Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter. / Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest

Dans la foulée des scandales financiers ayant secoué le milieu des affaires ces dernières années, l’efficacité des pratiques de régie d’entreprise, et, en particulier celles liées à l’indépendance des administrateurs, a été passée au crible. L’administrateur désigné par une partie pour la représenter est un type d’administrateur que l’on rencontre fréquemment au sein des conseils d’administration des entreprises. Toutefois, l’on peut se questionner sur l’indépendance réelle de ces administrateurs, considérant leur loyauté envers la personne les ayant désignés, laquelle détient habituellement un intérêt à titre d’actionnaire ou de partie prenante dans l’entreprise visée. En outre, alors que les principes légaux requièrent que les administrateurs agissent dans le meilleur intérêt de l’entreprise, la réalité pratique est parfois toute autre: aux prises avec les instructions ou les souhaits de la personne les ayant nommés, les administrateurs désignés se retrouvent placés en situation inhérente de conflit d’intérêts. Ce texte vise à offrir une analyse détaillée au sujet de l’administrateur désigné et du conflit d’intérêts résultant de cette double exigence de loyauté. L’objectif est de présenter un examen approfondi des diverses difficultés résultant de la nomination d’un administrateur désigné ou associées à celle-ci, ainsi que des réponses judiciaires et législatives liées à cette problématique. Cette réflexion mènera à une exploration de certains systèmes législatifs et légaux, en particulier ceux du Royaume-Uni, de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, afin d’obtenir une meilleure compréhension et d’offrir une perspective éclairée quant aux enjeux analysés par la présente. / Following the wave of corporate scandals that have surfaced over the past decade, significant attention has been showered on the efficiency of corporate governance practices, with particular scrutiny on the issue of director independence. One specific category of directors frequently nominated to sit on corporate boards is the nominee director. However, these directors often lack veritable independence given their extraneous loyalty towards their appointer, usually either a shareholder or stakeholder of the corporation. Furthermore, while legal principle requires that all company directors exercise their statutory duties with a view to the best interests of the corporation, in practice nominee directors are expected to follow the instructions or wishes of their appointer, resulting in their inherent position of conflict. This text focuses on the nominee director and the conflict of interest resulting from such director’s position of dual loyalty. Its objective is to provide a comprehensive examination of the various difficulties arising from, and associated with the appointment of nominee directors as well as the judicial and legislative responses to these difficulties. In examining the various complications associated with nominee directors, the legal framework in several foreign jurisdictions, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand is also explored throughout this text to provide further insight and perspective on the different issues analysed herein.

