Thesis (MAgric (Agricultural Economics))—University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The natural resources mainly land, forests, and grazing lands in the Highlands ago-ecological zone of Eritrea are in a severely degraded state. And much of these common pool resources comprise commons i.e. they are managed under the common property rights management regimes. “The tragedy of the commons”, model suggests that all commons will inexorably suffer overexploitation and degradation. Contrary to this deterministic proposition, however, common property theory argues that the ‘tragedy’ is not due to inherent flaws in the common property rights management regimes, but because of institutional failure to control access to resources, and to make and enforce internal decisions for collective use. If the commons dilemma situation exists- i.e. ‘tragedy’, then the underlying problem is the degeneration of the existing common property rights resource management regime into open-access-like regime—a condition that can potentially trigger “the tragedy of the commons”. The question of how to deal with the problem of the commons is, therefore, primarily an issue of the existence of efficient institutions. The prevailing severe degradation of the common-pool resources in the Highlands of the country thus calls into question the robustness of the common property rights regimes that are in place for the governance of these resources. This thesis attempts to address this important problem specifically in relation to forest and grazing land common pool resources. A case study based on a single-case qualitative and exploratory-explanatory research design was carried out in a village located in the Highlands of the country. Data were collected through various forms of interviews (semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews, key informants interviews, group discussions, and informal conversational interviews), direct observation, and document review. The data, gathered largely through using these separate lines of enquiry, were crosschecked to provide a triangulation of methods and to strengthen the validity and reliability of the data. The empirical findings reveal that existing common property rights management regimes for the management of the local common pool resources of the case study area have weakened over time. These findings indicate that, there is a significant incongruence between appropriation and provision rules. And this is manifested in terms of appropriation externalities and demand side and supply side provision externalities. This situation implies that existing local institutional arrangements i.e. common property rights management regimes in the case study area are not sufficiently robust to solve common pool resource appropriation and provision externalities. Though generalisation cannot be made beyond the case that was studied, there are several lessons that may be drawn from this field analysis, which may have valid implications for the natural resources management challenges and opportunities of the entire Highlands agoecological zone of the country.

原住民部落資源自主治理（self-governing）之概念已陸續地推展於原住民地區，過去有關於部落資源自主治理相關議題之討論與研究鮮少從原住民族土地問題切入，少數結合原住民族土地問題與部落資源自主治理者，研究場景也僅著重於原住民族單一族群內的自主治理組織發起與運作過程描述分析，至於在現實政經環境背景下，不同族群間自主治理的過程究竟該如何運作？以及藉由分析其運作過程產生的相關問題，進一步檢視現行原住民族自主治理部落土地資源之政策與地權及地用等相關法令規定者，尚乏相關論著。 本研究選取苗栗縣南庄鄉蓬萊村為實證研究對象，以Elinor Ostrom（1990）所提出的成功自主治理共用資源（common pool resources）八個設計原則（design principles）為檢驗基礎，分析蓬萊溪封溪護魚與八卦力民宿村部落土地資源自主治理制度設計成功與否、歸納制度脆弱或未成功的原因，並且透過社會關係網絡（social context）與取得權（access theory）等相關概念，分析兩案例之社會關係網絡與利益流樣態，以理解制度規範建構之互動過程與核心理由，發掘置於國家權力統治與資本主義貨幣經濟（cash economy）之現實場景下，原╱漢「多族群間」、以及「同族群內部」到「多族群間」自主治理部落土地資源之問題，並指出現行部落自主治理之地用與地權政策規劃與部落現實場景間之差距。 由實證案例分析可知，原住民族傳統部落組織的瓦解與重構過程中，原住民與平地人之間的政經稟賦差異加大，原住民族自主治理之立意往往被扭曲，平地人卻能掌控部落土地資源進而分享大部分之利得。此外，原住民族自主治理部落土地資源之政策走向，忽略漢人使用原住民族傳統領域土地亦有其特殊歷史背景或政策因素，是以在政策層面上當有再深入研究及通盤檢討之必要。而多族群間亦須放棄成見、加強溝通以謀求彼此共識，增加地方自主治理的社會資本，方可妥善管理部落土地資源，朝共同治理之目標邁進。 / The concept of indigenous resources self-governing has been promoted to the indigenous areas one after another. However, there have been few issues and studies about tribal resources self-governing observed from the viewpoint of indigenous land management. Even though minority of issues and studies link up indigenous land problems with tribal resources self-governing, their research background also only puts emphasis on the analysis of a single indigenous race, which describes the establishment of organization and operation for self-governing. How is the self-governing mechanism operated among different races under the realistic political and economical background? How is the self-governing policy of tribal land resources manipulated further? How are laws related to land ownership and land use implemented? All of these topics still lack correlative studies. Therefore, this research takes the tribe of the Penglai Village in Nanjhuang Township Miaoli County as an example, using eight design principles proposed by Elinor Ostrom (1990) to examine the case, which the Penglai stream blocking for fishing resources protection and the self-governing for tribal land resources in the Baguali B&B(bed-and-breakfast) village. The context of illustrations are: (1) analyzing whether the design of institution for the case is successful; (2) inducing the reason why institution is unsuccessful or weak; (3) analyzing the social context and benefit flows of the case to understand the interactive process and the core reason for the establishment of institution standard by the concept of social context and access theory; (4) finding the self-governing problems of tribal land resources among indigenous /Han multi-races(the case of Penglai River) and from one single race to multi-races(the case of Baguali B&B Village) under the realistic background of state right governing and cash economy of capitalism; and (5) pointing out the gap between the current land use and landownership policy plan for tribal self-governing and the realistic situation of tribe. By the analysis of the case, we can find that the disintegration and restructuring of the indigenous tribal organization because of the difference of the political and economical endowment from Han people results in the phenomenon, which the purpose of the indigenous tribe self-governing for land common pool resources has been twisted. In addition, the formulation of the self-governing policy for indigenous land resources ignores that the Han people using the indigenous traditional territory also have its special historical background or resulted from policy implementation. Therefore, it is necessary to study further and overall review, to strengthen the communication to seek a consensus among multi-races and to gain the social capital of local self-governing. In this way, it will be possible to manage the tribal land resources well and achieve the goal of common governance.

從實務面來看，總額支付制度（global budget）的施行絕非僅止於管制成本的手段，還必須觀照該管理的制度設計。畢竟制度不但能夠彙集各種資源，同時也成為資源使用的指標，影響行動者間的策略選項。另外，針對政策實施後的監控與評估檢討，也是修正制度與提升品質的反饋歷程。然而，學界與實務界在總額支付制度設計原則的研究卻十分有限，究其原因，重要的是主要集中於制度在實際的應用與效果，缺乏以一套適用的「方法」（methodology）來審視。誠如Elinor Ostrom所言，「政策分析家的工具箱有各式各樣的工具，但還缺乏一種具體明確的集體行動理論。」，共有資源管理的例子到處都有，但是分析家卻沒有很好的在理論上總結他們。他藉由制度分析與經驗實例，衍生出來的「制度設計原則」（Design principles），研究各種共有資源管理的問題：從不同類型的資源系統如灌溉系統、捕魚等自然資源或網路資源、財政預算等、到公共財制度研究等，都已經獲得豐碩的成果。本文的主要目標，就是在既有的理論基礎上，討論應用制度設計原則來進行「總額預算評估」的可能內容，並提出政策建議與後續研究的可能內容提出建議。 本文主要分為：（一）導論（二）文獻回顧與理論基礎（三）研究設計（四）中醫總額支付制度的演變（伍）中醫總額的自主管理（六）結論。希冀對學界或實務界在健保改革評估未來的發展，能有所啟發與助益。 / From the practice, global budget is not just the means to control cost, must also take the design of management into consideration. The institution not only can gather various kinds of resources, but also become the indexes, and influence the tactics among the persons who take action to select. Since a global budget married to fee-for-service payments directly analogous to a common-pool resources, we use a framework of design principles to explore the difference of outcomes of management, and to discuss the policy implications about institutional design and financial Incentives. Sincere as what Elinor Ostrom said, ' the policy analyst's box has many kinds of tools , but still lack a kind of concrete and clear collective action theory. ', example there are resource management in common everywhere, but it is the getting better to summarize they in theory. In addition, the “self-governing institutions” designed by each local medical association must be flexibly adapted to the context in which it is applied. To foster the cooperation among physicians, the medical associations of local level should also play the role to provide the institutional setting for collective participatory decision making. The medical associations of national level ought to change the financial incentives facing the physicians to induce the rational patterns of medical behavior so that the allocate efficiency of medical resource and effectiveness of global- budget management can be improved.

