Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

William James denies consciousness as an entity and this rejection lies in the background of my thesis. I searched the main reasons for this rejection in his philosophy. Throughout this search, I perceived two modes of existence of consciousness, that is active and passive. As James improves his thoughts on consciousness over the main arguments of classical empiricists, I explained his radical empiricism and pragmatism in relation to them. It is difficult to answer whether we are completely active or passive in the ways of our thinking and behaving. However, although it includes some problems and inconsistencies, James&rsquo / s philosophy presents a more plausible explanation of our thinking than rationalism and empiricism, since it can appreciate the changes of our life in an unfinished world of pure experience. Therefore, my inquiry into the existence of consciousness in James depends on this plausibility of the main characteristics of radical empiricism in connection with the classical empiricists.

This study argues that a pragmatic conception of religion would enable philosophers to make important contributions to our ability to handle concrete problems involving religion. The term 'philosophical anthropology', referring to different interpretative frameworks, which philosophers draw on to develop conceptions of human phenomena, is introduced. It is argued that the classical pragmatists embraced a philosophical anthropology significantly different from that embraced by most philosophers of religion; accordingly, pragmatism offers an alternative conception of religion. It is suggested that a conception of religion is superior to another if it makes more promising contributions to our ability to handle extra-philosophical problems of religion. A pragmatic philosophical anthropology urges us to view human practices as responses to shared experienced needs. Religious practices develop to resolve tensions in our views of life. The pictures of human flourishing they persent reconstruct our views of life, thereby allowing more significant interaction with the environment, and a more significant life. A modified version of reflective equilibrium is developed to show how we, on a pragmatic conception of religion, are able to supply resources for criticism and reform of religious practices, so the extra-philosophical problems of religion can be handled. Mainstream philosophy of religion attempts to offer such resources by presenting analogy-arguments from religious experience. Those arguments are, however, unconvincing. A comparison of the two conceptions of religion thus results in a recommendation to reconstruct philosophy of religion.

Classical approaches to conflict resolution assume that inducing conflict parties to analyse conflict constellations precipitates that the disputants recognise mutually shared needs or interests. Partially in critical reaction towards this assumption, a more recently emerging approach envisages setting up a communicative framework within which the conflict parties are supposed to harmonise their conceptualisations of the conflict. This dissertation, in contrast, argues that work within the frameworks of these classes of approaches is impolitic as long as war-related hostilities stay intact, since conflict parties which see the existence of the adversary as the core of the problem are unlikely to engage in a process of open communication or open analysis, so that trustbuilding is a sine qua non. Practice experiences of local NGOs in the former Yugoslavia suggest that the following activities can be conducive to trustbuilding: 1) supporting exchanges on personalising information, so that the internal heterogeneity of the opponent's group is rendered visible; 2) bringing intergroup iii commonalities to the foreground, either through cooperation on shared aspirations, or by unearthing interpersonal overlaps e.g. common feelings, values, and war-related experiences; 3) undermining the imagination of the own side's moral superiority by fostering the recognition of crimes and suffering inflicted by the own side. For those cultural and religious differences which persist after basic trustbuilding, a contingency approach is proposed: 1) Fostering the exploration of commonalities and differences; 2) If disagreements remain despite a better basic understanding, tolerance of these difference can be based on a better understanding of the values' background, and on an acceptance of differing beliefs as equal in valence; 3) Supporting the discovery of joint values to raise awareness for options of cohabitation with differences; disagreements which cannot be solved might be continued within an accepted communicative framework based on these shared values.

This essay analyzes the doctrines of the revival preacher E.W. Kenyon (1867-1948), such as perfect health, faith and positive thinking. Two of his late works from 1941 and 1942 is analyzed and contextualized referring to the contemporary New Thought movement, Christian revival movements and religious pragmatism in America during the late 19th century continued into the 20th century. Kenyon’s anthropology, his soteriology and epistemology is showed to be pneumocentric in a way that can be compared with the New Thought movement, but also has connections to Christian revival theology and Christian mysticism. Nevertheless, Kenyon’s theological system is eccentric compared with Christian faith, but it is also divergent from New Thoughts rejection of the atonement of Christ. Kenyon’s doctrine of perfect health and the possibility for a Christian to experience completely divine healing through faith is explained by his eccentric theological system. Therefore it is suggested that Kenyon is a predecessor of positive thinking dressed in a mix of Christian doctrines, New Thought ideas and a pragmatic adaptation of psychological and religious pragmatism.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

