This thesis analyses minority shareholder protection in common law and civil law systems. Principally, this is done by examining closely-held corporations created under Canadian, Ukrainian and German laws. It examines minority shareholder protection by critically analyzing voting and related rights, the right to information; withdrawal from the company, expulsion right, the dissolution of a company, derivative action and direct action. The thesis also summarizes problems in the civil law system that cannot be solved in favor of minority shareholders. In addition to the above-mentioned, it provides possible solutions to the problems of minority shareholder protection in the civil law system, that is, methods by which to increase protection for minority shareholders against the majority and/or directors. Specifically, it focuses on cumulative voting, common law director’s duties, derivative action and the oppression remedy. Moreover, this thesis analyzes the possibility of incorporating some institutions into civil law legislation and considers obstacles to implementing them.

Le capital social, de par la pluralité de ses fonctions, est le théâtre de la rencontre de l'intérêt des créanciers, des actionnaires et de la société. Sa modification, réalisée à la hausse ou à la baisse, impacte corrélativement l'étendue des prérogatives dont bénéficient ces protagonistes. Si ces derniers peuvent être animés d'objectifs divergents -et doivent, en conséquence, être protégés séparément -ils s'accordent néanmoins sur la nécessité de certaines caractéristiques intrinsèques du capital social. Aussi, il n'est pas surprenant que le législateur se soit attaché à assurer la sauvegarde de leurs droits, soit chacun particulièrement, soit de manière collective. L'étude des différentes mesures de protections prévues par le droit positif révélera tantôt ses imperfections, tantôt ses lacunes et ses incohérences. Sera également mis en exergue le caractère modulable de certains dispositifs, offrant ainsi aux organes sociaux la faculté de les supprimer ou de les façonner en fonction de la vision « distributive» ou« financière» du capital social qu'ils auront arrêtée. Enfin, cette étude mettra en relief l'opportunité d'autoriser sa variabilité sans contrainte si celle-ci est limitée par deux bornes, lesquelles dessineraient le capital« autorisé ». / Due to the multiplicity of its functions, the share capital is the scene where the interests of creditors, shareholders and the company meet. Its modification, whether it be for amplification or reduction, has an impact which corresponds to the extent of the prerogatives which the protagonists enjoy. If the latter may have conflicting objectives -and must therefore be protected separately -they nevertheless agree on the necessity of some intrinsic features of the share capital. This is why it is not surprising that the legislator has made a point of safeguarding their rights, either on an individual basis or collectively. The study of the different protection measures provided for by the positive law sometimes reveals its imperfections, sometimes its shortcomings and its inconsistencies. The adjustable nature of some specific devices will also be highlighted, thereby providing the social organs with the right to remove or shape them according to the "distributive" or "financial" vision of the social capital they will have determined. Finally, this study will highlight whether or not to allow its variability without constraint if it is set within two bounds, which would represent the "authorized" capital.

As medidas defensivas contra tomadas de controle constituem o núcleo de estudo desta dissertação. São instrumentos jurídicos adotados principalmente por companhias abertas com dispersão acionária, visando à proteção contra uma eventual tentativa de tomada de controle. O assunto é de especial interesse no atual momento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, que vem apresentando significativo desenvolvimento nos últimos anos e propiciando meios para a proliferação no Brasil de companhias abertas com dispersão acionária. O estudo do tema é feito concomitantemente à crescente utilização no Brasil de proteções contra tomadas de controle, inclusive por companhias não dotadas de dispersão acionária. Algumas medidas defensivas são inspiradas na experiência prática de outros países e vêm sendo transplantadas para o Brasil sem a adequada harmonização às características do nosso regime jurídico. Este trabalho analisa os efeitos da utilização de medidas defensivas e, na medida do possível, a admissibilidade da adoção de determinadas defesas no Brasil. São também abordados os balizamentos para a postura da administração de companhias diante de tentativas de tomada de controle. São estudados os padrões de tratamento do tema nos principais modelos existentes na experiência internacional, a fim de fornecer subsídios para a criação de uma identidade brasileira no tratamento das defesas contra tentativas de tomada de controle. / The defensive anti-takeover measures constitute the core area of study in this dissertation. These are legal devices adopted mainly by publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion, aiming at protection against an eventual takeover attempt. The subject is of special interest at the current moment of the Brazilian capital markets, which have shown significant development in the recent years, providing means for the proliferation in Brazil of publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion. The study of the issue is done concomitantly with the increase of utilization in Brazil of anti-takeover protections, including by companies without widespread ownership dispersion. Some defensive measures are inspired by the practical experience of other countries, being transplanted to Brazil without the proper harmonization with the characteristics of our own legal system. This work analyzes the effects of the utilization of defensive measures and, to the extent possible, the admissibility of adoption of certain defenses in Brazil. The boundaries for the behavior of the management of companies under takeover attempts are also approached. The patterns for the treatment of this issue in the main existing models in foreign experience are studied, so as to provide subsidies to the creation of a Brazilian identity in the treatment of the defenses against takeover attempts.