過去政府的保育政策多施行於國有地上，盡量避免限制私有土地上的經濟活動，卻也造成保護區周邊私有土地利用上，與保育目的不相容的情形，致使共享性資源（common pool resources, CPRs）走向悲劇一途。本文以宜蘭雙連埤濕地作為個案，從深度訪談瞭解該地私有地保育的困境，並從「協力治理」（collaborative governance）的角度分析，發現政府單方面的保育政策，難以達到良好的私地保育效果。本研究透過深度訪談追蹤雙連埤的保育努力過程，發現最後能夠維持雙連埤的風貌，荒野協會等民間保育團體功不可沒。保育團體不具備管理的職責，比較容易與在地居民的建立情感聯繫，能作為政府與居民之間的溝通橋樑；他們擁有豐富的生態知識，能化自然資源為物質性誘因（material incentives），結合居民生計與生態保育的行動，減輕私有地上活動對環境的壓力。透過「由下而上」的共享性資源管理模式，雙連埤的案例展現如何透過協力合產與「社基保育」（Community-Based Conservation）模式，破除「生態」與「生計」無法共存的迷思，進而達到永續發展的目的。 / Conservational policies have been known more applicable to public lands. Yet endangered species can not tell and thus have suffered from the economic activities on private land, leading to an inevitable tragedy. This thesis adopts Shuang-Lien Lake as a case to demonstrate the possibility of an alternative, community-based approach. Through in-depth interviews with policy makers and major stakeholders, this research indicates how collaboration between local government and voluntary citizen groups could overcome the oppositions by local residents against conserving valuable ecologic system on private land.

Espaces emblématiques des dynamiques complexes entre l’homme et l’écosystème dans des aires protégées abritant des ressources naturelles commune, les îles Galápagos et le Yasuní en Équateur partagent une histoire de dégradation environnementale, conflits socio-environnementaux et chaos territorial. La présence de biens communs, source d’une rente économique liée à la biodiversité et aux hydrocarbures (Yasuní) attire depuis un demi-siècle les intérêts des industriels du pétrole et du tourisme qui ont systématiquement exercé un poids déterminant sur les décisions en matière d’aménagement et de gestion de ces espaces, influant également sur leur gouvernance. Cette réalité joue à l’encontre de politiques d’aménagement territorial pour les deux espaces, Réserves de la Biosphère de l’UNESCO, depuis des décennies. Les Galápagos et le Yasuní témoignent en même temps de la manière dont les gouvernements équatoriens ont eu recours à une « instrumentation » des politiques pour décider le sort des deux aires protégées. Cette thèse montre comment un problème structurel – l’absence d’une politique d’aménagement territorial – a facilité la mobilisation d’instruments de politique pour administrer les deux réserves naturelles. L’histoire du Yasuní est un exemple éloquent de cette pratique d’instrumentation de politiques. La création du parc en 1979, puis les modifications de ses limites et le découpage de la Réserve de la Biosphère Yasuní, dont le parc est le noyau, ont été tous réalisés par des instruments de politiques. De même, aux Galápagos la puissance publique a opéré ses choix en matière d’accès aux espaces protégés et d’utilisation de leurs ressources, en privilégiant les instruments de politique. La loi spéciale des Galápagos (LOREG) a de facto gouverné l’archipel depuis son entrée en vigueur en 1998. Dans les deux cas, l’absence d’une politique d’aménagement territorial a permis l’adoption de décisions top-down sur l’administration des deux espaces.La «révolution citoyenne» du président Correa, en dépit d’une profonde refonte institutionnelle et d’un nouveau paradigme de développement – le Buen Vivir, ou Sumak Kawsay – ne saura changer la manière d’aménager les espaces des deux aires protégées. La planification est élevée à politique d’État qui prime sur toute autre politique, mais dans cette vision l’aménagement du territoire devient un instrument au service de la planification étatique.Ce travail, conduit dans une perspective interdisciplinaire en utilisant une grille de lecture encore peu explorée (les instruments de politique publique) veut aussi contribuer à de nouvelles pistes de réflexion sur l’action publique en matière d’aménagement du territoire ainsi que sur la gouvernance d’aires protégées riches en ressources naturelles communes. / Archetypes of the complex interactions between humans and ecosystems in protected areas rich in Common Pool Resources (CPR), the Galapagos Islands and the Yasuní in Ecuador share a history of environment degradation, socio-environmental conflicts and chaotic land development. The abundance of CPR, source of a lucrative rent from biodiversity and crude (in the Yasuní case) have attracted the interests of oil and tourism