Until 1980 in Australia, occupational superannuation had played only a peripheral role in securing retirement savings for the workforce at large with less than 40% of all employees at this time receiving superannuation benefits. By the time the twenty-first century began, however, 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers were covered by superannuation, and, by 2007, total superannuation assets had reached $1.2 trillion with superannuation fund balances the largest financial asset held by households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not occur as a result of free market forces operating between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase was found to be directly related to the level of intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the last three decades. / The rationale provided by these Governments highlighted the public interest necessity of ensuring that there was an adequate coverage, level and rate of growth of retirement savings. Criticisms of this rationale have, however, continued to grow unabated. These concerns focus on the failure of the regulatory regime changes introduced to actually achieve their public-interest rationales in terms of improving Australia’s national savings rates or to produce effective governance mechanisms to protect the security of the worker-owned trillion-dollar asset pool now under investment. / The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate these opposing claims (within the framework of the public interest and private interest theories of regulation), via the combination of a detailed literature review and a statistical analysis which utilised factor analysis, and logistic and multiple regression modelling techniques. / This combined analysis suggested three primary conclusions: / (1) the origins of the regulatory regime change process needed to be considered as a political game with the simultaneously experienced detriments of key interest groups resulting in a groundswell of pro-regulatory reform activity which sought to obtain relief from “suffering”. The private interest prediction that governments/politicians in electoral democracies were concerned about finding a support coalition to promote their re-election chances was, therefore, confirmed; / (2) in comparison, there was less than convincing evidence to support the public interest claims of bothgovernments in relation to the origins of the regime change process; and / (3) as opposed to these origins-related findings, the regulatory impact story analysis of the review period confirmed that the primary “winner” of the regulatory regime changes was the fund manager group in general and the large, incumbent, life office entities in particular with statistically significant improvements in fund manager “detriments” (e.g. in terms of the total superannuation assets held within the statutory funds of life offices variable). While the government/politicians group was also a “winner” given the significant increases in the “bureaucratic empire building” variable, it was a significant “loser” in terms of the downturn in the public interest variables of household savings rates, net personal savings rates and voluntary superannuation contributions. The ACTU, the employers and workers in general were also all “losers” in that: union membership rates were characterised by downturns; employers do not appear to have been able to “offset” increased occupational superannuation benefits with reductions in wages and/or employment levels; and there was no significant improvement in either of the fund member indicators (i.e. in terms of the fund member welfare index or their real rate of returns). Thus, the private interest prediction that, in terms of regulatory impacts/outcomes, there would be significant wealth transfers away from fund members primarily to the fund managers was confirmed. / These findings raise implications for the ongoing development of regulation in this area which will need further consideration. For example, is it likely that future, private interest-based regulatory changes will be imposed on the occupational superannuation industry which will lead to further detriments to fund members and increasing wealth transfers to the fund managers? Alternatively, is it likely that, at some point, a regulatory backlash will occur which could lead to more public interest outcomes? Or, is it possible that the interest groups studied might “mutate” or change to adapt to future circumstances which could then, in some future period, change the “winning” and “losing” profiles highlighted in this research? Also of interest is whether these findings, which were performed within a relatively unique set of political circumstances, are robust to alternative settings or time periods? These issues are ideal topics for future research projects.

