Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Various types of rules govern many areas of life in a sectional title scheme. The Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 prescribes model management and conduct rules in its regulations. Other non-prescribed rules are adopted by either the developers initially or later by the trustees of the body corporate. These rules provide for the control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of the sections and the common property in the scheme. Sectional owners and other occupiers have the entitlements of use and enjoyment of their individual sections and their share in the common property of the sectional title scheme, in proportion to their participation quota. These entitlements are restricted by the rules in operation within the scheme. Although these rules limit the entitlements of sectional owners and other occupiers in the interest of the sectional title community, they may not be unreasonable in their application and effect. In some instances, the application of the rules might exceed the bounds of reasonableness and result in unfair discrimination, arbitrary deprivation, unfair administrative action or restrictions on access to courts for dispute resolution. If certain rules are unreasonable in their application, based on one or more of the abovementioned grounds, the court must interpret the potentially impermissible rules and if the court cannot avoid a declaration of invalidity by implementing a constitutional remedy such as reading-up, reading-down, reading-in or severance, these impermissible rules will need to be substituted, amended or repealed and replaced because they are potentially unconstitutional and invalid. After a statutory and constitutional enquiry into the nature, scope, application, operation and effect of the rules governing sectional title schemes, it can be concluded that the various types of rules governing sectional title schemes restrict and limit sectional owners’ and occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment of their individual sections and share in the common property. However, after being tested against section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and other non-property rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, to determine if the rules are reasonable in their application and constitutionally permissible, it can be seen that the application of the rules do not necessarily amount to arbitrary deprivations of property and that they can be justified in terms of the Constitution because there is sufficient reasons for the particular regulations and they are procedurally fair. The various different types of rules governing sectional title schemes serve as reasonable regulations in as far as they contribute to a harmonious relationship between the trustees of the body corporate and the sectional owners and occupiers as members of the body corporate as well as between the members of the body corporate inter se. The rules serve an important function in this regard. Therefore, they are considered reasonable and constitutionally valid in as far as they do not enforce excessive regulation and as long as they are equally applicable and do not unfairly differentiate in their application. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verskeie tipes reëls reguleer alledaagse aangeleenthede in ‘n deeltitelskema. Die Wet op Deeltitels 95 van 1986 maak voorsiening vir voorgeskrewe bestuurs- en gedragsreëls in die regulasies. Die ontwikkelaars of die trustees van die regspersoon kan aanvanklik met die stigting van die skema of op ‘n latere stadium addisionele reëls byvoeg wat nie alreeds deur die Wet voorgeskryf is nie. Die reëls maak voorsiening vir die beheer, bestuur, administrasie, gebruik en genot van die eenheid en die gemeenskaplike eiendom in die skema. Die deeleienaars van deeltitelskemas en ander okkupeerders van die skema is geregtig om hulle individuele eenhede sowel as die gemeenskaplike eiendom, in ooreenstemming met hulle deelnemingskwota, te gebruik en geniet; en dit vorm deel van hul inhoudsbevoegdhede. Hierdie inhoudsbevoegdhede word beperk deur die skema se reëls. Afgesien daarvan dat die reëls die deeleienaar en ander okkupeerders se inhoudsbevoegdhede beperk in die belang van die deeltitelgemeenskap, mag die reëls nie onredelik wees in die toepassing daarvan nie. In sommige gevalle kan die toepassing van die reëls die perke van redelikheid oorskry en neerkom op ongeregverdigde diskriminasie, arbitrêre ontneming, ongeregverdigde administratiewe handeling of ‘n beperking plaas op toegang tot die howe met die oog op dispuutoplossing. Indien daar bevind word dat sekere reëls onredelik is in die toepassing daarvan op grond van een of meer van die voorafgemelde gronde, moet die hof artikel 39 van die Grondwet volg en die reël interpreteer om ‘n deklarasie van ongeldigheid te vermy. As die hof dit nie kan vermy deur middel van konstitutusionele remedies soos “op-lesing”, “af-lesing”, “afskeiding” of “in-lesing” nie, sal die reëls gewysig of geskrap en vervang moet word, anders sal die reël ongrondwetlik wees en ongeldig verklaar word. Na afloop van ‘n statutêre en konstitusionele ondersoek ten opsigte van die aard, omvang, toepassing, werking en effek van die reëls wat deeltitelskemas reguleer word daar bevind dat die verskeie tipes reëls wat ‘n deeltitelskema reguleer ‘n beperking plaas op die inhousdbevoegdhede van deeltiteleienaars en ander okkupeerders wat betref die reg om die eenheid sowel as die gemeenskaplike eiendom te gebruik en geniet. Ten einde te bepaal of die reëls redelik in die toepassing daarvan sowel as grondwetlik toelaatbaar is, word dit getoets in terme van artikel 25 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 1996 en ander regte in die Handves van Regte. Daar word bevind dat die toepassing van die reëls nie noodwendig ‘n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom is nie en dat dit geregverdig kan word in terme van die Grondwet omdat daar voldoende redes vir die spesifieke regulasies is en omdat dat hulle prosedureel billik is. Die verskeie tipes reëls wat ‘n deeltitelskema reguleer dien as redelike regulasies sover dit bydra tot ‘n harmonieuse verhouding tussen die trustees van die regspersoon, die deeltiteleienaars en die okkupeerders as lede van die regspersoon sowel as tussen die lede van die regspersoon inter se. Die reëls het ‘n belangrike funksie in hierdie verband. Die reëls word geag redelik en grondwetlik geldig te wees sover dit nie buitensporige regulasies afdwing nie, gelyk toegepas word en daar nie ongeregverdig gedifferensieer word in die toepassing daarvan nie.

Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: All agricultural subdivisions in the Republic of South Africa are regulated by the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. The declared purpose of the Act is to prevent the creation of uneconomic farming units and this purpose is achieved through the requirement that the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“Minister of Agriculture”) must consent to the proposed subdivision. The Act was promulgated in the 1970s when the South African landscape was racially divided. The government of the time used law to provide benefits for the white minority. At this time the rights of non-whites were restricted. This is the social and political background of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. The Act formed part of a legislative scheme that provided benefits for white farmers. More than a decade after democratisation and the end of apartheid the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act is still in operation. The post-apartheid legislature drafted and enacted the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998, but it has not yet been brought into operation. During 2003 the legislature tabled the Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill which contains subdivision provisions that are identical to the provisions contained in the Subdivision Act. These legislative actions have created some uncertainty about the state of agricultural subdivisions. In 2008 the Constitutional Court decided that the Act continues to apply to all agricultural subdivisions and that this would be the position until the legislature chooses a definitive course of action. This constitutional analysis of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act examines the effect of the Act beyond the pre-constitutional legislative intention and framework under which it was enacted. If the Act cannot be saved from its apartheid context, the Repeal Act should become operational. This thesis concludes that the necessary and legitimate purpose of the Act, namely the regulation of subdivision of agricultural land, can be removed from its pre-constitutional setting in the apartheid era and may continue to justify the legitimate regulation of subdivision of land. Comparative sources, namely the United States of America, specifically the states of Oregon and Hawaii, Western Australia and the province of British Columbia, Canada indicate that the regulation of agricultural subdivisions is a valid means of protecting agricultural land. If the Act can continue to exist without its legacy of apartheid and still serves a legitimate and necessary purpose it will have to be constitutionally compliant. The purpose of the Act and the means used to realise it were tested against the Bill of Rights. The effect that the regulation has particularly on ownership entitlements was examined against section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. Similarly, the consequences of the regulation with regard to other rights in the Bill of Rights were investigated. The conclusion was that where the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act is used for its purpose of preventing the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land, in the national interest, it is a legitimate land-use regulation that can continue to