of "Endymion" in order to prove that Keats had elaborated a “poetics of uncontrollability”, a series of textual and stylistic strategies, which violated linguistic and narrative standards and were therefore perceived as unsettling.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.