台灣解嚴之後，社會運動團體除了抗爭行動外，漸漸以體制內的修訂法律為主要手段。婦女運動團體也不例外。婦運團體推動的婦女法案，立法過程大部分都需要花很長一段時間和政府機關周旋。家庭暴力防治法則是一個特殊的例子，因為它在立法院裡，從提案到通過只花費一年多的時間，而且相關行政單位並沒有提出相對版本一起競逐。 筆者從歷史制度主義切入，觀察家庭暴力防治法（包含其前身―婚姻暴力防治法）的立法過程。最開始婚姻暴力議題因為鄧如雯殺夫案而受到注目；之後婦女新知基金會接受內政部補助，著手研究婚姻暴力，但研究報告出來後卻完全停擺；半年後現代婦女基金會以高鳳仙法官翻譯的美國模範家庭暴力法為藍本，擬定家庭暴力防治法草案；最後家暴法在立法院內經過數次政黨協商後，三讀通過。這中間的四年，對於婚姻暴力議題的宣導而言，因為受制於新聞熱潮的快速消退，整個政治環境被修憲、選舉、反核四等議題綁住，以及傳統家庭倫理和兩性相處觀念，所以受到的注視和討論有限。法案擬定方面，則因為有大環境有彭婉如案和白曉燕案的刺激，國際社會的風潮，制度上則有趨於健全的政黨協商機制和現代婦女基金會的董事長潘維剛佔有有利的政治地位（即身為執政黨資深立委，政府單位願意與其合作），加上推法策略上刻意隱藏性別問題，因此法案可以快速通過。 本研究發現，整個家暴法的立法過程，因為整個社會環境對法案擬定的刺激，強於政治環境的影響，制度上有政黨協商機制可以暫時調解警察和司法兩機關的權力鬥爭，策略上避開父權體制忌諱的性別意識，因此家暴法才能夠異於其他婦女法案，在立法院內順利審查、快速通過。