justifiably operate in a constitutional dispensation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Alle onderverdelings van landbougrond in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika word gereguleer deur die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond 70 van 1970. Die verklaarde doel van die Wet is om die totstandkoming van onekonomiese landboueenhede te voorkom, en hierdie doel word bereik deurdat die Minister van Landbou, Bosbou en Visserye (“Minister van Landbou”) toestemming moet verleen vir die voorgestelde onderverdeling van landbougrond. Die Wet is in die 1970s gepromulgeer toe grond in Suid-Afrika in terme van ras verdeel was. Die destydse apartheidsregering het die regstelsel gebruik om voordele vir die blanke minderheidsgroep te bewerkstellig, terwyl die regte van nie-blankes ingeperk was. Dit is die sosiale en politieke agtergrond waarteen die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond tot stand gekom het. Die Wet was deel van ‘n wetgewende raamwerk waarbinne voordele vir blanke boere geskep is. Meer as ‘n dekade na apartheid en die totstandkoming van ‘n demokratiese Suid-Afrika is die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond steeds in werking. Die post-apartheid wetgewer het die Wet op die Herroepping van die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond 64 van 1998 gepromulgeer, maar nog nie in werking gestel nie. Gedurende 2003 het die wetgewer die “Draft Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill”, wat onderafdelings soortgelyk aan die bepalings in die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond bevat, gepromulgeer. Bogenoemde stappe het onsekerheid geskep ten opsigte van die stand van onderverdeling van landbougrond. In 2008 het die Konstitusionele Hof beslis dat die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond sal voortgaan om die onderverdeling van landbougrond te reguleer totdat die wetgewer uitsluitsel oor die aangeleentheid verskaf. Die doel van die tesis is om die uitwerking van die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond te analiseer as deel van die huidige grondwetlike bedeling, aangesien dit geskep is tydens die apartheidsera. Indien die Wet nie van sy apartheidskonteks geskei of gered kan word nie sal die Herroepping Wet in werking gestel moet word. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die doel van die Wet, naamlik die regulering van die onderverdeling van landbougrond, van die voor-konstitusionele agtergrond in die apartheidsera geskei kan word en dat dit kan voortgaan om die wettige regulering van onderverdeling van landbougrond te regverdig. Regsvergelykende bronne, naamlik die Verenigde State van Amerika, veral die state van Oregon en Hawaii, Wes Australië en Brits-Columbië, ‘n provinsie van Kanada, dui aan dat die regulasie van die onderverdeling van landbougrond ‘n regsgeldige metode is om landbougrond te beskerm. Die doel van die Wet en die metodes wat gebruik word om hierdie doel te laat realiseer is getoets teen die Handves van Menseregte. Die uitwerking van die regulasie op die inhoudsbevoegdhede van die eienaar is spesifiek geëvalueer teen artikel 25(1) van die 1996 Grondwet, maar die gevolge van die regulasie is ook getoets teen ander regte in die Handves van Menseregte. Die gevolgtrekking was dat waar die Wet op die Onderverdeling van Landbougrond gebruik word met die doel om onekonomiese onderverdeling van landbougrond te verhoed in die nasionale belang, dit ‘n legitieme regulasie van grondgebruik is waarvan die gebruik steeds regverdigbaar is in ‘n grondwetlike bedeling.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The lessor's tacit hypothec improves the chances of the lessor to recover rent in arrears. This real security right arises by operation of law and attaches to the lessee's movable property found on the leased premises when rent is due but not paid. The extension of the lessor‟s tacit hypothec to third parties' property is the remedy's most controversial feature. The extension is supposedly based on one of two theoretical justifications, namely implied consent and the doctrine of estoppel. According to the implied-consent theory, the extension is based on the premise that the third party consented (explicitly or by implication) that his property can serve as security for the payment of the lessee's arrear rent. The basis of the second theory, the doctrine of estoppel, operates as a limitation on the rei vindicatio of the third party. Over the years discourse has shown that there are uncertainties surrounding these justifications. Recent debate has also shown that if constitutionally challenged, the extension of the lessor's tacit hypothec could amount to arbitrary deprivation of third parties' property. The aim of this thesis is to establish whether and how the existing common law principles that provide for the extension of the lessor's tacit hypothec over property belonging to third parties are affected by section 25(1) of the Constitution. Consequently, the