The approach of conceptualizing biodiversity and ecosystems as goods and services to be represented by monetary values in policy is being championed not just by economists, but also by ecologists and conservation biologists. This new environmental pragmatism is now being pushed forward internationally under the guise of hardwiring biodiversity and ecosystems services into finance. This conflicts with the realisation that biodiversity and ecosystems have multiple incommensurable values. The current trend is to narrowly define a set of instrumental aspects of ecosystems and biodiversity to be associated with ad hoc money numbers. We argue that ecosystem science has more to offer the policy debate than pseudo-economic numbers based on assumptions that do not reflect ecological or social complexity. Re-establishing the ecological discourse in biodiversity policy implies a crucial role for biophysical indicators as policy targets e.g., the Nature Index for Norway. Yet there is a recognisable need to go beyond the traditional ecological approach to create a social ecological economic discourse. This requires reviving and relating to a range of alternative ecologically informed discourses (e.g. intrinsic values, deep ecology, ecofeminism) in order to transform the increasingly dominant and destructive relationship of humans separated from and domineering over Nature. (author's abstract) / Series: SRE - Discussion Papers

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The objective of this thesis is to describe and analyse customs of science teaching in secondary schools and teacher education programmes in Sweden in relation to the notion of “inquiry” in science education. The main focus is on customs of language use and the educational goal of learning about scientific inquiry as distinct from the related goals of learning to do inquiry and learning canonical science content. There is also an exploration and description of different teaching approaches associated with “inquiry”. Previous research has noted that a key issue for reaching the goal of learning about scientific inquiry is the extent to which teachers are able to guide students to explicitly reflect upon this topic. A prerequisite is that teachers give students access to relevant categories of language for explicit reflection on the characteristics of scientific inquiry. Because of the situated nature of language use and learning, this also raises the need to address topics of context, culture and customs in science education. This thesis addresses the questions of how existing customs of teaching science are related to the goal of learning about scientific inquiry, how inquiry-related terminology is used in this context, and how relevant distinctions can be made to aid explicit reflection on these issues. Data has been collected in two studies and analysed and presented in four papers. Study 1 is based on interviews with twelve secondary school science teachers, and Study 2 is based on focus group interviews with 32 pre-service teacher students. The results include a description of the existing customs of inquiry-oriented instructional approaches in Swedish secondary schools. They show that these are often not connected with an explicit focus on teaching about the characteristics of scientific inquiry.  Inquiry-related terminology is analysed with a focus on the role and use of the terms “hypothesis” and “experiment”. Based on a theoretical framework of sociocultural and pragmatist views on language and learning, it is shown how the use of these terms, both in secondary schools and teacher education, tend to conflate the two categories methods of teaching and methods of scientific inquiry. Some problematic consequences for reaching the goal of learning about scientific inquiry are discussed, as well as possible origins of the problems and how the results from this thesis can be useful in overcoming these. / At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 3: Submitted. Paper 4: Submitted.

