Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.

政治行動（或政治實踐）這個觀念，自希臘至今，經濟眾多思想家以各種不同的基礎 、途徑與關懷在探討著，也獲得了眾說紛云的成果，並被引用作為政治的抗爭（在政 治史與思想史這兩方面，都同時呈現出政治行動在理論與實際、理論與實踐之間的關 係）。本論文便是在解析當代最受爭議的政治哲學家－－漢娜•阿蓮（Hannah Aren- dt，１９０６－７５）－－的最主要課題－－政治行動論。 本論文的處理方式，是將探討主題安置在整個政治哲學的發展歷程中，來拆解漢娜• 阿蓮政治行動論的繼承、誤解、混淆與特色，也就是試圖對漢娜•阿蓮作一政治哲學 意義上的評價。它的處理內容是：一、政治哲學（傳統－現代－當代）在理論與實踐 的對比關係；二、政治實踐在傳統（以亞里斯多德為代表）、現代（以康德為代表） 及當代（以馬克斯為代表）的意義及其差異，並作為漢娜•阿蓮政治行動論的比較基 礎；三、漢娜•阿蓮政治行動論所包含的三項課題：政治行動的內容，政治行動的異 化，以及政治行動的當代意義；四、比較前兩項結果，來探討漢娜•阿蓮政治行動論 的繼承，誤解特色與混淆，並以當代政治哲學在理論與實踐的關係之研究成果，作為 對漢娜•阿蓮的最後評價與定位。

Ascetic Citizens: Religious Austerity and Political Crisis in Anglo-American Literature, 1681-1799, attends to a number of scenes of voluntary self-restraint in literary, political, and religious writings of the long eighteenth century, scenes that stage, what Alexis de Tocqueville calls, “daily small acts of self-denial” in the service of the nation. Existing studies of asceticism in Anglo-American culture during the period are extremely slim. Ascetic Citizens fills an important gap in the scholarship by re-framing religious practices of seclusion and self-denial as a broadly-defined set of civic practices that permeate the political, religious, and gender discourses of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-American culture. This thesis focuses on the transatlantic relevance of the ascetic citizen—a figure whose rhetorical utility derives from its capacity, as a marker of political and religious moderation, to deploy individual practices of religious austerity as a means of suturing extreme political binaries during times of political crisis. My conception of asceticism’s role in Anglo-American society is informed by an understanding of ascetic citizenship as a cluster of concepts and cultural practices linking the ascetic’s focus on bodily control to republican theories of political subjectivity. The notion that political membership presupposes a renunciation of personal liberties on the part of the individual citizen represents one of the key assumptions of ascetic citizenship. The future guarantee of individual political rights is ensured by present renunciations of self-interest. As such, the ascetic citizen functions according to the same economy by which the religious ascetic’s right to future eternal reward is ensured by present acts of pious self-abnegation. That is to say, republican political liberty is enabled by what we might call an ascetic prerequisite in which the voluntary self-sacrifice of civic rights guarantees the state’s protection of such rights from the infringements of one’s neighbour. While the abstemious nature of ascetic practice implies efficiency grounded in economic frugality, bodily self-restraint, and physical isolation, the ascetic citizen functions as the sanctioned perversion of a normative devotional practice that circumvents the division between profane self-interest and sacred disinterestedness. The relevance of ascetic citizenship to political culture is its political fluidity, its potential to exceed the ideological functions of the dominant culture while revealing the tension that exists between endorsement of, and dissent from, the civic norm. Counter-intuitively, the ascetic citizen’s practice is marked by a celebration of moderation, of the via media. Forging a space at the threshold between endorsement/dissent, the ascetic citizen maps the dialectic movement of cultural extremism, forging a rhetorically useful site of ascetic deferral characterized by the subject’s ascetic withdrawal from making critical decisions. Ascetic Citizens provides a detailed investigation of how eighteenth-century Anglo-American authors such as Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson, Hannah Webster Foster, and Charles Brockden Brown conceive of individual subjectivity as it exists in the pause or retired moment between competing political orders.

This document examines the work in my MFA thesis exhibition. The objects in that installation address specific socio-aesthetic sites of class and power. The personal and cultural narratives examined here further explain the objects’ symbolic potential.