thesis describes, analyses and scrutinises the general principles regulating the lessor's tacit hypothec, and more specifically the extension of the lessor's tacit hypothec to third parties' property, in view of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Taking into considering the recent statutory protection of third parties' property, the thesis concludes that the extension of the lessor's tacit hypothec does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of third parties' property because correct application of the common law principles that provide for the extension and the statutory protection that has been introduced to exclude a large number of cases from the reach of the extension adequately protect third parties' property interests. Therefore, the requirements of section 25(1) are satisfied. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verhuurder se stilswyende hipoteek verbeter sy kanse om agterstallige huur van sy huurder in te vorder. Wanneer die huur opeisbaar word, maar die huurder versuim om tydig te betaal, kom hierdie saaklike sekerheidsreg deur regswerking tot stand en dit dek alle roerende sake wat op die verhuurde perseel gevind word. Die uitbreiding van die stilwyende hipoteek na eiendom wat aan derde partye behoort is die remedie se mees kontroversiële eienskap. Hierdie uitbreiding van die hipoteek se toepassingsveld berus na bewering op een van twee regverdigingsgronde, naamlik die derde se geïmpliseerde toestemming en die leerstuk van estoppel. Volgens die geïmpliseerde toestemming-teorie kan die hipoteek na derdes se bates uitgebrei word op die veronderstelling dat sodanige derde partye toegestem het (uitdruklik of by implikasie) dat hulle eiendom as sekuriteit vir betaling van die huurder se agterstallige huur mag dien. Die tweede teorie steun op die beperking wat die leerstuk van estoppel op die rei vindicatio van die derde party plaas. Oor die jare het debatte aangedui dat daar onsekerhede rondom hierdie regverdigingsgronde bestaan. Onlangse debatte het ook aangetoon dat, indien dit grondwetlik getoets word, die uitbreiding van die hipoteek moontlik mag neerkom op ‟n arbitrêre ontneming van die derdes se eiendom. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om vas te stel of en hoe die bestaande gemeenregtelike beginsels wat die stilswyende hipoteek na bates van derdes uitbrei deur artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet beïnvloed word. Die tesis bespreek, analiseer en toets gevolglik die algemene beginsels van die verhuurder se stilswyende hipoteek, en meer spesifiek die uitbreiding van die hipoteek na bates wat aan derdes behoort, in die lig van artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet. Met inagneming van die beskerming wat derde party se eiendom in terme van onlangse wetgewing geniet, bevind die tesis dat die uitgebreide toepassing van die stilswyende hipoteek nie op ʼn arbitrêre ontneming van derde partye se eiendom neerkom nie omdat korrekte toepassing van die gemeenregtelike beginsels wat vir die uitbreiding voorsiening maak, in kombinasie met die wetgewende uitsluiting van ‟n groot aantal sake wat aan derdes behoort, voldoende beskerming aan die belange van derdes verleen. Die vereistes van artikel 25(1) word dus bevredig.

Les partis politiques sont devenus les piliers de la démocratie moderne. De simples groupes inorganisés, ils sont devenus des structures hiérarchisées dont l’objectif est la conquête puis l’exercice du pouvoir. Les contingences historiques ont montré la nécessité pour les démocraties de se doter d’un appareil juridique pour se protéger des partis, mais également pour garantir leurs droits et libertés. Les partis ont donc été consacrés dans les Constitutions d’après-guerre. Cette constitutionnalisation s’est accompagnée de l’adjonction de Lois des partis ainsi que de dispositions législatives règlementant le droit des partis. La question du statut constitutionnel des partis se posait, alimentée par les décisions du juge constitutionnel, amené à se prononcer sur les droits, libertés et exigences des partis, dans le cadre du contrôle de constitutionnalité.Dès lors, il était intéressant d’aborder une approche comparatiste des partis politiques, sous l'angle du droit constitutionnel comparé, en l’occurrence du contentieux constitutionnel. La constitutionnalisation structurelle opposée à la consécration fonctionnelle permet de mettre en relief les grands principes directeurs du droit des partis. Ont ainsi été dégagés les principes de liberté, d’égalité, ainsi que celui de la transparence. Les partis sont confrontés aux exigences et aux interdictions, issues aussi bien des textes constitutionnels que législatifs. Les Cours constitutionnelles allemande, espagnole, italienne, française et portugaise apportent leurs appréciations, dont les travaux proposent une analyse détaillée. Le juge constitutionnel a certes remplit sa mission de protecteur de la Constitution en assurant la protection des principes démocratiques, mais dans