Until 1980 in Australia, occupational superannuation had played only a peripheral role in securing retirement savings for the workforce at large with less than 40% of all employees at this time receiving superannuation benefits. By the time the twenty-first century began, however, 91% of all Australian employees and 81% of all workers were covered by superannuation, and, by 2007, total superannuation assets had reached $1.2 trillion with superannuation fund balances the largest financial asset held by households. This substantial growth in superannuation coverage did not occur as a result of free market forces operating between producers and consumers in the superannuation industry. Rather, this increase was found to be directly related to the level of intervention in the industry by both the Labor and Coalition Governments throughout the last three decades. / The rationale provided by these Governments highlighted the public interest necessity of ensuring that there was an adequate coverage, level and rate of growth of retirement savings. Criticisms of this rationale have, however, continued to grow unabated. These concerns focus on the failure of the regulatory regime changes introduced to actually achieve their public-interest rationales in terms of improving Australia’s national savings rates or to produce effective governance mechanisms to protect the security of the worker-owned trillion-dollar asset pool now under investment. / The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate these opposing claims (within the framework of the public interest and private interest theories of regulation), via the combination of a detailed literature review and a statistical analysis which utilised factor analysis, and logistic and multiple regression modelling techniques. / This combined analysis suggested three primary conclusions: / (1) the origins of the regulatory regime change process needed to be considered as a political game with the simultaneously experienced detriments of key interest groups resulting in a groundswell of pro-regulatory reform activity which sought to obtain relief from “suffering”. The private interest prediction that governments/politicians in electoral democracies were concerned about finding a support coalition to promote their re-election chances was, therefore, confirmed; / (2) in comparison, there was less than convincing evidence to support the public interest claims of bothgovernments in relation to the origins of the regime change process; and / (3) as opposed to these origins-related findings, the regulatory impact story analysis of the review period confirmed that the primary “winner” of the regulatory regime changes was the fund manager group in general and the large, incumbent, life office entities in particular with statistically significant improvements in fund manager “detriments” (e.g. in terms of the total superannuation assets held within the statutory funds of life offices variable). While the government/politicians group was also a “winner” given the significant increases in the “bureaucratic empire building” variable, it was a significant “loser” in terms of the downturn in the public interest variables of household savings rates, net personal savings rates and voluntary superannuation contributions. The ACTU, the employers and workers in general were also all “losers” in that: union membership rates were characterised by downturns; employers do not appear to have been able to “offset” increased occupational superannuation benefits with reductions in wages and/or employment levels; and there was no significant improvement in either of the fund member indicators (i.e. in terms of the fund member welfare index or their real rate of returns). Thus, the private interest prediction that, in terms of regulatory impacts/outcomes, there would be significant wealth transfers away from fund members primarily to the fund managers was confirmed. / These findings raise implications for the ongoing development of regulation in this area which will need further consideration. For example, is it likely that future, private interest-based regulatory changes will be imposed on the occupational superannuation industry which will lead to further detriments to fund members and increasing wealth transfers to the fund managers? Alternatively, is it likely that, at some point, a regulatory backlash will occur which could lead to more public interest outcomes? Or, is it possible that the interest groups studied might “mutate” or change to adapt to future circumstances which could then, in some future period, change the “winning” and “losing” profiles highlighted in this research? Also of interest is whether these findings, which were performed within a relatively unique set of political circumstances, are robust to alternative settings or time periods? These issues are ideal topics for future research projects.

Pasirinkto tyrimo objektas yra viešieji ir privatūs interesai pasireiškiantys užtikrinant viešąją tvarką ir visuomenės saugumą. Darbo dalykas yra viešųjų ir privačių institucijų veikla, palaikant viešąją tvarką ir užtikrinant visuomenės saugumą. Darbe keliamas tikslas analizuoti viešąją ir privačią institucijų veiklą, palaikant viešąją tvarką ir užtikrinant visuomenės saugumą, įvertinti jų bendradarbiavimo galimybes. Siekiant baigiamojo darbo tikslo, reikalinga įvykdyti tokius uždavinius: - analizuoti sąvokas tvarka, viešoji tvarka, netvarka, visuomenės saugumas; - identifikuoti viešuosius ir privačius interesus tvarkos ir saugumo rinkoje; - išanalizuoti viešosios tvarkos ir visuomenės saugumo užtikrinimo veikloje dalyvaujančių subjektų veiklą; - analizuoti policijos ir privačių saugos tarnybų veiklos derinimo problemos viešosios tvarkos ir visuomenės saugumo užtikrinimo srityje bei pateikti jų sprendimo būdus. / The research of the chosen object is public and private interests and they come out ensuring public order and security of