This dissertation is concerned with a fundamental problem at the heart of Arendt’s The Human Condition—namely, ‘the problem of idleness’. This problem is related to the three types of human Arendt identifies as correlated to dominant activities in one’s life, animal laborans, homo faber, and the acting person. It explores Arendt’s predictions of an oncoming automation crisis, and the possibility of a corresponding crisis in the production—consumption cycle. The problem of idleness can be understood as the claim that if people are provided freedom from job-holding so that they may pursue other activities, they would likely turn to consumption to occupy their time. I claim that this problem of idleness is important in any consideration of an oncoming automation crisis, especially in relation to Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a solution to such a crisis. I claim that there is a hole in the UBI literature concerning this problem of idleness, and if left unaddressed it would result in both an ineffective UBI, and in a crisis of meaning for the general populace. This dissertation demonstrates what the problem of idleness is, why it is important, and what possible solutions exist. This contributes to the UBI literature by diagnosing and attempting to solve a gap in the literature which I argue would cause practical challenges in the implementation and stability of a UBI system. I also contribute to the Arendtian literature by problematizing traditional readings of Arendt, and offering a reappraisal of her thought on Marx, art, and the social.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 marcelo.pdf: 1135435 bytes, checksum: 7bafe053ff5c58fe43b45a4279e7a70b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-05-23 / Politics permeates all aspects of human dealings in society. This defense advances a jusphilosophical investigation on the reflections of Hannah Arendt in relation to: - Law: the intuition of the just/unjust, licit/illicit, lawful/unlawful and legal/illegal; - Power: its distinction of violence; its correlation with vigor, strength and authority; - Legitimacy: the differences between legitimation and legitimacy, its fundamental of validity, its importance for politics and law. The concepts of power, violence, as well as their correlates: vigor, strength and authority have led to many mistakes. A limiting vision of these concepts would be to view them only from a domain standpoint. What Arendt proposes is to analyze them individually, showing their particularities and the breadth of these concepts in the context of politics. Thus, power, along the lines of Arendt s rationale, corresponds to the human activity to act in unison . It is grounded on the freedom of action and speech, without which the public sphere loses its raison d être. Acting in unison is never the property of an individual, but belongs to a group that keeps it united. When we say that someone is in power , this means that he was sworn-in by a certain number of people to act on his behalf. It is here that power finds its legitimacy. Vigor denotes something in the singular: it is the property inherent to an object or person and belongs to its character. Vigor has a peculiar independence and, for this reason, it is the nature of a group and of its power to turn against independence, the property of individual vigor. Strength, oft confused with violence, should only indicate the energy released by physical or social movements. It is the natural quality of an isolated individual. It is measurable, reliable and unchangeable. In a struggle between two men, the decisive factor is strength, not power / A política permeia todos os aspectos dos negócios humanos na sociedade. Este arrazoado leva adiante uma investigação jusfilosófica acerca das reflexões de Hannah Arendt em relação a: - Direito: a intuição do justo/injusto, lícito/ilícito, jurídico/antijurídico e legal/ilegal; - Poder: a sua distinção da violência; sua correlação com o vigor, a força e autoridade; - Legitimidade: as diferenças entre legitimação e legitimidade, seu fundamento de validade, sua importância para a política e direito. Os conceitos de poder, violência, assim como seus correlatos: vigor, força e autoridade têm prestado a muitos equívocos. Uma visão limitante destes conceitos seria vê-los somente sob a óptica do domínio. O que Arendt se propõe a fazer é analisá-los individualmente, mostrando suas particularidades e a amplitude destes conceitos no âmbito da política. Desse modo, o poder, no rastro do pensamento de Arendt, corresponde à atividade humana para agir em concerto . Fundamenta-se ele na liberdade de ação e do discurso sem os quais a esfera pública perde sua razão de ser. O agir em concerto nunca é propriedade de um indivíduo, mas pertence a um grupo que o conserva unido. Quando dizemos que alguém está em poder isto significa que foi empossado por um certo número de pessoas para agir em seu nome. É aqui que o poder encontra sua legitimidade. O vigor designa algo no singular: é a propriedade inerente a um objeto ou pessoa e pertence a seu caráter. O vigor possui uma independência peculiar, por isso, é a natureza de um grupo e de seu poder voltar-se contra a independência, a propriedade do vigor individual. A força, muito confundida com a violência, deveria indicar somente a energia liberada por movimentos físicos ou sociais. Ela é qualidade natural de um indivíduo isolado. É mensurável, confiável, imutável. Na luta entre dois homens, o que decide é a força, e não o poder