Submitted by Alexandre Ramos Coelho (alexandre.coelho@gvmail.br) on 2015-06-09T22:53:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado_ARCoelho_ 09.06.15_FINAL.pdf: 1391202 bytes, checksum: e5aeec796f84194f76858aa85f8ad7b6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2015-06-10T11:39:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado_ARCoelho_ 09.06.15_FINAL.pdf: 1391202 bytes, checksum: e5aeec796f84194f76858aa85f8ad7b6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-10T12:43:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Mestrado_ARCoelho_ 09.06.15_FINAL.pdf: 1391202 bytes, checksum: e5aeec796f84194f76858aa85f8ad7b6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / According to data, from the Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market – ANBIMA, accumulated of 12 months, as of July 7, 2014, the sum of investments, redemptions and capital raised, the fund industry in Brazil transacted more than 11 billion Brazilian Reais. It is a considerable financial value, making the industry fund an important tool to channel savings and to invest in the most diverse projects of the economy. In addition, the collapse of some financial conglomerates in Brazil in recent years involving investment funds managed by companies belonging to such conglomerates has highlighted the importance of rules and studies addressing the relationship between the asset manager / fund administrator and the respective investors in those funds. In fact, the research conducted over the years 2013 and 2014 with regulators, academics and other participants in the securities market have demonstrated that there are few studies that can provide assistance in solving problems of this nature, including situations involving conflicts of interest between asset managers / fund administrator and investors. Thus, in face of the economic importance of the fund industry to Brazil and the relevance of the rights of investors / shareholders in the fund industry, and also due to the lack of studies, this work aims at conducting a theoretical and empirical research on the fiduciary relationship between the fund administrator, the asset manager and the respective shareholders of the investment funds. Along these lines, the goal will be to identify the origin, the essential characteristics of this relationship, the risks it can bring to the investor, and the duties it imposes on administrators and managers. We propose to evaluate the historical origin of the fiduciary relationship and understand the theoretical foundations that support its application to investment funds in the United States and Brazil. Based on this theoretical knowledge and under the focus of fiduciary duties applicable to administrators and managers, we develop an evaluation of the standards of conduct contained in the rulings of the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM), to test the fiduciary relationship characteristics on the CVM rules. Finally, was conducted a study of cases where administrators and managers were convicted for breaking the fiduciary relationship and for failing to comply with specific duties embedded in the standards of conduct previously evaluated. On the basis of theoretical and empirical studies described, it is finally concluded that there are, indeed, essential characteristics in determining a fiduciary relationship between fund administrator / asset manager and the shareholder, and once this relationship is established, fund administrators and asset managers will have to observe the duty of diligence and loyalty to the shareholder. Also on the basis of theoretical and empirical studies, it is possible to say that the CVM standards establish the fiduciary relationship between the fund administrators / asset managers and the shareholder of investment funds, as well as fiduciary duties related to this relationship. / De acordo com dados de 07.10.2014 da Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais – ANBIMA, no acumulado em 12 meses, entre aplicações, resgates e captações, a indústria de fundos movimentou mais de 11 bilhões de reais no Brasil. É um volume financeiro considerável, fazendo dos fundos de investimento importantes instrumentos de captação de poupança e de direcionamento de recursos para os mais diversos projetos de financiamento da economia. Além disso, as quebras de determinados conglomerados financeiros no Brasil nos últimos anos envolvendo fundos administrados e geridos por sociedades pertencentes a esses conglomerados colocou em evidência a importância de regras e estudos direcionados à relação entre o administrador-gestor e o cotista de fundos de investimento. De fato, pesquisa conduzida ao longo dos anos de 2013 e 2014 demonstrou que acadêmicos, reguladores e demais participantes do mercado de valores mobiliários possuem poucos estudos que possam assisti-los na solução de problemas relativos a essa relação, inclusive diante de situações envolvendo conflitos de interesses entre administradores-gestores e cotistas. Assim, diante da importância econômica dos fundos de investimento para o Brasil, da relevância dos direitos dos investidores dentro da indústria de fundos, e também em razão da escassez de estudos, este trabalho tem por finalidade realizar investigação teórica e empírica sobre a relação fiduciária entre o administrador, o gestor e os respectivos cotistas dos fundos de investimento. Dessa forma, o objetivo será identificar a origem, as características essenciais dessa relação, os riscos que ela pode trazer para o investidor e os deveres que ela impõe aos administradores e gestores. Para tanto, propõe-se avaliar a origem histórica da relação fiduciária e os fundamentos teóricos que a suportam aplicados aos fundos de investimento nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil. Com base nesse conhecimento teórico e sob o enfoque dos deveres fiduciários aplicáveis aos administradores e gestores, parte-se para a avaliação das normas de conduta contidas nas instruções da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), visando testar as características da relação fiduciária diante das regras da CVM. Por fim, realiza-se estudo sobre casos em que administradores e gestores foram condenados por quebra na relação fiduciária e por inobservância de deveres específicos embutidos nas normas de conduta avaliadas anteriormente. Com fundamento nos estudos teóricos e empíricos descritos, conclui-se que existem características essenciais na configuração de uma relação fiduciária entre o administrador-gestor e o cotista de fundos de investimento e que, uma vez formada essa relação, administradores e gestores obrigam-se a observar o cumprimento de deveres de diligência e de lealdade perante o cotista. Igualmente, ainda é possível afirmar que as normas da CVM de fato instituem a relação fiduciária entre o administrador-gestor e o cotista de fundos de investimento, bem como os deveres fiduciários conexos a essa relação.