le même temps, il s’est révélé le protecteur des droits et libertés des partis / Les partis politiques sont devenus les piliers de la démocratie moderne. De simples groupes inorganisés, ils sont devenus des structures hiérarchisées dont l’objectif est la conquête puis l’exercice du pouvoir. Les contingences historiques ont montré la nécessité pour les démocraties de se doter d’un appareil juridique pour se protéger des partis, mais également pour garantir leurs droits et libertés. Les partis ont donc été consacrés dans les Constitutions d’après-guerre. Cette constitutionnalisation s’est accompagnée de l’adjonction de Lois des partis ainsi que de dispositions législatives règlementant le droit des partis. La question du statut constitutionnel des partis se posait, alimentée par les décisions du juge constitutionnel, amené à se prononcer sur les droits, libertés et exigences des partis, dans le cadre du contrôle de constitutionnalité.Dès lors, il était intéressant d’aborder une approche comparatiste des partis politiques, sous l'angle du droit constitutionnel comparé, en l’occurrence du contentieux constitutionnel. La constitutionnalisation structurelle opposée à la consécration fonctionnelle permet de mettre en relief les grands principes directeurs du droit des partis. Ont ainsi été dégagés les principes de liberté, d’égalité, ainsi que celui de la transparence. Les partis sont confrontés aux exigences et aux interdictions, issues aussi bien des textes constitutionnels que législatifs. Les Cours constitutionnelles allemande, espagnole, italienne, française et portugaise apportent leurs appréciations, dont les travaux proposent une analyse détaillée. Le juge constitutionnel a certes remplit sa mission de protecteur de la Constitution en assurant la protection des principes démocratiques, mais dans le même temps, il s’est révélé le protecteur des droits et libertés des partis

La constitutionnalisation du droit pénal désigne l’emprise croissante de la Constitution sur la matière pénale du fait de l’enrichissement des principes constitutionnels et de la diversification des contrôles de constitutionnalité. Le Conseil constitutionnel n’est pas le seul à l’origine de ce phénomène, même s’il en est l’acteur principal. Toutes les autorités de contrôle, de conception et d’application du droit pénal contribuent, par le partage de leurs compétences et l’échange de leurs doctrines, à l’existence d’un droit pénal conforme à la Constitution et à la construction du volet pénal de la norme suprême. En outre, si la constitutionnalisation s’inscrit dans la promotion de la Constitution, elle est surtout au service de la légitimation de la matière pénale elle-même. L’ensemble des principes constitutionnels, tels qu’énoncés dans les textes et interprétés par le Conseil, sont empreints d’une philosophie humaniste. Leur consécration et leur respect permettent la reconnaissance et l’adhésion du justiciable, amené à percevoir le droit pénal comme juste et justifié. La constitutionnalisation est donc un processus porté par le rapprochement des autorités et porteur de légitimation pour le droit pénal. Mais, si elle est un processus, le droit pénal constitutionnel en est le résultat. La constitutionnalisation donne, en effet, naissance à un droit pénal nouveau, le droit pénal constitutionnel. Placé sous l’emprise de la Constitution, le droit pénal est désormais élaboré et appliqué à la lumière de la norme suprême, et ne peut être compris ni appréhendé sans une référence à celle-ci. / Constitutionalization of criminal law refers to the growing ascendancy of the Constitution over criminal law due to the densification of constitutional principles and the diversification of constitutionality controls. The Constitutional Council is not the only body wherefrom this phenomenon originated, although its prime contributor. By sharing their powers and exchanging doctrines, all authorities that control, elaborate and apply criminal law make it compliant with the Constitution and contribute to the construction of the criminal part of the Supreme Law. Moreover, whilst constitutionalization promotes the Constitution, it first and foremost contributes to the legitimization of criminal law itself. All constitutional principles, as set out in statutes and construed by the Council, are imbued with a humanistic philosophy. Formalization of and compliance with these principles encourage individuals to accept and subscribe to criminal law, as they see it as fair and well-founded. Constitutionalization is therefore a process driven by the growing interaction of authorities and a factor of legitimization of criminal law. Yet, whilst constitutionalization is a process, constitutional criminal law is its outcome. Constitutionalization does indeed give birth to a new kind of criminal law, constitutional criminal law. Now under the influence of the Constitution, criminal law is elaborated and applied in the light of the Supreme Law, and cannot be understood nor comprehended without reference to it.