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Edith de Azevedo Marques.pdf: 1312593 bytes, checksum: 100558e3701e6f194cb50f0c71b94f7d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-22 / The development of the present paper has as objective a reflection on the right to peace in the classification of fundamental rights. The analysis of this intention lies in a reflection on the thinker Hannah Arendt, considered a fighter for the Jewish folk under Nazi persecution that culminated in the holocaust, in which millions of Jews were exterminated in an extremely cruel way. This violence against Jews made Hannah Arendt turn her life into a constant battle for peace with great determination in actions of courage and bravery. The peace we will talk about in this study refers to the peace not meaning the opposite of war but of violence, considering war a type of violence. We will briefly analyze two works of Hannah Arendt: ―The Origins of totalitarianism‖ and ―Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil‖, also developing historical, social and politic aspects, about the facts that raised the interest of their author. Finally, we present the concept of peace within the juridical norm, talking about social peace that derives from the function of the right of harmonizing relationships between subjects / A linha de desenvolvimento do presente trabalho tem como objetivo uma reflexão sobre o direito à paz, na classificação dos direitos fundamentais. A análise dessa pretensão nasce de uma reflexão voltada para a pensadora Hannah Arendt, considerada uma combatente em defesa do povo judeu, sujeito à perseguição nazista, culminada com o holocausto, onde foram exterminados milhões de judeus, de forma extremamente cruel. Essa violência contra os judeus fez com que Hannah Arendt fizesse, durante toda sua vida, uma constante luta pela paz entregando-se com determinação em ações de grande coragem e destemor. Essa paz, tratada nesse estudo, refere-se à paz não como o contrário da guerra, mas da violência, considerada a guerra um tipo de violência. São analisadas, de forma breve, duas obras de Hannah Arendt: ―Origens do totalitarismo‖ e ―Eichmann em Jerusalém: um relato sobre a banalidade do mal‖, desenvolvendo também aspectos históricos, sociais e políticos sobre os acontecimentos que suscitaram o interesse de sua autora. Para finalizar, apresenta-se a concepção de paz no âmbito da norma jurídica, tratando a paz social decorrente da função do direito de harmonizar as relações intersubjetivas

O direito à verdade frente a graves violações de direitos humanos foi criado recentemente e tem um significado jurídico que permanece incerto em diversos aspectos relevantes. As divergências em torno do seu conceito, que ainda está em formação, geram problemas práticos quando se busca tornar esse direito efetivo. A tese analisa a questão que está na base do debate jurídico-dogmático sobre esse direito, a saber, o significado que o termo verdade adquire ao se tornar o seu objeto. É feita uma investigação sobre a forma como este tema é abordado pelos estudos sobre justiça de transição e sobre como se deu a emergência e o desenvolvimento do direito à verdade no direito internacional dos direitos humanos, nas esferas universal e interamericana. O objetivo é, depois, buscar compreender o que, de um ponto de vista teórico, fez com que surgisse na história e no pensamento político-jurídico a necessidade de sua criação e passou a alimentar o esforço para a sua conceituação. Essa análise aponta que a verdade almejada com o direito em estudo tem outras dimensões para além da busca de informações desconhecidas sobre casos individuais de violações a direitos humanos. Como o tema da verdade, sabidamente, é de enorme extensão no campo filosófico, o presente trabalho faz uso de temas de reflexão de Hannah Arendt, que para essa temática tem tido grande repercussão inclusive em sede doutrinária, com o fim de, por meio de um desenvolvimento extensivo, examinar as diferentes dimensões do problema. / The right to the truth concerning gross human rights violations was created recently, and has a legal meaning that remains uncertain in many relevant aspects. The disagreements about its concept, which is still in development, cause practical problems when one tries to make this right effective. The thesis analyses the issue that underlies the legal-dogmatic debate about this right, i.e., the meaning of the term truth when it becomes its object. An investigation is undertaken on how this theme is addressed by studies on transitional justice and also on the emergence and development of the right to the truth in international human rights law, in the universal and in the inter-American systems. The goal is then to try to understand what, from a theoretical point of view, led to the emergence in history and political-legal thought of the need for its creation, and began to feed the effort to its conceptualization. This analysis indicates that the truth sought with the right examined here has dimensions other than the search for unknown information about individual cases of human rights violations. The theme of truth being, as known, a subject of enormous extension in the philosophical field, the present study makes use of topics of reflection by Hannah Arendt, which have had a great repercussion on this subject even in legal dogmatic thought, in order to examine, through an extensive development, the different dimensions of the problem. By doing so, it is intended to shed light on the way the conceptualization of the right to the truth is being consolidated and on the difficulties it faces.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ana.pdf: 567316 bytes, checksum: 92ee3a85ae2f1f2887af1780af36f0f3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-05-18 / The present study aims to connect the conception offered by the philosopher Hannah Arendt about the narratives of historical events with narrative of personal facts, most specifically the ones that occur during clinical psychology, rendering favourable the comprehension that man may have about himself, as the co-author of his own life. The starting-point for these thoughts concerns the way of life of the modern man, who, rooted out and heir of a world broken up with tradition, may become ill as an alternative to stand living. The growing absence of public spaces for the search of common benefit has been restricting people s suffering to the private ambit, making illness be understood as a biological or affective deficiency, thus individual. This effort in seeking in philosophy bases to the clinical work reflection is justified by the interest in understanding human existence in order to amplify the specific view of psychology about the so-called psychic sufferings. Arendt s philosophy offers resources for this consideration, most specifically about the concepts of narrative and comprehension that can be transferred to the psychotherapy extent. Understanding oneself by telling its own story is based on the idea that allows the actor of a biography to become a self-spectator as well as a narrator to the others. Nevertheless, this activity is not solitary. In order to make the self-comprehension happen it is necessary for the personal stories narrative to be dialogical, thus presenced by a witness and arisen from a truths discoverer meeting. These truths, although never absolute, always reveal the hero of his own story / O presente estudo propõe relacionar o entendimento que a pensadora Hannah Arendt oferece a respeito da narrativa de acontecimentos históricos com a narrativa de histórias pessoais, mais especificamente, as que ocorrem na psicologia clínica, propiciando a compreensão que o homem pode ter de si mesmo, como co-autor da sua vida. O que se tomou como ponto de partida para essas reflexões diz respeito ao modo de viver do homem moderno, que, desenraizado e herdeiro de um mundo rompido com a tradição, pode encontrar no adoecimento uma alternativa para dar conta do existir. A crescente ausência de espaços públicos para a busca do bem comum, tem restringido o sofrimento das pessoas ao âmbito privado, fazendo com que o adoecimento seja entendido apenas como uma deficiência biológica ou afetiva, portanto individual. Esse esforço em buscar na filosofia fundamentos para a reflexão do trabalho clínico se justifica pelo interesse em compreender a existência humana, a fim de ampliar a visão específica da psicologia quanto aos sofrimentos denominados psíquicos . A filosofia de Arendt oferece recursos para essa reflexão, mais especificamente quanto aos seus conceitos de narrativa e compreensão, que podem ser transpostos para o âmbito da psicoterapia. Compreender-se narrando a própria história, tem por base a faculdade do pensamento que permite ao ator de uma biografia tornar-se um espectador de si mesmo e narrar-se aos demais. No entanto, essa atividade não se dá de modo solitário. Para que a compreensão de si mesmo se dê, é necessário que a narrativa de histórias pessoais seja dialógica, que tenha a presença de uma testemunha, e que surja de um encontro ensejador de verdades, jamais absolutas, mas reveladoras do herói de sua história