本文要旨在回答中國大陸的能源戰略是如何形成，並探討此一戰略如何影響中國大陸的石油安全。本文主從歷史制度主義的觀點主張中國能源體制是決定中國的石油戰略最重要的因素。解釋中國的能源部門在經濟改革與國際化的內、外部環境下，產生制度變遷，進而形成不同時期的石油戰略。在回答中國大陸日益龐大的石油需求與進口石油依賴，使得政府制訂出提升能源使用效率、節約能源、能源多元化與確保海外石油供應 但由於中國為保護國有石油企業的壟斷角色，對於「迎進來」的市場進入條件設下許多條件限制，對外又採取積極的石油外交，使得國際社會對中國產生重商主義與保護主義的疑慮。 中國的能源部門自1980年以來已經歷幾個階段的改革，第一階段是從1982年至1987年，強調要計畫經濟為主、市場力量為輔的能源制度改革；第二階段是從1988至1992年，重點在於國有企業的改革，鼓勵國有企業集團化；第三階段是從1993至1997年，重點在政企分離，並把配置資源的基礎性職能轉移給市場；第四階段是從1998至2002年，重點在加強國有資產的監管與國有企業經營，並初步建立宏觀能源調控體系；第五階段則是自2003年以降，主要的改革目標在建立跨部門的能源協調機制與對外的競爭力。 本文但由於「漸進主義」式的制度變遷使得能源部門體制改革仍存在許多問題，諸如能源部門分散、能源監管部門眾多、國家安全思維與既得利益等，使得政府部門考量其能源安全時，政府干預仍多於市場思維，即便自改革開放以來國家能力已不斷衰退。但在能源辦與發改委能源局的人力有限以及能源部門缺乏效率的情形下，擁有龐大資源的三大國有石油企業（中石油、中石化、中海油）無疑「挾持」政府的決策，例如理論上中央政府可完全控制與審核國有企業的海外投資，但實際國有企業通常是在海外投案案定局後才通知發改委與國務院。中國的能源決策中的缺乏效率常來自於既得利益者的把持，而不願在整體的政治與經濟政策上肩負起更多的政策責任，例如中央政府與國企對於戰備儲油到底由誰出資的內部爭論。 未來中國的能源戰略會持續採取「迎進來、走出去」的方向；近年來政府試圖改革其能源決策程序，透過建立跨部會的決策協調機制試圖重奪能源決策的主導性，因此於2005年5月正式成立「能源領導小組」，並積極透入政府能源白皮書與能源相關法案的草擬，政府的舉動等於是將能源政策的制訂再度「中央化」。未來中國能源戰略的最大挑戰仍來自於能源體制能否深化改革，並且制訂出對外、對內策略一致的能源戰略，以因應中國未來的石油需求以及消減國際社會的疑慮。 / The new facet of global oil politics and China’s surging oil demand have forced the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises to secure foreign oil supplies and to implement energy efficiency. However, systemic level or state-centered theories have provided limited theoretic orientation to explain China’s state behaviors and foreign behavior. It is essential to explore China’s energy institution and energy strategy behind its quest for oil security. That is, China’s foreign strategy should be put into broader context of China’s institutional evolution and domestic/foreign energy policy-making process. This research applies historical institutionalism to look at history evolution of China’s energy institution and energy strategy (especially oil strategy). Chinese energy institution has experienced four main stages of institutional evolution since 1980s. The main themes of four stages have emphasized different administrative, institutional, and energy goals. Meanwhile, institutional critical junctures and feedbacks (formation and reproduction) also have existed in every stage. The first phrase (1980-1992) emphasized how to integrate market forces into China’s bureaucratic institution with socialist characteristics and the market oriented reforms faced several institutional challenges due to necessity of central planning; the second phrase (1993-1997) was characterized by slight and limited institutional restructuring within the energy sector because market force did not gain political support from the leadership. The Chinese government established both the State Energy Commission (SEC) (1980-82) and the Ministry of Energy (MOE) (1988-93) in the wake of acute energy shortages to re-centralize authority over the energy sector. However, neither institution could effectively coordinate and implement energy policy, partly because they could not overcome the vested interests in sectional industries. The third phrase (1998-2002) was characterized by radical institutional reforms on conglomerating SOEs and delimiting administrative power. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) along with the Energy Bureau within it have taken over full governmental regulatory and public sector responsibility from SOEs. However, NDRC functions not as powerful as SOEs do. Therefore, the fourth phrase (2003 until now) then put attention on the establishment of a super-ministerial interagency, revivification of administrative power, and emphasis of foreign competitiveness. The establishment of State Energy Leading Group (SELG) aims at regaining strong central authority and to correcting turbulent oil strategies made on a base of institutional constraints. Above all, China’s institutional evolution is characteristic of state-regulated marketization, limited property right reforms, strategic preference, and departmentalism in China’s energy sector since 1980s. The institutional evolution has constrained China’s energy institution from planning a long-term national energy strategy. China’s energy sector continuously confirms institutional formation by the support of highest leadership and mainstream ideology, and confirms institutional reproduction between the directive and liberal forces, between the government and market forces. Meanwhile, international responses to China’s hunting behaviors are to play either a conductive role in impelling China’s institutional reforms and in adjusting its foreign behaviors. To prevent serious energy competition and to enhance international cooperation, China has shown its willingness to communicate with other nations on oil issues. However, China also needs to show its determination to implement domestic demand-side measures and a market approach instead of implementing protectionist “welcome-in” and aggressive “going out” policies. Ongoing institutional reforms still determines whether the China’s energy institution will ensure the country’s energy security. In the short term, the establishment of the central authority in the energy sector will improve departmental coordination and policy persistance. However, in the long term, China’s ongoing institional reforms need to integrate more market forces, proceed property right reforms, and reshape relationship between the government and market. Without deeper institutional reforms, energy bureaucrats and SOEs would be dragged into institutional process of formation and reproduction but gain limited results in meeting China’s oil security.

Many economies throughout the world were devastated by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Ireland in particular experienced a severe collapse in its housing market. Despite the progression of European-influenced planning policy that was meant to promote balanced regional development in Ireland, the country's housing market vastly overbuilt, exacerbating a housing market crash that ended the Celtic Tiger era. Drawing on Europeanization and historical institutionalism as theoretical frameworks, this thesis argues that the link between these EU-influenced policy principles and local Irish planning practice was weak during an important phase of Ireland's economic growth. This conclusion is demonstrated through the analysis of a case study, McEvoy and Smith v. Meath County Council. The findings show that while Ireland's national government created an ambitious National Spatial Strategy modeled on EU principles, non-binding Regional Planning Guidelines allowed local authorities to continue granting zoning changes and permissions. These decisions were therefore uninhibited by the constraints of population projections, consideration for infrastructure provision, and overall good planning practice. This research calls into question the effectiveness of transferring policy principles from the EU to Member States. It suggests more generally that to implement policy and law successfully, policy makers must appreciate the societal and economic context in which these rules will operate.