Submitted by Liana Issa Lima (liana.issa@gmail.com) on 2018-08-15T18:29:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Liana Issa Lima - versao 20180815.pdf: 1652303 bytes, checksum: e320b696d4c47845489f2f667e0aa766 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Katia Menezes de Souza (katia.menezes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-15T19:43:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liana Issa Lima - versao 20180815.pdf: 1652303 bytes, checksum: e320b696d4c47845489f2f667e0aa766 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-16T13:25:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liana Issa Lima - versao 20180815.pdf: 1652303 bytes, checksum: e320b696d4c47845489f2f667e0aa766 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T13:25:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Liana Issa Lima - versao 20180815.pdf: 1652303 bytes, checksum: e320b696d4c47845489f2f667e0aa766 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-04-18 / Esta dissertação pretende abordar os arranjos institucionais de governança corporativa em empresas estatais listadas existentes na Nova Zelândia, Índia, Argentina e Arábia Saudita. Para tanto, será analisado como é moldado o ambiente institucional no qual operam tais empresas, os problemas de governança corporativa enfrentados e as soluções adotadas em cada uma dessas jurisdições. O objetivo da pesquisa é o de verificar que lições podem ser extraídas e, eventualmente, aplicadas para a melhoria do ambiente institucional brasileiro. Tem a finalidade, portanto, de entender as alternativas institucionais existentes em outros países e que potencialmente poderiam servir de inspiração para os legisladores e reguladores brasileiros, quando da (re)formulação de normas de governança para as empresas estatais listadas no país. / This dissertation aims at approaching the institutional arrangements of corporate governance in listed state-owned companies in New Zealand, India, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia. In order to do that, the structuring of the institutional environment in which such companies operate will be analyzed, including the corporate governance issues they face and the adopted solutions in each one of these jurisdictions. The objective of the research is verifying which lessons can be learned and, at some point, be applied to the improvement of the Brazilian institutional environment. It has the aim, therefore, to understand the institutional alternatives present in other countries and that could potentially serve as inspiration to Brazilian legislators and regulators when considering the (re)formulation of corporate governance norms to listed stateowned companies in the country.