This dissertation reconsiders the relationship between fiction and slavery in American literary culture. “Prisoners of Style” shows how writers from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century, including Hannah Crafts, Mark Twain, Charles Chesnutt, and William Faulkner, wrestled with enslavement. They found it not only a subject to be written about, but also a problem of characterization. Slavery and the ontological sorcery through which it produced a new kind of individual—the individual who is also a thing—led these authors to rethink basic formal assumptions about realist fiction, especially about what constitutes a literary character. The writers I discuss did not set out to argue for the slave’s humanity or to render her interiority, but instead sought to represent the systematic unmaking of black personhood perpetrated by the laws and institutions that governed chattel slavery in the US. They set out to reveal the ideological violence perpetrated against enslaved blacks, and they did so by writing characters who embodied the categorical uncertainty of the slave, characters who were not allegories for real, full people. The tradition of writing I describe does not represent the fullness of enslaved “persons”; instead it renders something far more abstract: the epistemology that undergirded enslavement—those patterns of thought that preconditioned slavery itself. The authors I study understood fictionality as a thorny ethical, epistemological, and political problem. In my chapter on Crafts, for example, I look at The Bondwoman’s Narrative alongside a set of non-fiction texts about Jane Johnson, the slave who preceded her in John Hill Wheeler’s household. Reading the novel against legal documents, pamphlets, and histories about Johnson and her escape from Wheeler, the chapter explores what fiction could do that these other modes of writing could not. In moments of sleep, amnesia, and daydreaming, Crafts resists the normative logic of subjecthood and individual rights that underpins the representations of Johnson. In the second half of the project, I demonstrate the significance of fictionality to American literary realism’s evolution into modernism. The final chapter, on Faulkner, places two of his Yoknapatawpha novels within the context of his interest in modernist painting and sculpture. Work by Picasso, Matisse, and other visual artists inspired his concern with surfaces and flatness, leading to a meditation on artifice that runs throughout his major novels. I argue that his flatness—his insistence on the non-referential quality of fiction—is crucial for understanding his characterization and philosophy of history history, in particular the history of Southern plantation slavery.