Les États semblent ériger les Cours constitutionnelles en meilleur garant de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cette étude propose une délimitation des compétences, voire des responsabilités constitutionnelles. Elle démontre que si l'inneffectivité de la protection des droits a été mise en évidence en dépit de l'existence des mécanismes de justice constitutionnelle et des ratifications massives des conventions internationales, c'est la recherche des défaillances de la protection constitutionnelle qui s'impose. La confrontation « des engagements internationaux aux défaillances de la protection des droits fondamentaux » pose la question du contrôle qui est censé être exercé par le juge constitutionnel. Au regard des expériences française et internationale, le Niger offre un exemple parfait des paradoxes de ces mécanismes de contrôle tant a priori qu'a posteriori. Ces défaillances apparaissent à travers les limites constitutionnelles de l'intervention du juge constitutionnel, voire du juge international. Cette étude à la fois micro et macrocomparative, révèle le décalage entre la justice constitutionnelle nigérienne et française. Bien plus, elle illustre le déficit de la protection constitutionnelle, y compris de la France, par rapport aux véritables exigences internationales de la protection. Au-delà, cette thèse propose des pistes d'une protection conventionnelle efficace, voire effective des droits fondamentaux conventionnels. / States seem to assign a more important role to Constitutional courts to protect fundamental rights. This study proposes a delimitation of powers and constitutional responsibilities. It shows that if the ineffectiveness of human rights has been highlighted despite the fact that there are mechanisms of constitutional justice and massive ratifications of international conventions, research focusing on constitutional protection deficiencies remains crucial. Comparing “international commitments and deficiencies in the protection of fundamental rights” raises the issue of control which is supposed to be exercised by the Constitutional court. In the light of the French and international experiences, Niger provides a perfect example of paradoxes of the pre-control and post-control mechanisms. Such deficiencies appear through constitutional limits of the intervention of the Constitutional judge and the international judge. This micro and macro comparative study reveals the difference between the Nigeren and the French constitutional justice. It also illustrates the shortfall of the constitutional protection including France in the face of the real international requirements of the protection. Furthermore, this doctoral thesis proposes courses of action for effective and efficient protection under the convention.

En septembre 1969, un coup d’État mené par Kadhafi et ses compagnons donnera lieu à un modèle de gouvernement fondé sur la notion de la Jamahiriya qui trouve ses références théoriques dans le contenu du Livre Vert de Kadhafi. L’avènement de la Jamahiriya, qualifié de « Révolution », prétend mettre en œuvre l’exercice du pouvoir directement par le peuple (jamahir), à travers des congrès et des comités populaires. De fait, la première question qui se pose à nous est de cerner le type d’État en vigueur en Libye. Soulever ce point, c’est aussi s’interroger sur la place occupée par les droits de l’homme dans l’architecture institutionnelle libyenne. Et sous cet angle, l’idée qui s’impose est que l’organisation les droits et libertés relèvent de documents successifs : Déclaration de 1969 ; Charte verte des droits de 1988, loi de consolidation des libertés de 1991. Aussitôt surgit la question de la valeur juridique de ces textes dans la hiérarchie des normes, étant entendu qu’il n’existe pas en Libye une constitution proprement dite. C’est là une problématique essentielle, puisque de cette qualification dépend le degré de garantie des droits et libertés. On mesure alors l’importance d’une étude des principaux traits de la législation libyenne. Reste à ajouter que la reconnaissance des droits théoriquement affirmés, est tributaire de l’ordre « révolutionnaire » qui impose l’obligation de respecter et de protéger la Jamahiriya. Aborder ce point, c’est montrer les entraves que peut constituer le régime politique quant à la protection des Droits ; c’est également s’interroger sur le rôle du juge en tant que gardien des libertés. L’analyse de cet aspect implique une approche de l’étendue et des limites du contrôle des actes de l’État, qu’il soit un contrôle administratif ou un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois, sachant que la combinaison de ces deux techniques sert en principe à offrir aux citoyens une garantie et l’assurance d’exercer pleinement leurs droits et libertés. Or, là encore, les moyens juridictionnels conçus pour assurer la protection des droits fondamentaux risquent de se heurter à la nature du régime qui met en avant la protection de la « révolution » au dépend de toute autre liberté. C’est autrement soutenir que le système institutionnel dans son entier constitue une restriction à la protection des Droits. Évoquer cette réalité, c’est éclairer les entraves relevant de la pratique même du pouvoir. En définitive, la nature du régime et l’idéologie de la Jamahiriya conditionnent la forme d’expression des droits fondamentaux. C’est là tout l’enjeu du rapport entre pouvoir et libertés publiques que nous proposons d’étudier dans le cadre de ce travail. / In September 1969, a coup led by Gaddafi and his companions will result in a model of government based on the concept of the Republic which finds it’s theoretical references in the content of the Green Book of Gaddafi. The advent of the Republic, also called "Revolution", claimed to implement the exercise of power by the people (Jamahir) through congresses and people's committees. In fact, the first question that faces us is to identify the type of state force in Libya. Raising this point is also questioning the place of human rights in Libya's institutional architecture. And in this light, the idea must be that the organizations of human rights and freedoms are relieving from successive documents: Declaration of 1969; Green Charter of Human Rights of 1988, Freedoms Consolidation Act 1991. Soon after arose the question of the legal status of these texts in the hierarchy of norms, provided there is no constitution in Libya itself. This is a key issue, since from this qualification depend the degree of guarantee of rights and freedoms. The importance of a study of the main features of Libyan legislation is measured. It remains to add that the recognition of the rights affirmed in theory, depends on the order "revolutionary" which imposes the obligation to respect and protect the Republic. Address this point is to show the obstacles that may be the political regime on the protection of rights; it is also questioning the judge's role as a guardian of freedom. The analysis of this aspect involves an approach to the scope and limitations of the control of state action, whether administrative supervision or control of the constitutionality of laws, knowing that the combination of these two techniques are used in principle to provide citizens with a warranty and insurance to fully exercise their rights and freedoms. Yet again, the judicial remedies designed to ensure the protection of human rights are likely to face the kind of diet that emphasizes the protection of the "revolution" at the expense of all other freedoms. It is in another way to support that the institutional system as a whole constitutes a restriction on the Protection of the Rights. Discussing this reality is exposing the barriers within the same practice of power. Ultimately, the nature of the regime and the ideology of the Libyan determine the form of expression of fundamental rights. That's the whole point of the relationship between public power and freedoms that we propose to study in the context of this work.