Submitted by Luiz Fernando Hideichi Sasaki (luiz.sasaki@susep.gov.br) on 2016-08-02T19:55:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Sasaki - versão aprovada 29_07_2016.pdf: 2676534 bytes, checksum: 99cae22120aa59917795862e37f9f5b0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2016-08-03T16:32:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Sasaki - versão aprovada 29_07_2016.pdf: 2676534 bytes, checksum: 99cae22120aa59917795862e37f9f5b0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-08-23T19:56:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Sasaki - versão aprovada 29_07_2016.pdf: 2676534 bytes, checksum: 99cae22120aa59917795862e37f9f5b0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-23T19:57:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Sasaki - versão aprovada 29_07_2016.pdf: 2676534 bytes, checksum: 99cae22120aa59917795862e37f9f5b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-07-29 / Examining the prevalence of transparency in the sale of auto insurance in Brazil and around the world, this study considers the costs and benefits of this transparency through two surveys and based on extensive contextual and scholarly analyses. The agency relationship in the insurance intermediation consists of two principals (the consumer and the insurer) and one agent (the insurance broker). This relationship presents a classic principal-agent dilemma where the broker’s compensation system — in which insurers pay the brokerage commission — may portend negative effects for consumers. The international survey queried insurance supervisors and organizations representing insurers and insurance brokers about global practices related to the transparency in the auto insurance sale and received responses from 39 foreign jurisdictions (in addition to the European Commission). In the national survey, 191 Brazilian insurance brokers answered a questionnaire on their practices and opinions related to transparency in the auto insurance sale. The results show that 24 out of the 39 international jurisdictions analyzed require or encourage the disclosure of brokerage commissions to consumers. In jurisdictions where disclosure is compulsory, there is prior (prior to the decision made by the consumer) and active (without being requested by the consumer) transparency. In the national survey, results showed that 92% of insurance brokers (legal entities) in Brazil do not disclose to consumers the amount of brokerage commission received, and that 93% of brokers are against active disclosure and 92% against passive disclosure (at consumer request). Given these results, and based on the theoretical and empirical evidence examined, this study recommends the adoption of transparency requirements relating to prior and active disclosure of brokerage commissions in Brazil. / Ao examinar o domínio da transparência na venda do seguro automóvel no Brasil e no mundo, este estudo leva em consideração os custos e benefícios da transparência por meio de dois surveys e com base numa extensa análise contextual e acadêmica. A relação de agência que se forma na intermediação do seguro consiste de dois principais (consumidor e seguradoras) e um agente (corretor de seguro). Esta relação exibe um clássico dilema principal-agente onde o regime de remuneração dos corretores de seguro, no qual o pagamento da comissão de corretagem é feito pelas seguradoras, pode resultar em efeitos negativos para os consumidores. O survey internacional consultou supervisores de seguro e entidades representativas de seguradoras e de corretores de seguro sobre as práticas globais relacionadas à transparência na venda do seguro automóvel e recebeu respostas de 39 jurisdições estrangeiras (além da Comissão Europeia). No survey nacional, 191 corretoras de seguro brasileiras responderam um questionário sobre suas práticas e opiniões relacionadas à transparência na venda do seguro automóvel. Os resultados mostram que 24 das 39 jurisdições estrangeiras analisadas exigem ou apoiam a divulgação da comissão de corretagem aos consumidores. Nas jurisdições em que a divulgação é compulsória, prevalece a transparência prévia (anterior à tomada de decisão pelo consumidor) e ativa (sem que seja solicitada pelo consumidor). No survey nacional, os resultados mostram que 92% das corretoras de seguro (pessoas jurídicas) no Brasil não divulgam aos consumidores o valor da comissão de corretagem que recebem e que 93% das corretoras são contrárias à divulgação ativa e que 92% são contrárias à divulgação passiva (a pedido dos consumidores). Diante desses resultados, e baseado nas evidências teóricas e empíricas estudadas, recomenda-se a adoção de requisitos de transparência no Brasil, relacionados à divulgação prévia e ativa da comissão de corretagem aos consumidores.