La question de la nature de la firme n’a jamais suscité de consensus parmi les économistes, ce qui signifie que loin d’être épuisé, ce champ de recherche mérite de faire l’objet de nouveaux développements théoriques. Quelles sont les propriétés constitutives et quels sont les mécanismes de gouvernement – interne et externe – des firmes ? Partant d’une analyse critique des théories économiques, cette thèse propose de poser les jalons d’une théorisation de la firme en tant qu’entité réelle émergente fondée sur le pouvoir. Pour ce faire, nous développons une démarche méthodologique originale reposant sur une approche pluridisciplinaire (économie, théorie des organisations et droit) et expliquons que la firme crée des mécanismes génératifs intrinsèques. Pour comprendre les règles constitutives de la firme, nous analysons les relations de pouvoir, lesquelles sont, par nature, plurielles et « cohésives ». Avec l’évolution récente de l’environnement institutionnel, les relations de pouvoir se sont substantiellement modifiées. Que ce soit dans l’entité firme (gouvernement interne) ou dans l’entité firme-réseau (gouvernement externe), nous montrons théoriquement et empiriquement – à partir des enquêtes REPONSE 2004-2005 et ERIE – une relation positive entre le pouvoir et la coopération dans l’activité de production. De nombreuses implications politico-légales et normatives émanent de notre travail de recherche. / The question of the nature of the firm has not lead to a consensus among economists, which means that this research field is not obsolete and makes way for new theoretical investigations. What are the constitutive properties and the internal and external governance mechanisms of firms? Starting from a critical analysis of economic theories, this dissertation proposes some building blocks for a new approach to the firm as a power-based emergent real entity. To do so, an original methodological reasoning based on an interdisciplinary framework (economy, organization theory and law) is proposed and it is shown that the firm produces intrinsic generative mechanisms. In order to understand the constitutive rules of the firm, we analyze power relationships, which are in essence plural and cohesive. With the recent evolution of the institutional environment, power relationships have been substantially modified. Whether in the real entity called “firm” (intra-firm level) or in the real entity called “network-firm” (inter-firm level), we show both theoretically and empirically – from the 2004-2005 REPONSE and ERIE surveys – a positive relationship between power and cooperation in productive activity. Several politico-legal and normative implications result from this dissertation.

Le pacte d’actionnaires se place dans une forme de dépendance unilatérale au contrat de société qui n’est pas sans rappeler le rapport juridique d’accessoire à principal.En effet, s’il est fondamentalement distinct du contrat de société qu’il complète, tout pacte conclu par certains actionnaires, en dehors des statuts, afin d’organiser leurs relations interindividuelles d’actionnaires, trouve nécessairement sa matière et puise sa raison d’être dans le pacte social. Ainsi, la dépendance du pacte au contrat de société se manifeste-t-elle, de la manière la plus évidente, par la caducité qu’entraîne pour le pacte l’arrivée du terme du contrat de société ou la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire d’un partenaire.Dès lors, par analogie avec la règle selon laquelle l’accessoire a vocation à suivre le sort du principal, cette dimension d’accessoire du contrat de société justifie que le pacte subisse l’influence du cadre juridique auquel le contrat de société est lui-même soumis, à savoir le droit des sociétés et, en particulier, l’ordre public sociétaire.Cette dépendance au contrat de société, par essence commune à tous les pactes d’actionnaires en raison de leur objet matériel et de leur cause, est à géométrie variable. Elle repose en effet sur divers facteurs de rattachement au contrat de société que sont l’exercice du droit de vote, la détention des actions ou la qualité d’actionnaire des partenaires, lesquels impriment, selon qu’ils s’immiscent plus ou moins profondément dans le fondement, la structure ou encore le fonctionnement de la société, différents degrés de dépendance dans la relation pacte - contrat de société.Malgré l’hétérogénéité du régime des pactes d’actionnaires, il est alors possible de dégager,à l’aune de cette dimension d’accessoire, une tendance fondamentale qui anime, en droit positif, la jurisprudence relative aux pactes. Cette ligne directrice réside dans la variabilité du degré d’emprise des règles qui encadrent le contrat de société sur le régime des pactes d’actionnaires.La jurisprudence se révèle être, en effet, d’une manière générale et par-delà la casuistique, en cohérence avec cette influence proportionnelle de l’environnement sociétaire à l’intensité du degré de dépendance que présente chaque type de pacte en fonction du facteur qui le rattache au contrat de société. Les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance marquée au contrat de société bénéficient ainsi d’une marge de liberté à la mesure de celle dont bénéficie le contrat de société pour l’aménagement de l’exercice du droit de vote ou de la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire. Au