Nesta obra, discorre-se sobre os princípios jurídicos, deduzidos do valor justiça, importantes à conformação de um sistema tributário, cujos efeitos econômicos mostrem-se constitucionais em face dos objetivos da Constituição Econômica, dentre os quais se incluem a justiça social e a justiça fiscal. A história constitucional republicana brasileira condicionou o surgimento da técnica da minudência, de modo que se impõe superá-la para reconhecer legítimas limitações ao poder de tributar, implícitas ou explícitas, fora dos capítulos especificamente dedicados à matéria tributária, reconhecendo-se, assim, a unidade inerente ao ordenamento jurídico. O autor conclui que há diversas limitações constitucionais ao exercício de competências tributárias, comprometidas com o valor justiça, determinadas por princípios da Constituição Econômica e por princípios decorrentes da justiça fiscal, implícitos ou explícitos, que determinam os contornos de um sistema tributário ideal, não do ponto de vista da Ciência das Finanças, mas da ordem constitucional vigente, a ser instituído e tutelado pelos formuladores da política tributária que, por isso, não devem buscar objetivos meramente orçamentários, condicionantes de uma desordenada atividade de instituição de tributos, mas o desiderato de instituir um verdadeiro sistema tributário comprometido com objetivos determinados por valores constitucionalmente albergados. / This essay addresses juridical principles, deducted from justice value, important to the conformation of a tributary system which economical effects should prove to be constitutional when compared to the objectives of the Economical Constitution, such as social and fiscal justice. The Brazilian republican constitutional history conditioned the appearance of the detail technique, which imposes the need to surpass it in order to acknowledge legitimate limitations to the power of laying tributes, implicit or explicit, outside the chapter specifically dedicated to tax matter, thus recognizing the intrinsic unity of the legal system. The author concludes that there are several constitutional limitations to the exercise of tax competence, committed to the justice value, determined by principles of the Economic Constitution and by principles resulting from fiscal justice, implicit or explicit, that determine the boundaries of an ideal tax system, not from the perspective of Public Economics, but from the ruling constitutional order, which is to be established and protected by the formulators of tax politics that, therefore, shouldnt aim merely at budget goals, condition to a chaotic activity of tax imposition, but the desire to found a true tax system committed to goals determined by constitutionally sheltered values.