the society. It is necessary to realise such tasks: -to discuss the conception of order, public order, public security; -to identify public and private interests of order and safeness in the market; - to analyse public order and safeguarding of society which takes part in subject activity; -to create public order safeness of the society and to ensure cooperating model of the subjects. The research of the chosen theme was done by basing on such methods: -historical comparative method. It was used by comparing police and also private services of security when they were formed earlier and nowadays; -the analyzing method of documents. It was used by analyzing different deeds, contracts and other documents; -comparative method. It was used trying to reach the activity of different public securities and to ensure public security; -method of the concepts interpretation. Because of it, it was analysed and appreciated by different concepts (public order, legality or lawfulness, security of the society and etc) content. The ending of the content forms (makes) preface, laying out (parts, chapters, sections), conclusion, summary, summary in foreign language and list of literature. In the first part of work it is trying to analyse important conceptions such as public order, security of the society, public and private interests and to find out their content. In the... [to full text]

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-06T12:55:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ceres Linck dos Santos.pdf: 1031580 bytes, checksum: 24bb61e10b252149d812fef8fb81f2fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-06T12:55:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ceres Linck dos Santos.pdf: 1031580 bytes, checksum: 24bb61e10b252149d812fef8fb81f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-07 / This study aims to analyze the structure of the legal transaction in the tripartite plan, focusing on the invalidities and on the principle of conservation, as normative source for the appearance of interpretations or techniques that aim at the effectiveness of the negotiation declaration and the effectiveness of the law. In the investigation of the limits of freedom and of private autonomy for the practice of legal transactions, it assesses the public interest should always be considered supreme in relation to private interest or in what form they are related. Subsequently, a number of invalidity treatment institutes, such as reduction and substantial conversion, are analyzed. In the end, it focuses on the autonomy provided for in article.217, item I of the Federal Constitution, aimed at the organizational and functional regulation of leading sports organizations and associations, analyzing the applicability of the conservation principle and techniques for dealing with disability in the scope of the legal relations of sports law, exemplifying two practical cases / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a estrutura dos negócios jurídicos no plano tripartite, focando nas invalidades e no princípio da conservação, enquanto fonte normativa para o surgimento de interpretações ou técnicas que visem à eficácia da declaração negocial e à efetividade do direito. Na investigação dos limites da liberdade e autonomia privada para a prática de negócios jurídicos, avalia-se se o interesse público deve ser considerado sempre supremo em relação ao interesse privado ou de que forma se relacionam. Posteriormente, analisa-se, pontualmente, alguns institutos de tratamento de invalidades, como a redução e a conversão substancial. Ao final, foca-se na autonomia prevista no art.217, inciso I da Constituição Federal, destinada à regulamentação organizacional e funcional de entidades desportivas dirigentes e associações, analisando-se a aplicabilidade do princípio da conservação e de técnicas de tratamento das invalidades no âmbito das relações jurídicas de direito desportivo, exemplificando com dois casos práticos

This thesis brings fresh light on the types of problems that contemporary democracies might face when interacting with private interests. More specifically, the study examines the separation between the state and private interests, based on the assumption that this separation is a precondition for maintaining democracy and legitimate governance. It is thereby a contribution towards understanding the social forces that allow private interests to penetrate the public realm, as well as the forces that protect the state from such penetration. Under which circumstances do private interests access state apparatus in ways that contradicts its universalistic principles? How does the state consider challenges against its legitimacy and how are such threats dealt with? These questions are answered by means of two case studies. The first concerns the interaction between a number of state authorities that receive sponsoring from business enterprises. The second concerns interaction - partially afflicted by corruption - between the state monopoly for selling alcoholic beverages (‘Systembolaget’) in Sweden and its private suppliers. Applying theories on organizational boundaries, exchange, trust, networks as well as legitimacy to these cases, the study demonstrates how state reforms, inspired by the logic of markets, has introduced new ways for private interest to access state affairs. In the case of ‘Systembolaget’, this is particularly evident. The possibility of access, the study argues, is a consequence of reshaping the internal boundaries of the state, broadening informal relations as well as extended scope of action for state employees. This replaced social differentiation as a mechanism of separation by the personal integrity of state employees. Interestingly, this finding should be considered in relation to how the state has attempted to sharpen its organizational boundaries through a strengthening of regulation and the businesslike relations of exchange.