businesses over the last fifty years. These industries have consistently steered public decisions over the creation, spatial organisation and administration of these natural reserves, additionally affecting their governance, a reality which has hindered the implementation of land-use planning policies for these areas which are two UNESCO MAB Reserves. The Galapagos and Yasuní protected areas are also a powerful example of the peculiar way whereby Ecuador governments over the last five decades have “instrumented” policy making, preferring the use of policy tools to public policies to decide on the two areas’ fate. This thesis shows how a structural problem such as the absence of a land use planning policy, has thrust the practice of policy tools adoption, instead of policy making, to manage the two protected areas. The “revolución ciudadana” led by president Correa succeeded in re-founding State institutions and launching a new development paradigm (Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir) however, it did not advance on land-use management related issues particularly regarding the two areas. Correa has placed national planning at the heart of public policy making it the state policy – backed by a powerful bureaucratic structure – but in this process, land use planning is considered as an instrument in support of national planning. This research, carried out under an interdisciplinary perspective, using policy tools as analytical key, wishes to contribute new insights and methods of analysis on public land use planning and management, as well as governance of common pool resources in protected areas.

Social dilemmas constitute a broad class of quandaries, including, for example, common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas and public good (PG) dilemmas. CPR's are characterized by non-excludability and rivalry and are often associated with overexploitation. Through similar arguments, the features non-excludability and non-rivalry give rise to under-provision of PG's. The prevalence and inefficiencies often associated with CPR's have given rise to an extensive literature and the role of resource uncertainty has not been ignored. Uncertainty combined with rivalry is often said to augment users' incentive to overexploit. However, underlying most of the theoretical research is an explicit or implicit assumption of symmetric information, or a symmetric lack of information. In reality, people generally have access to different sources of information and they may differ in their abilities to process information. In the first two papers of this thesis, the assumption of symmetry is relaxed and both papers demonstrate that from a welfare perspective, the distribution of uncertainty is also of importance. Many CPR's and PG's are natural, which can complicate the situation. In the traditional resource management literature, the exploited resource is often assumed to be properly characterized by some concave growth function. Today, there is extensive empirical evidence suggesting that many ecosystems have more complex, often non-linear dynamics. Management of such resources can be quite challenging as the non-linear dynamics can make the ecosystem flip between alternate stable states, and even marginal changes can cause radical transformations of such ecosystems. Most of the CPR models assume the shared resource to be of fixed size or to be able to generate a constant flow of services. In the third paper we aim at providing a more complete picture of the overexploitation of a common resource, by combining the institutional structure with complex ecological dynamics. We manage to raise questions and doubts about the standard assumptions. Another feature of convex-concave resources is that a state can become highly robust and sometimes an ecosystem change may even be irreversible. This is problematic if, for example, we wish to restore a degraded ecosystem. The aim of the fourth paper is to empirically analyze this question, by eliciting peoples' preferences through a hypothetical referendum on the issue. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2005