This thesis contributes to the growing EU-US literature by comparing and explaining the evolution of urban policy in these two federal systems. The thesis begins with a puzzle: after introducing two similar and equally short-lived regeneration schemes—Model Cities (MC) (1967) and URBAN (1994)—the US and the EU followed different paths: the former replaced MC with the durable Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in 1974, while the latter ended urban policy by ‘mainstreaming’ URBAN in its regional policy in 2006. To solve the puzzle I formulate a two-part argument: first, I explain the similarities between MC and URBAN as resulting from three factors: a favourable political context, holistic urban policy ideas, and centre-periphery mistrust. I then explain subsequent trajectories by looking at the interplay of policy and politico-constitutional institutions. While both MC and URBAN were unable to ‘stick’ because of their inherent weaknesses, the result of their demise depended on the existence of a federal ‘city welfare’ state. In the US, the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) embodied this state, and channelled Nixon’s attacks on MC into the creation of the structurally stronger CDBG. In the EU, conversely, DG Regio could not provide a comparable anchor for urban policy: when URBAN was attacked by regions and cities, the DG just reverted to its ‘business as usual’ by mainstreaming the programme. I test my argument with a macro-historical comparison of the two cases and four in-depth city studies—Arlington, VA and Baltimore, MD on the US side, and Bristol, UK and Pescara, Italy on the EU side—aimed at analysing micro-level institutional dynamics. In both parts of the study I use a wide range of sources: secondary and grey literature, statistical sources and, especially, archival material and elite interviews. At both levels of analysis the test confirms my argument.

This thesis explores continuity and change in the developmental welfare approach in Thailand following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It examines both the exogenous and endogenous forces that generated change as well as both the ‘process’ and the ‘content’ of transformation or responses to the crisis. It uses the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) policy as a case study to explore these changes. The principle research question is: To what extent did the post 1997 crisis policy on social protection in Thailand represent a shift from its existing institutional path of developmental welfarism? Extending from this overarching question are subsidiary questions, which guided the thesis. They include: To what extent did the OTOP policy address the social protection gaps that became apparent in the Asian financial crisis? To what extent did the OTOP policy benefit its target population? The thesis uses historical institutionalism (HI) and the role of ideas as the analytic frameworks in analyzing change. The thesis argues that the exogenous shock of the 1997 financial crisis contributed to some departure from the institutional path of developmental welfarism in Thailand. However, the change did not follow the conventional punctuated equilibrium (PE) model under the HI framework in the sense of moving from one equilibrium to another after an exogenous shock. Rather, the radical change that took place after the exogenous shock was gradual. The new set of institutional arrangement prompted significant ideational and institutional transformations. They involved both intended and unintended consequences of incremental shifts in the forms of ‘layering’ ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In addition, the thesis argues that the transformation in Thailand after the 1997 financial crisis lies in an intermediate order of change that is found between shifts in policy instrument and a wholesale ‘paradigm shift’ (Hall, 1993). Here, apart from having introduced a new policy such as OTOP, the Thai government engaged in a broader rethinking of Thailand’s developmental welfare path. Moreover, the study finds that the structure of economic development in a developing country context can both promote and impede social protection, rather than only subordinate the latter. The claim is based on the finding that the expansion of economic policy goals in Thailand supported local development and increasing inclusiveness of the informal sector after the 1997 financial crisis. Finally, the thesis argues that social protection delivery or lack thereof reflects contestation of ideas as well as material interests. Both the state and the policy beneficiaries in the OTOP context pushed for their interests when there were gaps between policy formulation and implementation. As a result, changes occurred both in the policy goals and in who benefited from OTOP.

[pt] Esta dissertação observa o desenvolvimento do compromisso coletivo com a democracia representativa no âmbito da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA). Uma descrição dos casos em que a OEA atuou na promoção e defesa da democracia a partir da aprovação da Resolução 1080 e do Compromisso de Santiago é dada e permite o acompanhamento da criação de mecanismos de ação coletiva e a instituição de práticas que constituem o que se chamou de paradigma democrático nas Américas. O instrumental teórico do institucionalismo histórico oferece uma alternativa às análises realistas, racionalistas e funcionalistas sobre o papel da variável institucional no desenvolvimento desse paradigma. / [en] This dissertation observes the development of a collective commitment with representative democracy within the Organization of American States (OAS) from the 1990`s onward. A descriptive analysis of the cases in which the OAS acted for the promotion and defense of democracy is therefore given and allows the following of the creation of collective action mechanisms as well as the institution of practices that constitute what can be called a democratic solidarity paradigm in the hemisphere. The theoretical tools of historical institutionalism offer an alternative to realist, rationalist and functionalist analysis of the role of the institutional variable on the development of this paradigm.

The aim of this study is to analyse the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats idea development in the issue of migration in 2010-2018. The inquiry consists of the following two research questions. How has the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats positions regarding migration developed in 2010-2018? How can institutional theories explain the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats idea development? The study is encompassed by three theoretical perspectives also recognised as rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism. In regard to the methodological approach, the study employs the comparative case study design with the most-similar system and is essentially an idea analytical study. The main results reveal that both the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats have adjusted their migration policies but to different degrees. The Swedish Democrats promote similar policies in 2010 as in 2018 with smaller alterations while the Moderate Party has customised larger alterations, distinguishing the party’s migration policy from 2010 and 2018. These policy alterations are primarily explained as a result of rational action, societal discourses and critical junctures.