Tirant les conséquences du constat, devenu banal, de la libéralisation du droit international privé contemporain, une tentative de systématisation de la matière peut être entreprise à partir du contexte néolibéral qui est désormais le sien. La doctrine néolibérale à l’œuvre en Europe, et trouvant sa source dans l’ordolibéralisme allemand, préconise un interventionnisme juridique constant afin de construire un marché et d’en généraliser la logique à l’ensemble des rapports sociaux. En conséquence, les moyens offerts aux individus pour satisfaire les intérêts privés sont accrus alors que, dans le même temps, l’État développe et défend un intérêt public pour la bonne tenue des relations privées. Un phénomène de prévalence des intérêts parcourt ainsi le droit international privé. Il consiste en une multiplication des habilitations, tant à destination des parties que du juge, leur conférant le pouvoir de satisfaire, respectivement, l’intérêt privé et l’intérêt public. À la généralisation du principe d’autonomie bien au-delà de la matière contractuelle et au-delà de la détermination de la loi applicable, dans la détermination de la compétence juridictionnelle, répond ainsi une généralisation du recours aux lois de police, à l’ordre public international, au for de nécessité ou à différentes formes de forum non conveniens. Mais, le phénomène de prévalence des intérêts multipliant les risques de conflits d’intérêts, il rend nécessaire une discipline de coordination des intérêts. Cette discipline repose sur deux fondements complémentaires : la supériorité ontologique de l’intérêt public, d’une part, et conception privatiste du droit international privé, d’autre part. Alors que la supériorité ontologique de l’intérêt public implique sa supériorité sur l’intérêt privé, la conception privatiste du droit international privé impose, en retour, l’interprétation stricte des méthodes de satisfaction de l’intérêt public. Là se trouve l’équilibre. Cependant, l’étude du droit positif laisse apparaître des hypothèses de dé-coordination des intérêts résultant, notamment, du déclenchement de l’exception d’ordre public international lorsqu’il inclut des droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et de la paralysie des lois de police par le choix de la juridiction compétente. Un intérêt prévaut alors indûment sur l’autre. Pour y remédier et re-coordonner les intérêts, il est proposé de recourir à un raisonnement en proportionnalité de manière à rétablir la place normalement échue à chacun d’eux. / This study aims to propose a systematization of Private International Law from the European neoliberal context, based on the German ordoliberalism. This doctrine recommends a permanent legal interventionism to build a market and generalizes this logic to every social relation. Therefore, the means offered to individuals to satisfy their private interests are increased while, at the same time, the State actively defends a public interest in private relations. Thus, Private International Law is permeated by a phenomenon of primacy of interests. It leads to a rise of power-conferring norms, both for parties and the judge, to respectively satisfy private and public interests. Yet, this phenomenon increases the potential for conflict of interests and requires a method of coordination of interests based on two complementary principles: the ontological superiority of public interest, and the private conception of Private International Law. The analysis of positive law reveals some situations of dis-coordination of interests that could be overruled by the use of proportionality to restore the role properly assigned to each of them.

En 1917, les Bolcheviks prennent le pouvoir en Russie, répudient la dette extérieure, nationalisent les entreprises privées et imposent un début de gestion soviétique à l’économie. La France, dont les liens économiques avec la Russie ont été largement renforcés durant les trois décennies d’avant-guerre, voit ses immenses avoirs dans l’ancien Empire compromis. Les milieux privés français, qui sont les plus lésés parmi ceux des puissances alliées, réagissent fortement à ce changement de régime. Ce mémoire s’intéresse à ces milieux d’affaires et cherche à comprendre comment ils réagissent à la prise de pouvoir soviétique. Jouent-ils un rôle dans l’évolution du processus décisionnel vers l’intervention militaire? Ont-ils un impact sur le terrain en Russie? Comment subissent-ils l’échec final des efforts français? Nous démontrons que le facteur économique est central dans l’adoption d’une politique interventionniste. Nous étudions également comment le gouvernement cherche à soutenir les milieux privés discrètement, mais les utilise surtout pour avancer ses propres intérêts en Russie. Enfin, nous démontrons que l’échec des milieux privés à protéger leurs intérêts a de nombreuses causes communes avec l’échec de l’intervention militaire. / In 1917, the Bolshevik party seized power in Russia, repudiated state debt, nationalized private enterprises and imposed early forms of Soviet management to the economy. France, whose economic ties with Russia had largely grown during the three previous decades, saw her huge investments in the country compromised. The French private sector, by far the most affected of all Allied powers, reacted strongly to this regime change. This memoir focuses on the subsequent actions of the private sector, and seeks to understand how they reacted to the Bolshevik’s coming to power. Did they play a role in the process of decision-making towards military intervention? Did they have any impact on the ground in Russia? How did they react to the ultimate failure of the intervention and the loss of their assets? We demonstrate that the economic factor was central in the adoption of an interventionist policy. We also examine how the French government discreetly tried to support the private sector, but mostly used it to advance its own interests in Russia. Finally, we demonstrate that the failure of the private sector to defend its interests has many common causes with the failure of the military intervention itself.