A large part of the poor people in the world is dependent on local natural resources for their survival. Often, these resources are managed as common-pool resources; that is, they are used in common by a limited group of people, who are dependent on each other in their use of the resource. The first two essays in this dissertation explicitly examine the effects of poverty on common-pool resource management. I show that if utility is a non-homogeneous function of consumption, both income level and income distribution affects the chances for cooperative management of common-pool resources. In the first essay, I let the S-shaped relationship between health and consumption be reflected in an S-shaped utility function, and use game theory to examine the effects on cooperation. I find that the chances for cooperation are greater if the users of the common-pool resource are relatively well off than if they are very poor, but greatest of all in groups of users just managing to get the food they need to remain in good health. In the most relevant consumption levels, a temporary decrease in consumption may cause cooperation to fail. In the second essay, I show that income inequality decreases the scope for cooperation. In poor groups of users, the poorest will be the ones unable to cooperate, while in richer groups of users, the richest will be the ones who can not commit to cooperate. Alms-giving, an unequal sharing of the gains from cooperation and even a certain amount of free-riding are ways of making cooperation possible despite inequality. In the third essay data from ten, and case studies of five, irrigation systems in Nepal are analysed. The results show a positive correlation between income level and cooperation and a negative correlation between income inequality and cooperation, which supports the results from the first two essays. However, while the theoretical essays focus on the incentives to cooperate, the empirical analysis shows that it is at least as important that the users find a way to coordinate their efforts. The case studies, in particular, emphasise the importance of having a person as a leader. Furthermore, cooperation works better when a large share of the users belongs to the same ethnic group. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002</p>

To curb greenhouse gases and mitigate climate change is one of the biggest challenges human society face today. Carbon dioxide (CO2) has accumulated rapidly in the atmosphere as a consequence of burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. The aim of this study is to explore two methods to store carbon dioxide in geological formations and biological sinks. The aim is also to discuss the two mitigation options from a sustainable perspective and whether it can lead to a better environment and benefits for local and global societies. The research questions are: Which method to store carbon dioxide, geological or biological, is the most effective? Which method to store carbon dioxide, geological or biological, has the greatest potential to promote sustainable development for local communities? The method used is a comparative case study and presents four case studies that explore the potential for CO2 storage offshore in Norway and Brazil; and in tropical forests in Mexico and Brazil. The mitigation options are discussed from two different theoretical perspectives. The principle of the theory of ecological modernisation is that innovation and environmentally friendly technology can solve the environmental problems human societies face today, whereas the theory of common pool resources promotes local communities to govern limited resources in order to manage them sustainably. The findings suggest that ecological modernisation legitimize environmental destruction as carbon dioxide storage in geological formations (CCS) use the technology as a mean to extract more oil and gas; which results in a rebound-effect. Therefore, carbon dioxide capture in geological formations is not a realistic method unless it can prevent further emissions. Protected forest resources can be seen as biological insurance, which safeguard ecosystem services, biodiversity, and the forest potential to hold carbon. Carbon sequestration in tropical forest has the potential to store carbon dioxide given that the forests are protected and local communities have tenure rights, knowledge, and the means to protect the forest and manage them sustainably.