O presente trabalho consiste num estudo analítico sobre a prescrição tributária com a finalidade de, didaticamente, buscar identificar um subsistema jurídico próprio, dotado de normas e valores próprios, que permita o estudo destacado do tema dentro do sistema do direito positivo, a partir de uma análise lógico-sintática da expressão prescrição tal qual referido na alínea b do inciso III do art. 146 da Constituição Federal de 1988 (CF/88)2, que outorga competência ao legislador complementar para fixar normas gerais sobre a prescrição tributária, para construir uma significação possível para tal expressão, identificando sua acepção de base3, não se admitindo que se diga que o seu conteúdo seja vazio, a fim de que se possa identificar o regime jurídico aplicável à prescrição tributária, com a completa compreensão dos limites da competência do legislador complementar e ordinário nesse âmbito, de modo que se possa perceber a existência de uma tríplice4 perspectiva pragmática do uso dessa expressão no discurso do direito positivo, no qual por vezes é tomado como norma prescricional, ou como fato prescricional (hipotético), ou ainda como relação jurídica prescricional, o que já foi anteriormente investigado por outros autores, mas não sob o rótulo aqui sugerido, apesar de pouco explorada, daí porque merecendo melhor atenção, compreensão e aplicação na solução de casos da pragmática jurídica, para, ao final, identificar os eventuais acertos e/ou vacilos da jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) no julgamento dos casos e problemas aqui apresentados. / The present paper consists of an analytical study on tax statute of limitations with the aim of identifying, didactically, a special legal subsystem, endowed with its own normative values and rules, allowing the aforementioned study within the system of positive law, from a logical syntactic analysis of the phrase Statute of Limitations pursuant to as mentioned in Article 146, III, b, of the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution5, which grants to the supplementary law competence concerning establishing general rules with regard to the tax limitation, to constitute a possible meaning to such a phrase, identifying its basic acceptation6, not considering to say that its content is hollow, in order to identify the legal regime applicable to tax limitation, with the comprehensive understanding of the supplementary and ordinary laws competence limits herein, in order to realize the existence of a triple7 pragmatic perspective of using such phrase in the utterance of the positive law, in which is sometimes taken as statute of limitations, or statute of limitations fact (hypothetical), or even as Legal Relationship of Limitations, which has previously been investigated by other authors, but not under the approach suggested hereto, though little investigated, hence why deserves better attention, understanding and application in solving cases of Legal pragmatism, to, in the end, identify any adjustments and/or wanderings of the jurisprudence of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and the Federal Supreme Court (STF) in judging cases and claims presented herein.

A dissertação trata da responsabilidade especial prevista no art. 40 da Lei 6.024/74 para os administradores de instituições financeiras frente aos credores sociais na hipótese da quebra da instituição. É discutida a natureza dessa responsabilidade, se objetiva ou subjetiva, buscando seu exato conteúdo. O tratamento adotado é interdisciplinar, envolvendo diversas áreas do direito e da economia. O direito constitucional fornece a tábua de valores para o sistema, impondo limites, e a teoria geral do direito contribui com a análise do conteúdo e a finalidade das normas de responsabilidade, com o regramento prudencial do Banco Central servindo para o detalhamento das condutas. São então utilizadas as ferramentas de análise econômica do direito, particularmente a teoria dos jogos para a modelagem de um regime de responsabilidade subjetiva, e outro de responsabilidade objetiva, como jogos estratégicos, na forma normal e na extensiva, identificando os pontos de equilíbrio e de eficiência, O resultado aponta para uma ineficiência do modelo de responsabilidade objetiva para o administrador. O modelo de responsabilidade subjetiva revela-se mais eficiente, apontando como desejáveis as ferramentas de delação premiada e inversão do ônus de prova, para mitigar problemas de assimetria de informação entre depositante e instituição financeira. A dissertação conclui que a responsabilização objetiva do administrador seria inconstitucional e ineficiente, e que o regime jurídico atual é de responsabilidade subjetiva, mas que pode ser aprimorado, especialmente tornando mais claras as regras aplicáveis. / The dissertation analyzes financial institutions\' managers\' special liability to creditors in the event of bankruptcy, as established by Brazilian Law 6.204/74 article 40. Its discussed the nature of such a liability, whether a negligence standard or strict liability rule, seeking to clarify its full extent. The approach is interdisciplinary, using many fields of both law and economics. Constitutional Law provides the goals and values for the system, and General Theory of Law contributes to analyzing the content and purpose of liability rules, with the Central Bank\'s prudential supervision rules detailing actions. The tools of economic analysis of law are then used, particularly game theory to model a system based on a negligence standard, and another based in a strict liability standard, as strategic games in both normal form and extensive form, identifying the points of equilibrium and efficiency. The result points to an inefficient model of strict liability for the administrator. The model based on a negligence standard is shown to be more efficient, pointing as desirable tools that grant immunity to whistleblowers and reverse the burden of proof, to mitigate problems of asymmetric information between depositors and financial institutions. The dissertation concludes that the strict liability of the manager would be unconstitutional and inefficient, and that the current legal regime is that of negligence standard liability, but it can be improved, particularly by clarifying the rules.