Il est traditionnellement admis que le droit pénal a pour fonction de défendre l’intérêt général, ce qui explique le rôle prééminent de l’État tout au long du processus répressif. Pourtant, l’analyse du droit positif met en exergue une extension de la fonction normative du droit pénal en direction des intérêts privés, individuels ou collectifs qui ne peut que bouleverser les fonctions traditionnellement assignées à la responsabilité pénale et à la sanction pénale qui l’accompagne. Parce que les intérêts privés concurrencent l’intérêt général dans l’ordre des valeurs protégées par les textes d’incrimination, les règles de la responsabilité pénale et les fonctions de la sanction pénale sont désormais sollicitées pour résoudre des litiges entre particuliers, et assurer la réparation du dommage causé par l’infraction. Parce que la configuration des acteurs au procès pénal n’est que le reflet des valeurs protégées par la norme pénale, l’introduction des intérêts privés dans le champ de protection de la loi pénale a naturellement entraîné une mutation de la répartition traditionnelle des rôles processuels du juge et des parties dans le procès pénal au profit des parties privées. Même si cette mutation a trouvé dans l’influence du modèle européen de procès équitable le terreau favorable à une telle évolution, celui-ci n’a joué qu’un rôle catalyseur dans l’ascension des parties dans la maîtrise de la direction de l’instance pénale comme dans la maîtrise de la matière litigieuse ; la véritable cause de ces évolutions. / It is traditionally allowed that the criminal law has as a function to defend the general interest, which explains the preeminent role of the State throughout the repressive process. However, the analysis of the substantive law puts forward an extension of the normative function of the criminal law in the direction of the private interests, individual or collectives which can only upset the functions traditionally assigned with the criminal responsibility and with the penal sanction which accompanies it. Because the private interests compete with the general interest in the order of the values protected by the texts from incrimination, the rules of the criminal responsibility and the functions of the penal sanction from now on are requested to solve litigations between individuals, and to ensure the compensation for the damage caused by the infringement. Because the configuration of the actors to the criminal trial is only the reflection of the values protected by the penal standard, the introduction of the private interests into the field of protection of the criminal law naturally involved a change of the traditional distribution of the processual roles of the judge and parts in the criminal trial with the profit as of private parts. Even if this change found in the influence of the European model of fair trial the compost favorable to such an evolution, this one played only one catalyst part in the rise of the parts in the control of the direction of the penal authority as in the control of the litigious matter; the true cause of these evolutions, it is the privatization of penal repression.

I denna uppsats studeras hur avvägningarna mellan allmänna och enskilda intressen hanteras avde dömande organen och hur de olika sakägarna resonerar utifrån de olika intressena. Arbetet har genomförts som en fallstudie där fyra olika byggprojekt studerats. Gemensamt för alla är att de ligger i Stockholms innerstad och har mött motstånd i form av överklaganden. Det finns lite olika definitioner för vad allmänintresset är, somliga menar att allmänintresset är ensammanslagning av flera enskilda intressen medan andra definierar att det bestäms av folkets valda representanter. Det ideologiska tillvägagångsättet som diskuteras är utilitarism, enhetligt, rättighetsbaserad ochdialogbaserad. För att tolka domstolarna domslut används fjäder- och balansvågsmodellen där fjädervågsmodellen symboliserar gränsen för vad man som sakägare är skyldig att tåla. Balansvågsmodellen symboliserar det beslut som tas baserat på de sammanvägda för- och nackdelarna. Det första fallet är kvarteret Plankan 24 där Svenska Bostäder vill bygga nya bostäder i den oexploaterade innergården, planen har mötts av kritik från de boende som menar att luftkvaliteten, bullernivåerna, ljusinsläpp, rekreationsytor, barnens miljö och kulturmiljön avsevärt kommer att försämras. Mark och miljööverdomstolen anser att de skäl som de klagande åberopat inte är tillräckliga för att planen inte ska genomföras. Fall nummer två handlar om Orgelpipan 6, en hotellbyggnadskomplex och en av citybanans uppgångar mittemot centralstationen. De klagande menar bland annat att ett nytt hotell kommer att skapa obalans på en redan obalanserad marknad, att ljusförutsättningarna kommer att försämras och att byggnaden kommer att för skada Stockholm. Länsstyrelsen anser inte att deklagomål som kommit in är tillräckliga för att planen inte ska vinna laga kraft. Det tredje fallet handlar om Mårtensdal 6, ett kontorskomplex som ska