A system of systems (SoS) framework is proposed for policy design that takes into account the value systems of multiple participants, harnesses the complexity of strategic interactions among participants, and confronts the risks and uncertainties present in participants’ decision making. SoS thinking provides an integrative and adaptive mindset, which is needed to tackle policy challenges characterized by conflict, complexity, and uncertainty. With the aim of putting SoS thinking into practice, operational methods and tools are presented herein. Specifically, SoS engineering methodologies to create value system models, agent-based models of competitive and cooperative behaviour under conflict, and risk management models are developed and integrated into the framework. The proposed structure, methods and tools can be utilized to organize policy design discourse. Communication among participants involved in the policy discussion is structured around SoS models, which are used to integrate multiple perspectives of a system and to test the effectiveness of policies in achieving desirable outcomes under varying conditions. In order to demonstrate the proposed methods and tools that have been developed to enliven policy design discourse, a theoretical common-pool resources dilemma is utilized. The generic application illustrates the methodology of constructing ordinal preferences from values. Also, it is used to validate the agent-based modeling and simulation platform as a tool to investigate strategic interactions among participants and harness the potential to influence and enable participants to achieve desirable outcomes. A real-world common pool resources dilemma in the provisioning and security considerations of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is examined and employed as a case study for applying strategic conflict models in risk management. Overall, this thesis advances the theory and application of SoS engineering and focuses on understanding value systems, handling complexity in terms of conflict dynamics, and finally, enhancing risk management.

從共用資源理論觀點暨公共選擇角度而言，原住民部落資源與傳統領域土地乃一「封閉式共用資源」，若由原住民部落團體共有並自主經營管理，社群內部將可能透過個體的合作，創造共同利益，發揮傳統生態知識、善用在地組織，避免原住民地權流失，並進一步達到資源永續發展的目的。但由於受限於「經濟人」與「國家理性主義」之假設，且忽視了人與自然資源會相互影響、相互限制的事實，人們常引用Hardin（1968）的「共用地悲劇」，指出共用資源必將陷於過度使用的危險之中，最終肇致環境的退化。 為釐清此議題，本研究以新竹縣尖石鄉後山兩個具有共用資源自主治理個案的泰雅族部落為例，選取現今既有的「部落地景」、「河川魚群」、「森林產物」等三種形式之共用資源進行觀察；在時間上則以這些資源在保育目的下被部落共同維持開始，到被賦予促進部落經濟期待後的發展為主要的範圍。以新制度經濟學為理論基礎，藉由實證調查和比較，並經「組織中的個人制度選擇」、「社會中的共管組織」以及「社會生態系統」等三個層面的分析，討論有哪些因素影響個人遵守集體的正式與非正式規範？群體如何制定符合當地條件的共用資源治理規範，並維持組織的長期存續？而社會與自然生態之間的互動關係又是如何形成？冀以探討影響「以部落為基礎的自然資源自主治理」之內外部因素及其互動關係，俾提供後續共用資源管理制度設計思考的基礎。 / From the perspective of “common pool resources” (CPR) theory and public choices, the tribal resources of aboriginals and traditional territories are a “closed-access” type of common pool resources. If aboriginal tribes manage the CPR in a self-governing way, the communities may be able to, through the cooperation of individuals within, create collective interests, leverage traditional knowledge regarding the ecosystem, utilize local organizations in order to avoid the lapse of aboriginal land, and achieve the sustainable development of resources. However, people are limited to the hypotheses of “homo economicus” and “raison d’état” along with an overlook of the fact that mutual influences and restrictions lie between humans and natural resources. They often quote the essay “Tragedy of the Commons” by Hardin (1968), according to which common resources are under the constant threat of overuse that will eventually degrade the environment. To establish clarity on this issue, this paper uses an Atayal county with two CPR self-governing cases to observe three types of common pool resources currently seen today: tribe landscape, river fish and forest produce. The time horizon starts at the time point when these resources were placed under tribal management for conservation purposes, and ends at the time point when these resources are expected to prompt economic development. This paper conducts empirical investigations and comparisons based on the theoretical foundations of new institutional economics, and analyzes three aspects of these issues: choice of personal systems within an organization, collective management organizations in a society, and Social-Ecological Systems (SESs). This paper discusses the factors that affect how individuals conform to social norms, formal and informal. How a public choice is made to design the rules which are proper to local CPR situation and maintains the organization long-term sustainability? How do the interactions between society and the natural ecosystem come into being? By exploring the internal and external factors of self-governance of natural resources by tribes and the resulting interactions, this paper aims to provide a foundation for subsequent studies in the design of the management systems for common resources.