contraire, les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance modérée au contrat de société, qui organisent des cessions ou des acquisitions d’actions,sont plus largement libérés des contraintes auxquelles est soumis le contrat de société au regard du principe de libre négociabilité des actions. Quant à l’influence sur les pactes de certains autres principes d’ordre public sociétaire, tels que la prohibition des clauses léonines ou l’expertise de l’article 1843-4 du Code civil, elle demeure incertaine en droit positif. Toutefois, la jurisprudence tend à reconnaître le particularisme de ces règles et à leur retirer, en conséquence, tout caractère impératif en dehors du cadre des relations entretenues collectivement par les actionnaires avec la société. / Shareholders’ agreement falls into a form of unilateral dependence to the companyagreement that is reminiscent of the legal relationship between the incidental and itsprincipal.Indeed, although it is fundamentally separate from the company agreement, which itsupplements, any agreement concluded by certain shareholders apart from the articles ofassociation, in order to organise their inter-individual shareholders relationships, is,nevertheless, necessarily based on and permitted by the company agreement. Thus, thecontractual dependency of the shareholders’ agreement to the company agreementmanifests itself, in the most obvious way, through the obsoleteness of the shareholders’agreement caused by the termination of the company agreement or by the loss ofshareholder status by a partner.Therefore, by analogy with the rule according to which the incidental is inclined to yield to theprincipal, such kinship to the quality of accessory to the company agreement justifies the factthat the shareholders’ agreement would be under the influence of the legal framework towhich the company’s memorandum and articles of association are submitted, that is to saycorporate law and, in particular, corporate law and order.This dependence to the company agreement, which is in essence common to allshareholders’ agreements due to their material object and cause, turns out to be flexible. Itrests indeed on different connecting factors to the company agreement, such as using thevoting right, shareholding or shareholder status of partners, which imprint, according to howdeep they work into the company foundation, structure or functioning, different degrees ofdependence in the relationship between the shareholders’ agreement and the companyagreement.In spite of the heterogenic regime of the shareholders’ agreements, it is possible to outline, inrespect to this type of accessory status to the company agreement, a crucial tendency thatleads, in positive law, agreements-related case law. This guideline lies in the variability of thehold on shareholders’ agreements regime by the rules that frame the company’smemorandum and articles of association.Indeed, case law proves to be, generally speaking and beyond casuistry, consistentwith this proportional influence of the company environment to the degree of dependenceeach type of shareholders’ agreement is subject to, according to the factor connecting it tothe company agreement. The shareholders’ agreements that show a strong dependence tothe company agreement are given a leeway commensurate with the one the company’smemorandum and articles of association benefit from regarding voting right or loss ofshareholder status arrangements. By contrast, the moderately dependant shareholders’agreements, organising transfer or acquisition of shares, are more widely released from therestrictions that govern the company’s articles of association regarding the principle of freetransferability of shares. Furthermore, the influence on shareholders’ agreements of someother principles of corporate law and order, such as the leonine clause prohibition or theexpertise of Article 1843-4 of the French Civil Code, remain uncertain in positive law.However, case law tends to recognize the distinctive identity of these rules and,consequently, to clear them from any imperative property beyond the frame of therelationships that the shareholders have collectively with the company.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Bushatsky.pdf: 1380757 bytes, checksum: 47bccc0b95080221650937333369ec7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-09 / This doctoral thesis presents the principle of negotiating security, relating it to corporate law. For such, the principles of rules are differentiated, exposing the basic principles of corporate law, emphasizing that it is due to private autonomy that the partners subject themselves to the will of the majority in corporate resolutions, just as decisions made should follow the interests of the corporation. After this, the principle of negotiating security was conceptualized, which is sustained over 4 (four) pillars: objective good faith (loyalty), confidence theory, principle of correction (inspired by the Italian law) and private autonomy. It was asserted that loyalty, reliability, correction and subjective and objective autonomy jointly studied provide the base value for the interpretation of the Law and Legal Affairs, bringing security to corporate relations, within the legal framework of trade, creating the standard of behavior expected from all those involved in trade. By