L'objectiu d'aquest treball s'emmarca dintre del que tradicionalment s'ha anomenat teoria del coneixement, perquè pretén examinar alguns conceptes bàsics que fonamenten i participen en el procés de coneixement. Tot això, des duna perspectiva clarament pragmatista i, més específicament, deweyana.Optar per una perspectiva clarament deweyana suposa una reformulació de nocions tradicionalment emprades per la filosofia en general i per la teoria del coneixement en particular. Els primers conceptes afectats són els de "filosofia" i "coneixement", que hauran de ser reconstruïts.Però si la noció de coneixement ha de ser replantejada, també ho haurà de ser la qüestió de les seves bases: en el millor dels casos, les bases tradicionals del coneixement no podran ser interpretades com fins ara; en el pitjor dels casos, caldrà substituir-les per noves bases. És evident que no es pot construir un nou edifici sobre vells fonaments. Així, l'anàlisi de les bases del coneixement haurà d'incidir en les diferències respecte a la interpretació tradicional del coneixement.Aquesta investigació estableix, com a hipòtesi inicial, que la noció reconstruïda de coneixement té com a condicions de possibilitat - el que hem anomenat "bases del coneixement" - l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici. Si és cert que són condicions de possibilitat del coneixement, aleshores haurien d'aparèixer com a nocions fonamentals de qualsevol teoria del coneixement - sempre que s'acceptin d'entrada els pressupòsits pragmatistes.D'altra banda, el coneixement sempre ha estat vinculat a l'educació. Així, segons la visió tradicional, el coneixement era substancial, mentre que l'educació (identificada amb la instrucció) era el procés pel qual s'adquiria aquesta fi-en-si.Ara bé, que el coneixement ja no sigui substancial sinó instrumental no significa que desaparegui la seva íntima relació amb l'educació, sinó que - necessàriament - es replantegi: l'educació passa a ser el procés obert, social, de diàleg, en el qual es desenvolupa el coneixement; un coneixement que ja no és un fi-en-si sinó que retroalimenta el mateix procés "educatiu", enriquint-lo.Hem dit que les condicions de possibilitat del coneixement són l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici. Però, alhora, aquests resulten ser també els fonaments filosòfics de l'educació; respondre realment a les necessitats dels individus i de la societat.Experiència, recerca, diàleg i judici sorgeixen tant de la mateixa naturalesa de la filosofia com de la naturalesa de l'educació. Són alhora elements d'una filosofia reconstruïda i assumpcions del paradigma reflexiu en l'educació. Així doncs, podríem dir que el judici, l'experiència de l'individu i la comunitat de recerca (aquesta en tant que context en què es donen el diàleg filosòfic i la recerca) esdevenen pressupòsits inevitables de la "nova" filosofia i de la "nova educació. "Aprendre a pensar pel propi compte" - que apareix com a l'objectiu de l'educació - suposa atendre a totes i cadascuna d'aquestes bases.En aquest context, la filosofia o teoria de l'educació esdevé una teoria filosòfica del coneixement: una reflexió sobre el coneixement i el pensament, sobre les condicions de possibilitat del coneixement, sobre els seus límits.Aquest plantejament s'enfronta explícitament a altres alternatives força més comunes i que volem intentar d'evitar: -un estudi de la filosofia de l'educació i/o de la teoria del coneixement simplement historicista, com a mer compendi de teories i autors ordenats més o menys cronològicament;-una reflexió abstracta sobre el coneixement, sense cap mena de contrastació empírica;-una investigació sociològica sobre el coneixement en el qual es privilegiïn els condicionaments sociològics (que no vol dir necessàriament socials) de l'adquisició del coneixement basant-se en realitats culturals i educatives existents però oblidant tot fonament filosòfic; o -una teoria sobre el coneixement de caire marcadament psicologista.Per tal d'evitar fer hipòtesis i reflexions en el buit, concretem el nostre estudi en un projecte concret: Philosophy for Children, perquè entenem que és una teoria del coneixement portada a la pràctica filosòfica; que posa en joc, doncs, les mateixes bases que garanteixen el coneixement.Així, aquesta investigació no és solament una reflexió sobre les bases epistemològiques de Philosophy for Children, ni una apologia del projecte, sinó que pretén posar i analitzar les bases d'una visió més global del coneixement prenent en consideració totes les seves vessants. En aquest sentit, Philosophy for Children en és útil en la mesura que serveix de suport concret per a la nostra anàlisi.Així doncs, establim que les bases del coneixement - en la seva acceptació pragmatista - són tres: experiència, comunitat de recerca i judici. Alhora, aquests elements són també condicions d'una educació reflexiva. Queden així estretament vinculades la filosofia i l'educació.Confirmar aquestes hipòtesis suposa una sèrie de passos:1r. Analitzar la noció de filosofia que hi ha al darrera d'aquesta concepció del coneixement. No pretenem que les nostres conclusions siguin vàlides universalment (trairíem el mateix esperit pragmatista!) sinó solament que ho són en l'espai que queda delimitat per una determinada manera d'entendre la filosofia. 2n. Investigar cadascuna de les bases del coneixement en el context de les filosofies de Dewey i , especialment, de Lipman per tal d'oferir-ne una interpretació i veure en quina mesura es vinculen amb el coneixement. Això suposarà, en algun cas, recórrer a algun altre autor, per tal d'afinar més en la demarcació del concepte en qüestió.3r. Clarificar el concepte d'educació relacionat amb el coneixement i establir els lligams corresponents amb cadascuna de les bases analitzades.Un cop fets aquests passos esperem que quedarà manifest que l'experiència, la comunitat de recerca i el judici són bases del coneixement i, alhora, elements essencials de qualsevol procés educatiu.Tot això, a més, ha d'anar acompanyat de l'exigència d'un paper actiu del filòsof en el procés educatiu. No n'hi ha prou amb "baixar la filosofia del cel a la terra"; cal que, a més, aquest descens repercuteixi en la manera com l'home es relaciona amb els altres i amb el seu entorn. Només així podrà ser superat el vell dualisme entre pensament i acció. / This research deals with the bases of knowledge. We concentrate in the concept of knowledge from a pragmatist point of view (and, specifically, from a deweyan perspective). We look for the possibility conditions of an instrumental and naturalistic knowledge. In order to avoid a treatment of the subject in a merely abstract way, we focus our attention on a concrete project, Matthew Lipman's Philosophy of Children.We work out the hypothesis according to which the concepts of experience, community of inquiry, and judgment constitute the necessary bases of knowledge. So, we analyze these notions in Lipman's project from a deweyan perspective in order to see how they can construct knowledge.The analysis of these notions implies also the reconstruction of the concept of philosophy itself, which is now intimately related to education. This is the only way to overcome the dualism between theory and practice, against which Dewey always fought.