Submitted by CRISTINE BASSETO CRUZ (crisbasseto@gmail.com) on 2017-03-02T23:43:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao 2017-02-24 final.pdf: 2091106 bytes, checksum: 2ffbc1ca866db49e442bf1009d316bf2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2017-03-02T23:47:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao 2017-02-24 final.pdf: 2091106 bytes, checksum: 2ffbc1ca866db49e442bf1009d316bf2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-06T12:53:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao 2017-02-24 final.pdf: 2091106 bytes, checksum: 2ffbc1ca866db49e442bf1009d316bf2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-08 / This paper intends to discuss the legal adequacy of loan arrangements among shareholders, companies offering shares in initial public offer and their underwriters pre-initial public offer. These transactions – known as 'equity kickers' – became popular during 2004 – 2007 Brazilian capital markets’ IPO wave, when several Brazilian corporations went to public offering their shares after borrowing pre-IPO money from their underwriters. Taking into account the usual arrangements among those agents and a few researches made afterwards, we examine the economic and social consequences to the issuer and to the securities market, the legal role of the underwriter under the Brazilian securities exchange legal environment and discuss the fiduciary duty imposed to financial intermediaries in capital. Further on, we discuss the potential conflict of interest arising from credit relationship between underwriters and issuing companies and the adequacy of mandatory information provided in IPO information memorandum (prospecto) for the purpose of warning potential conflict that may arise from such credit relationship. Finally, we conclude our legal analysis and suggest a review of security exchange commission (CVM) current regulation in order to address fiduciary duties to financial intermediaries and improve disclosure standards on conflict of interest to potential investors during securities public offers. / Este trabalho pretende discutir a legalidade dos arranjos contratuais e empréstimos firmados entre acionistas, companhias ofertantes e instituições intermediárias previamente à realização de ofertas públicas iniciais. Esses arranjos – conhecidos como 'equity kickers' – foram largamente utilizados por companhias brasileiras que ofertaram suas ações durante os anos de 2004 a 2007. Tendo por base o formato usualmente utilizado nessas transações e os resultados trazidos por algumas pesquisas realizadas após a realização dessas ofertas, analisamos as consequências econômicas e sociais observadas e sua pertinência para o contexto do mercado de capitais, o papel das instituições intermediárias sob a ótica da regulamentação Brasileira e seu dever fiduciário perante os demais agentes de mercado. Ademais, discutimos o potencial conflito de interesse inerente ao papel simultâneo de distribuidor e credor desempenhado pelo coordenador nessas ofertas e a comunicação desse conflito ao mercado através da divulgação das informações pertinentes no prospecto de distribuição da oferta. Por fim, apresentamos uma análise jurídica e sugerimos a revisão da regulamentação da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários no sentido de tratar expressamente o tema do dever fiduciário das instituições intermediárias no mercado de captais e aumentar a exigência de informações acerca de transparência das situações de conflito ao mercado na realização de ofertas públicas de valores mobiliários.

The research problem for this study was that forensic investigators in the Forensic Services (FS) of the City of Tshwane (CoT) are unable to successfully deal with procurement fraud as a result of the lack of knowledge, skills and resources required to conduct computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud. This research was conducted to ascertain the value of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. Further, the study sought to determine how to improve the CoT forensic investigators’ knowledge and competence regarding the application of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. The purpose of this study was to explore the procedures that should be followed by CoT forensic investigators when conducting computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud. The research also aimed to discover new information, not previously known to the researcher, related to computer forensics during the investigation of procurement fraud by exploring national and international literature. In addition, the study explored existing practices so as to use this information to improve the current CoT procedure, within the confines of the legislative requirements. The overall purpose of this study is to provide practical recommendations for best practices, based on the results of the data analysis, which address the problem and enhance the investigative skills of CoT forensic investigators. The study established that it is imperative and compulsory to apply computer forensics in any procurement fraud investigation in order to efficiently track down cyber criminals and solve complicated and complex computer crimes. It was also established that forensic investigators within the FS in the CoT lack the necessary computer skills to optimally investigate procurement fraud. It is therefore recommended that CoT forensic investigators acquire the necessary skills and essential training in computer forensics in order to improve their knowledge and competence regarding the application and understanding of the value of computer forensics in the investigation of procurement fraud. / School of Criminal Justice / M.Tech. (Forensic Investigation)

This paper contributes to the literature by presenting a detailed summary of existing problems with credit rating agencies and proposing a model of a European Rating Agency that acts as a competitor and benchmark to the established credit rating agencies. European Rating Agency (ERA) as a new entrant will make a difference by increasing rating transparency and reputation cost for rating agencies at the same time. A vital point when developing the idea of an independent rating agency was the minimization of regulation changes. This will help shareholder to better orientate and understand the functionalities of the European Rating Agency which will make its establishment process easier. Reputation cost (capital) are assumed to be the building blocks that support the unique position of current rating agencies. ERA is modelled specifically to target this information and use the fragile concept of trust and reputation to the benefit of all stakeholder.