combining the principle of negotiating security with the principle of corporate preservation, it can be demonstrated how conflicts of interest involving the company, partners and administrators should be resolved. Following, first an overview of business risk and the multiple facets of justice, then a review on the legal protection of private investment, arriving at the conclusion that it must comply with its corporate function, in order to expose the main aspects of the business corporation. In order to prove the understanding, doctrinal passages were presented, recent decisions of the Brazilian courts on corporate law were analyzed, as well as how theoretical examples were used as illustration. Finally, the paper emphasizes that the principle of negotiating security must be applied in corporate law, protecting society, partners, administrators, and, thus, helping both the economic and the social development / Na presente tese de doutorado apresenta-se o princípio da segurança negocial relacionando-o com o direito societário. Para tanto, diferenciam-se os princípios das regras, expondo, depois, os princípios basilares do direito societário, destacando que é graças à autonomia privada que os sócios se sujeitam à vontade da maioria nas deliberações sociais, assim como as tomadas de decisões devem seguir o interesse da sociedade. Após, conceituou-se o princípio da segurança negocial sustentando-o em 4 (quatro) pilares: boa-fé objetiva (lealdade), teoria da confiança, princípio da correção (inspirado no direito italiano) e autonomia privada. Asseverou-se que lealdade, confiança, correção e a autonomia subjetiva e objetiva estudadas conjuntamente trazem o valor base para a interpretação da Lei e dos negócios jurídicos, trazendo segurança às relações sociais, dentro do regime jurídico comercial, criando o padrão de comportamento esperado de todos os envolvidos no comércio. Conjugando o princípio da segurança negocial com o princípio da preservação da empresa, demonstrou-se como os conflitos de interesses envolvendo sociedade, sócios e administradores devem ser resolvidos. Seguiu-se, primeiro com uma visão geral sobre o risco empresarial e as múltiplas facetas sobre justiça, depois realizando uma crítica sobre a proteção jurídica ao investimento privado, concluindo que este deve cumprir sua função social, para assim expor os principais aspectos da sociedade empresária. Para provar o entendimento, trouxeram-se passagens doutrinárias, analisaram-se recentes decisões dos tribunais brasileiros sobre direito societário assim como se utilizaram exemplos teóricos como ilustração. Por fim, ressaltamos que o princípio da segurança negocial deve ser aplicado no direito societário, protegendo sociedade, sócios, administradores, e, ajudando, consequentemente, no desenvolvimento econômico e social

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Guarilha P de Freitas.pdf: 880892 bytes, checksum: 40e48c5886660a2ffbfb45835061694f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-06 / This work aims to analyze and explore the controversial and relevant aspects inserted in the context of the working control, giving special emphasis to the aspects related to the mandatory bid rule and to the responsibility of the controlling shareholder for the misuse of his control power. Therefore, we have analyzed (i) the origin and the economic justification of the pattern of dispersion of the company s capital stock, which permits the appearance of the working control; (ii) the dynamism of the corporate control; (iii) the main aspects associated to the definition of the working control; (iv) the mandatory bid for the changing of the corporate control; (v) the responsibility of the minority shareholders for the misuse of the corporate power / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar e explorar os aspectos controversos e relevantes presentes num contexto de controle minoritário, sobretudo aqueles relacionados à oferta pública por alienação de controle e à responsabilidade do acionista controlador. Para tanto, analisamos (i) a origem e a justificativa econômica do modelo de dispersão acionaria, modelo esse que propicia o surgimento do controle minoritário; (ii) a dinâmica do poder de controle; (iii) os principais contornos relacionados à definição do controle minoritário; (iv) a oferta pública por alienação de controle; e (v) a responsabilidade do acionista controlador minoritário por abuso do poder de controle

Corporate governance practice differs regionally and nationally, depending on how each legal environment protects minority investors, capital markets and company ownership structure. Governance can also change spectacularly in regions or countries with comparatively high levels of institutional investment. The notion of institutional investors' activism is increasingly important in developed markets as the ideal corporate governance mechanism to monitor corporate managers and overcome agency problems arising from dispersed corporate ownership in modern companies. These institutions can work together on an improved corporate governance framework more effectively than individual investors, monitoring corporate controllers of listed companies in emerging and developing markets, using their influence more vigorously and in ways more fitting to a concentrated ownership environment such as that