bli 125 meter högt. De klagande är befintliga hyresgäster som anser att deras verksamhet inte ska behöva flytta och Fortum Värme AB som anser att höjden på byggnaden riskerar att inskränka deras verksamhet pga. att den är högre än deras egen skorsten. Mark- och miljööverdomstolen beslutar att Fortums överklagande bör accepteras och upphäver därför planen pga. av allmänintresset. Det sista fallet är byggandet av Nobel Center på Blasieholmen bakom Nationalmuseum. De klagande är gemensamt emot planen då det kommer påverka riksintresset och kulturmiljön. I Mark- och miljödomstolens domslut går man på de klagandes linje och upphäver planen för att planen innebär påtaglig skada på kulturmiljön och riksintresset. Den ideologi som tycktes vara den som tillämpades mest var en blandning mellan utilitarismenoch enhetliga. Den rättighetsbaserad ideologin användes inte alls och den dialogbaserade är något som används tidigare i planprocessen. Något entydigt samband i domstolarnasbedömningar har dock inte kunnat konstaterats, det kan bero på att varje fall är unikt och har dess egna förutsättningar. Kommunen och övriga sakägare resonerar på olika sätt när det kommer till avvägningar mellan allmänna och enskilda intressen. Generellt gör kommunen avvägningar genom ett utilitaristiskt och enhetligt tillvägagångsätt medan sakägarna använder olika tillvägagångssätt beroende påom de representerar ett företag, en förening eller är en privatperson. / This paper examines how the balances between public and private interests are handled by the appeals court and how the different stakeholder’s reason based on the different interests. The work has been carried out as a case study in which four different construction projects were studied. Common to all is that they are in Stockholm's inner city and have met with resistance in the form of appeals. There are slightly different definitions for what the public interest is,some believe that the public interest is a combination of several individual interests, while others define that it is decided by the elected representatives of the people. The ideological approach under discussion is utilitarianism, unitary, rights-based and dialogical. To interpret the court's verdict, the dynanometer and beam scale model is used wherethe dynamometer model symbolizes the boundary of what you as a stakeholder are obliged toendure. The beam scale model symbolizes the decision that is made based on the weighted pros and cons. The first case is Kv. Plankan 24, where Svenska Bostäder wants to build new housing in the undeveloped courtyard, the plan has been met by criticism from the residents who believe that the air quality, noise levels, day light, recreation areas, children's environment and the cultural environment will deteriorate significantly. The Land and environmental court consider that the reasons cited by the complainants are not sufficient for the plan not to be implemented. Case number two is about Kv. Orgelpipan 6, a hotel building complex and one of the new entrances for the new commuter track, Citybanan. The complainants believe, among otherthings, that a new hotel will create imbalance in an already unbalanced market, that the lighting conditions will deteriorate and that the building will harm the character of Stockholm. The County Administrative Board does not consider that the complaints received are sufficient for the plan not to get implemented. The third case is about Mårtensdal 6, an office complex that will be 125 meters high. The complainants are existing tenants who feel that their business should not need to relocate and Fortum Värme AB who believes that the height of the building risks reducing their business because it is higher than their own chimney. The Land and environmental court decide that Fortum's appeal should be accepted because the public interest of Fortums appeal is greater than the office building to be higher than the chimney. The last case is the construction of the Nobel Center at Blasieholmen behind the NationalMuseum. The complainants jointly oppose the plan as it will affect the national interest and the historical culture environment. The Land and Environmental Court cancels the plan because it involves significant damage to the historical cultural environment and the national interest. The ideology that seemed to be the one most applied for the court was a mix between utilitarianism and unitary. The rights-based ideology was not used at all and the dialogue-based is something that is used earlier in the planning process. However, no clear connection in the judgments of the courts has been found, it may be because each case is unique and has its ownconditions. The municipality and the other stakeholders reasoning in different ways when it comes to the delimitation of public and private interests. In general, the municipality balances through autilitarian and uniform approach, while the business owners use different approaches depending on whether they represent a company, an association, or a private person.