Real Estate Agencies compensation consists of commissions and a part of the commission corresponds to what the real estate agent gets as salary. This incentive-based commission system is usually covered by an agreed fixed amount, a variable commission model or a combination of both depending on the brokerage object's final selling price. Commission system can lead to adverse consequences when the real estate agent abuses their position and exploits an information advantage to gain a financial benefits. Based on completed questionnaires, that have been posted for this study, directed to consumers and real estate agents, it is recognized that the parties in the Swedish real estate agent industry has experienced or is experiencing a certain unethical behavior because of commission-based pay structures. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how asymmetric information affects the real estate industry brokerage contract negotiations regarding the commission and whether conflicts of interest may occur due to this. Because of asymmetric information in contract situations, there may be situations in which agreements will contradict societal norms and ethical principles, because the broker abuses his advantage. The essence of this thesis is to convey a discussion in order to associate the legal application of contracts with normative ethics. The essay writers propose for instance based on ethical approaches to create a complement to the existing law and further to come up with practical solutions to limit the possibility of unreasonable commission models in real estate brokerage. The essay writers argue that the introduction of a stricter supervision of the commission procedure would create stronger assurance and reduce the abuse of the information asymmetry in the industry. / Fastighetsmäklarbranschens ersättningssystem utgörs av provision och motsvarar en del av vad en fastighetsmäklare får i lön. Detta incitamentbaserade provisionssystem brukar omfattas av ett avtalat fast belopp, en rörlig provisionsmodell eller en kombination av båda som beror på förmedlingsobjektets slutliga försäljningspris. Provisionssystemet kan föranleda negativa följder om fastighetsmäklaren missbrukar sin ställning och utnyttjar ett informationsövertag till att skapa sig en finansiell fördel. Utifrån genomförda enkätundersökningar i denna studie riktade till konsumenter och fastighetsmäklare medges det att parterna inom den svenska fastighetsmäklarbranschen har upplevt eller upplever ett visst oetiskt beteende på grund av provisionsbaserade lönestrukturer. Syftet med denna uppsats är därför att undersöka hur asymmetrisk information påverkar fastighetsmäklarbranschens avtalsförhandlingar avseende provisionen och huruvida intressekonflikter kan uppstå till följd av detta. På grund av asymmetrisk information i avtalssammanhang kan det förekomma situationer där avtalen strider mot samhällsnormer och etiska principer när mäklaren missbrukar sitt övertag. Kärnan i denna uppsats är att föra en samlad diskussion som avser att koppla den rättsliga tillämpningen av avtalslagen med den normativa etiken. Uppsatsförfattarna resonerar bland annat utifrån etiska synsätt för att skapa ett komplement till gällande lag och vidare komma fram till praktiska lösningar till hur eventuellt oskäliga provisionsmodeller kan begränsas. Uppsatsförfattarna hävdar att ett införande av en starkare tillsyn över provisionsförfarandet skulle skapa större förtroende och minska asymmetrin i branschen.

The study is mainly to reflect on how the two members of the European Union, Sweden and Finland has chosen to implement the directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union. To limit the study the focus has been to investigate the width of ‘conflict of interest’ as well as the width of ‘contracting authorities’. The conflict of interest may appear in all phases within the purchasing process with a risk for unjust advantages for the wanted supplier or the opposite, where a supplier is excluded by purpose. The actual procurement process is presented in the study in a wider context where the procurement document, the publication of the document as well as the establishing of the winning tender is defined as the second phase. The total process of purchasing begins with a first phase, the analysis of the actual need, market orientation and an evaluating of the previous contract. The third phase, contract management, is very critical as the risk of becoming caught altering the contracts during the term is low. Therefore, is not only the conflict of interest connected to the prior involvement of candidates or tenderers that need to be addressed. The regulation of the two national procurement laws does not contain the wider sense of conflict of interest. Instead, one Finnish inferior law, regulating administration and conflict of interest there in, appears to be the most comprehensive legislation to include all organizations that the procurement law applies to. The Swedish regulation as oppose to the Finnish spread out on a general administrative law and a law applied to the municipal organizations. However, this is not including all the organizations that must process their procurations according to law. The legislator refers to the constitutional principle, the principle of equality, and a mandate for the procurement authority to support all procurement organizations that are obliged to implement procurement under public procurement laws. Above is a simplified description of how the procurement directive has been implemented in Sweden and Finland. What has been noted is that is does not appear to be any penalties for those who shows a behavior indicating that there is a conflict of interest in any of the steps of the purchasing process. On the other hand, it is the contracting organization that may face penalties such as a waste of resources when a procurement is reviewed and fails, which means further time spent on yet another process of procurement. A contracting organization that does not manage its contracts according to the stated demands in the procurement might make such incorrect purchases or concessions that could lead to considerable sanctions.

This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.