in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the role of institutional investors in emerging and developing markets will depend strongly on institutional investors' activism and the arrangements determined and undertaken by the corporate governance regulatory framework in these markets. In considering the influential role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance practice, a high level of minority shareholder protection thus remains an indicator of good corporate governance and regulatory pressure of rights and incentives, which are necessary to empower non-controlling shareholders in these concentrated ownership markets to exert a strong activist influence in monitoring corporate activities, thus improving the corporate governance practices of investee companies. In this context, this thesis contends that in Saudi Arabia in particular, shareholder involvement in corporate governance is inadequate, as a result of a variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. It goes on to identify what improvements are necessary and where, to ensure a sound framework for effective institutional investor activism and to improve the level of minority shareholder protection. It also cautions Saudi legislators against erecting hurdles to the future engagement of Saudi and foreign institutional investors in monitoring corporate activities which may affect the conditions for access, allocation and monitoring of equity, which is so important for value creation and sustainable economic growth. The main benefit to be derived from this research is that it facilitates a fuller understanding of the Saudi approach to corporate governance, the corporate ownership environment and trends in the capital market. The analysis also deepens knowledge of corporate governance regimes, including the role of institutional investors, and of their characteristics and investment behaviours. In short, it considers whether institutional investors are willing or have been encouraged to use their power to engage in the companies in which they invest and whether they are qualified to solve the agency problem.

Le financement de l’économie sociale et solidaire (ESS) se trouve actuellement au centre des préoccupations des acteurs et des observateurs de celle-ci. La question de savoir comment le droit peut faciliter le financement des entreprises de l’ESS mérite donc qu’on y consacre une analyse systémique. Le cadre juridique du financement de l’ESS est posé par les normes impératives en droit des sociétés et des groupements de l’ESS. La loi n°2014-856 du 31 juillet 2014 relative à l'ESS dresse une liste limitative des formes juridiques appartenant à l’ESS : associations loi 1901, fondations, coopératives, mutuelles et sociétés commerciales sous certaines conditions. Afin de discuter les normes impératives ayant un impact sur le financement des entreprises de l’ESS, la première partie de cette thèse reconstitue l’offre éparse de statuts et leur régime juridique. En découle, dans la seconde partie, une critique ordonnée de l’accès aux ressources financières, selon qu’elles sont destinées aux organisations sans but lucratif (OSBL) ou aux sociétés, libérales ou avec une contrepartie, qu’elles soient le fruit d’un investissement ou qu’elles proviennent d’une des parties prenantes. Cette thèse aboutit à cinq séries de propositions de réformes : la redéfinition de l’ESS pour un fléchage plus affûté des ressources financières dédiées ; la révision des normes impératives entravant la performance financière des OSBL ; la stimulation de l’investissement dans l’ESS ; la sécurisation des ressources des entreprises de l’ESS au moyen de l’évaluation de l'impact social ; la pérennisation des aides d’État, eu égard à l’utilité sociale, et des compensations pour obligation de service public / Nowadays the financing of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) lies at the forefront of the concerns plaguing operators and observers in the sector. Therefore, how can SSE financing be eased by law is an issue that deserves a systemic analysis. The legal framework for SSE financing has been set by peremptory norms of SSE corporate law. French act n°2014-856 of 31 July 2014 on the SSE establishes a restrictive list of legal forms that automatically belong to the SSE: non-profit organisations, foundations, cooperatives, mutual societies and commercial companies under certain conditions. With a view to discussing the peremptory norms which affect the financing of social enterprises, the first section of this thesis gives an overview of the SSE statutes and their scattered legal regime. As a result, the second section provides a sorted review of the access to financial resources, whether they are intended for not-for-profit or for-profit organisations, with or without consideration, and whether they stem from an investment or are provided by a stakeholder. This thesis leads to five series of reform proposals: redefining the SSE for a better earmarking of the dedicated financial resources; revising the peremptory norms that hinder the financial performance of not-for-profit organisations; stimulating investments in the SSE; securing the resources for social enterprises through the assessment of their social impact; perpetuating both state aid regarding social utility and compensations for public service obligations