馬列主義揭示無產階級政黨必然會帶領群眾走向共產天堂，這樣的「目的論」賦予了共產黨作為無產階級先鋒隊統治上的合法性。1978年以來，中共為了發展經濟改革而多次進行意識型態的修正，2000年以前中共所修正的意識型態都謹守在社會主義框架中，自我定位為工農階級政黨，但「三個代表」允許資本家入黨，卻將合法性基礎轉向了其他社會階層。 為什麼中共要提出「三個代表」，以及為何提出的時間點會在2000年？本文認為要從經濟結構和領導互動兩個變數來解釋。市場化的改革造成中國大陸經濟和社會的變動，私營經濟發展迅速、公有制經濟的優勢地位受到挑戰、紅色資本家人數上升，這些變化使理想與現實嚴重脫節。由於延續市場化路線在1990年代後已成為領導人的既定政策，加上前蘇聯因為脫離群眾而崩潰的經驗，使中共面對經濟社會變動時，選擇調整意識型態以符合現實需求。 1998年以後，經濟社會的變動更形劇烈，私營經濟負擔稅收、產值與就業的功能顯著提升，學界發表大量調研報告，加重了領導人的壓力，調整意識型態已經勢在必行。合法性基礎轉變以後，中共必需以政績尋求支持，並解決民眾需求。然而當「由下而上」的民意日趨重要時，勢必在未來衝擊「由上而下」的一黨專政體制。 / Marxism-Leninism theory claims that proletariat party will inevitability lead the people to arrive the paradise of communism. Such the “teleology” gives the legitimacy on as proletariat vanguard for Communist Party. Since 1978, the CCP revised ideology for many times to develop the economic reform. Ideology revised by CCP before 2000 was kept in the frame of socialism; the CCP positioned oneself as the class parties of workers and peasants. However the “Three Represents” allows capitalists to join the party, and turns the foundation to other social strata. Why did the CCP propose the “Three Represents” in 2000? I think there are two factors: the economic structure and interactions between the senior level. The market-based reform causes the economical and social change; like the rapid development of private economy, the challenge in the advantage of public economy, and the red capitalist's number rises. Which changes make ideal and reality disconnect seriously. The leaders extend the market-based policy, and the experience of the Soviet Union collapse, make the CCP in the face of the change of economy and society, choose to adjust ideology in order to accord with the current demand. After 1998, the violent change in the economic society appears even more violently, became that tax from private economy, the functions of the growth of output value, employment improve apparently, a large number of research reports were delivered by educational circles, has been imperative for the leader's to adjust ideology. After the transition of the legitimacy foundation, the CCP has to seek the support from the people by achievement in politics, and needs the demands of people. From top-to-bottom dictatorship system of one party will certainly be assaulted, when the “bottom-to-top” opinions of people become more important in the future.

No description available.

Dozens of major cities around the world have launched large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects over the past fifty years. Absent from this list of noteworthy achievements, however, is Toronto, a case of grand ambitions gone horribly awry. Despite three extensive revitalization plans in the second half of the 20th century, Toronto’s central waterfront, an area roughly double the city’s central business district, has remained mired in political gridlock for decades. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why this came to pass. Informed by extensive archival and interview research, as well as geospatial data analyzed using Geographic Information Systems software, the thesis demonstrates that above and beyond political challenges typical of any major urban redevelopment project, in Toronto, issues of land ownership — specifically, public land ownership — were pivotal in defining the scope and pace of waterfront planning and implementation. Few, if any, waterfront redevelopment projects around the world have been attempted amidst the same degree of public land ownership and jurisdictional fragmentation as that which plagued implementation efforts in Toronto. From 1961-1998, no less than 81% of all land in the central waterfront was owned by one public body or another, dispersed across a patchwork of public agencies, corporations, and special purpose authorities nestled within multiple levels of government. Such fragmentation, specifically across public bodies, added a layer of complexity to the existing intergovernmental dynamic that effectively crippled implementation efforts. It created a “joint-decision trap” impervious to conventional resolution via bargaining, problem solving, or unilateral action. This tangled political history poses a considerable challenge to conventional liberal, structuralist, and regime-based theories of urban politics derived from US experiences. It also highlights the limits of conventional implementation theory in the study of urban development, and calls into question longstanding interpretations of federal-provincial-municipal relations and multilevel governance in Canada.